The Accidental Ambassadors: Implications of Benevolent Radicalization

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The Accidental Ambassadors: Implications of Benevolent Radicalization

KENNETH PATRICK REIDY

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Abstract

Radicalization research explores the socialization process prior to becoming an extremist and/or engaging in terrorism. The problem is, these are the only outcomes radicalization research investigates; a selection bias. Using normative group equivalence and constructivist grounded theory, six British Muslim aid workers were selected who matched Western Jihadists on four characteristics: socio-demographics, a desire to act against injustice, previous criminality and previous mobilization to Daesh-controlled territory between 2015 and 2018. Upon returning to the U.K. the research participants were interviewed under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act and categorized as false positives. This confirmed the credibility of the match. What distinguished both cohorts were the behaviors engaged in when mobilized; one outside of social norms and the democratic consensus (Jihadism) and the other within them, but taken to the extreme (humanitarianism *in extremis*). How did a matched group engage in morally opposed behaviors under similar circumstances at home and abroad? The original contribution to knowledge is that radicalization is a vector; one can radicalize malevolently or benevolently. The latter are positive deviants whose pro-social and victim-centric prognoses compete with the anti-social and perpetrator-centric prognoses of Jihadists because both recruit from the same sentiment pool. Therefore, benevolently radicalized groups embody an attractive alternative for those who wish to positively impact upon the suffering of others; a "do this instead" narrative uniquely aligned to a relevant offline behavior. Bolstering their numbers is posited to stymy Jihadist recruitment, empower European Muslim youth and engender a perceptive shift away from their suspect community status using the same term which securitized them.

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Declaration

I declare that the work contained in this thesis has not been submitted for any other award and that it is all my own work. I also confirm that this work fully acknowledges opinions, ideas and contributions from the work of others.

Any ethical clearance for the research presented in this thesis has been approved. Approval has been sought and granted by the Faculty Ethics Committee on 02 November 2016.
I declare that the Word Count of this Thesis is 84,877 words

Name: Kenneth Reidy

Signature:

Date: 07 December 2018

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

In discussing the degree of risk posed by returnees from the Syrian conflict, the problem explored in this thesis is accurately summarized by the former head of the Metropolitan Police's Counter Terrorism Command: "you've got your charity worker at one end of the spectrum and trained terrorists returning from Daesh training camps at the other end. And you've got all shades in between. The important thing is to get the assessment right—what are you dealing with?" (Cruickshank, 2016).

This thesis "deals" with charity workers "at one end of the spectrum". As discussed in section 5.3, the research approach is situated among others juxtaposing politically violent samples to others in order to ascertain the distinguishing factors (Altunbas and Thornton, 2011; Bartlett and Miller, 2012; Cragin *et al*., 2015; Knight, Woodward and Lancaster, 2017; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014b; Merari, 2010; Merari, Diamant, Bibi, Broshi and Zakin, 2009; Mumford *et al.,* 2008; Pyrooz, LaFree, Decker and James, 2018; Tosini, 2010).

Rather than selecting all charity workers returning to the U.K. from Jihadist conflict zones, the research participants of this study were also matched to European Jihadists using normative group equivalence (see section 1.3.2.1.18). This was achieved through "Risk Factor Instruments" (see glossary) and overlapping static and dynamic factors parsed from the literature (see section 3.5). What distinguished them from the research participants of other similar studies was that they engaged in behaviors relevant to the study of terrorism by mobilizing to Jihadist conflict zones, but they did so without being extremists (see Table 3.3). The credibility of the

match was conformed by all research participants being interviewed by the authorities under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000.

The reason for selecting mobilized and matched (but non-extremist) research participants was to intentionally complicate "get[ting] the assessment right" in order to accurately reflect the task faced by the British security services and contribute to their wider field of terrorism studies. Notable exceptions aside (Merari 2010; Merari *et al.,* 2009), a significant number of studies which use research participants to discern the distinguishing factors of the politically violent rely on availability samples such as students (Amjad and Wood, 2009; Doosje, Loseman and van den Bos, 2013), (nationally) representative samples (Altunbas and Thornton, 2011; Coid *et al.*, 2016; Ginges Hansen and Norenzayan, 2009), quota samples (Bhui, Everitt and Jones, 2014), demographically balanced samples (Costello *et al.,* 2016) or samples which exhibit traits of vulnerability to violent extremism (Pretus *et al.,* 2018). While such research is not without merit, their limitation is that their research participants have not engaged in behaviors (outside of experimental settings) indicative of the problem at hand; terrorism (see sections 5.3.1 and 6.5.1).

This is overcome with research which selects "activist" non-violent extremist samples, such as members of *al-Muhajiroun* (Kenney, 2018; Wiktorowicz, 2005). That is, research participants who act on their extremist views, but do so in a non-violent and (largely) legal manner; the cognitively radicalized. As discussed in greater depth in sections 2.4 and 5.3, the limitation of these studies is that they are premised on extremism being a necessary precursor to Jihadist terrorism (the sequence of cognitive-leading-to-behavioral radicalization). Nonetheless, and as noted by Braddock (2019, p.4), juxtaposing a non-violent population sample (activist or non-activist) to a violent one is merely one research design of many within terrorism studies.

The mobilized and matched (but non-extremist) status of the research participants are presented as a distinctive sample who may yield insights other research participants may not. Given their unique placement, it is necessary to illustrate their credibility. As detailed in section 4.4, a desire for a change in lifestyle (from petty crime and gangs to a socially respected one) led the research participants to mosques where they intended to commence a pious lifestyle and "do the right thing". There they had the opportunity to encounter aid workers who subsequently became role-models to emulate. As they became involved in charity work, they adopted the tenets of humanitarianism and mobilized in order to provide humanitarian relief. However, unlike most humanitarians, the aid workers they serendipitously encountered specialized in proving relief to those most in need; civilians living in Jihadist conflict zones. Therefore, it was to Jihadist conflict zones that the research participants mobilized. This drew the attention of the security services and resulted in them being interviewed under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (see "Risk Factors" in Table 3.3 and "Risk Indicators" in Table 3.4). As established in these interviews, the research participants are neither terrorists nor extremists nor supporters of either (see Table 3.3 and section 3.5.5.1). As false positives they are released without charge.

The Schedule 7 interviews provide a level of credibility that the majority of the studies discussed above do not (see section 3.5.3). That is to say, while some of the research participants of those studies expressed extremist sympathies, most did not act on them (or were not reported to have acted on them) and were not categorized as a "risk" by the authorities (or were not reported as such in the literature). The credibility of the research participants of this study are further buoyed by others in their social milieu who pursued another route and became Jihadists. As one research participant remarked, "their lives [Jihadists] went this way and my life went that

way, and it's a thin line between the two" (WQB121). In other words, given the (mobilized) match between the humanitarian research participants of this study and European Jihadists (Table 3.5), similar people under similar social conditions seem to be embarking on morally opposed pathways (see sections 3.5.5.2 and 6.1); one group outside of social norms and the democratic consensus (Jihadism) and the other within them, but taken to the extreme (*aid-in-extremis*). Chapter five argues that utilizing the research participants of this thesis in a control or comparison group function may provide insights others cannot. Chapters six and seven argue that *aid-in-extremis* may function as an attractive alternative to Jihadism for particular typologies and this has preventative policy implications (see section 7.3).

Both arguments are undergirded by the original contribution to knowledge: radicalization is a vector. That is, one can radicalize in a malevolent manner (Jihadism) or a benevolent manner (humanitarianism) (see section 4.7). It is widely accepted that Jihadism (in the U.K.) is "equifinal". That is to say, there are many pathways into the radicalization process (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, p.220; Ranstorp, 2010, p.6; Silke and Brown, 2016, p.135). What this thesis argues is that radicalization is also "multifinal"; there are also many outcomes of the radicalization process. Conceptualizing radicalization as a vector is premised on the (mobilized) match (section 3.5), the pathway and socialization parallels of both cohorts (see sections 1.3.2.1.13 and 4.6 and Figure 7.1) and the selected definition of radicalization - one which stresses *in extremis* mobilizations to Jihadist conflict zones rather than the outcomes of terrorism and/or extremism (sections 4.2 and 4.3). Given the consciously perilous nature of these mobilizations and their foundational moral impetus ("sacred values"), Jihadists and the

humanitarian research participants are framed as "devoted actors" (Pretus *et al.,* 2018 [see glossary]).

The primary research question of this thesis is "How do British Muslims mobilize to Jihadist conflict zones in a benevolent rather than a malevolent manner?" As depicted in Figure 7.1, the factors which were instrumental in determining the vector pursued were role-models (section 1.3.2.2.3) who impacted upon "Group Priorities" (the combination of a shared frame, group interests and aligned behaviors [section 1.3.2.3.1]) which determined (or significantly influenced) the congruent prognostic response (section 1.3.2.1.17) (see Table 4.5). The conclusions this thesis comes to suggests that confronting (the allure of) Jihadism is best achieved indirectly; promoting constructive groups who compete for the same (or similar) adherents by offering alternative action scripts which are premised on "better ideas" (see sections 2.6 and 7.4). This is posited to make adherents recalcitrant to violent extremist ideology, lower (communal) reactance and expand the "Grey Zone" (see section 1.3.2) by channeling aroused sentiments into constructive, relevant and fulfilling pursuits situated within social norms and the democratic consensus (see section 6.8).

1.2 Research Design

This research project did not set out with the express intention of critically appraising radicalization, it merely sought to explore the factors which distinguish mobilized and matched aid workers from Jihadists. This was deemed an important question to research given the increasing and sudden number of mobilizers prior to the start of this research (2012-2015) along with the number of returnees during the research (2015-2018). Therefore, establishing an

empirically validated means of distinguishing the (potential) threats from the false positives would ensure that investigative resources were deployed efficiently and effectively.

1.2.1 Foundation for the Primary Research Question

As the Arab Spring devolved into the Syrian civil war, the author noticed that British Muslims were raising money in the U.K., buying old ambulances, filling them with food, clothing and/or medical supplies and driving them to Syria to deliver them to the besieged population. But the rise of Daesh in late 2013/early 2014 drew a different cohort of British Muslims out to the Levant. Some pretended to be humanitarians so as not to draw the attention of the authorities (section 3.5.2), but subsequent attacks (domestic and international) along with voluminous executions, torture and rape quickly drew the attention of the U.K. among others. By 2014 the Charity Commission required all aid convoys and humanitarian organizations providing humanitarian aid to register with the Charity Commission and obtain a charity number. In this manner, the British government would be able to verify, or at least have a level of verification, as to who was leaving the country under the auspices of humanitarian aid.

As Daesh seized control of more land, the number of formal British Muslim aid workers functioning within or close to Daesh's borders dwindled with most opting to freight aid to Turkey and rely on local contacts from previous engagements to distribute its contents (section 3.5.1). As time passed, this was largely restricted to (informal) refugee camps because traveling into Daesh controlled territory was deemed too risky. However, larger aid organizations were also prohibited from operating in, and often times even close to, Daesh seized territory as it was expanding. As a result, those Syrian and Iraqi nationals caught in or around Daesh territory bore the brunt of the catastrophic consequences; aerial bombing, Daesh's form of governance and life

with scarce resources. Harrowing images and stories circled social media of life inside the conflict zones, life inside the refugee camps and the perilous trip some made, or attempted to make, to Europe. With no aid being delivered to those living amidst or around Daesh and stringent warnings about traveling to these locations from the Home Office, a small number decided that something had to be done. These are the research participants of this study.

As stated in section 1.1, the initial purpose of this research was to explore what differentiated those engaging in humanitarian aid in these contested areas from (those who intended to be) Jihadists or those who (intended to) function under the aegis of Jihadist groups (see section 5.3.2). Upon initial inspection, this may seem rather obvious and therefore a fruitless endeavor; one group are humanitarian and the other are Jihadists. But the difference is not verifiable, particularly as there is no consular presence in Syria or Daesh controlled territory during the time period in question (2015-2018). As such, Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (the power to stop, search and hold individuals at ports, airports and international rail stations) is used to interview persons of suspect, particularly those who may have travelled to Jihadist conflict zones. All research participants have been "schedule 7'd" on numerous occasions.

With Daesh going from strength to strength, rising numbers of European cells and recruits along with a number of successful attacks within European borders, the attention of the security services was firmly on where and when the next European attack would take place. At the same time, growing security measures bolstered the sentiment within British Muslim communities that they were being persecuted (Rabasa and Bernard, 2015, p.4; Roy, 2006; Sageman, 2017a, p.171) (see sections 6.6 and 7.5.2).

The author submitted a proposal during the summer of 2015 which offered to explore those factors which differentiated Jihadists from humanitarians so as to provide some means of data sensitivity for distinguishing the two. A rapidly growing empirical base on Jihadism generally and Daesh in particular was being established and the author intended to interview genuine (and consistent) British Muslim aid workers (that is, those on "one end of the spectrum") who plied their trade in and around Daesh territory. Data would then be juxtaposed to the literature on terrorism and conclusions could, hopefully, be drawn. This was a functional and simple research design which could easily be amended to cater for (geo-political) changes.

1.2.2 Grounded Theory Methodology

Grounded theory was deemed an appropriate methodology given its strength in understanding (social) processes and is particularly amendable to research questions with little available data (see section 3.4). Given the contextual specifics of the research design (the combination of humanitarian work in Jihadist conflict zones, Daesh [a Jihadist group *with territor*y] along with a new and brutal means of conducting Jihad - all to the backdrop of the GWOT), this second feature made it particularly suitable to the initial research question.

1.2.3 Adaptive Research Design

One of the defining features of grounded theory is that it is data led, rather than literature informed; an "abductive" and "inductive" rather than "deductive" form of analysis (see glossary). As such, significant portions of the literature review were conducted during data analysis (labelled as "Subsequent Literature Review" in Figure 3.9) rather than prior to data collection (labelled as "Preliminary Literature Review" in Figure 3.9). A consequence of this was that data analysis (and conclusions drawn) was an ongoing process (section 3.4.2). Therefore, the

research design was not fully established at the start of the research. Instead, it evolved as analysis progressed and this influenced the direction the research took (depicted in Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1 Final Research Design



1.2.4 Formulating the Primary Research Question and Establishing Trustworthiness

As illustrated in Figure 1.1, the central question of radicalization research is "Why do only a minority of people radicalize to terrorism while the majority, subjected to the same radicalizing factors, do not?" (see section 5.2). A Home Office review of the literature on Islamist extremism in the U.K. found no studies which investigated why those considered at risk "choose not to become involved in violent extremism" (Home Office, 2011, p.38). However, in the years since this Home Office publication, numerous researchers have investigated this question (see section 5.3). At the time of writing, the consensus from the expert community is that current research is unable to explain why some engage in terrorism while similar others refrain from it (Horgan, in Chenoweth, English, Gofas and Kalyvas, 2019). This thesis holds that those vulnerable to becoming terrorists (see Tables 3.4 and 3.5) may refrain from doing so because they engage in other impactful activities. The problem is, these other activities (which may nonetheless be premised on the same or similar "Sacred Values" [see glossary]) are not catered for in most definitions of radicalization because they are neither extremist nor terroristic (see sections 1.3.1.6, 4.2 and 4.3). As such, they are not researched by scholars of terrorism (see sections 1.3.1.6 and 5.3.1). To operationalize the central question of radicalization research, the final format of the primary research question of this thesis is "How do British Muslims mobilize to Jihadist conflict zones in a benevolent rather than a malevolent manner?"[1]

In order to establish credibility for concluding that radicalization is a vector, the pathway and socialization processes of the research participants (Figure 4.2) were juxtaposed with nine

[1] However, this thesis utilized constructivist grounded theory methodology to answer this question and as such, there was no conceptual framework. Therefore, that the research participants were surmised to have radicalized was a product of data analysis and as such, the term "radicalization" was not used in the research question.

relatable models which either depict the adoption of the terrorism tactic, the adoption of an extremist mindset or both (Figures 4.6 and 4.7). Despite this indicating that radicalization as a vector had merit, this conceptualization is at loggerheads with the scholarly literature on radicalization as most definitions of radicalization specify outcomes from the radicalization process (section 1.3.1.3). Therefore, the author engaged in four further activities to ensure that this conceptualization was "trustworthy" (section 3.10):

1. The author reviewed his coding and analysis to ensure that conclusions accurately conveyed what was described in the interviews. Furthermore, coding categories were reaffirmed as saturated (section 3.8.2). Finally, the coding process and means of abstraction was also reviewed and reaffirmed as accurate (Table 3.6, Figure 3.7 and Table 4.1).
2. A focussed literature review was conducted in order to ascertain if other scholars had similarly described radicalization as having vector qualities. Indeed, numerous scholars had done so (section 4.3.2).
3. The author published an article outlining the concept of radicalization as a vector in a peer-reviewed journal - one with a specific focus on radicalization and de-radicalization (The Journal for Deradicalization). Peer review feedback from (de-)radicalization experts noted that the concept was both original and adequately supported by the data and literature review. With revisions, both reviewers recommended the article for publication (see Reidy [2018] for the subsequent publication).
4. The author interviewed two British Muslim CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) consultants who currently function in roles which prevent violent extremism and have been doing so for approximately ten years. One does so as a consultant (SHB435) and the other as

the founder of an organization which focusses on preventing violent street crime as well as Jihadism (HQD556). Based on their experiences, the author enquired as to whether they agreed that (a) radicalization was a vector (see "Multifinality" in glossary) and, based on that and in their experience (b) whether some people (particular typologies [see section 6.7]) could be persuaded or induced to become humanitarians (or something else) instead of Jihadists. Both answered in the affirmative and agreed that benevolent radicalization could function for some people, but stressed that for many who want to respond or have impact, "Jihad is the only game in town" (SHB435).

Given these five procedures it was therefore concluded that conceptualizing radicalization as a vector had merit as confirmed through model juxtapositions, data analysis, buttressed by the literature, supported by at least three members of the scholarly community (the editor and the two peer reviewers) and two experienced CVE consultants. However, as illustrated in Figure 1.1 ("Two Implications"), establishing this marked a turning point; should the author continue interviewing in order to achieve a higher sample and a more granular level of analysis, or instead focus on the implications of this vectorized conceptualization?

1.2.5 Research Design and Research Questions

As depicted in Figure 1.1, with radicalization as a vector established, the author opted to explore the impact that radicalization as a vector may have for radicalization research and preventative strategies. This was reasoned to be a more fruitful and beneficial avenue rather than further interviews and data analysis because doing so would assist in the betterment of radicalization research as well as contributing to the development of novel and applied approaches to preventing (malevolent) radicalization, as specifically requested by scholars (see

sections 1.2.8, 5.1 and 7.4). Furthermore, the usefulness and potential impact of a vectorized conceptualization of radicalization would only be established if it could be applied in a practical manner through research designs (section 5.3) and/or policy (sections 6.3 and 7.3). Therefore, as outlined in sections 3.5.1 and 3.8.2, data collection stopped at six matched research participants and the research design was amended to address the potentiality for applied implications.

Question 1 below is the primary research question of this thesis. As detailed throughout chapter four, data analysis indicates that mobilizing to Jihadist conflict zones as a humanitarian rather than a Jihadist is a function of benevolent radicalization and the factors which influence this vector ("The Radicalization Process" in Figure 4.2) are prototypical group members (role-models, specifically what Staub [2015, p.133] refers to as "altruistic models and guides") and coalescing "Group Priorities" (a combination of the worldview of the group [frame], their interests and their aligned behaviors [to include prognostics]).[2] Together, these impact upon perception and ([adopted] social) identity which are continually reinforced by humanitarian mobilizations (the resultant prognosis).[3]

With this confirmed (section 1.2.4), question 2 explored the implications of this for future radicalization research (sections 5.1 to 5.3). This resulted in the potentiality of psychopathy research designs functioning as potential blueprints for radicalization research (sections 5.4 to 5.5). Question 3 addressed radicalization as a vector for preventative strategies resulting in what this thesis terms as "The Indirect Approach" to preventing malevolent radicalization. Rather than solely countering malevolent radicalization through counter-narratives and alternative-narratives

[2] See section 1.3.2 for further discussion and definition of these terms.

[3] Ibid

(section 1.3.2), what is proposed is a competing narrative buttressed by a pro-social behavioral prognosis; an attractive alternative to Jihadism (section 7.3) - what Hamid (2018a) labels as a "counter-engagement".[4] Therefore, the research questions of this thesis are as follows:

1. How do British Muslims mobilize to Jihadist conflict zones in a benevolent rather than a malevolent manner?
2. To what extent could the benevolently radicalized be utilized to function as a control or comparison group for radicalization research? This is the subject of chapter five.
3. How could humanitarianism be presented in order to function as an effective alternative to Jihadism? This is the subject of chapters six and seven. To answer this question, a further sub-question was asked.

    3a. "Who (which typologies [of pre-Jihadist]) would view this as an attractive alternative?" This is addressed specifically in section 6.7.

1.2.6 Purpose Statement

The purpose of this constructivist grounded theory study was to explore the pathways and socialization process(es) of British Muslim humanitarians to "Sham" between 2015 and 2018. What is unique about this sample (*n=6*) is that they are matched to European Daesh recruits by socio-demographics, pre-mobilization behaviors, general intent and geographic destination (see Tables 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5). What differentiates both cohorts are the groups they joined and the behaviors engaged in once in theatre (see section 4.4). Given the purpose of these groups and the belief structures upon which they were founded, the research participants are neither terrorists nor extremists and do not support either (Table 3.3). This thesis aimed to isolate those factors

[4] Ibid

which determined or influenced which group one joined; Jihadist or humanitarian (see Figure 7.1). Data analysis indicated that the research participants radicalized, but that they did so benevolently and this resulted in them becoming humanitarians rather than Jihadists. As such, radicalization was conceptualized as a vector; one can radicalize benevolently or malevolently. To account for this, this thesis critically appraised knowledge on radicalization and, as a consequence, offers a novel means of deductively testing radicalization knowledge (chapter five) as well as providing a preventative form of counter-engagement (chapter seven).

1.2.7 Significance of the Study

This study intended to differentiate British Muslim humanitarians matched (along various static and dynamic criteria [see Table 3.2]) to British Muslim Jihadists. Doing so has practical as well as theoretical implications. Radicalization was conceptualized as a vector. As such, people can radicalize malevolently or benevolently. This suggests that contemporary understandings of radicalization are incomplete and/or favor particular outcomes of the process rather than understanding the process as a whole (see "Multifinality" in glossary). This suggests two implications for radicalization, the first of which is theoretical and the second practical:

1. A frequent question within radicalization research concerns the characteristics of a control or comparison group (Freilich and LaFree, 2016, p.572; Klausen *et al.*, 2015, p.79). Indeed, few studies have a comparison or control group to substantiate their findings (Cragin, 2014, p. 338; Knight, Woodward and Lancaster, 2017, p.29). The problem is, no control or comparison group adequately captures why some people became Jihadists while others do not - perhaps because the control or comparison groups utilized in radicalization research are never behaviorally radicalized (see section 5.3). Within the confines of contemporary

understandings of radicalization, this makes sense; behavioral radicalization refers to those who engage in (politically and/or religiously) violence. However, this thesis defines behavioral radicalization as "mobilization to Jihadist conflict zones", not the activities one engages in while mobilized (section 4.3.1). Therefore, the research participants are considered behaviorally radicalized and given this, they embody a control or comparison group which may yield insights others cannot (see Tables 5.1 and 5.8). This is the subject of chapter five.

2. Preventing Jihadism is critical (Clutterbuck, 2010, p.145; Ranstorp, 2010, p.1; Vidino and Hughes, 2015, p.33). Investigating the factors which impact upon the vector one pursues are also of practical significance because of their potential in influencing pathways away from Jihadism and towards attractive alternatives such as the proposed Indirect Approach (see Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 and Table 4.5). Therefore, the practical implications to conceiving of radicalization as a vector necessarily include potential policy implications.

This thesis argues that conceptualizing radicalization as a net-negative impedes a holistic understanding and this has implications for effective prevention where a significant shortcoming is the lack of practical and effective alternatives to Jihadism (section 2.6.7). In other words, preventative and counter measures do not provide a positive cause to radicalize for because that would be conceptually impossible given the malevolent-only confines of successful radicalization (see "Radicalization Hypothesis" in glossary). However, understanding radicalization as a vector allows for the theoretical possibility of utilizing benevolent radicalization as a means of offsetting malevolent radicalization, particularly if the former fulfills the recurring factors (section 2.3) identified as pivotal to joining the latter (what this thesis

subsumes under “Needs” [section 1.3.2.1.1], “General Intent” [Table 3.4] and the “Opportunity” to act upon both [section 1.3.2.2.6]).

Therefore, a supplementary option in the preventative armory could take the form of an effective alternative rooted in the social psychological, religious, ideational, aspirational, personal and geopolitical realm - key variables (or “needs” to be fulfilled) in the radicalization process. Doing so would involve a policy devoted to structuring the environment so as to “nudge” (see glossary) those in the process of radicalizing toward benevolent radicalization; an identity based means of mobilization for a glorious, noble and impactful cause with significant others. This is based on the premise that, under different circumstances, particular typologies of those engaged in terrorism or other (related) antisocial/malevolent behaviors may have engaged in an entirely different activity (Byrne, 2016, p.118; Dutton, 2013, pp.9-10; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, p.68; Reich, 2009, p.40; Richardson, 2006, p.vxii; Schmid, 2013a, p.28) (see point 2 in section 4.5.1).

Therefore, adopting a situational approach, influencing these conditions (“Choice Architecture” [section 1.3.2.1.14]) may impact upon the trajectory pursued (see section 7.3). Subsequently, buttressing benevolently radicalized groups offers a viable alternative to terrorism for some (see “Counter-Engagement” in glossary and “Typologies” in section 6.7). This approach to preventing extremism and/or Jihadism does not do so directly and it also does not stop people from radicalizing. Instead, it ensures that one radicalizes in a manner which is within social norms and the democratic consensus (see sections 4.3.2 and 6.6.2).

The benefits of situational structuring (“Choice Architecture” [section 1.3.2.1.14]) so as to buttress benevolent radicalization are, in the short-term, effective mitigation of violence

through the provision of a pro-social and impactful alternative and this, in the long-term, would impact upon positive attitude formation as articulated in "Cognitive Dissonance Theory" (section 1.3.2.3.3). Therefore, a theoretically effective and informed means of countering malevolence lays in the promotion of benevolence; the promotion of "better ideas" (Staub, 2013, pp.343-352) and groups rather than merely countering negative ones (section 2.6). This is postulated to create an ever growing cohort of people who would be inoculated to extremism and dissuaded by violence based on their involvement with benevolently radicalized groups (section 6.1). This approach would function by providing a sense of social identity which transcends the parochialism of extremism while ensuring that adherents stay within the societal fold.

Nonetheless, and despite numerous researchers having theorized on the potential benefits of radicalization (section 4.3.2), these remain unaccounted for in most understandings of radicalization. Instead, radicalization only accounts for malevolence when successful; positivity is not incorporated into conceptualizations of radicalization and as such, countering it subsequently favors problem-based approaches rather than strengths-based approaches (section 6.2.4) such as the proposed Indirect Approach (sections 6.3 and 7.3). In order for strengths-based accounts to become a viable means of preventing malevolent radicalization, it is necessary to recognize the benefits of radicalization. In other words, it requires understanding that radicalization is a vector (section 4.3).

1.2.8 Scholarly Requests

The presumption that terrorism and extremism are the only successful outcomes of the radicalization process is a rate-limiting factor for knowledge progression within radicalization research (see section 5.1). This presumption accounts for three scholarly shortcomings:

1. Dependent variable selection bias resulting in a confirmation bias; successful radicalization only results in terrorism and/or extremism. In other words, other potential outcomes of the radicalization process are not pursued within radicalization research because these outcomes fall outside the remit of terrorism and/or extremism. By refraining from researching other potential outcomes, radicalization research is continually confirming of terrorism and/or extremism as the sole successful outcomes of the process (see sections 2.2, 4.3, 5.2 and 6.6).
2. Control or comparison groups in radicalization research are unable to adequately account for the adoption of the terrorism tactic and/or the onset of extremism. This is partly the product of a questionable association between extremism and terrorism (section 2.4.1) and partly because, given the outcome restrictions of radicalization, no control or comparison group (except Merari's [2010]) in radicalization research is behaviorally radicalized (Table 5.1). As discussed in sections 5.3 and 5.4, this makes it difficult to (dis)confirm radicalization knowledge.
3. The specified outcomes of radicalization also have implications for countering or preventing radicalization to terrorism and/or extremism; without acknowledging that other outcomes are possible and without researching how or if they occur, policies are restricted to problem-based approaches designed to counter radicalization rather than strengths-based approaches which can influence if and how they occur. This is addressed in chapters six and seven.

To account for these limitations in radicalization knowledge, scholars are requesting research in four key areas:

1. Verification of knowledge. Scholars are requesting research which substantiates findings on radicalization (King and Taylor, 2011, p.618; Hafez and Mullins, 2015, p.971).

2. Develop new theoretical approaches. Ranstorp (2009, p.15) proposed developing "against-the-grain theories" which "push the envelope in new directions" (Ranstorp, 2009, p.17). Similarly, others requested "new approaches" (Byrne, 2016, p.119 and p.156; Neumann, 2016, p.174) and "alternative ideas" (Koomen and Van Der Pligt, 2016, p.231). Bridging these requests with the third request, Schmid (2013b, p.202) noted that "all too often, students of terrorism have tended to formulate hypotheses that are testable with available data, rather than generating new data dictated by hypotheses to be tested."
3. Develop new sources of data. De Bie and De Poot (2016, p.597) encouraged researchers "to seek new types of data" while Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva and Medin (2011, p.507) requested "bolder … choices of study populations". Similarly, Ilardi (2004, p.215) opined on the exploitation of "original information sources."
4. Develop novel understandings. The Council of the European Union (2007, p.2) requested researchers to generate "new ideas" so as to develop "insight not readily available to policymakers and counter-terrorism officials" (Ilardi, 2004, p.224). Similarly, The Council of the European Union (2007, p.2) also called for "fresh ideas" as these may engender an "entirely new narrative" (Soufan, 2017, p.298).

This thesis has operationalized these assertions by opting for a lateral means of data acquisition; British Muslim humanitarians operational in Jihadist conflict zones rather than mobilized British Jihadists (addressing point 3 above). This has gone some way towards verifying contemporary radicalization knowledge (addressing point 1 above) by means of a unique theoretical approach which resulted in an unorthodox conceptualization; the process of radicalization is a vector (see "Multifinality" in glossary). As such, one can radicalize

malevolently or benevolently (addressing point 4 above). A consequence of this is that the benevolently radicalized may function as a control or comparison group for future radicalization research (see Table 5.1) as well as an attractive alternative for particular typologies of pre-Jihadist (sections 6.3 and 7.3) under the premise of Positive Deviance (section 6.4) (addressing point 2 above) - a "Biomimicry" model (see glossary). Therefore, this thesis specifically responds to the request for more research to investigate the relationship between push, pull and protective factors (Knight, Woodward and Lancaster, 207, p.38).

1.2.9 Original Contribution to Knowledge

The original contribution to knowledge is the re-conceptualization of radicalization from a process which only results in terrorism and/or extremism when successful, to a process which is a channel dependent vector - one that can result in malevolent or benevolent outcomes (see "Multifinality" in glossary).

Effective alternatives have been postulated to militate violent extremism by numerous scholars (Atran 2010, p.224 and pp.290-291; El-Badawy, Comerford and Welby, 2015, p.7; Frey and Luechinger, 2003; Kundnani, 2015a, p.15 and p.199; Malet, 2009, pp.113-114; Marsden, 2017a; Neumann, 2016, p.182; O'Gorman, 2011, p.71; Sageman, 2008, p.117; Schimd, 2013a, p. 49; Sitter, 2013, p.11; Venhaus, 2010, pp.11-15). However, none of these are predicated on the hypothesis of providing a positive cause to radicalize for because that would be conceptually impossible given the malevolent-only confines of contemporary conceptualizations of radicalization. Yet conceiving of radicalization as a vector allows for the theoretical possibility of using benevolent radicalization as a means of offsetting malevolent radicalization through a strengths-based approach; a constructive means of fulfilling "drivers" (section 2.3.2.1) and

recurring factors (section 2.3 - that is, “Needs” [section 1.3.2.1.1], “General Intent” [Table 3.4] and the “Opportunity” to act upon both [section 1.3.2.2.6] as discussed in section 1.2.7).

1.3 Key Terminology

This section presents the definitions of key terms and/or concepts presented throughout the thesis. All terms are restated in the glossary along with non-key terms which may, nonetheless, require a definition. Key terms in this section are divided into “General Terminology” (section 1.3.1), which covers the preliminary literature review process prior to data collection, and “Specific Terminology” (section 1.3.2) which covers the subsequent literature review process during data collection and analysis (Figure 3.9). Where applicable, the presentation of these terms includes discussions on their conceptual and/or definitional shortcomings so as to illustrate their problematic nature, delineate where the author drew definitional parameters and why.

As stated in sections 1.2.3 and 2.1, significant aspects of the literature review were conducted during data analysis (the subsequent literature review) rather than prior to data collection (the preliminary literature review), as per the requirements of grounded theory (section 3.4.2). Therefore, many of the key specific terms presented in section 1.3.2 were a product of the subsequent literature review conducted during data analysis (the constant comparison method [section 3.4.4]), rather than the preliminary one conducted prior to data analysis (see Figure 3.9). The problem is, presenting these specific terms in the literature review prior to presenting the data analysis and results (chapters four, five, six and seven) renders them analytically disjointed. That is to say, without providing context, why these terms are introduced and how they were

operationalized would not be immediately clear to the reader. Therefore, in keeping with how most grounded theory studies are presented, this thesis front-loads the results by discussing the application of the conclusions drawn. To do so, section 1.3.2 presents these key specific terms in a manner which simultaneously (albeit briefly) alludes to the results and the context within which they are utilized.

1.3.1 General Terminology

1.3.1.1 Terrorism

Silke (2004a, p.2) notes that most books on terrorism begin by noting the difficulty in conceptualizing terrorism. Indeed, there is no legal definition of terrorism that commands full international approval (Carlile, 2007 in Taylor, 2010, p.122) and it is unlikely that any definition will ever be generally agreed upon (Silke, 2008). Various scholars claim the tactic has existed for over two hundred years (Iviansky, 2009, p.9; Krueger and Malekova, 2009, p.201; Silke, 2004b, p.209) while others claim a history of over two thousand years (Merari and Friesland, 2009, p. 347; Reich, 2009, p.93; Victeroff, 2009, p.55) citing groups such as the Zealots, the Sicarii, the Assassins (Pinker, 2011, p.418; Reich, 2009, pp.24-25), the Nazarites, the Thugs and the Taborites (Kaplan, 2016, p.230).

This latter time period, referred to as the prehistory of terrorism (Grisham, 2014, pp. 14-15) or ancient terrorism (Rapoport, 1979), had in particular instances a socially approved moral mandate based on negating unjustified or overzealous violence conducted by (or on behalf of) the nation state. For example, Laquer (1999, p.10) introduces the utilitarian logic of stoics Senaca and Cicero and describes instances of public approval for the terrorist tactic (such as in engendering tyrannicide). This illustrates the definitional problem of subjectivity (Grisham,

2014, p.10; Toros and Gunning, 2009, p.93; Townshend, 2011, p.2); the nation state and/or the tyrant are unlikely to view their actions as overzealous or unjustified. This illustrates the *one persons terrorist is another persons freedom fighter* aphorism which is central to the difficulties of definition (Bandura, 1998, p.165; Skoczylis, 2013, p.50; Townshend, 2011, p.4; Victeroff, 2009, p.63).

As such, and with very few exceptions outside of French and Russian anarchists, a terrorist is an exonym not an endonym. Terrorism therefore has distinctly negative connotations (Hoffman, 1998) and is attributed to one's enemies (Richardson, 2006, p.xv). As such, those designated as contemporary Islamist terrorists refer to themselves as Jihadists, *mujahideen* or, less frequently nowadays, *fedayeen* and are referred to by their in-group as heroic freedom fighters (Victeroff, 2009, p.63; Whittaker, 2007, p.267), sometimes justifiably so (Staub, 2015, p. 14).

In relation to this, a second problem in the definitional quandary concerns objectively distinguishing terrorism from other tactics (Allan, *et al.,* 2015, p.9; Hegghammer, 2010/11, p.55; Nilson, 2015, p.344; Townshend, 2011, p.6; Whittaker, 2007, pp.8-9). Without being able to do so, the term may be used in a "sloppy" manner to refer to acts which are not strictly terrorism (Jenkins, 1980, p.2) and may also be applied in a "double standards" manner (Ganor in Schmid, 2013b, pp.43-44; Schmid, 2013b, p.85).

A third definitional problem is that the term has evolved over time and the tactic has manifested in numerous ways (Gordon, 2009, p.111; Laquer, 1977, p.183; Whittaker, 2007, p.5). For example, the term and tactic description was first used during the French Revolution (Halliday, 1996, p.35; Krueger and Malekova, 2009, p.202; Townshend, 2011, p.3) (1789-1799).

However, in contradiction with contemporary usage, it referred to acts of terror conducted "by the state" (Halliday, 1996, p.35) rather than non-state actors for whom it is largely reserved today (Schmid, 2013a, p.20). This contemporary bottom-up precedence first emerged in the late nineteenth century with *Narodnaya Volya* (Iviansky, 2009, p.9; Krueger and Malekova, 2009, p. 201; Reich, 2009, p.25; Sedgwick, 2010, p.485); "The People's Will", a group which engaged in the tactic of terrorism to promote populism. *Narodnaya Volya* were an important precursor to, and formed the philosophical foundation for, the Social Revolutionary Party which eventually brought about the Russian Revolutions of 1917, thereby dismantling Tsarist autocracy.

The irony in separating "terrorism from above" (terrorism conducted by the state - what Berger [2018] terms as oppression) and "terrorism from below" (terrorism conducted by non-state entities) (Laquer, 1977, p.7) and ignoring the former in contemporary definitions, is that tyrants such as Joseph "Stalin", Mao Zedong and Saloth Sar (who adopted the nom de guerre Pol-Pot after the Khmer Rouge took Phnom Penh in 1975) have killed millions of non-combatants whereas non-state actors engaged in combat against a nation state have killed significantly less. This has also resulted in the perception that "terrorism and national liberation are located on two opposite ends of a spectrum legitimizing the use of violence" (Ganor, 2009, pp.19-20). However, and as alluded to above, Schmid (2016b, pp.8-9) notes that freedom (or national liberation) is a goal while terrorism is a tactic.

The (at times) public approval of the terrorism tactic, its initial use by the nation state, its inherent subjectivity and the number of people killed from top-down terrorism as opposed to bottom-up terrorism are key points to raise because radicalization as a vector and the proposed Indirect Approach recognize the legitimacy of the general intent to "do something" (Table 3.4

and section 5.4.5.3) about the top-down (that is, nation state conducted) onslaught of Syrian and Iraqi civilians and is therefore central to the "do this instead" option provided (the Indirect Approach [sections 6.3 and 7.3]) as further detailed in sections 1.3.2 and 2.6.7.

However, the Indirect Approach is designed to function as an appendage to CONTEST (section 1.3.1.5) and as such, this thesis adopts the definition of terrorism used by the British government: "The UK Government defines terrorism as an action that endangers or causes serious violence to a person/people; causes serious damage to property; or seriously interferes with or disrupts an electronic system. The use or threat must be designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public and is made for the purpose of advancing political, religious or ideological cause" (Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000).

This definition, like many contemporary definitions, emphasizes the psychological contagion of fear within the target population rather than the act itself as being the desired result (Goodin, 2006, p.1; Juergensmeyer, 2000, pp.127-128; Krueger and Malekova, 2009, p.202). As Pinker (2012, p.416) concludes, "panic is the whole point of terrorism, as the word itself makes clear" (see also Kilcullen [2009] and Simpson [2018] in section 6.3). Atran (2010, p.xiv) captures this sentiment when he states, "perhaps never in the history of human conflict have so few people with so few actual means and capabilities frightened so many".

This definition also allocates space to the cause under which the act is committed. While this thesis refers to the impetus for radicalization as "General Intent" (section 1.3.2.1.2 and Table 3.4) and/or a means of fulfilling "Needs" (section 1.3.2.1.1) along with the opportunity to act upon both, aspects of the literature (and mainstream opinion specifically) generally refers to extremism or ideology specifically as the cause of radicalization, with the adoption of both being

an outcome of radicalization (see section 2.3.2.1). However this thesis presents ideology as a component of a "Frame" (section 1.3.2.3.2 [which itself is a component of "Group Priorities" in section 1.3.2.3.1]) and distinguishes constructive from destructive frames (sections 1.3.1.3 and 1.3.2.1.5). A critical aspect for the conclusions drawn from this research is that the research participants are not extremists (Table 3.3), but are nonetheless radical and therefore deviant (sections 2.2 and 6.4). Given the necessity in drawing these distinctions, defining these terms is paramount.

1.3.1.2 Extremism and Radicalism

As the Indirect Approach is designed to function within British policy, this thesis adopts the official definition of extremism. The U.K. Government defines extremism as vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. Extremism also includes calls for death of members of the armed forces (HM Government, 2018). Outside the UK, extremism faces similar definitional problems as terrorism; "unwelcome political dissent may be labelled as violent extremism" (Schomerus, El-Taraboulsi-McCarthy and Sandhar, 2017, p.9).

(violent) Extremism is often used interchangeably with a variety of other terms (Githens-Mazer, 2009, p.8; Gurski, 2016, p.5; Schmid, 2013a, p.11) and distinguishing it from radicalism is the most pertinent for the arguments made in this thesis (see section 2.2). Schmid (2013a, pp. 8-10) lists a number of critical distinguishers: unlike radicalism, extremism is characterized by intolerance, anti-social beliefs, closed-mindedness and is more in favor of the use of force. Similarly, Lifton (2000) describes members of Aum Shinrykio as absolutists who engage in black-and-white thinking with no shades in between. These cognitive traits are labelled as

"Cognitive Rigidity" in Table 3.3 (see also Meerlo [1956] in section 2.6.5). In contrast, radicalism is characteristically understood as demanding far-reaching changes (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p.798; Veldhuis and Staun, 2009, p.4). As such, radicalism does not necessarily reject diversity and radicals can be brought into the mainstream (or vice versa: when a radical idea itself becomes mainstream, in which case it ceases to be radical as was the case with the civil rights movement, women's suffrage and various other New Social Movements [Kriesi, Koopmans, Dyvendak and Giugni, 1995, p.xviii]). Given these parameters, the research participants would not be characterized as extremists or supportive of extremism (Table 3.3). But this is not to say that their actions are not undergirded by a (moral) philosophy (see "Sacred Values" in glossary). As clarified in the following section, the principles upon which their actions are based are within the societal and democratic norm; constructive rather than destructive ideologies.

1.3.1.3 Ideology

Ideologies, or ideas more generally, are important because they codify a cause, which is almost always framed in a positive manner. As noted by Staub (2015, p.14), "even perpetrators of genocide or other mass violence normally believe that they are acting for a higher cause." Ideologies also clarify, at least to a certain extent, how the cause is to be achieved; constructively or destructively (see section 1.3.2.1.17). But unlike extremism, an ideology in this thesis is only understood as inherently negative under particular conditions. Staub (2013, p.139) defines ideologies as "visions of social arrangements in the society or the world and of relationships between people". As such, ideologies can be constructive by conveying hope or destructive by conveying hope through the identification of an enemy (see Figure 4.8). In other words, the hope

conveyed through destructive ideologies is premised on the eradication of an enemy. As such, a characteristic of destructive ideologies is the blaming and scapegoating of a particular group[5] (see "prognostics" in section 4.7).

In distinguishing constructive from destructive ideologies, the critical point to raise is that in the process of attributing blame, destructive ideologies simultaneously diminish responsibility; "it's not your fault, it's their fault" (see Figure 4.8 and sections 4.7.1, 6.2.4 and 7.3.2). In identifying the culprit, they provide a sense of effectiveness; by "dealing with" the culprit, the adverse conditions experienced are expected to improve (Staub, 2013, p.140). On the other hand, "Constructive Ideologies" (see glossary) offer the vision of a better future that is brought about through constructive means. That is, rather than identifying a group to be eliminated, they convey hope by identifying behaviors or structures to be implemented. It is important to note that both constructive and destructive ideologies may be premised upon similar "Sacred Values" (see glossary and Table 4.5). For the purposes of this thesis, constructive visions in combination with constructive community groups may provide alternatives to destructive movements. In other words, "one way to combat destructive ideologies is by providing powerful alternatives" (Staub, 2013, p.345). The constructive ideology referred to in this thesis is the "Frame" (section 2.5) of the group the research participants joined - itself a component of the "Group Priorities" (section 1.3.2.3.2).

Within terrorism research, ideologies refer to a group of beliefs to which terrorists purport to adhere to and to which they attempt to instill in others so as to guide their actions (Horgan and Braddock, 2016, p.383). This is achieved by use of a narrative; the means with

[5] Meerlo (1956, p.197) states, "nowadays there are no devils and ghosts in the trees and in wild animals; they have made their homes in the various scapegoats created by dictators and demagogues."

which an ideology is communicated. Although this thesis adopts a "Learning-By-Doing" approach (behavior led rather than cognition supported [sections 1.3.2.3.6 and 6.5]) based on the results and the tenets of grounded theory (section 3.5.4), narratives nonetheless form an integral part of the Indirect Approach (section 7.3) because people can also learn and engage in behaviors by following theoretical principles (Abuza, 2006; Silber and Bhatt, 2007).

1.3.1.4 Narrative

Horgan and Braddock (2016, p.383) note that a narrative can be understood as a story. That is, "any cohesive and coherent story with an identifiable beginning, middle, and end that provides information about scene, characters, and conflict; raises unanswered questions or unresolved conflict, and provides resolution." Narratives are used to influence beliefs and attitudes and successful narrative resonance results in the receivers beliefs and attitudes aligning with those who created the narrative (see "Frame Alignment" in section 2.5). Two forms of narrative are discussed in this thesis: counter-narratives state what they are against while alternative narratives state what they are for (see sections 1.3.2.1.15, 2.6.7 and 7.5.1).

1.3.1.5 Jihad and Jihadist

Jihad (and derivatives thereof) does not refer to the expansive understanding as used in the Quran. Instead, it superficially refers to non-state actors engaged in an armed struggle under the auspices of an Islamist cause. Sayyid (2015, p.xix) describes Jihadists best as *neo-Kharajites*; those who declare other Muslims as non-Muslims (or apostates as is the practice of *Takfir*). The route towards adopting this mindset is generally referred to as radicalization. As radicalization forms a cornerstone of this thesis, the following section addresses radicalization at length and in so doing, provides the groundwork for the specific terms discussed in section 1.3.2.

1.3.1.6 Radicalization

The process of radicalization is generally applied when one intends to understand how a person or group came to adopt an extremist mindset and/or became a terrorist (organization/ network). As such, the radicalization process hypothesizes four outcomes: "terrorism", "extremism", "both" or "neither". Therefore, the radicalization hypothesis can be stated as follows: the process of radicalization may result in terrorism or extremism or both or neither. As such, successful radicalization results in terrorism or extremism or both. Whether the process takes a religious, ethnic or nationalist form and results in anti-social attitudes or political violence, successful radicalization is always considered malevolent. Any non-terrorism and/or non-extremism outcome(s) resulting from the process would be subsumed into the "neither" category because, per the hypothesized outcomes, it would definitionally constitute "neither" terrorism nor extremism.

The problem is, this "neither" category is implied to mean "no result" because the only actionable outcomes radicalization concedes to are "terrorism" and/or "extremism". Subsequently, the existence of any outcomes outside of terrorism and/or extremism are imperceptible to those researching radicalization and, should they be found to exist, this would imply a fragmented understanding of the concept.

This outcome-centric definitional constraint is argued to be a conceptual flaw because radicalization does not account for other outcomes as definitions of radicalization are embedded with "hypothetical intent" (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, p.217). This is problematic because the scholarly consensus on radicalization knowledge lays with the (socialization) process of radicalization, not its postulated outcomes (Al-Lami, 2009, p.2; Maskaliūnaitė, 2015,

p.12; Ramakrisha, 2016a, p.151). Underscoring this, Schmid (2013a, p.19) asserts that radicalization is "linked too readily to terrorism (broadly defined) as an outcome". Therefore, radicalization should (ideally) not be defined by predetermined outcomes.

The problem with illustrating other behavioral outputs of the radicalization process (specifically ones which are pro-social and thus morally opposed to [violent] extremism) is that the scholarly purview of those who utilize the concept of radicalization is terrorism and/or extremism. In other words, radicalization is only employed in the investigation of terrorism and/or extremism. This dependent variable selection bias (further outlined in sections 2.3.2.2 and 5.4) means the only effects researched, and hence attributed to radicalization, are terrorism and/or extremism. This specified focus assisted in inducting the rule that successful radicalization results in terrorism and/or extremism and was confirmed by deductive research designs (see "Deduction" in glossary). However, as Moore (2007, p.4) notes, "deductive reasoning is subject to deception"; the deductive analysis employed to establish the truth preserving qualities of radicalization as a causal mechanism maintained focus on the timely effects of terrorism and/or extremism rather than critically appraising other potential outcomes of the radicalization process. Indeed, similar reasoning failures were at the root of the intelligence assessment on the Iraqi government's possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction.[6]

This thesis presents a matched research sample ($n=6$) which would correctly be labelled as "neither" terrorists nor extremists (see Table 3.3). The problem is, their socialization process is presented as a form of radicalization (sections 4.3 and 4.7) while their subsequent behaviors

[6] Rather "than thinking imaginatively and considering seemingly unlikely and unpopular possibilities, the Intelligence Community instead found itself wedded to a set of assumptions about Iraq, focussing on intelligence reporting that appeared to confirm those assumptions" (Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2005, p.155).

would incorrectly be labelled as “no result” (the mobilized aspect of their “Match” [section 3.5.5.2]). In other words, this thesis holds that the research participants radicalized, but that they did so in a manner that resulted in a beneficent outcome which contemporary definitions of radicalization do not cater for. This, initially at least, seems like a misapplication of the radicalization process because the process of radicalization is only applied when one intends to understand how an individual or group adopted the terrorist tactic and/or an extremist mindset. Furthermore, benevolent outcomes of the radicalization process are fundamentally at odds with the concept as contemporarily conceived; by most definitions, there can be no “good” radicalization.

This thesis argues that the three successful outcomes of radicalization (“terrorism”, “extremism” or “both”) were inadvertently curtailed so as to be congruent with the behavior which precipitated its mainstream usage (Islamist inspired terrorism) and its posited causal cognition (extremism) because, as stated in section 2.2, the scholarly beginnings of radicalization as a formal research topic were, largely, the Islamist inspired attacks in the USA (2001) followed by Europe (2004 and 2005) (Coolsaet, 2016a, p.11; Schmid, 2013a, p.iv; Schmid, 2016a). Indeed, the contemporary concept of radicalization was borne of Islamist terrorism (Horgan, 2014a, p.7; Silke and Brown, 2016, p.129) and this dependent variable selection essentialized the concept by artificially curtailing the research sample (Muslims) and outcomes of the radicalization process (terrorism and/or extremism). As such, the concept of radicalization was unwittingly appropriated for sole use within the field of terrorism and this delimited the “effects” observed (see “Abduction”, “Deduction” and “Induction” in glossary).

Subsequently, attempts to answer "radicalization towards what?" (Schmid, 2013a, p.12) were met with derivatives of Islamist inspired terrorism (Young, Zwenk and Rooze, 2013, p.8). This resulted in a false dilemma because radicalization may be a normal process (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 196) existing in non-virulent (and therefore imperceptible) forms yet ones which may metastasize under particular conditions such as, for example, "opportunity factors" (Precht, 2007, p.56) or "toxic situations" (Dutton and Tetreault, 2009) - also understood as "atrocity generating situations" (Lifton, 1986) (see also: Browning [1998, p.8]; Steiner [1980, p.431]; Waller [2007, p.20]). Therefore, radicalization as a concept may be more malleable than contemporarily conceived (Dearey, 2010, p.3) and could result in other behavioral outcomes, as discussed in section 4.3.2. The problem is, these are unaccounted for because they do not fall within the remit of the predetermined outcomes of the "Radicalization Hypothesis" (see glossary).

1.3.1.6.1 The Concept of Radicalization

Radicalization has become a popular construct to explain the socialization process prior to engaging in terrorism or becoming an extremist. The problem is, there is no universally accepted definition of radicalization (Schmid, 2013a, p.5; Veldhuis and Stain, 2009) and, given this, the term is highly contested. This is further buoyed by contradictory findings (Costanza, 2015, p.2; Crenshaw, 2008, p.30; Ranstorp, 2009, p.24), contested policies (Barzegar *et al*., 2016, p.12; Githens-Mazer, 2009, p.7) and blunt behavioral indicators (Dawson and Amarasingam, 2016, p.13; Francis, 2016, p.916; Sageman, 2017a, p.167).

The concept of radicalization is a disputed term (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p.798; Sageman, 2017a, p.4; Sedgwick, 2010, p.490). This is important to state at the outset because

how one conceptualizes a phenomenon determines what one infers about it and this impacts upon the strategies used to investigate it as well as the policies implemented to prevent it. Indeed, defining radicalization and specifying who the process refers to is as much a political decision as it is a methodological one.[7] Post 9/11, successful radicalization is largely understood as a process resulting *solely* in terrorism and/or extremism - outcomes which are either implicitly understood or, most often, explicitly stated in definitions (see "hypothetical intent" in section 1.3.1.6). Subsequently, empirical research on radicalization typically starts with the outcome of terrorism[8] and/or extremism and then works back to document the process which led to it.[9] The complexity which radicalization aims to capture is further compounded by the fact that the term is used to illustrate a wide array of social processes which vary in time and place (Neumann, 2013). Therefore, what radicalization entails is also highly contextual.

Definitions fall into two broad categories; those that focus on cognitive radicalization (understood as the adoption of extremist views) and those that focus on behavioral radicalization (understood as engaging in terrorism or behaviors in willing support thereof). Given these disparate foci, radicalization is also used interchangeably with other terms such as "fundamentalism", "(violent) extremism" and "terrorism". Given these overlapping definitional boundaries, McCauley and Moskalenko (2017) disaggregate radicalization of opinion from radicalization of action (as do others [see section 4.2]) while Goodwin (2014) and Sageman

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[7] This refers to the relationship (or not) between the traditional use of the term "radical" and its contemporary usage as a process with specific reference to terrorism and/or extremism (Dzhekova, Stoynova, Kojouharov, Mancheva, Anagnostou and Tsenkov, 2016, p.10; Pisoiu, 2012, pp.13-18; Schmid, 2013a, p.8).

[8] Or those who attempted to engage in terrorism, but whose efforts were ultimately thwarted (Corner and Gill, 2018, p.147).

[9] However, as Kenney (2017, p.2) notes, scholars have paid more attention to how terrorists learn and adapt (i.e. outputs of learning). Less attention had been paid to tracing how violent extremists acquire knowledge and how they develop their beliefs and skillsets.

(2017b) reject the term altogether. Nonetheless, without setting boundaries articulating precisely what one means by radicalization, one may easily use the same term to refer to different phenomena.

As applied in mainstream usage, the term is relatively new and is largely a product of the post 9/11 environment (section 2.2). Given this, it conveys a distinctly negative connotation and is applied almost exclusively to Muslims (section 6.6.1). This, in contrast to its root "radical" and "radicalism" which, as stated in section 1.3.1.2, are not necessarily negative nor anti-democratic (Ramakrisha, 2016a; Schmid, 2013a) and are structured more towards reformism rather than utopianism or the application of violence (Bötticher, 2017). As noted above, there is particular conflation with the term "extremism" because an extremist form of Islam (along with specific political grievances [Anonymous, 2003]) laid the foundation for the attacks which gave rise to the concept. Nonetheless, and precisely because of its blurry definitional boundaries, radicalization presents itself as a highly adaptable and malleable concept which can account for a wide variety of factors. Yet, as argued, this scope is not reflected in its postulated outcomes which are restricted to terrorism and/or extremism when the radicalization process is successful.

This thesis breaks from this mould and applies the term to the process of becoming a humanitarian (under specific parameters [section 3.5]). Nonetheless, given its fuzzy boundaries and because the term is being applied outside the field it is exclusively reserved for, it is wholly necessary to define what one means by radicalization. As such, this thesis defines radicalization as "a collectively defined, individually felt moral obligation to participate in direct action, where direct action involves a voluntary, repeated (or of longer duration) and consciously perilous mobilization to a Jihadist conflict zone without any supplementary means with which to defend

oneself". Therefore, radicalization is understood in strictly behavioral terms, does not specify a (behavioral) outcome beyond a geographic location but does require one to be aware of the consequences of mobilizing (see section 1.4.1). The central defining construct of radicalization as defined in this thesis is a process which results in *mobilization* to Jihadist conflict zones rather than a process which results in "terrorism" and/or "extremism" (see section 4.3). Therefore the vector classification assigned is determined by the behaviors one engages in when mobilized in Jihadist conflict zones (see section 5.3.2).

1.3.1.7 Prevention

Prevention in this thesis refers to two forms: (1) early prevention and (2) primary prevention with section 6.2 distinguishing "Primary" from "Secondary Prevention" (see glossary). Staub (2013, p.289) notes that when prevention programs start, they are usually in response to intense violence. He further notes that the most important actors in early prevention are internal actors (Staub, 2013, p.290 [see also sections 6.3, 6.5.1 and 7.3.2]) which is why the Indirect Approach commences using positive deviants (see sections 1.3.2.1.21 and 6.4). The Indirect Approach takes a long-view and, while focussed on Daesh specifically, also intends to address whatever group and ideology evolve from it. This development should be expected because the conditions which gave rise to Daesh are still very much present at the time of writing. For early prevention to be successful, Staub (2013, p.292) recommends identifying the desirable outcomes to be created (see Figure 7.2 "Desired Outcomes" [defined in this thesis as a pro-social behavior reinforced by a constructive ideology, both of which are subsumed under diagnostics/prognostics in glossary]). The Indirect Approach is structured along these "Desired Outcomes".

1.3.1.8 CONTEST

While CONTEST is not discussed specifically in this thesis, U.K. Counter-terrorism measures are mentioned. The reason for outlining CONTEST is that the proposed Indirect Approach (sections 6.3 and 7.3) is not aimed at replacing any element of CONTEST. Instead, it is recommend as an auxiliary to current policies and as such, these policies require a brief explanation.

The British Counter-Terrorism strategy is called CONTEST. It has been revised four times, most recently in 2018. The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk of terrorism within the U.K. and its overseas interests. CONTEST is structured along four work streams: “Pursue” involves the investigation and disruption of terrorist attacks. “Prevent” works to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism and extremism. “Protect” involves protective security to stop (or lessen the damage of) a terrorist attack and “Prepare” exists to minimize the impact of an attack and ensure quick recovery. In 2012, the “prevent” arm of CONTEST was organized through Channel; a multi-agency and voluntary program that works with people deemed susceptible to becoming terrorists and/or engaging in acts in support thereof. The aim is to intervene in the early stages of involvement. Deciding what to do and when to act is the function of a channel panel which is chaired by the local authority but includes other agencies as required.

1.3.2 Specific Terminology

The proposed Indirect Approach to preventing malevolent radicalization (sections 6.3 and 7.3) is a theorized application of benevolent radicalization, as briefly discussed in section 1.1 and outlined in the following section. The effectiveness of the Indirect Approach is based on the matching criteria (the theoretical sampling criteria presented in Table 3.2 and how these criteria

matched with scholarly knowledge of Jihadists [Tables 3.4 and 3.5]), similarities in static and dynamic factors (illustrated under "Similarities" in Figure 7.1) and similarities in the socialization process (sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6). The factors identified as significant in determining the vector (the related factors of role-modeling [see section 1.3.2.2.3], "Group Priorities" [section 1.3.2.3.1] and prognostics [see section 1.3.2.1.17]) are depicted under "Differentiators" in Figure 7.1 (see also Table 4.5).

Figure 4.2 divides radicalization into a pathway stage, a threshold stage ("Involvement") and a process stage as each involves different factors. As the Indirect Approach is modeled on the vector of the research participants (a biomimicry model premised on Positive Deviance [see glossary for definitions of terms and sections 6.3, 6.4 and 7.3 for their application]), it is also divided along these fault lines; Figure 7.2 illustrates the process stage while Figure 7.3 depicts the pathway stage and both are bridged by the threshold ("Involvement" [introduced in section 1.3.2.2.4]). In keeping with this structure, the key specific terminology will be presented in a similar format; section 1.3.2.2 will discuss the pathway and section 1.3.2.3 will discuss the process stage. This is preceded by section 1.3.2.1 which explains the purpose of the Indirect Approach. Finally, sections 1.3.2.1 to 1.3.2.3 follow the format of explanation-followed-by-definitions of key terminology.

1.3.2.1 The Purpose of the Indirect Approach

The Indirect Approach recognizes the positive and/or positively perceived aspects of radicalization ("Needs" [1.3.2.1.1.]) and the emotional "pull" to act against a perceived injustice ("General Intent" [1.3.2.1.2]). Regarding the former, it therefore recognizes that an inability to fulfill these needs may lead to a "Cognitive Opening" (1.3.2.1.3) where they are fulfilled

destructively (see section 5.4.6). Concerning the latter, it recognizes the moral outrage one may experience from, for example, viewing footage of the Syrian civil war ("Vicarious Deprivation" [1.3.2.1.4]) and the desire to confront that injustice (see section 2.4). Therefore, the Indirect Approach works to support groups which promote "Constructive Ideologies" (1.3.2.1.5) through concrete actions (clarified below) because doing so can satisfy "Needs" (1.3.2.1.1) and "General Intent" (1.3.2.1.2) and, in so doing, can foster a positive worldview (discussed in section 2.5) and prevent Jihadism by offering an attractive alternative.

Therefore, the Indirect Approach is a "Strengths-Based Approach" rather than a "Problem-Based Approach" (1.3.2.1.6). However, people radicalize for myriad reasons (see section 2.3), but some nonetheless consciously aspire to be Jihadists. As such, the Indirect Approach only targets specific "Typologies" (1.3.2.1.7), all of which are subsumed under the label of "Pre-Jihadist" (1.3.2.1.8) prior to mobilization and addresses the prevention of "Pathological Altruism" specifically (1.3.2.1.9). That is, it seeks to constructively channel needs, aroused emotion, religiosity and empathy.

Rather than countering (violent) extremism and preventing people from radicalizing, the Indirect Approach instead offers a constructive means of fulfilling the motivation(s) to act and/or the means of fulfilling needs (see Table 3.4 and "Needs" in section 1.3.2.1.1). As further elaborated on in the following section, it aims to do so by buttressing constructive groups and their leaders (sections 1.3.2.2.3 and 1.3.2.3.1) because these impact upon prognostics ("what are we going to do?" [see section 1.3.2.1.17 and the "Hofstad Group" in section 4.5.2]). The success and resonance of this proposition is based on the encouragement of "Active Bystandership" (1.3.2.1.10) and "Moral Courage" (1.3.2.1.11) with these pro-social groups who

act heroically ("Heroic Imagination and Heroism" [1.3.2.1.12]) (see also sections 4.4 and 4.5). As this thesis argues that similar mechanisms and values are at play with those who mobilize to function under the aegis of beneficent *and* maleficent groups (see section 4.3.2), the Indirect Approach proposes to encourage benevolent radicalization as a means of offsetting malevolent radicalization ("Radicalization" [1.3.2.1.13]).

The Indirect Approach aims to compete with Jihadist narratives and influence subsequent behaviors through the provision of "Choice Architecture" (1.3.2.1.14). That is, the benevolent vector is favored *by design* over the malevolent one (sections 7.3 and 7.4). In other words, the Indirect Approach seeks to influence how one radicalizes, rather than solely implementing measures which counter the process, outcomes and support mechanisms of malevolent radicalization.

The problem it addresses is, taking down (violent) extremist content, prohibiting extremist groups and creating "Counter Narratives" (1.3.2.1.15) does not fill their void and does not redress the nation state auto-immune response (the manufacturing of suspect communities) terrorist groups seek to engender (section 6.6). In turn, the suspect community feels vulnerable and/or threatened and this increases the chances of them identifying with extreme groups (Hogg, 2007; Hogg, 2014; Lyons-Padilla *et al*., 2015) and becoming hostile or aggressive (McGregor, 2006, p.299; Staub, 2015, p.115). This is termed as "reactance" in section 6.4 and "jujitsu politics" in section 6.8. This dynamic, best encapsulated by the word "friction" (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011), causes more devastation than terrorists could ever hope to achieve and is referred to as a "collapse of the grey zone" (Burke, 2016) in section 7.5.2 (see section 1.3.2.1.20 and "Grey Zone" in glossary).

Furthermore, the government actions addressed in the previous paragraph fail to provide behavioral alternatives. As discussed in section 1.3.2.1.2, the Indirect Approach recognizes why malevolent radicalization exists and it aims to fill this post-takedown void by promoting pro-social responses within the targeted community ("Counter-Engagement" [1.3.2.1.16]). To achieve this, the Indirect Approach seeks to be an attractive cognitive *and* behavioral alternative to Jihadism. In other words, it combines a resonating narrative with a desired behavior which competes with Jihadist narratives and behaviors ("Diagnostics and Prognostics" [1.3.2.1.17]). In combination with takedowns, the Indirect Approach aims to "Dominate the Prognostic Narrative" (depicted in Figure 7.3) and engender a perceptive shift from the (violent) aggressors (whether that be Assad and his supporters or the likes of Daesh who are almost always framed as heroic protectors [section 6.5.1]) to the victims of conflict (see section 4.7.2 and "second-order consequences of combat" in section 7.3.2). In other words, it aims to (re-)categorize one's social reality (section 1.3.2) and it proposes to do so in a behavior-led manner (section 1.3.3). The chances for audience resonance are maximized by placing citizens and civil society at the centre of the messaging strategy rather than outside experts (section 6.4).

Finally, the Indirect Approach is designed to be scalable (within the British context at least). Therefore, while radicalization as a vector is based on a small-*n* study whose research participants hold a radical prognosis, given the specificity of the "Match" (1.3.2.1.18) they are unlikely to be representative of British Muslim responses. However, "radical" responses are, by definition, never representative. Therefore, an evaluative component illustrating success would entail their prognosis *not* being radical and being adopted by the mainstream ("Contagion" [1.3.2.1.19]), as was the case with other pro-social radical prognoses such as civil

rights and women's suffrage (see sections 2.2 and 3.5.1). In other words, the Indirect Approach aims to ensure that enough marginal mobilizers drive "Pre-Jihadists" (1.3.2.1.8) to reformulate their prognostics and in so doing, expand the "Grey Zone" (1.3.2.1.20) and limit "Pathological Altruism" (1.3.2.1.9). Furthermore, given the research participants non-representative and pro-socially radical behavior, this thesis categorizes them as "Positive Deviants" (1.3.2.1.21).

1.3.2.1.1 Needs

Needs are described in numerous ways throughout the literature (see "Primary Goods", "Primary Human Goods", "Emotional Needs" and "Basic Needs" in glossary). Overall however, they represent naturally sought after psychological needs, outcomes and experiences. They assist in explaining positive behavior when fulfilled and negative behavior when frustrated (see section "Criminogenic Needs" and "Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis" in glossary and section 5.4.6). In other words, "needs can be fulfilled constructively or destructively" (Staub, 2013, p.107). For example, Venhaus (2011a and 2011b) conducted over 2000 interviews and personal history trajectories of foreign fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan and questioned what Al-Qaeda recruits were searching for when they joined the organization? He concluded that they saw no other viable option with which to fulfill their quest for "meaning" (2010, p.16). This search for meaning is accurately described as a need. Therefore, the Indirect Approach is presented as an alternative means to provide for the need of, for example, meaning fulfillment (see sections 6.2.4 and 6.7). Needs and their means of fulfillment are discussed in section 5.4.6.

1.3.2.1.2 General Intent

Joining a (Jihadist) group on the premise of fulfilling needs. As illustrated in Table 3.4, this may include "looking for something beyond their immediate environment" and/or a desire to

"do something" about an injustice. This may include a desire to "to do the right thing" (Table 3.4 and section 4.4) as was the case for the research participants. General intent is not mutually exclusive from needs, as illustrated in the previous sentence, but it is more specific than fulfilling needs because it also addresses specific external actions (see section 4.7). In terms of how "General Intent" functions within the conceptualization of radicalization as a vector, Sageman (2017c) notes how Muslims who mobilized to Syria in a Jihadist and humanitarian capacity did so in order to protect their community; in other words, to "do" something about perceived victimhood. With general intent confirmed, one becomes a "Pre-Jihadist" (1.3.2.1.8). "General Intent" is discussed further in section 3.5.

1.3.2.1.3 Cognitive Opening

A cognitive opening is an internal or external (set of) event(s) which makes a person receptive to ideas that, under other circumstances, they would not have been (see Table 3.4). Section 4.5.1 illustrates that the term is also referred to as "openness to engagement" (Horgan, 2014a, p.101) and "unfreezing" (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, p.80).

1.3.2.1.4 Vicarious Deprivation

The psychological state when other people's oppression or injustice is adopted as one's own. This relies on empathy and may result in moral shock. When this results in one joining a Jihadist group (the weaponization of empathy for destructive purposes), this thesis refers to it as "Pathological Altruism" (1.3.2.1.9) - what McCauley (2018) refers to as "the dark side of empathy". How empathy can go awry is discussed in section 5.4.6.

1.3.2.1.5 Constructive Ideologies

Ideologies codify a cause and outline how it is to be achieved. Constructive ideologies convey hope through constructive behaviors while destructive ideologies convey hope by outlining who the culprit is (blame and scapegoating) and how to dispose of them (section 1.3.1.3). See also “Sacred Values” in glossary - what Macfarquhar (2015, p.296) refers to as “duty”.

1.3.2.1.6 Strengths and Problem-Based Approaches

Strengths-based approaches are a means of fulfilling needs by focussing on talents and/or abilities rather than problems and/or deficits. Strengths-based approaches identify which good(s) (or need[s]) one is pursuing and facilitates socially acceptable means of attaining them (section 5.4). Problem-based approaches are risk-based approaches. They identify risk factors and focus on confronting the problem. Both are discussed in sections 6.2 and 6.3

1.3.2.1.7 Typologies

Typologies in this thesis refers to motivation rather than function (financier, logistician etc.) or status (foreign fighter, returnee etc.). Which typologies the Indirect Approach targets are described in section 6.7.

1.3.2.1.8 Pre-Jihadists

Those who are motivated to mobilize by both a humanitarian concern and a desire to engage in defense of fellow Muslims (Khosrokhavar, 2017, p.113). Pre-Jihadists may be indistinguishable during the nascent stages of their pathway but given vectorization, may function in morally opposed capacities. That is, while some pre-Jihadists consciously aspire towards Jihadism others may also radicalize malevolently, but unintentionally so (for example,

for purposes of defensive engagement [such as Neumann's "Defenders" in section 6.7]). Others may do so benevolently (humanitarian engagement). Pre-Jihadists who do not specifically aspire towards Jihadism but radicalize malevolently nonetheless are termed "Pathological Altruists" (1.3.2.1.9). The Indirect Approach is designed to facilitate the "Opportunity Factors" (1.3.2.2.6) of benevolent radicalization occurring at the expense of malevolent radicalization.

1.3.2.1.9 Pathological Altruism

Vicarious deprivation (1.3.2.1.4) is one means of, or antechamber for, engaging in pathological altruism; a warping mechanism (Table 5.8) which weaponizes empathy in particular (but may also function with a need) for destructive purposes. The Indirect Approach is designed to prevent the pathological altruism of particular typologies of pre-Jihadist; those whose needs or intent could be fulfilled by more constructive means (see section 6.7). While this concerns those motivated to defend victims and reduce suffering specifically, it also includes those experiencing an identity gap filled by membership, those searching for a sense of belonging and (potentially) those experiencing "doubt and uncertainty" within a malevolent pathway and/or process (see sections 5.4.6.3 and 6.5). How pathological altruism can occur is discussed in section 5.4.6.2.

1.3.2.1.10 Active Bystandership

"In the midst of great violence, some people endanger themselves to help others" (Staub, 2013, pp.4-5) and they do so in a "continuous" manner (Staub, 2013, p.387). Active bystandership is used in conjunction with other terms and concepts to explain why the research participants are considered radicalized (1.3.2.1.13), with sections 4.4 and 4.5 illustrating how this occurred. For example, see "Devoted Actors" and "Sacred Values" in glossary.

1.3.2.1.11 Moral Courage

Moral courage refers to the courage to express important values in words and actions even in the face of opposition, potential disapproval and ostracism or a violent response (Staub, 2015, p.47). The concept of moral courage forms an integral component of why the research participants are considered radicalized (1.3.2.1.13), with sections 4.4 and 4.5 illustrating how they radicalized benevolently (see also Table 4.5 and Figure 7.1).

1.3.2.1.12 Heroic Imagination and Heroism

The heroic imagination is the opposite of the "hostile imagination" which Keen (1992) used to describe the psychology of enmity that is fueled by notational propaganda against "enemies". Zimbardo (2007) describes the heroic imagination as a set of attitudes concerned with helping people and being willing to sacrifice or take risks for others. It is therefore related to "Moral Courage", "Active Bystandership", "Devoted Actorship", "Sacred Values" and the "consciously perilous" nature of radicalization as discussed in the following section. Engaging the heroic imagination is the process of being aware of how one can help others in need and being willing to take appropriate action regardless of the personal risk involved. When this motivates pro-social behavior it becomes heroic action (see Oliner and Oliner [1998] for an example of this in a different context). As discussed in section 4.3.2 and 4.7, and alluded to in "Vicarious Deprivation" (1.3.2.1.4) and "Pathological Altruism" (1.3.2.1.9 and 5.4.6.2), the same situation which inflames a hostile imagination can also inspire a heroic one; both imaginations provide a unique opportunity for action good or evil (and may be premised on the same [sacred] values), but instead of being a perpetrator the heroic imagination can induce people to act in the service of others (see section 4.3.2). Sections 4.4 and 4.5 illustrates how the research participants

engaged (or came to engage) their heroic imagination and section 4.7.2 illustrates what distinguishes the heroic from the hostile imagination.

1.3.2.1.13 Radicalization

Radicalization is defined as "a collectively defined, individually felt moral obligation to participate in direct action, where direct action involves a voluntary, repeated (or of longer duration) and consciously perilous mobilization to a Jihadist conflict zone without any supplementary means with which to defend oneself". As radicalization is a vector, this can be achieved malevolently or benevolently. Malevolent radicalization is always outside of societal norms and the democratic consensus, while benevolent radicalization is best understood as social norms taken to the extreme; *in extremis* (see glossary). With specific reference to "consciously perilous" above (as well as active bystandership, moral courage, the heroic imagination, sacred values and devoted actors), the "Match" described in section 1.3.2.1.18 and the pathway and process parallels between the research participants and Jihadists (section 4.6), the research participants were categorized as benevolently radicalized; delivering aid *in extremis*.

1.3.2.1.14 Choice Architecture

This refers to the design of how options are presented to people and the impact of that design on the option selected. When the design intends to assist people making choices which are overall positive, it is known as a "Nudge" (see glossary). Choice architecture forms an integral part of the Indirect Approach (Figures 7.2 and 7.3), is used to nudge "Pre-Jihadists" (1.3.2.1.8) towards benevolent groups (section 7.4) and is premised on how the research participants radicalized benevolently. Providing choice (rather than forcing one to undergo an intervention) is

central to the Indirect Approach; “we cannot prevent one mental contagion [“a Jihadist prognosis”] through enforcing another” (Meerlo, 1956, p.205).

1.3.2.1.15 Counter-Narratives and Alternative Narratives

Counter-narratives “directly deconstruct, discredit and demystify violent extremist messaging. This is achieved by challenging ideologies through emotion, theology, humor, exposure of hypocrisy, lies and untruths and is delivered by civil society” (Radicalization Awareness Network, 2015, p.4). On the other hand, alternative narratives “undercut violent extremist narratives by focussing on what we are ‘for’ rather than ‘against’” and is achieved through the provision of positive stories about social values, tolerance, openness, freedom and democracy - delivered by civil society or the government (Radicalization Awareness Network, 2015, p.4). However, as detailed in section 2.6, both have limitations, particularly because they do not make effective use of emotion and are not aligned to an offline behavior, as discussed next.

1.3.2.1.16 Counter-Engagement

The limitations of counter and alternative narratives are remedied by a counter-engagement which aligns an alternative narrative with an offline behavior (Hamid, 2018a) such as the Indirect Approach (sections 6.3 and 7.3). This is argued to be more effective than counter-narratives and/or alternative narratives as stand alone entities because counter-engagements offer a means of addressing “the hearts and minds of people and fulfills the needs the original ideology has served” (Staub, 2013, p.366). In other words, counter-engagements offer a means of addressing the behavioral, cognitive, emotional, psychological and religious needs which malevolent radicalization and destructive ideologies fulfill.

1.3.2.1.17 Diagnostics and Prognostics

Diagnostics refer to defining a problem and prognostics refer to delineating a solution. The Indirect Approach seeks to amplify pro-social prognoses and alter perception (or "Frame" in section 1.3.2.3.2) from aggressor to victim (see section 7.3.2). These are discussed in section 4.7.2 specifically but referred to throughout the thesis. It is important to note that Jihadists and humanitarians diagnose situations similarly by illustrating unwarranted suffering (partly because both are premised on the same or similar "Sacred Values" [see glossary]). A significant factor which distinguishes Jihadists from humanitarians are prognostics; what one is to do about that suffering (see Table 4.5 and Figure 7.1).

1.3.2.1.18 The "Match"

As discussed in section 3.5, research participants were matched using normative group equivalence (section 3.5.5.2) to Jihadists by static and dynamic factors; socio-demographics, pre-mobilization behaviors, general intent and mobilization locales (see Table 3.4). The match is confirmed as credible as all research participants were interviewed under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act. The match forms an integral component of the credibility of this study.

1.3.2.1.19 Contagion

This refers to the spread of feelings among group members. This is more likely to occur when there is a shared perception of wrongs (diagnostics) and a shared vision of how to correct them (prognostics) (Staub, 2013, p.187 [see section 1.3.2.1.17]).

1.3.2.1.20 The Grey Zone

The tolerant and diversified space between the camps of belief and unbelief. Collapsing the grey zone is a divide and rule tactic which aims to foster suspicion of mainstream Western

Muslims, trigger an auto-immune response from the nation state and make Western Muslims feel like the enemy within Western society because this drives them to the "safety" of extremist groups (see Bötticher [2017] in section 2.2 and sections 6.6.1 and 7.5.2).

1.3.2.1.21 Positive Deviance

An approach to behavioral and social change based on the observation that particular people in any given community employ uncommon but successful strategies which enable them to find better solutions than their peers despite having no extra resources or knowledge and facing the same constraints. Perceiving of the research participants as positive deviants is critical in terms of them having preventative capacities. Positive Deviance is discussed in section 6.4 and applied in section 7.3.1.

1.3.2.2 The Pathway

As stated, the Indirect Approach is based on the radicalization pathway and process as experienced by the research participants (Figure 4.2). Three factors are emphasized in the pathway stage (affordance [specifically, chance and contingency], role-models and involvement) and these influenced the benevolent vector eventually pursued. In other words, the combination of these three factors assisted in constructively channeling emotion and engendering a perceptive shift from aggressor to victim. As further expanded upon in section 4.4, that which initially propelled them to search for an alternative life course was the intent to "do the right thing" rather than descriptive risk factors presented in section 2.3. However, during the nascent stages of their search, the research participants had not defined what "the right thing" was (see sections 4.4 and 5.4.6.3). Instead, it was understood as a life course in opposition to the one they intended to exit. As such, an (renewed) appreciation for Islam was sought out.

Through chance encounters ("Affordance" [1.3.2.2.1] and "Behavioral Contingency" [1.3.2.2.2]), they came upon potential role-models ("Social Learning Theory" [1.3.2.2.3]) who offered a means with which to quickly expand upon their quest for an Islamic identity (section 4.4.1). These (the goal and the role models themselves) appealed to the the research participants (see section 6.5.1) and they became involved ("Involvement" [1.3.2.2.4]) with this humanitarian "Community of Practice" (1.3.2.2.5). Given the significance of the role of chance, the Indirect Approach seeks to lower the "Opportunity Factors" (1.3.2.2.6) for malevolent encounters by increasing the opportunity for benevolent encounters on and offline by linking a narrative to a congruent offline behavior ("Counter-Engagement" [section 1.3.2.1.16]). In other words, the Indirect Approach seeks to influence the affordance of the environment ("Choice Architecture" [1.3.2.1.14]) so as to encourage positive engagement and beneficent channeling of emotion. This is achieved through involvement in pro-social groups. These groups diagnose similarly to Jihadist organizations and they fulfill the same needs (sans violence). Yet they offer a competing narrative and constructive prognosis (sections 4.5.2 and 4.7), both of which are aligned to an offline behavior.

1.3.2.2.1 Affordance

This refers to the quality of an environment that enables, facilitates or makes action possible (Taylor and Currie, 2012, p.3). In this thesis, affordance refers largely to the role of the environment in operationalizing chance encounters and opportunity factors ("Behavioral Contingency" [1.3.2.2.2]). As these categories were critical to how the research participants radicalized benevolently, affordance (and how it can be utilized through "Choice

Architecture" [1.3.2.1.14]) is an important factor in radicalized pathways (see sections 4.3.2 and 4.5).

1.3.2.2.2. Behavioral Contingency

Behavioral contingencies state the if-then conditions that set the occasion for the potential occurrence of a certain behavior and its consequences. Contingencies may also refer to "accidents of fate" (Marsden, 2017c, p.103) such as chance encounters (see sections 4.4, 4.5.1 and 6.5.1). Nonetheless, behavioral contingencies work in conjunction with contingencies because "accidents of fate" may set the occasion for subsequent behaviors (see Figure 4.2).

1.3.2.2.3 Social Learning Theory

In accordance with "Learning-By-Doing" (1.3.2.3.6), Social Learning Theory (Bandura, 1977) posits that people learn from one another by means of observation, imitation, and modeling. In discussing the importance of this form of learning for children, Huesemann and Huesemann (2018, p.157) note that learning by observation (imitation) is an important process in the acquisition of most of the cognitions that influence social behavior. As discussed in section 4.5.1, the radicalization vector the research participants pursued was significantly impacted upon by role-models, or who Sageman (2017a, pp.124-125) termed as "prototypical group members" and who Richardson (2006, p.45) describes as "the personification of the group". However, the role-models followed by the research participants were "constructive leaders" (Staub, 2013, p. 406). That is, "a leader who considers peaceful alternatives under violence-generating circumstances and works for peace post-violence" (Staub, 2013, p.406 [see glossary]). These people are important for mobilizing active bystanders (section 1.3.2.1.10) and therefore role-modeling is central to the Indirect Approach.

1.3.2.2.4 Involvement

Becoming involved signals the movement from the pathway to the process in Figure 4.2 and is the first step in "Learning-By-Doing" (1.3.2.3.6). Involvement works in conjunction with the numerous behavior-led theories utilized in the Indirect Approach (depicted in Figures 7.2 and 7.3).

1.3.2.2.5 Community of Practice

A community of practice refers to a, largely, informal learning environment where people with common interests or goals share knowledge and interact in order to further those goals. The form of interaction in which this is achieved is often through conversation and imitation (see section 4.4). See "Learning-By-Doing" and "Social Learning Theory" in glossary.

1.3.2.2.6 Opportunity Factors

"Venues or locations which provide the setting for radicalization by offering an opportunity to meet likeminded people, by giving inspiration or serving as a recruitment ground for radicalisors" (Precht, 2007, p.56). Opportunity factors are posited as central to operationalizing "Needs" (1.3.2.1.1) and "General Intent" (Table 3.4). Therefore, opportunity factors are critical to the proposed Indirect Approach.

1.3.2.3 The Process

Involvement signaled the start of the research participants socialization process and was also their introduction to the priorities of this community of practice ("Group Priorities" [1.3.2.3.1]). A significant aspect of group priorities is the frame of the group ("Social Movement Theory" [1.3.2.3.2]) because this impacts upon perception, identity and behavior in the form of humanitarian mobilizations, as introduced in section 1.3.2.1.8 ("Diagnostics and

Prognostics"). In "Learning-By-Doing" (1.3.2.3.6), the behaviors engaged in (the humanitarian mobilizations and aid drives) were continually reinforced by the frame which supported them (*zakat*); cognitive consistency ("Cognitive Dissonance Theory" [1.3.2.3.3]). This assisted in the research participants self-categorizing ("Social Identity Theory" [1.3.2.3.4]) as humanitarians. This role designation assisted in the assignment of appropriate behavior (see section 4.7.1).

Both cognitive consistency and self-categorization as pro-social actors embody a postulated inoculative effect against malevolent radicalization. For the research participants, this new (moral and pro-social) identity played a significant role in reducing the uncertainty felt in their delinquent previous life courses ("Uncertainty Reduction Theory" [1.3.2.3.5]) as discussed in section 4.4. Overall, the Indirect Approach is a behavior led approach which assists in the (re-) categorization of one's social reality (section 2.5). Furthermore, positive actions may lead to wider members of society joining the cause and this may result in a reciprocity cycle harnessing peaceful community relations and alternative role-models (see section 4.5.2). Indeed, as stated in section 7.5.2.1, this could also be used as a metric to gauge success.

1.3.2.3.1 Group Priorities

Group priorities are an important concept in this thesis. The term was a product of the coding process (see Figure 3.7 and Table 4.1) and refers to the combination of the shared frame of the group (the worldview or schema [see section 1.3.2.3.2]), the interests of the group and the aligned behaviors which result from both (see section 4.5.2 for a practical explanation).

1.3.2.3.2 Social Movement Theory

An interdisciplinary framework which seeks to explain why social mobilization occurs, the form it takes and the consequences thereof. An important aspect of this is the concept of a

frame, defined as mental structures which shape perception through the organization of experience. Frames are further elaborated on in sections 2.5 and 7.3.1.

1.3.2.3.3 Cognitive Dissonance Theory

Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance theory suggests that people have an inner drive to hold all attitudes and behavior in harmony and avoid disharmony (or dissonance). This is known as the principle of cognitive consistency (Staub, 2013, p.171). When there is an inconsistency between attitudes or behaviors (dissonance), something must change to eliminate the dissonance. Critical for this thesis is that research indicates that cooperating on positive tasks assists in the adoption of positive attitudes (Deutsch, Coleman and Marcus, 2006) and this is supportive of the "Learning-By-Doing" foundation (1.3.2.3.6) of the Indirect Approach (see "Positive Deviance" in section 6.4).

1.3.2.3.4 Social Identity Theory

Developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979 and 1986), it focusses on how people self-categorize as group members and adopt the identity of the group. People emphasize similarities within their own group and differences with other groups - whose members are perceived as being similar. The group differences are enhanced in favor of one's own group resulting in an elevated status of one's own group leading to higher self-esteem - the core motivation for group identification.

1.3.2.3.5 Uncertainty Reduction Theory

In situations of uncertainty, individuals are more likely to categorize themselves with a group that reduces uncertainty (the "Need" [section 1.3.2.1.1] or primary [human] good pursued [see glossary]). In other words, individuals resort to processes of social categorization as a means

of countering existential uncertainty (Hogg, 2007; McKeown, Haji, & Ferguson, 2016). This theory is grounded in "Social Identity Theory" (section 1.3.2.3.4) because group identification is a potent way to resolve uncertainty (Staub, 2013, p.137).

1.3.2.3.6 The Learning-By-Doing Principle

Behavior induced learning forms a significant element of the proposed Indirect Approach (see section 6.5). As such, many of the concepts and theories used to construct the Indirect Approach (see Figures 7.2 and 7.3) are behavior rather than cognition led. For example, "whole societies become more aggressive by engagement in harmful, aggressive, violent actions" (Staub, 2015, p.86). However, consistent with the vectorized approach of this thesis, the opposite is also true (Staub, 1979; Staub, 1989); "people 'learn-by-doing' and they change as a result of what they do" (Staub, 2013, p.192).

1.4 Boundaries of the Thesis

During the initial sampling phase of data collection, the author met or was informed of other British Muslims who were mobilized in Syria and Iraq and functioning in other roles. These included volunteering with search and rescue teams (the White Helmets), volunteering as medical doctors in (makeshift) hospitals, volunteering as medical instructors, volunteering as drivers (mainly ambulance) and working as freelance journalists. However, people who mobilized to function in these roles did not form part of the final sample because either they were unavailable by being in Iraq or Syria, or they did not "match" European Jihadists (see sections 1.3.2.1.18 and 3.5.5.2). Therefore, the research participants of this study only concerns those who mobilized to "Sham" in a humanitarian capacity.

This thesis adopts a strictly behavioral approach to radicalization and subsequently does not discuss cognitive radicalization at any length. Doing so is consistent with grounded theory methodology because the literature review is determined by the data and the data analysis process; the research participants did not follow the behavior-follows-cognition principle implied in theorizing on cognitive radicalization. Another boundary is that this thesis focusses solely on radicalization below that of the nation state. This is not to say that a nation state cannot radicalize. Rather, incorporating the nation state into the concept of radicalization involves a macro level of analysis which was not the focus of this thesis.

Furthermore, radicalization in this thesis refers strictly to *ad extra* radicalization, not *ad intra* radicalization (Khosrokhavar, 2017, p.114); radicalization directed outwards (*ad extra* [mobilization]) to other countries (Jihadist conflict zones), not inwards (*ad intra*) within one's own country. Therefore, mobilization to Jihadist conflict zones was a central defining construct of what this thesis understands as radicalization (see sections 1.1 and 4.2). However, as illustrated in Table 5.1, this is also one of its limitations; the definition of radicalization in this thesis is unable to account for non-mobilized radicalization. The following section details the limitations of the research design, methodology and the conclusions of this study.

1.4.1 Limitations of the Study

The limitations of the research design encompass the size of the sample (discussed in section 3.7.2) and the unrepresentativeness of the sample (discussed in section 3.5.1). Regarding the former, the numerous criteria for inclusion in the theoretical sample (Table 3.2 and 3.4), while a necessity for answering the primary research question (see section 1.2.5), inevitably placed restrictions on admittance (discussed in sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.3). Subsequently, the

sample is not representative of British Muslim humanitarians (see section 3.4.5 for the limitations of grounded theory). However, as stated in section 3.5.1, representativeness was not the intended purpose. Instead, the value of this thesis lays in resultant conceptualizations (radicalization as a vectorized construct [section 4.3]) and a new avenue for preventing Jihadism (the Indirect Approach [section 7.3]) based on a small number of successful outliers who, by definition, are never representative; positive deviants (section 6.4). Nonetheless, critical socio-demographic factors were not included: British Muslim converts, first (third or more) generation British Muslims, Muslims from outside Birmingham, British Muslims above the socio-economic class of the research participants and British Muslim females. This raises questions of transferability to other contexts; a signifiant limitation because the Indirect Approach (section 1.3.2.1) is premised on the radicalization pathway and process of the research participants (see sections 4.4.2 and 6.3.1). That is to say, the Indirect Approach is a design that is modeled on the organic social process of the research participants; a "Biomimicry" model (see glossary). As Ashcroft (2000, p.40) notes, "it is always risky to extrapolate one's data … because there is no guarantee that the relationship will remain the same". In other words, second-order consequences of the nation state supporting and encouraging benevolent radicalization can not be foreseen at the outset (see section 6.3.1).

A further but related problem to transferability is, there are numerous pathways towards Jihadism (see Figure 4.3 and "Equifinality" in glossary) and the pathway/process of the research participants does not account for them all. As such, the Indirect Approach cannot counter these other pathways (see section 2.3.2.2). In order to overcome this limitation, the Indirect Approach is designed as a "Counter-Engagement" (section 1.3.2.1.16). Rather than countering directly, it

utilizes a grassroots and organic strengths-based approach to provide an alternative narrative and means of engagement (sections 6.3 to 6.5). This is presented as a strength because benevolently radicalized groups diagnose situations similarly to Jihadists (sections 1.3.2.1.17 and 7.4) and recruit from the same sentiment pool (sections 3.5.5.2 and 6.1). Furthermore, the literature review illustrated that the factors involved in the radicalization of the research participants are not uncommon among Jihadists (see Figures 4.6 and 4.7 and "Sacred Values" in glossary).

A further limitation of the Indirect Approach is the role of bonding (section 1.3.2.2.3). That is to say, the Indirect Approach is unlikely to resonate and be effective if potential adherents do not aspire towards (and are therefore unwilling to learn and imitate) prototypical group leaders. For example, section 4.4 illustrates that the research participants were unable to convince every person they spoke to in their social network to give up crime and become practicing Muslim humanitarians (see footnote 58). However, as discussed in section 6.1, this may be overcome (at least to an extent) by bolstering the number of prototypical group leaders; higher numbers of leaders (and therefore a wider spectrum of personalities) engaging with the British public stacks the odds in favor of more potential adherents bonding with them. Nonetheless, the Indirect Approach is only posited as effective for particular typologies of pre-Jihadist (Table 5.8 and section 6.7) and without the "General Intent" to "do" something (section 1.3.2.1.2 and Table 3.4), which may be construed as a "Cognitive Opening" (sections 1.3.2.1.3 and 4.5.1), it is unlikely to resonate with potential prospective adherents ("Pathological Altruists" in section 1.3.2.1.19). A final limitation, and one which is particularly difficult to foresee, are unintended consequences or second-order effects of applying the Indirect Approach.

Constructivist grounded theory is a subjective methodology. This is compounded by the fact that an inter-rater was not utilized in this study, albeit for practical reasons as outlined in section 3.4.5. Therefore, the trustworthiness of the analytical conclusions may be drawn into question. As discussed in section 1.2.4, five steps were taken to account for this: (1) the pathway and radicalization process of the research participants were juxtaposed to nine radicalization pathway models (Figures 4.6 and 4.7) which illustrated that the pathway and process of the research participants (Figure 4.2) could, to a significant extent, also be applied to the radicalization of Jihadists (section 4.6). (2) Coding and analysis was reviewed and confirmed as credible and saturated (Table 3.6, Figure 3.7 and Table 4.1). (3) This was bolstered by a publication in a peer-reviewed journal (Reidy, 2018) and (4) a literature review which demonstrated that other researchers had also discussed the vectorized qualities of radicalization (see section 4.3.2). (5) Two accomplished Muslim CVE consultants were interviewed in order to ascertain if, in their experience, one could potentially radicalize benevolently and whether benevolent radicalization could be bolstered to stymy Jihadist recruitment. Both answered in the affirmative.

Using aid workers to promote an alternative narrative and behavioral response may be construed as a risky strategy for governments because it would require them to relinquish control of the message (see section 6.3.1). This risk is compounded by the well-documented overlap between Muslim humanitarian organizations and Jihadist groups (section 3.5.2). However, these are tempered by the seemingly unanimous view on the importance of civil society in preventing radicalization (see sections 3.5.5.2, 6.3.1 and 6.4). Finally, as illustrated in Table 5.1 and discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3, the definition of radicalization utilized in this thesis hinges on

mobilization to conflict zones rather than the outcomes of terrorism and/or extremism and this necessarily restricts who would be categorized as radicalized.

1.5 The Accidental Ambassadors

This thesis refers to the six research participants as "Accidental Ambassadors". There are four reasons for doing so; two for "accidental" and two for "ambassador".

"Accidental" reason one: as section 4.4 will clarify, the research participants did not intend to become humanitarians. During the initial stages of their pathway their motivation was simply "to do the right thing" (see Figure 4.2). As Islam was viewed as unquestionably positive, particularly in relation to their previous lifestyle, it was to Islam that they turned (section 1.3.2.2). In the process of becoming (re-)acquainted with their faith, they had serendipitous contact with Muslims aid workers in their local mosque (see sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2). These people focussed on delivering aid to those most in need and identified recipients were located in Jihadist conflict zones (see section 3.5.1). That is to say, those most in need happened to be in Jihadist conflict zones rather than aid workers intending to function in Jihadist conflict zones specifically. Nonetheless, it was through these chance encounters (subsumed under "Opportunity Factors" [1.3.2.2.6]) that the research participants became humanitarians (see sections 4.4 and 4.5). Much the same can be said for Kilcullen's (2009) "Accidental Guerrilla". In his analysis, most insurgents had no initial intention to engage Coalition Forces in violent confrontation. Instead, it was through contact with (foreign) extremists that many came to brandish weapons and engage in warfare. Therefore, both the research participants and, in Kilcullen's analysis (2009), a majority of insurgents adopted these roles "accidentally" through serendipitous contact.

The Indirect Approach (sections 6.3 and 7.3) formalizes these chance encounters so as to stack the odds in favor of more people having benevolent fortuitous encounters (see "Opportunity Factors" in sections 1.3.2.2.6 and 6.5.1 and "Biomimicry" in glossary) and this is postulated to stymy Jihadist recruitment.

"Accidental" reason two: as stated above and outlined in section 6.2.4, the research participants became humanitarians through serendipitous contact rather than a preconceived thought process or through (top-down) design. As they became involved in humanitarianism, they adopted its tenets; a behavior-led rather than cognition induced prognostic (see sections 6.3 and 6.5). An inadvertent consequence of their humanitarianism was that they were unwittingly engaging in behaviors which were expanding the "Grey Zone" (see sections 1.3.2.1.20 and 7.5.2). That is to say, expanding the grey zone by offering an alternative prognosis within social norms and the democratic consensus was a second-order and "accidental" consequence of their humanitarianism. Given this, the research participants did not perceive themselves as counter-Jihadists or engaging in a counter-engagement (see section 6.4 for how this is related to Positive Deviance). Nonetheless, building on how they came to prognose in the manner they do, the proposed counter-engagement (the Indirect Approach [section 7.3]) is a "design" premised on matching criteria (sections 3.5.4 and 3.5.5) which aims to facilitate "Pre-Jihadists" (sections 1.3.2.1.8 and 6.7) adopting this pro-social prognostic as a consequence of induced involvement; "accidentally", but by design nonetheless (see section 7.3 and "Biomimicry" in glossary).

"Ambassador" reason one: no research participant labelled themself as an ambassador, but they did discuss how the behaviors of some British Muslims (or those who identify as British Muslims [i.e. extremists]) reflect on pubic perceptions of Islam. This irked them because the

speech and behaviors of an unrepresentative few are perceived (or portrayed in various media outlets) as being symbolic of the underlying sentiments of the majority (see section 6.6). While the research participants do not perceive any fault lines between being British and being Muslim (see section 4.5.2), they do understand that observable behaviors contribute to public perceptions of their faith and identity. As such, "representing" Islam subsequently became an open code and was placed in the theoretical code of "Identity Adoption" in Figure 3.7 and "Identity" in Table 4.1 (see also section 6.2.4). However, the problem is that pro-social behaviors by British Muslims remain invisible (or are simply not "newsworthy" [Smith, 1989 in Horgan *et al.,* 2016, p.1236]) to the wider British public, perhaps because of the perceptive link between Islam and terrorism (typified by who the general public assumes radicalization concerns; Muslims). That is to say, reporting on British Muslim behavior has a tendency to confirm rather than disconfirm this tacit link (see section 6.6.1). That pro-social "ambassadorial" behaviors by British Muslims not only become recognized by the domestic British public but may proliferate under the Indirect Approach is therefore aspirational and indicative of radicalization being perceived as possessing vector qualities (see "Multifinality" in glossary).

"Ambassador" reason two: the conflict zones research participants function in rarely have any formal British representation. Consequentially, the research participants are informally representing Britain. However, this informal representation is shared with British Jihadists who often refer to themselves as (insert first name) al-Britani ([insert first name] "the British") (see section 3.5.5.1 and "kunya" in section 6.3). By labeling the research participants as ambassadors they can reclaim the "British" label (see section 6.3). Indeed, the same can be done for other interpretations. For example, "Allahu Akbar" has evolved somewhat in meaning, from being a

call to submission to being a war chant. Raising ones right hand and index finger has similarly changed from being an expression of monotheism to a Daesh salute. The concept of Jihad has been impacted, from being a struggle for moral expansion to one narrowly defined by sanctified violence against a vilified majority. Daesh also use the word *Ummah* in a supremacist manner "to imply religious exclusiveness, when once it meant all our neighbors and wider humanity, regardless of faith" (Khan, 2016, p.184). Finally, the concept of Shariah has become a trigger word for beheadings and worse.

Sageman (2017b, p.18) notes that "group members often acquire a specific vocabulary … dress code … and ways of behaving. In short, this discursive political protest community often becomes a counterculture". For the Indirect Approach to succeed, it will need to craft its own identity, be proactive in reclaiming the narrative and construct other, or more traditional meanings for the above mentioned examples. Indeed, Neumann (2017, p.60) states that mainstream interpretations of Islam should be proactive in reclaiming the narrative. In other words, these words and actions need to be reclaimed from the Jihadists and, in a small way, this thesis accomplishes this by granting the research participants ambassadorial status, albeit informally and accidentally.

1.6 Organization of Thesis

This research utilized constructivist grounded theory. Therefore, the order with which this thesis proceeds is not the order with which research was conducted. Chapter two provides the literature review for the various topics addressed throughout the thesis including radicalization, the role of emotion, framing and messaging. Chapter three presents the methodology. This

describes how data was collected and analyzed as well as covering ethical requirements and how trustworthiness was established. Chapter four presents the original contribution to knowledge; radicalization as a vector. This is used as the foundation for the following three chapters.

Chapter five is composed of two sections. Section one presents the benevolently radicalized as a potential control or comparison group for future radicalization research. However, in presenting a vectorized view of radicalization to the Home Office in 2018, the author encountered difficulties in explaining this and was unable to provide examples of this conceptualization outside of radicalization (see section 5.1). Therefore, the second section presents another research area which functions along similar multifinal lines to what is proposed in this thesis. Chapter six presents benevolent radicalization as an attractive alternative for particular typologies of pre-Jihadist. As stated, this will not function for all pre-Jihadists. For example, before arresting Shannon Maureen Conley, the F.B.I attempted to convince her to participate in peaceful support of Muslims in Syria and Iraq, to which she replied that she had "no interest in doing humanitarian work" and "felt that Jihad is the only answer to correct the wrongs against the Muslim world" (Kohlmann and AlKhouri, 2014, p.3). This is followed by chapter seven which presents the framework for the Indirect Approach to preventing malevolent radicalization.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

2.1 Introduction and Organization of Chapter

The primary research question of this thesis is, "How do British Muslims mobilize to Jihadist conflict zones in a benevolent rather than a malevolent manner?" However, as clarified in section 1.2.4, this question was a product of data analysis (particularly the "Constant Comparison Method" [section 3.4.4]) rather than one clarified at the outset. Similarly, as per the tenets of grounded theory, the literature review which follows only concerns that which was revealed in data analysis and this necessarily limits the scope of this chapter. However, as illustrated in Figure 3.9, a "Preliminary Literature Review" was conducted prior to data collection but, as discussed in section 3.4.2, this merely served the purpose of reacquainting the author with general concepts within terrorism studies rather than providing avenues for research. Nonetheless, as interviews were conducted and data coded, the author engaged in a "Subsequent Literature Review" (Figure 3.9) which pursued the various topics raised in data analysis.

This chapter divides these findings into four broad topics. First, as discussed in section 1.2, the conceptual finding of this thesis is that radicalization is a vector (see "Multifinality" in glossary). Therefore, in answering the primary research question, the research participants are presented as benevolently radicalized. However, this conceptualization is at odds with most of the literature where radicalization is used to explain the adoption of extreme ideation and/or engaging in terrorism; a product of the conditions which gave rise to the term, as discussed in section 2.2. Section 2.3 follows with an overview of the approaches adopted in studying

radicalization. Particular attention is paid to the pathway approach as this informed the questions asked during data collection (see section 1.2.5 for the research questions and Table 4.1 for an illustration of how they were asked in interview) and functions as a means of establishing credibility for the presentation of radicalization as a vector (see section 4.3).

A second finding of this thesis was that the research participants "Learned-By-Doing" (sections 1.3.2.3.6 and 6.5) under accidental circumstances rather than engaging in planned and theoretically informed behaviors. As such, section 2.4 introduces the shortfalls of the cartesian reasoning employed in many definitions of radicalization, specifically those which presuppose that extremism is a necessary pre-condition and/or causal mechanism for Jihadist terrorism. One product of this research avenue revealed the role of (generated) emotion as a factor in the reasoning process and pre-condition for mobilization and this is discussed in sections 2.4.1.2 and 2.4.1.3 with the latter arguing that emotions should be disaggregated from frames. Section 2.5 illustrates the importance of emotion in ensuring that a frame finds resonance with its target audience; an important facet of the Indirect Approach (displayed in Figure 7.3).

Section 2.6 is also based on the learning-by-doing principle and provides the foundation for answering the third question of this thesis, namely "How could humanitarianism be presented in order to function as an effective alternative to Jihadism?" It argues that the most effective way to achieve this is through alternative narratives aligned with off-line behaviors (a counter-engagement [Hamid, 2018a]) rather than counter-narratives. Therefore, section 2.6 also functions in laying part of the foundation for the Indirect Approach. Given this premise, the Indirect Approach is designed to encourage people to engage in pro-social but impactful and emotionally

resonant behaviors because, as suggested by "Cognitive Dissonance Theory" (1.3.2.3.3), doing so will result in them justifying those behaviors in order to maintain cognitive consistency.

2.2 A Brief History of Radicalization

The term radicalization was not in frequent use prior to 2001 (Bartlett, 2017, p.131; Khosrokhavar, 2017, p.1; Pisoiu, 2012, p.10) but its usage increased significantly post 2001 (Coolsaet, 2016b, p.11; Sedgwick, 2010, p. 479 and p.490).[10] This was particularly the case after the homegrown Madrid attacks of 2004 (Coolsaet, 2016a, p.11; European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalization, 2008, p.5; Sageman, 2017a, p.89; Schmid, 2013a, p.iv). Horgan (2014a, p.82) confirms that "the past ten years of research surrounding how and why people become involved in terrorism can be encompassed under a single label: 'radicalization research'". One may therefore surmise that radicalization is inextricably linked with terrorism.

Earlier usage of the term in the 1970s stressed the interaction between social movements and the nation state which, under particular conditions, escalated towards the formation of clandestine and/or violent groups (Arendt, 1969, p.18; della Porta and Lafree, 2012, p.6). This is how Sageman (2017b) understands radicalization, but this is also why he avoids using the term; his analysis returns to the role of the nation state in contributing to the cycle of escalating competition and violence (see footnote 10 and Polk [2007, pp.xix-xxii]) rather than focusing on the contributing factors, organizational characteristics or beliefs of the non-state actor which, to a significant extent, is the contemporary focus of the term.

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[10] However, radicalization has been discussed prior to 9/11 and this analytical approach favored the use of violence within an escalating conflict between social movements and the state. See, for example, Crenshaw (1995), Juergensmeyer, (2000), Sprinzak, (1999) and Reich (1998).

Before September 11th 2001, radicalization was simply referred to as recruitment (Silke and Brown, 2016, p.129),[11] yet the events which transpired led to the term merging with extremism to include the ideological foundation upon which the attacks were committed. This awkwardly aligned radicalization's root "radicalism" with extremism (see section 1.3.1.2). As scholars have noted, while there is some overlap between radicalism and extremism, radicalism lays nonetheless within the democratic consensus while extremism is always anti-democratic (Bötticher, 2017; Ramakrisha, 2016a; Schmid, 2013a). This conceptual link between radicalism and terrorism has particularly problematic implications; some radicals are pro-democratic and may engage in legitimate forms of contestation against violent and authoritarian regimes who, in turn, label them as terrorists engaging in illegal resistance against legitimate forms of government (see section 1.3.1.1). This legitimates a harsh top-down response which may "drive the pro-democratic radicals into the arms of the anti-democratic extremists" (Bötticher, 2017).

This blurring of concepts is important for this thesis and the proposed Indirect Approach because the research participants engage in behaviors which are considered radical; functioning as a humanitarian in Jihadist conflict zones where the majority of humanitarians do not function due to safety concerns. This, along with their match to Jihadists, links (albeit falsely) their radical behavior to extremism which contributes to why they are subject to Schedule 7 interviews (see section 3.5.5.1).

The broader concern is that false accusations may propel grievances and drive the falsely accused into the arms of Jihadists and extremists as suggested by Bötticher (2017) (see

[11] Allan *et al.* (2015, p.10) note that in their literature review they did not find any literature which distinguished the concepts of recruitment from radicalization. To that end, Sageman (2017c) bridges both by referring to them as a form of volunteerism.

"Suspicion" in Figure 3.7). A further problem in linking radicals such as the research participants with Jihadists and/or extremists is that the authorities are blinded to the possibility of non-extremist and non-violent false positives providing an attractive alternative for pre-Jihadists, as discussed in section 4.3.2. These concerns aside, radicalization became the new buzzword (Maskaliūnaitė, 2015, p.9; Richards, 2011, p.152) and master signifier of the GWOT (Kundnani, 2012, p.3). As the term gained currency in this specific domain, it became increasingly defined by it. As a result, successful radicalization was often used synonymously with extremism and/or terrorism (section 1.3.1.6.1).

2.2.1 Why Radicalization?

In the highly charged and emotional atmosphere immediately following the 9/11 attacks, it became increasingly difficult to discuss the root causes of terrorism due to the perceived implication of justification in such discussions (Dzhekova, Stoynova, Kojouharov, Mancheva, Anagnostou and Tsenkov, 2016, p.8; Sedgwick, 2010, pp.480-481). At the same time, the urgency to better understand what gave rise to the attacks led to the emergence of radicalization as "a less value-laden, more liberal alternative to the simple accounts of terrorism offered immediately after 9/11" (Kundnani, 2012, p.5). Hence, "it was through the notion of radicalization that a discussion about the political, economic, social and psychological forces which underpin terrorism and political violence became possible again" (Neumann, 2008, p.4) i.e. political "hot potatoes" such as foreign policy could be analyzed under the holistic and interconnected rubric of radicalization without appointing blame at any one particular factor. Therefore, the concept of radicalization was largely borne of Jihadist terrorism and this resulted in the concept inheriting a number of in-built limiting assumptions (Kundnani, 2012, p.5;

Sageman, 2017b, p.3), the nature of which Silke and Brown (2016, p.130) described as "mired in political baggage and quickly shackled with even more".

2.2.2 Assumptions of Radicalization

The alignment between Jihadist terrorism and radicalization made the concept lopsided on two accounts: (1) Radicalization research focussed almost exclusively on Jihadist terrorism and this inadvertently bolstered the assumption that the only people who radicalize are Muslims (see section 6.6.1). This artificially restricted understanding of the socialization process(es) and outcomes (see sections 2.3.2.2, 3.5.5 and 5.2). (2) As the concept of radicalization developed and gained momentum, it became an explanation for terrorism and inadvertently adopted the logical circularity of a möbius strip: radicalization leads to terrorism because terrorists are radicalized… On this tautology, Schmid (2013a, p.iv) notes, "the popularity of the concept of 'radicalisation' stands in no direct relationship to its actual explanatory power", a sentiment echoed by Kundnani (2012, p.10; 2015, p.123) and Coolsaet (2016a, p.11). In this sense, the concept of radicalization is less a phenomenon and more a noumenon; a theoretical construct used to explain the underlying causes or dynamics of evidence observed.

Radicalization has been found to rest on an empirically limited foundation (Gurski, 2016, p.15; Koomen and Van Der Pligt, 2016, p.6; Silke and Brown, 2016, p.145), constituting a questionable link between data and developed theory (Kundnani, 2015b, p.8; Lia and Skjolberg, 2004; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014a, p.604). This is evidenced by the number of researchers who have questioned the very foundation on which current radicalization knowledge is based (Allan *et al.,* 2015, p.20; Cragin *et al*., 2015, p.16; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p.797; Horgan, 2014a, pp.2-3; Jackson, 2009, p.74). Other scholars questioned the causality between

radicalization and violence (Githens-Mazer, 2009, p.22; Horgan, 2014a, p.15; Ramakrisha, 2016, p.151; Jackson, 2011). However, as the following section details, the empirical foundation for the concept has improved substantially in recent years.

2.2.3 Limitations of the Radicalization Construct

Radicalization as a concept faces five principal limitations, the first of which is the perennial problem of terrorism studies; the illusive subject in the form of primary data (Horgan, 2014a, p.42; Neumann and Kleinmann, 2013, p.360; Pisoiu, 2012, p.1). The problem stems partly from the fact that there are very few actual terrorists (Taylor, 2010, p.122; Taylor and Currie, 2012, p.11). This is compounded by the second limitation, the numerous restrictions placed upon researchers in data collection; legal, ethical and security concerns (Atran, Axelrod, Davis and Fischoff, 2017, pp.352-353; Dalgard-Nielsen, 2010, p.812; Horgan, 2017b; Innes and Levi, 2017, p.464; Neumann and Kleinmann, 2013, p.378; Sageman, 2017a, p.21; Schmid, 2013b, p.462; Schmid, 2016a). However, as Almohammad (2018) demonstrates, numerous researchers are nonetheless obtaining access with returnees and/or defectors. Furthermore, means of obtaining data has improved significantly; both Schuurman (2018) and Vergani *et al.* (2018) illustrate that there has been a significant rise in the empirical literature over time. This has been aided by the rising use of social media by Jihadists and the accessibility of (big) data by researchers.

The third issue in expanding the radicalization knowledge base is that the process is inherently "protean" (Khosrokhavar, 2017, p.145); it is comprised of many pathways (Klausen, 2016, p.i; Koomen and Van Der Pligt, 2016, p.234; McGilloway *et al.*, 2015, p.49; Schomerus, El-Taraboulsi-McCarthy and Sandhar, 2017, p.3; United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism,

2017, p.40). In other words, variation in how one radicalizes is the norm (see "Equifinality" in glossary, section 4.4.2 and Figure 4.3). As such and despite their increasing usage, developing a decontextualized pathway or profile is unlikely to assist with further conceptual development (see section 2.3.2.3). Fourth are the circumstances which gave rise to radicalization, as addressed in sections 2.2 and 2.2.1, because these artificially restricted the research sample and corresponding radicalization process(es). However, the concept of radicalization is cautiously being applied to far right extremists (Kallis, Zeiger and Öztürk, 2018). Nonetheless, the inherent assumption is that responses to (perceived) affronts are either violent (terrorism) or anti-social (extremism) because these are the only successful outcomes the concept of radicalization is designed to cater for. The fifth limitation is one introduced in the previous section and addressed in sections 2.4.1.1 and 6.5: the intuitive causality of cognitions (such as extremism or ideology specifically) causing behavior (such as terrorism or behaviors in conscious support thereof).

2.3 Radicalization Research

Radicalization is largely agreed upon to occur at the intersection of the enabling environment and a personal trajectory (European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalization, 2008, p.9; Sageman, 2017a, p.71; Vidino and Hughes, 2015, p.27). Therefore, the contributing factors span the individual-to-social spectrum and this makes the radicalization process highly complex and individualized (Vidino and Hughes, 2015, p.27). This complexity is manifested by the heterogeneity of those who become involved in terrorism (Horgan, 2014a, p. 81; O'Gorman and Silke, 2016, p.159) and further compounded by the role of context within

which radicalization occurs (Rabasa and Bernard, 2015, p.3; Ranstorp, 2010, p.2; Sedgwick, 2010, p.481).

Nonetheless, researchers such as Neumann (2017, pp.17-18) have identified recurring factors: (1) Grievances (the thwarting of expectations, conflicts of identity and perception of injustice). This is brought to the fore in section 2.4.1.3 which discusses the importance of untangling a personal grievance from a broader frame. (2) "Emotional Needs" (see glossary). This is further expanded upon in terms of "Needs" (section 1.3.2.1.1) throughout the thesis (for example, see section 6.3) as well as the role of emotion in the radicalization and reasoning process (section 2.4). (3) Ideas which make sense of grievance, identify a scapegoat and offer solutions. As discussed in sections 1.3.1.3 and 1.3.2.1.5, the identification of scapegoats is a significant factor in distinguishing constructive from destructive ideologies (Staub, 2013, p.263 [see "Ideology" in glossary]). (4) Networks of people because, with rare exceptions, radicalization is a social process in which authority figures, charismatic leaders or a tightly knit group of peers play influential roles. This was also evident in the results of this study (sections 4.4 and 6.5.1) and as such, role-modeling (section 1.3.2.2.3) forms an integral component of the Indirect Approach. (5) Commitment - which encompasses loyalty and peer pressure. While increasing commitment is addressed in section 4.4.1, a product of the convergence of "Group Priorities" (section 1.3.2.3.1) on "Identity" and "Perception" (see section 4.4 and Figure 4.2), no evidence of peer pressure was discovered in the data. Nonetheless, as discussed throughout section 3.5, the research participants are described as being committed to a consciously perilous cause and as such, "Commitment" is depicted in the coding schedule (see Figure 3.7 and Table 4.1). (6) Violence, particularly exposure to violence. This is not applicable to the research

participants who are consistently non-violent. Neumann's (2017) six factors are reflective of the numerous analytical approaches applied to the process of radicalization, as described next.

2.3.1 Wider Approaches

Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to researching radicalization. The first, given the rarity of terrorism, was intuitively dispositional. A telling example involved German officials secretly removing the brain of Ulrike Meinhof (Red Army Faction) so neuropathologists could discover abnormalities. "To state officials it seemed more natural that the source of her violence was located in brain deformities than in the political conflicts of postwar Germany" (Kundnani, 2015a, p.115). This fallacy is known as the Fundamental Attribution Error (Ross and Nisbett, 1991, pp.119-144); the inability of one to "fully appreciate the power of situational forces acting on individual behavior when they are viewed outside of the behavioral context" (Zimbardo, 2007, p.276) - what Silke (2009, p.96) termed as "Cheshire-Cat Thinking".[12]

Overtime however, the study of terrorism involvement became more nuanced; much like criminological research, Gill and Corner (2017) illustrate how specific subtypes of terrorist are now "split" instead of "lumping" them together into one outcome variable (Gill and Corner,

[12] Despite context being widely viewed as an integral factor in radicalization (Coolsaet, 2016b, p.5; Hafez and Mullins, 2015, p.959; Wali, 2011, p.248), this is not reflected in numerous "Risk Factor Instruments" (see glossary) which have a methodological basis in individualism (Knudsen, 2018, pp.3-4 [see also Sageman 2017c]). Nonetheless, Merari's (2010, p.119) research illustrates that the personality characteristics of incarcerated failed suicide bombers were markedly different from his control group of incarcerated prisoners (unrelated to suicide bombing). He argues that given the rarity of suicide attackers, they may have distinctive personality characteristics (2010, p.243) which make them more susceptible to outside influence (2010, p.222). See also section 5.3.1.

2017, p.238).[13] Doing so disaggregates the actors, illustrating the complexity of roles and highlighting the typologies involved thereby moving away from narrow and linear understandings. This approach is reflected in wider contemporary research. For example, initial research on terrorists indicated psychopathy and particular personalty variables as causal (Gill and Corner, 2017, pp.232-233), subsequent research, spanning decades, has shown terrorists to be relatively normal ("no more or less likely to experience particular mental disorders than the average person on the street" [Gill and Corner, 2017, p.234]) and not mentally ill in relation to the overall population (Esposito, 1992, p.138; Ferracuti, 1982; Post, 1985, p.211; Reich, 1998, pp.275-279; Silke, 2004a, p.1; Schmid, 2013a, p.21; Taylor and Quayle, 1994, p.14; Townshend, 2011, p.16).

However, and despite the brevity of this conclusion, the rise of Daesh coincided with a significantly higher number of people with mental health conditions radicalizing to terrorism (Europol, 2016, p.6) and this led researchers to revisit the role of mental health (van Ginkel *et al.,* 2016, p.64; Corner and Gill, 2018; Gruenewald *et al*., 2013 in Freilich *et al*. 2014, p.362). Another avenue within this paradigm included personality research and attempts at profiling, but evidence for a terrorist personality and subsequent profile were not forthcoming (Al-Lami, 2009,

[13] Scholars disaggregated the study of terrorism on numerous fronts: roles within terrorist groups (Victeroff, 2005), sub-types of terrorist (the lone actor, the foreign fighter and the suicide bomber among others), terrorism as distinct from other tactics (Grisham, 2014, p.12; Malet, 2009, p.109; Taber, 2002, p.ix) such as insurgency (Moghaddam, Berger and Beliakova, 2014) among others (Schmid, 2013a, p.13), the role of mental health in the commissioning of terrorism (Corner, Gill and Mason, 2016; Merari, 2010) and the difference between the contextual factors resulting in the adoption of terrorism in conflict zones as opposed to those in non-conflict zones (Reich, 2009, p.29; Sageman, 2017b; Schmid, 2016a). The process of radicalization itself was also disaggregated; behavioral radicalization was theorized to involve different mechanisms than cognitive radicalization (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017) and various strategies for confronting radicalization were identified. However, terms such as CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) and PVE (Preventing Violent Extremism) are still used synonymously (Boncio, 2018). This thesis contributes to further disaggregation of radicalization and, in line with "radical's" positive tenets, radicalization is presented as a socialization process which may result in anti-social *or* pro-social behaviors (see section 6.6.1 for the perceptive implications of this [see also "Multifinality" in glossary]).

p.3; Crenshaw, 1992; Sageman, 2004), with Bouhana (2018) and Horgan (2017c) questioning the profiling paradigm altogether.

However, situational accounts are more promising as the scholarly consensus is that nobody is born a terrorist and people must therefore undergo a (socialization) process before becoming a terrorist.[14] As such, situational approaches account for the majority of radicalization research. Within this approach, radicalization research is divided into four general research questions, the answers and approaches to which are not mutually exclusive:

1. "Why do people become radicalized?" This encompasses the root cause approach (section 2.3.2.1) and it addresses strains and grievances (facilitative causes and precipitating events) which impact upon attitude and (organizational) behavior. "Why" works in conjunction with the second question.
2. "What enables the radicalization process?" Research within this approach centers largely on ideology and the conditions which enable ideological uptake or extreme ideation in the form of environmental stimuli and conditions (Alimi, Demetriou and Bosi, 2015, p.7) and occurs largely under the assumption that ideology is a contributory or necessary factor. This is critiqued in sections 2.4.1.1, 5.3.1 and 6.5.1.
3. "Who is involved in the radicalization process?" This assumes a network approach to radicalization and research revolves around the roles (formal and informal) of peers, family and mentors in the radicalization process (see section 2.3.2.3).
4. "How do people radicalize?" How radicalization occurs adopts a process centric approach which depicts pathways to terrorism. More often than not, studies within this approach also

[14] Schmid (2013b) notes that radicalization is one means of many to becoming a terrorist.

account for contextual variables, particularly when presented as case studies. As such, "how" questions necessarily incorporate "what" and "who" and, along with illustrating "how" radicalization occurred, conclude on "why", "when" and "where" it occurred. Given its ability to combine these perspectives, "how" questions offer significant insight. As such, the primary question of this thesis is a "how" question (see section 1.2.5).

2.3.2 Situational Approaches

Radicalization research within the situational paradigm is approached from different analytical perspectives and these function at different levels of analysis. These include the root cause approach ("why?" [section 2.3.2.1]), the pathway approach ("how?" [section 2.3.2.2]) and social-centric approaches (section 2.3.2.3). The latter groups numerous (geo)political, behavioral, social psychological, sociological and criminological levels of analysis and present themselves as theories such as rational choice theory, relative deprivation theory, various social psychological theories, interdisciplinary approaches such as social movement theory and a wide variety of empirical analyses with specific foci on "what?" and/or "who?" questions (points 2 and 3 above).

While these three analytical approaches are presented as mutually exclusive, they share many factors in common because what differentiates them are the philosophical paradigms applied to the attributable factors, not necessarily the attributable factors themselves. For example, social identity theory may be applicable within a root cause approach which itself can be framed within the wider geopolitical paradigm. Similarly, a causal pull factor such as a quest for significance (Jasko, LaFree and Kruglanski, 2017; Dugas and Kruglanski, 2014) may also find resonance within criminological theories or frameworks. This is further elaborated on in section 2.3.2.3 which discusses non-process models of radicalization.

2.3.2.1 The Root Cause Approach

In order to avoid undue emphasis on particular analytical levels of radicalization, Schmid (2013a, p.4) recommends a three-level model of analysis for radicalization research; the micro, meso and macro levels (Table 2.1). At the micro level are, largely, case study based approaches which focus on individual level variables referring to dispositions, needs, inclinations, (traumatic) experiences and emotions.[15] For example, see Knight, Woodward and Lancaster (2017). The meso level represents the enabling environment which links the individual to their broader reference group. Research conducted at this level pays particular attention to (small) group dynamics and is, largely, the domain of (social) psychologists. However, various scholars such as Atran (2010) link meso level research with broader societal structures such as culture, history or geopolitics and as such, his analysis bridges the meso and macro levels.

Table 2.1 Levels of Analysis I

Level	Category Focus	(Causal) Factors
Macro	Macro Level Category	Societal factors and strains at the national, international and geopolitical level
Meso	The Socially Intermediate (group) Level Category	The radical milieu which accounts for the supportive and/ or complicit social surround and includes group dynamics
Micro	The Individual Level Category	Identity issues, perceptions of marginalization/discrimination/ alienation/stigmatization/ rejection, (proxy) humiliation, psychopathologies, (moral) outrage and emotions

[15] It should be noted that contemporary research at this analytical level differs substantially from the dispositional approach discussed in section 2.3.1.

The importance of these analytical strata is illustrated by the number of researchers who have similarly articulated their usage. However, Table 2.2 also illustrates that scholars stress different factors within each level and draw the boundaries between and within each in different places.

Table 2.2 Levels of Analysis II

Levels of Analysis	Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010)	ISSCM (2008)	Lia and Skølberg (2004)
Micro	Individual Level Factors	Internal Level	Individual and Group
Meso	Group Level Variables	Social Level	
Macro	Sociological Background Factors	External Level	Societal and National - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - International

Crenshaw (1981, p.30) divides the strata slightly differently by grouping various aspects of the meso and macro level into one group she labels as "situational" (broader political, social and economic conditions) so as to have a separate focus on both the "individual" and the organization (or movement). Others still apply a particular focus on (socio-)cultural level factors (Bartlett *et al.,* 2010; Post, 2005) and networks beyond ones immediate environment (Pedahzur and Perlinger, 2006; Sageman, 2004; Sageman, 2008). Subsequently, these do not easily translate along Schmid's (2013a, p.4) dividing lines but connect the boundaries nonetheless.

However, there is a certain amount of artificiality in separating the causal factors into these mutually exclusive levels as "many macro level factors have a social or an individual

element to them" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009, p.29). For example, relative deprivation can function at both the macro and micro level; this requires one to contrast societal levels of wealth relative to ones own and the dividing line is based on perception; while absolute deprivation can be objectively determined, relative deprivation is subjective (Richardson, 2006, pp.56-57).

Analytical overlaps can occur at three levels:

1. Macro-Down: this may occur when a societal strain manifests itself with the individual at the micro level or the group at the meso level. For example, an individual may attribute their current unemployment status to structural constraints; "I/we can't get a job because where I/ we live there is no work". The prognosis in this situation is to move somewhere with better job prospects.
2. Micro-Up: this would be the opposing dynamic where unemployment is attributed to personal skill-sets; "I/we can't get a job because I/we don't possess the training or knowledge the market demands". The prognosis would be to obtain the necessary qualifications.
3. Meso-Out: this involves group dynamics or ones immediate milieu disingenuously instigating an identity variable for a micro or macro level cause; "You can't get a job because of who you are". This involves an altering or buttressing of perception; a key factor in radicalization research (Cragin *et al.,* 2015, p.8; Khan and Nhlabatsi, 2017, p.1821; Qadir, 2016, p.44-48). Further problematizing this, these overlaps may occur simultaneously. A means of overcoming these involve another form of structuring.

This distinguishes precipitant (short-term triggers [local]) catalysts from permissive (long-term conditions [distal]) factors which direct motivation (Crenshaw, 1981, p.24; Whittaker, 2007, p.14) and are referred to differently throughout the scholarly literature. Much like the three levels of analysis discussed above, these differing terms reflect different foci. For example, while precipitant and permissive factors allude to intensity of experience over time, the following ones distinguish superficial from more comprehensive factors: root causes and contributing factors (Reich, 2009), proximate and ultimate causes (Waller, 2007), big issues and little issues (Horgan, 2017c) and underlying reasons and happenings (Bokhari *et al.,* 2006, pp.32-33). Another way of conceiving of these, as this thesis does, is push and pull factors, most commonly referred to as either a singular risk factor or "drivers" in the plural (see "Risk Factor Instruments" in glossary).

Push factors manifest themselves by means of an individual's general dissatisfaction with current circumstances. This may include personal grievances or a personal crisis but may also include factors at any level of analysis. For example, structural imbalances (Gupta, 2018, p.150) may lead to a gap between expectations and fulfillment (Merari and Friesland, 2009, pp.348-349) resulting in variations of the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard *et al.,* 1939), relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970; Huntington, 1968) or humiliation-revenge mechanisms (see glossary). Modifying these to *perceived* inequality (Blau and Blau, 1982; Taber, 2002, p.183) or *perceived* humiliation is perhaps a more applicable approach (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008, p.4) particularly because no direct correlation between terrorism and various structural factors (such as GDP or poverty) have been empirically found (Gupta, 2008; Krueger and Malekova, 2003; Piazza, 2006).

On the other hand, pull factors encompass those which draw an individual and would include radicalizing influences such as a recruiter (who Reinares, Garcia-Calvo and Vicente [2017] refer to as "radicalizing agents") or a sense for belonging and purpose (Borum, 2014, p. 293). However, risk factors are neither indicative nor predictive of radicalization (Horgan, 2014a, p.162). Furthermore, (many of the) factors which push or pull an individual toward radicalization are in scholarly dispute (Cragin *et al.,* 2015, p.1; Sageman, 2008, p.68). For example, some scholars, particularly those focusing on European Jihadists, stress the role of push factors (Coolsaet, 2016b; Weggemans, Bakker and Grol, 2014) while others stress pull factors (Dawson and Amarasingam, 2017, p.206). While these differences may stem from the analytical traditions from which radicalization is researched, they may also be a product of contextual factors which, given variation, may result in conflicting conclusions.

As stated earlier in this section, a risk factor may function at any of the three levels of analysis and manifest itself as both pull and push simultaneously. Therefore, determining which drivers (or combination thereof) caused one to radicalize is exceedingly difficult (see section 2.3.2.2). For example, the quest for belonging (a pull factor at the personal level) may be a function of ones socio-economic status (a push factor at the macro level); with no job and a stunted social life, one may join a gang for income and companionship. Over time, and under the nefarious influence of a well-liked recruiter, one may engage in obsessive victim footage viewing with friends (pull factors at the meso level) and develop empathy with victims, particularly when their suffering resonates with personal experience (and the victims are perceived as part of one's community) and the desire to avenge perceived injustices; "Vicarious

Deprivation" (section 1.3.2.1.4) and "Pathological Altruism" (section 1.3.2.1.9) - push factors which function at all three levels simultaneously.

This illustrates that the factors which coalesced and resulted in one joining a group may not be those which sustained group involvement and subsequent behavior (see section 4.5.1). There are two implications to this:

1. The pathway should be disaggregated from the radicalization process (section 4.5). Indeed, this was one of the research findings of this thesis: the research participants undefined aim of "doing the right thing" (pathway) resulted in them mobilizing to "Sham" (among other Jihadist conflict zones) to assist civilians based on elevated empathy harnessed through "Group Priorities" (section 1.3.2.3.1), role-modeling (section 1.3.2.2.3) and the humanitarian prognostic (section 1.3.2.1.17). But "doing the right thing" was not why they joined the humanitarian group; they joined the group through chance social contact (see section 4.5.1) and were "open" (section 1.3.2.1.3) to joining the group by a desire to "do the right thing" (see section 4.4).
2. Therefore, an attractive alternative would be one which fulfills as many of the same needs or drivers which coalesce to result in Jihadism, but reconfigured through constructive role-modeling and pro-social group priorities to result in beneficent behavior (the humanitarian prognostic [located within Western norms and the democratic consensus] which competes with the Jihadist one); the purpose of the Indirect Approach (see section 1.3.2.1). The following section details the analytical approach adopted in this thesis.

2.3.2.2 Pathway Approaches

The type of data collected in this thesis presents itself as the second of the three analytical approaches to the study of radicalization presented in section 2.3.2; the pathway approach. This is typified by the primary research question being "how" centric and is popular within radicalization research because it presents data contextually which incorporates factors at all three levels of analysis. The tendency within this approach is to ask "how" questions and, with sufficient data, attempt to answer "why" in analysis rather than asking directly (see section 4.5.1). Unlike other approaches, the pathway approach is (initially at least) well-aligned to grounded theory in that it is data-led rather than theory informed. That is, prior to the application of a conceptual framework, this approach delineates what occurred prior to the behavior in question and this, to a significant extent, can be objectively ascertained.

"How" research questions within a constructivist and emic approach (such as grounded theory) are well positioned to probe the social construction of meaning and inherent subjectivity, rather than taking research participants substantive accounts at face value (Hardin, 2002, p.4; Horgan, 2014a, p.87). This is important because people may not be aware of "why" they engaged in a particular activity (Barrett and Martin, 2014, p.197; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008a, p.6; Klausen *et al.,* 2015, p.69; Malet, 2013, p.7; Sageman, 2017a, pp.105-106) or they may "find it hard to articulate what led them to make the decisions they made" (United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, 2017, p.3). Alternatively, they may rationalize or justify their behavior when asked (Byrne, 2016, p.107; Coolsaet, 2016a, p.21; Kahneman, 2011; Tavris and Aronson, 2015). Some may spin their stories in order to present themselves in a more favorable manner (Horgan, 2009, p.15). People also lie (Speckhard, in Middle East Institute 2016; Stephens-Davidowitz, 2017) or,

more specifically, terrorists may be deceptive when interviewed (Huesmann and Huesmann, 2018, p.156; Sageman, 2017b, p.xvi).[16]

Finally, they may warp the truth believing it to be real as Roy (2017b) demonstrates with "Cedric", a French Jihadist who claimed at his trial: "I'm not a keyboard jihadi, I didn't convert on YouTube. I read the scholars, the real ones." Roy (2017b) notes that this comment was made even though Cedric cannot read Arabic and met the members of his network over the internet. The point here is two-fold: Cedric may truly believe his own story. As such, establishing truthfulness poses significant challenges (Moore, 2007, p.54). Consequently, when attempting to understand why an individual radicalizes, researchers should be cautious in ascribing causality through self-accounts of radicalization, particularly from research participants who have not had the time, or are not of the maturity, to reflect on their own radicalization. As such, pathway approaches recommend answering "why" in analysis after documenting "how" it happened.

"How" research questions are an accessible means with which to proceed because answers can be traced in interview; "particular events are usually recalled with more clarity and vivid detail then are the stages of gradual…involvement" (Horgan, 2005, p.88 in Pisoiu, 2012, p. 25). Therefore, deciphering *why* people mobilize is more effectively done in analysis (with sufficient data and knowledge) rather than asking directly because, as demonstrated by Cedric, "the 'motivation' [to act] may rarely be the actual 'cause'" (Peters, R. S. in Horgan, 2014a, p.

[16] Nonetheless, scholars have argued that it is important to listen to what they have to say (Anonymous, 2003; Bjorgo, 2018; Roy 2017b).

90).[17] The models which result from this present radicalization as a process with varying levels of complexity which take place over a period of time involving various factors at all levels of analysis.

To illustrate this, Sinai's (2012, pp.22-23) model is presented because process models are used in section 4.6 to demonstrate the credibility of the model which resulted from data analysis (Figure 4.2). Sinai (2012) divides the terrorism trajectory into three distinct phases: (1) Radicalization, (2) Mobilization (active engagement) and (3) Action (the terrorist act). Phase one is comprised of six factors (personal factors [resulting in a person seeking something which addresses their concerns], political/socioeconomic, ideological, community [sub-culture], group factors and enabling factors [opportunity]). Phase two is characterized by triggers which propel the individual. These take the form of opportunities (such as radical contacts in ones network), capability (the skill [acquired through training] to carry out a specific task) and readiness to act. The final phase involves target selection and execution.

Despite its ability to capture a wide array of factors at all levels of analysis, there are five drawbacks to pathway approaches such as Sinai's (2012) model. These limitations are presented next and are returned to in section 4.4.2 which offers a critical appraisal of Figure 4.2 (the pathway and process model of the research research participants).

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[17] To further this point, Silke (in Byrne, 2017), who has conducted interviews with jailed British Jihadists, states "When I ask them why they got involved, the initial answer is ideology … But if I talk to them about how they got involved, I find out about family fractures, what was happening at school and in their personal lives, employment discrimination, yearnings for revenge for the death toll of Muslims." Similarly, in Venhaus's (2010) study of 2032 foreign fighters in Iraq, he notes "many of the subjects interviewed for this study initially claimed that their reason for fighting was to punish the West for its attacks on Muslims. As the discussions progressed, however, it became clear that they had been angry with members of their families, especially their fathers, or had been involved in neighborhood disputes and squabbles before becoming interested in al-Qaeda" (Venhaus, 2010, pp.8-9). This means of analysis will be returned to in more detail in sections 5.4.5 to 5.5.

1. While not necessarily sequential, pathway models such as Sinai's (2012) model are nonetheless presented as such and this gives the impression of an "orderly image" (Hafez and Mullins, 2015, p.960).
2. Another misgiving is that they do not articulate precisely how an individual or group progressed from one stage to the next (Bouhana, 2018).
3. A shortcoming of the pathway approach is to "de-emphasize" and/or neglect the wider macro causes (Neumann, 2013, p.875; Sedgwick, 2010, pp.480-481).
4. Pathway approaches do not clarify why others, in the same situation with similar (or identical) stressors did not radicalize (see section 5.2). This is the central question of radicalization research and results from this research indicate that, rather than not radicalizing, non-terrorists and non-extremists may engage in other activities (some of which may be construed as radical and may also be premised on similar or identical sacred values [see Table 4.5]) which are also impactful and fulfill the same or similar needs as terrorist affiliation, but are imperceptible to terrorism researchers because these alternatives do not involve terrorism or extremism.
5. The major flaw with the pathway approach is foundational; dependent variable selection bias which results in a confirmation bias (see sections 1.2.8, 1.3.1.6, 3.5.5 and 5.2). That is to say, pathway studies start by selecting cases of terrorism and/or extremism and then reason backwards so as to outline the experienced radicalization process (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009, p.17).

The model which resulted from this thesis (Figure 4.2) accounts for all five: Figure 4.2 is not presented as an orderly image, merely the pathway is but this is a product of it being a

composite model (see section 4.4.2). Figure 4.2 articulates how the research participants progressed through each pathway stage and depicted how and why others did not progress. The third drawback, "deemphasizing the wider macro causes" was indeed a shortcoming in creating Figure 4.2. However, macro causes were accounted for in coding. For example, Figure 3.7 linked delinquency to wider macro level factors. However, these did not reach saturation and are therefore not displayed in Figure 4.2 (but are discussed in section 4.4).

Part of the original contribution to knowledge of this thesis concerns the latter two points (4 and 5): in addressing the dependent variable selection bias, the research design of this thesis did not select cases of successful terrorism or extremism and then reason backwards. Instead, it selected research participants who were (morally) opposed to (violent) extremism (Table 3.3) but who nonetheless matched Jihadists on socio-demographics, risk factors, pre-mobilization behaviors and mobilized destinations (Jihadists conflict zones) (see section 3.5.5.2 and Table 3.4). Furthermore, by selecting non-(violent) extremists and illustrating that the socialization process they proceeded through applies equally to them as it does to Jihadists ("Multifinality" [see glossary]), this thesis cautiously attempts to answer the third shortcoming (the central question of radicalization research ["Why them and not others?"]) by concluding that more people may have radicalized than current understandings of radicalization have accounted for (see section 4.3).

2.3.2.3 Social-Centric Approaches and Resultant Non-Process Models

Numerous theoretical approaches are encapsulated within this paradigm, with the most discussed being social identity theory (such as Sageman [2017b]), network theory (such as

Sageman, 2004), social movement theory (such as Wiktorowicz [2005])[18], empirical approaches (such as Silver *et al.* [2018]) and combined approaches (such as McCauley and Moskalenko [2011]). However, the models which result from analysis at this social-centric level do not necessarily follow any particular approach or theory because many aim to account for radicalization across different contexts and time periods and this results in de-contextualized overviews (see: Hafez and Mullins, 2015; Koehler, 2017).

For example, McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) list twelve mechanisms functioning at the individual, group and macro level of analysis but, while accounting for all levels of analysis, this may be construed as a one-size-fits-all approach where all mechanisms or factors are equally weighted until a context is applied. In other words, they do not provide a framework which indicates how these mechanisms work together in radicalizing an individual or group because doing so would require contextual factors. Numerous radicalization models are constructed in this format (COT Institute, 2008, p.16; Veldhuis and Staun, 2009, p.24) and Pisoiu (2012, p.46) has argued that they resort to "piling" various factors into one relatively unstructured model. Nonetheless, as stated in section 2.2.3, this is increasingly how contemporary radicalization models are being presented (della Porta, 2018; Jensen, *et al.,* 2018).

2.3.3 Concluding Remarks

This thesis is a grounded theory study and as such, the literature review is determined by data analysis (see Figure 3.9). As radicalization was but one of the results, sections 2.4 to 2.6 address further results and conceptualizations by providing the theoretical grounding upon which they are based. Therefore, sections 2.2 and 2.3 only provided a cursory overview of the various

[18] Wiktorowicz's (2005) model has also been described as "process centric" and therefore categorized as a pathway approach. As stated, these approaches are not mutually exclusive.

approaches taken within radicalization research. For a more comprehensive analysis of these approaches, the author directs the reader to the numerous literature reviews discussing these approaches and the theories they pertain to (Allan *et al*., 2015; Bondokji *et al.,* 2017; Borum 2011a; Borum, 2011b; Borum, 2011c; Dzhekova *et al.*, 2016; Koomen and Van Der Pligt, 2016; Nasser-Eddine *et al.,* 2011; Schmid, 2013a).

2.4 Radicalization and Means of Negation

This section commences with a criticism of radicalization and in so doing, builds the foundation for the conceptualization of radicalization as a vector (section 4.3). There are two implications to conceiving of radicalization as a vector; the benevolently radicalized may function as a credible control or comparison group for radicalization research (chapter five) as well as an attractive alternative to Jihadism (chapters six and seven). The remaining sections of this chapter are devoted to structuring the argument towards presenting benevolently radicalized groups as attractive alternatives to Jihadism. To do so, section 2.4.1 criticizes radicalization on two accounts; the thought-leading-to-behavior principle and the role of emotion in radicalization. The latter also functions as an introduction to section 2.5 which discusses the concept of framing and in so doing, illustrates how protocols function within a frame and how emotions align with frames to ward off competing narratives; a significant obstacle which will need to be addressed if communication and narratives in particular are to be used as a tool for preventing Jihadism.

Section 2.6 provides the footing for the use of alternative narratives presented in sections 6.3 and 7.3. It does so by illustrating the shortfalls of counter-narratives and builds upon the arguments presented in sections 2.4 and 2.5. A brief overview is presented in section 2.7. Overall,

sections 2.4 to 2.6 serve as the foundation for the presentation of radicalization as a vector (section 4.3) and this conceptualization (premised on "Multifinality" [see glossary]) paves the way for the benevolently radicalized to be presented as a potential control or comparison group for future radicalization research (chapter five) as well as functioning as an alternative to Jihadism for particular typologies (chapters six and seven).

2.4.1 Critical Appraisal of Extremism-to-Terrorism

As discussed above, a frequent means of understanding radicalization is a "process whereby people tun to extremism" (Neumann, 2017, p.17). Therefore the process of radicalization is theorized to commence with "Cognitive Radicalization" (see glossary) (Neumann, 2013, p.873 and p.880; Sageman, 2016, p.105; Vidino, 2010, pp.4-5). The problem is, the causal sequence of cognitive to behavioral radicalization has been brought into question (Borum, 2011b, p.8; Dyer, McRoy, Rodriguez and Van Duyn, 2007, p.3; Horgan, 2014a, p.162; Khalil, 2014; Kundnani, 2015a, p.288; Sageman, 2016, p.106). Specifically, most extremists do not engage in violence (Khosrokhavar, 2017, p.4; Sageman, 2017b, p.9). As such, McCauley and Moskalenko (2017) distinguished radicalization of opinion from radicalization of action, as have others (see section 4.2). A further problem is that an untold quantity have engaged in terrorism without the use of a supporting ideology (Horgan, 2014a, p.84; Kundnani, 2015b, p.23; Vergani, *et al.,* 2018, p.3).

Sedgwick's (2010, p.490) comparison of radicalization definitions illustrates "disagreement about the … relationship between thought and action" as articulated by others (della Porta and LaFree, 2012, p.7; Horgan, 2014a, p.84; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, p. 105; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014a, p.603; Pisiou, 2012, p.12). Indeed, the attitude-behavior

axis is central in defining radicalization (Dzhekova *et al*., 2016, p.12; Horgan, 2014a, p.84) but is tempered by the low conversion rate of political violence arising from the postulated high rate of cognitive radicalization (Horgan, 2014c; Holt *et al.,* 2015, p.111; Kurzman, 2011 in Hafez and Mullins, 2015, p.961; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2009, p.257). This thought-to-action principle is reinforced by the use of the term violent extremism (introduced by policy makers in an attempt to shed the political baggage of terrorism [see section 2.2]) which incorporates any kind of violence inspired by extremism (Neumann, 2017, pp.14-15). Based on this understanding, countering extremism does not counter terrorism, it counters the process of ideological adoption (see section 5.3 for how this impacts upon research). The following sections investigate this and conclude that the thought-leading-to-action premise, while intuitive, omits critical factors and skews policy responses.

2.4.1.1 Thought-to-Behavior

That behavior follows thought, the so-called Cartesian view, makes rational and intuitive sense. The problem is, this sequence has been brought into question (Barrett, 2017; Gorman and Gorman, 2017; Mercier and Sperber, 2017). Indeed, attitudes are not good predictors of all types of behavior (Mackay and Tatham, 2011, pp.169-171; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, p.105 and pp.219-220; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014a, p.603; Wicker, 1969). Specifically, holding extremist beliefs is a poor indicator of violent action (Dawson and Amarasingam, 2017, p.10; Kundnani, 2015a, p.140; Sageman, 2017a, p.80). This is because of the chasm between what people believe and what they actually do (Sageman, 2017b, p.xvi and p.31).

Festinger (1964 in Myers, 2010, p.123), who founded cognitive dissonance theory (section 1.3.2.3.3), theorized that it may function the other way round; attitudes can follow

behavior (Cialdini, 2007, pp.57-113; Myers, 2010, p.132) and behaviors can affect moral attitudes (Myers, 2010, p.140). Critically, self-justification post-behavior is more readily achieved than acting in accord with ones beliefs (Abelson, 1972; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, p.220; Myers, 2010, p.145). As such, Staub (2013, p.399) states that "people learn by doing". The "Learning-By-Doing Principle" (introduced in section 1.3.2.3.6) discussed next forms the foundation for answering the third research question of this thesis (section 1.2.5) addressed in chapter seven: "How could humanitarianism be presented in order to function as an effective alternative to Jihadism?"

Doing influences thinking (Myers, 2010, p.148) to such an extent that acting one's way into a new way of thinking is easier than thinking ones way into a new way of acting (Pascale *et al.,* 2010; Singhal *et al.*, 2014, p.22). This is why "attempts to change behavior by changing attitudes often fail" (Myers, 2010, p.125). The problem is, changing attitudes (or illustrating failures in reasoning) is the premise assumed by counter-narratives (see section 2.6).

Zimbardo (2007, p.449) offers an example: "Talmudic scholars are supposed to have preached not to require that people believe before they pray, only to do what is needed to get them to begin to pray: then they will come to believe in what and to whom they are praying". Similarly, Mackay and Tatham (2011, pp.169-170) note that British attitudes toward wearing seat belts were negative until after drivers began wearing them. Research that controlled for the effect of advertising on attitudes about seat belts showed that the act of wearing the seat belt resulted in a more favorable attitude towards wearing it, rather than a favorable attitude toward the seat belt itself. Wearing the seat belt thus became cognitively favorable *after* the behavior had taken place. In other words, once made, "decisions grow their own self-justifying legs of support" (Myers,

2010, p.145). As such, Horgan (2017c) and Holt *et al.* (2015, p.111) note that ideological adoption may be a by-product of involvement - a conclusion supported by the results of this thesis (see sections 4.4 and 4.5).

Furthermore, a key factor which is lacking in counter-narratives is the effective use of emotion (see "Emotional Needs" in glossary and section 2.4.1.3). This, in contrast to the highly emotional output of Daesh footage which legitimizes grievances, designates a culprit and justifies righting-the-wrong (see sections 1.3.1.3 and 4.7.2). The following sections discuss the role of emotion in decision-making (the foundation for what is presented in section 6.6.2) and in the process, advocates for its adoption and operationalization in preventing Jihadism.

2.4.1.2 The Emotional Elephant in the Room

Over time, the rational linearity of cognitive constructs such as attitudes or thoughts causing behavior (or, for the purposes of this thesis, cognitive-to-behavioral radicalization) was brought into question, initially by Tversky and Kahneman (1973) and later by Sutherland (1992). But it was Damasio (1994) who, in his work with a brain-damaged patient, stumbled across the realization that emotion was a critical part of the decision-making process; "feeling was an integral component of the machinery of reason" (Damasio, 2006, p.xxii). Further research demonstrated the interlaced nature between cognition and emotion (Brookfield, 1987, p.12; Greene, 2015; Haidt, 2013a). As Weston (2008, p.51) notes, "feeling and thinking evolved together, and nature 'designed' them to work together". Indeed, emotions play a pivotal role in human nature (Benthall, 2004, p.205) as well as a systematic and profound role in almost every cognitive process (Kilter and Lerner, 2010, p.342). As discussed in section 2.6.4, emotions powerfully influence how humans make decisions (Gorman and Gorman, 2017, p.21; Thaler,

2015). Damasio (2006) subsequently researched the neurological mechanics of decision-making and concluded with the "somatic marker hypothesis" (2006, pp.165-201) which posits that emotional processes guide and/or bias behavior, particularly decision-making (see section 2.6.4).

As the concept gained acceptance within scientific circles, Kahneman (2011), summarizing decades of research, distinguished between fast, instinctual and emotional modes of thought (System 1) (characteristic of the process of categorization [Sageman, 2017b, p.6] - what Kahneman [2011, p.98] refers to as "heuristics" and what Cialdini [2007] refers to as "fixed action patterns") and slower, deliberative and logical modes of thought (System 2)[19] concluding that people place too much confidence in human rational judgment because, contrary to popular thought, System 1 guides System 2.[20]

In more illustrative terms, Haidt (2013a, pp.52-71) described it as "the rider and the elephant" where System 2 is the rider attempting to coax the elephant (System 1) into doing what the rider wants. While the rider represents conscious and controlled processes such as reasoning, "the elephant represents the other 99 percent" (Haidt, 2013b, p.306). Similarly, Barrett (2017, p. 80) states that "affect is in the drivers seat and rationality is a passenger" - a conclusion identical to Kahneman (2011) and Haidt (2013a) who concluded that in the battle for emotion over reason, "elephants rule" (Haidt, 2013a, p.52). As such, "when we feel bad, we act bad" (Berkowitz in Hueseman and Hueseman, 2018, p.157).

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[19] However, Gorman and Gorman (2017, p.181) note that this dichotomy is "a serious oversimplification of how the mind works".

[20] It should be noted that Kahneman (2011) views these systems as distinct forms of inference (System 1 being intuition and System 2 being reasoning) while Mercier and Sperber (2017, pp.107-175) view System 2 (reasoning) as also being a form of intuitive inference.

There is good reason why human cognition functions like this; without heuristics we would grind to "a perplexed and fatal standstill" (Taylor, 2004, p.151). Benthall (2004, p.209) likens such a person to Mr. Spock, the highly rational character from Star Trek, and states that without emotion, such a person would be "mentally paralyzed when faced with many everyday dilemmas". Similarly, Gorman and Gorman (2017, p186) note, "if we engaged our dorsolateral prefrontal cortex every time we need to make a decision, we would be locked in place all day trying to figure things out when our own experience could give us a quick path to action." Therefore, as alluded to in section 2.3.2.2, when people's rationale is tinged with emotion, they may not be fully aware of why they engaged in particular behaviors.

Human decisions are interwoven with emotions (Damasio, 2006; Haidt, 2013a; Kahneman, 2011; Sunstein, 2009, p.52; Thaler, 2015), emotions are at the root of everything we do (Lewis, Amini and Lanon, 2001, p.36) and human lives are defined by emotions (Linjakumpu, 2017, p.19). Human beings are not primarily rational actors (Ariely, 2009; Gorman and Gorman, 2017; Mercier and Sperber, 2017; Thaler, 2015; Weston, 2008) and concepts such as the rational economic person (*homo economicus*) who controls their emotions in order to make reasoned economical judgements are rooted in a "neural fairytale" and "biological fallacy" (Barrett, 2017, p.80). In other words, human beings are irrational by design, not by default.[21] This brings into question the rational models used as frameworks for understanding political acts of violence (Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva and Media, 2011, p.507) and the role ideology (particularly as a theological or geo-political mechanism) is posited to play as a causal factor. Overall, without accounting for emotion (and moral reasoning which incorporates

[21] However, for an exception to this, see Cleckley (2015) in section 5.4.6.

emotion [Atran, 2006, p.127; Sageman, 2017a, pp.145-146]) frameworks for understanding or influencing Jihadism are fundamentally flawed.

2.4.1.3 The Role of Emotion in Terrorism

The role of emotion has generally been under researched within terrorism studies (Bartlett *et al.,* 2010, pp.31-34; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014a, p.605) and is "rarely a central issue in radicalization research due to the limitation of available evidence" (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, p.221). They furthermore reason that "if emotions can affect those who invest their savings in the stock market, it is likely that emotions also affect those who invest their lives in intergroup conflict" (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014a, p.605).

However, and to the contrary, emotionality in various forms is nonetheless frequently mentioned in the literature (Atran, 2010, p.305; Bartlett and Miller, 2012, p.17; Bartol and Bartol, 2013, p.210; Byrne, 2016, p.95; Change Institute, 2008, p.124; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008b, p.11; della Porta, 2013, p.20; Fergusson, 2017, p.109; Haase and Somaskanda, 2017; Hegghammer in Anthony, 2017; Holt, Freilich, Chermak and McCauley, 2015, p.114; Horgan, 2014a, p.79; Khoshrokhavar, 2009, pp.233-234; Knight, Woodward and Lancaster, 2017, p.32; Kundnani, 2015a, p.127; Malet, 2013, p.5; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017, p.214; Nesser, 2015, p.24; Qadir, 2016, p.26; Ragheb, 2014, p.13; Radicalization Awareness Network, 2018, p. 302; Rice, 2009 in Horgan, 2014a, p.79; Richardson, 2006, p.49; Sageman, 2008, p.40; Sageman, 2017a, p.138; Schmid, 2013a, p.33; Schomerus, El-Taraboulsi-McCarthy and Sandhar, 2017, p.3; Staub, 2013, p.506; Tosini, 2010, p.394; Venhaus, 2010, p.6). For example, Hueseman and Hueseman (2018, p.158) note that if one's in-group is perceived as being excluded, the

aroused affect may prime violent scripts which may coalesce with hostile schemas (further outlined in section 2.5).

Three examples are presented to bring the centrality of emotions to the fore in the commissioning of terrorism as well as providing the footing for how the same emotions which propel Jihadism may also be utilized pro-socially through the provision of a benevolent frame under the stewardship of "altruistic guides" (Staub, 2015, p.130 [section 1.3.2.2.3]), constructive group priorities (section 1.3.2.3.1) and pro-social prognostics (section 1.3.2.1.17) as initially presented in section 1.3.2:

1. "The motivations of the FTFs [Foreign Terrorist Fighters] in this sample seem more emotional than ideological. This is particularly the case with the younger fighters. The belief that it is one's duty to defend members of the in-group is often confused in their minds with ideas of 'jihad' and other tenets of religious ideology" (United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, 2017, p.40).
2. "A common pattern in separatist and other radical movements has been the reluctance of militants to openly admit how influential certain emotions were in their decision to join radical organizations. It can be argued that their political motivation would probably appear less relevant if those emotions were to be seen as motivational factors" (European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalization, 2008, p.16).
3. "For many people, violent jihad is about emotion, not intellect or reasoning" (Bartlett *et al.,* 2010, p.31).

The reasons why emotions are not at the forefront of research in radicalization are two-fold:

1. More time and resources have been spent researching rational decision-making where the pros and cons of an action are weighed over moral or emotional or devoted behavior (Atran, 2006). Indeed, since the Enlightenment, Western society has placed extraordinary value on logic and reason (Haidt, 2013b, p.301; Wright-Neville and Smith, 2009, p.89) thereby underplaying the important role of emotions in judgements and decisions (Kilter and Lerner, 2010, p.342; Lewis *et al.,* 2001, pp.36-37).[22] This necessarily impacted upon understandings of radicalization and perhaps is also why counter-narratives adopt a more rational approach to preventing and countering (violent) extremism (see section 2.6).
2. Emotions are often grouped under the heading of "Grievance". The problem with doing so is that personal emotions become intertwined within a framework or narrative. Therefore, researchers are unable to disaggregate the raw emotion from the frame (see sections 1.3.2.3.2 and 2.5). That is to say, they are presented as analytically fused. Indeed, destructive ideologies aim to bind a personal emotion to its espoused cause, as discussed next.

2.5 Framing and the Construction of Social Reality

As stated in section 1.3.2.3.2, frames are mental structures which shape how people perceive the world; they organize experience. As a result, they influence behavior and what counts as good or bad outcomes (or consequences) of those behaviors. Different disciplines use different words for this; social cognition theory uses the word cognitive "schema". Political science and political psychology use "frames". The philosophy of science terms these as

[22] Indeed, much the same can be said for the secular bias within academia which necessarily downplays the role of religion or, more specifically, religious sentiments.

“paradigms" while cultural studies use the term “social scripts”.[23] “Frame” was selected for this thesis because framing theory (discussed below) is utilized in the Indirect Approach (see Figure 7.3).

The concept of framing, or means of organizing experience, was first introduced by Goffman (1974). Frames function by structuring how ones perceives an event or society. This refers to ones worldview, phrased by Goffman as ones “schemata of interpretation”. This includes moral values and general beliefs. The focus of framing theory is on the social production of meaning and the dissemination thereof. A key tenet of framing theory is that the meanings derived from an event are neither objective nor self-evident; a multitude of meanings may be assigned and, in congruence with the constructivist approach adopted in this thesis, this alludes to multiple visions of social reality. Therefore, framing theory seeks to understand group behavior by understanding the social reality shared by group members. Frames do not merely provide meaning, they form the architecture of ones perception. However, they are only adopted if they can be successfully disseminated and brought to resonate with potential adherents. This is what Wiktorowicz (2005) refers to as “frame alignment”; the congruence between an individual and a groups values and beliefs.

There are four types of frame alignment, three of which are of relevance for the Indirect Approach presented in section 7.3:

1. “Frame Bridging” links “two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem” (Snow *et al*., 1986, p.467). Bridging occurs

[23] Social scripts are a specific instance or application of a schema. For example, violent behavior is a script within a hostile world schema. As such, scripts are activated by situational factors and are interpreted through a frame (Huesemann and Huesemann, 2018, p.157).

between a movement and an individual. This is facilitated by a movement organization which links the movement with "an unmobilized sentiment pool or public opinion cluster, or across social movements" (Benford and Snow, 2000).

2. Frame amplification involves "the invigoration of an interpretive frame (particularly values and beliefs) that bears on a particular issue" (Snow *et al.*, 1986, p.467). The most effective (that is, resonating) frames are those which utilize values and beliefs (Benford and Snow, 2000). Frame amplification is of particular relevance to movements that have been stigmatized because these very values and/or beliefs contradict those of the dominant culture (Berbrier 1998).
3. Frame extensions are how movements incorporate participants by extending their interests to include those of potential adherents (Benford and Snow, 2000; Snow *et al*., 1986).

Frames necessarily impact upon (subsequent or antecedent) behavior. For example, after a frame has resonated and when presented with a problem, the frame plays a significant role in determining behavior because it influences perception. Conversely, a frame can also be incorporated after a behavior has been engaged in because, according to dissonance theory, one must justify that behavior in order to avoid dissonance (see section 1.3.2.3.3). As stated in Section 2.4.1.1, this is why some scholars have articulated the view that ideological uptake may also be a product of involvement rather than something which precedes behavior, as was the case with the research participants of this study (see sections 4.4 and 4.5).

As discussed in sections 1.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.1 and further elaborated on in section 4.5.1, pro-social group priorities and constructive role-models were instrumental in instilling the humanitarian prognostic response of the research participants. However, as illustrated in section

4.4 and discussed in sections 4.5.1 and 6.5.2, this occurred largely through (resonating) chance encounters with aid workers. As will be discussed in section 6.1, the Indirect Approach proposes to formalize such chance encounters into a structured format (see "Biomimicry" in glossary). Section 7.3.2 recommends that benevolently radicalized groups receive state funding in order to promote their prognostic response. The immediate purpose of this is to stymy Jihadist recruitment and prevent "Pathological Altruism" (sections 1.3.2.1.9 and 5.4.6); bolstering benevolently radicalized groups would ensure that more pre-Jihadists have more opportunities to have such fortuitous encounters. Were these encounters to resonate, pre-Jihadists would be diverted from Jihadism. Supporting this is the assertion that the malevolently radicalized and the benevolently radicalized recruit from the same sentiment pool (see sections 3.5.5.2 and 6.1). Therefore, as argued in section 7.5.2.1, the benevolently radicalized prognostic also competes with the Jihadist prognostic by offering an alternative yet competing narrative (premised on the same or similar sacred values [see "Group Priorities" in Table 4.5]) which constructively channels emotions and fulfills needs.

2.5.1 Recapitulation

At this point it is important to provide a comprehensive re-cap on what has been presented after section 2.3. Section 2.4 discussed the limitations of the thought-leading-to-action sequence and has instead argued that human cognition can also be influenced by behavior. This forms a central tenet of the preventative Indirect Approach. Another tenet the Indirect Approach rests on is the role of emotion, the influence of which seems to be underutilized in C/PVE. It was argued that emotion should be disaggregated from the analytical construct under which it is usually deposited (grievances [see the discussion disaggregating "motivation" from "cause" in

section 2.3.2.2]) and that an effective means of countering malevolent frames is to provide competing but nonetheless beneficent ones which exist within social norms and are premised on similar sacred values (see Table 4.5). What follows relates how frames are connected to emotions and why the rational approach of counter-messaging is unlikely to resonate and, worst of all, may even provide substance to nefarious prognostics.

2.5.2 Emotion and Protocols

Section 2.3 commenced by stating that "radicalization is largely agreed upon to occur at the intersection of the enabling environment and a personal trajectory". This section provides a focussed view of this and, combining the previous arguments, demonstrates how one's emotional state is influenced by protocols under the stewardship of a frame. It illustrates that linking an emotion to a larger narrative cultivates the sense that the etiology of ones emotion is endemic to the wider in-group. As such, this rhetorical technique serves the purpose of incorporating the catalyst event into a wider narrative. For this to be successful, the frame must be able to effectively bridge one's personal experience and the corresponding (or personal) emotions with the wider narrative. The argument is that this can be maladaptive (Jihadism) or adaptive (the proposed Indirect Approach).

2.5.2.1 Empirical Protocols

Empirical literature is replete with experiments where research participants are manipulated by protocols designed specifically to induce neurological responses (Forgas and East, 2008; Ruys and Stapel, 2008) with results being validated by fMRI (Corbettta and Shulman, 2002). For example, reading the word "apple" makes the brain respond, to a certain extent, as if the apple is actually present (Barrett, 2017, p.27). Despite the protocol being "false",

it nonetheless elicits a neurological response which is “true” in the sense that it is felt - sensory neurons fire to produce sensations about the apple (taste, smell, texture) and other neurons fire to start digestive processes.

Experimental protocols such as these transition to what Sageman (2017a, p.118) discovered about the process of radicalization: “most global neojihadis I interviewed attributed their politicization to watching videos of slaughtered Muslims in distant lands”. Indeed, similar conclusions have been presented by numerous researchers (Bartlett *et al.,* 2010, pp.31-34; Bokhari *et al.,* 2006, p.14; Dearey, 2010, p.154; Holt *et al.,* 2015, p.107; Nesser, 2015, pp. 94-100; Neumann, 2017, p.23; Pisoiu, 2015, p.18; Staub, 2013, p. 191; Vidino and Hughes, 2015, p.27) and one former (convert) Jihadist (Storm, Lister and Cruikshank, 2015, pp.49-51). This is known as vicarious deprivation (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008b, p.5; Sageman, 2004, pp.48-50; Sageman, 2008, pp.95-96) or vicarious humiliation (Khosrokhavar, 2009, pp.152-154) as initially presented in section 1.3.2.1.4. These are the equivalent of protocols which, while “false” in the sense that the individual is not *in situ*, nonetheless elicit emotional responses (such as anger and outrage [Holt *et al.,* 2015, p.114]). The apple and footage protocols demonstrate that “one does not need to personally experience the stimulus in order to experience an output” (Koomen and Van Der Pligt, 2016, p.128).

2.5.2.2 Framing Protocols

How the elicited emotion is utilized is a product of the frame (section 2.5). For example, anger (or moral outrage) can be channeled to violence (Holt *et al.,* 2015, p.109; Mullins, 2016, p. 48; Ranstorp, 2010, p.6; Richardson, 2006, p.42; Sageman, 2008, p.40; Sageman, 2017c). This is an intuitive sequence. But like radicalization as a vector, it can also be a “source of social

progress" (Byrne, 2016, p.118) when positively channeled (Bartlett, *et al.,* 2010, p.25; Githens-Mazer, 2010a, p.19 and p.25; Peucker and Akbarzadeh, 2014, p.136). Similarly, trauma or prior victimization can prime violent responses and/or clinical problems but they can also result in altruism (Staub and Vollhardt, 2008), particularly under conditions of constructive guidance (Staub, 2015, p.133) (see section 4.3.2 and "Altruism Born of Suffering", "Constructive Leadership" and "Multifinality" in glossary). Byrne (2016, p.118) calls this "a fork in the road" where one mobilization path is peaceful and the other violent.

Another important element in how the emotion is interpreted is the behavioral context, specifically role models who can induce malevolence or benevolence (Bierhoff, 2002, p.3; Rahimullah *et al.*, 2013, p.23; Zimbardo, 2007, p.301 and p.450) through the provision of a frame or the cultivation thereof within a community of practice (see section 4.5.1). Related to this, as discussed in section 6.5.1, people also take cues on how to behave from other people (Braddock and Morrison, 2018, p.22; Cialdini, 2007, pp.114-166; Pinker, 2011, p.674). Therefore, and under particular conditions, situational influences may outweigh internal (dispositional) factors in determining behavioral output (Myers, 2010, p.125).[24]

Specifically, this thesis argues that the priorities of the group (section 1.3.2.3.1) play an instrumental role in subsequent behavior. As such, Briggs and Silverman (2014, p.43) recommend that any means of preventing terrorism by channeling the affective arousal inherent in the radicalization process should do so through the provision of an alternative reference group; one which utilizes the momentum of the very emotions (and vales) which drive Jihadism for benevolent purposes through a pro-social frame (see Hasan [2017] in section 7.4). This is what

[24] However, this does not negate the role of agency as discussed in section 6.7.

Schmid (2013a, p.28) would refer to as "social engineering" and plays an instrumental role in the Indirect Approach (see sections 6.5.2 and 7.4). The following section illustrates the limitations of counter-narratives in persuading (particular typologies of) pre-Jihadists from engaging in Jihadism.

2.6 Counter-Narratives

The purpose of counter-narratives is to debunk extremist propaganda (Radicalization Awareness Network, 2015; Ritzmann, 2017, p.2). This is achieved through various means. Some propose to contrast the quality of life in the West with the destruction of Jihadism (de Graaff, 2010 in Nasser-Eddine *et al.,* 2011, p.51). Other approaches adopt a moral perspective by portraying Jihadists as criminals (Kessels, 2010). Emphasizing the resultant civilian suffering is also proposed (Jacobson, 2010) as are religious approaches which stress the peaceful nature of Islam (Kessels, 2010; Qureshi and Marsden, 2010).

This section presents seven limitations of counter-narratives. Doing so is necessary for answering the third question of this thesis; "How could humanitarianism be presented in order to function as an effective alternative to Jihadism?" By clarifying limitations, steps can be taken to ensure future narratives and preventative efforts are as effective as possible. These are subsequently utilized in the Indirect Approach.

2.6.1 Credibility

Counter-messages may be perceived as an erudite form of "culture jamming" (Klein, 2010, pp.279-310) and may at times "seem barely more than a euphemism for state propaganda" (Glazzard, 2017). As such, people have a tendency to dismiss them (Soufan, 2017,

p.298). For this reason, the idea of using former and repentant foreign fighters as a means of dissuading others has been broached by many (Barrett in Townsend, McVeigh and Anthony, 2014; Bloom, 2016; Braddock and Morrison, 2018, p.23; Briggs and Silverman, 2014, p.48; Horgan, 2014c; Kenney, 2018, p.235; Khosrokhavar, 2017; Neumann, 2015; Speckhard in Middle East Institute, 2016; Taylor, 2017).

However, Cottee (2017) argues that there is scant evidence to support the effectiveness of this and that the logic behind using such "retrospective atrocity tales" is flawed; it is meant to capitalize on the former fighters' "street creds" (as argued by Lakhani [2014]) as this makes them trustworthy, a key requirement for credibility (Braddock and Morrison, 2018, p.32; Morrison, 2018). The problem is that this credibility is lost as soon as the cause is relinquished, as similarly noted by the United Nations Office for Counter-Terrorism (2017, p.44). Furthermore, Cottee (2015) argues that these forms of counter-messages minimize the glamour and attractiveness of such groups and causes - frequently mentioned pull factors (Picart, 2015, p.354; Reich, 2009, p. 29; Sageman, 2008, pp.159-160) which Horgan (2017c) labels as "little (but underestimated) factors".

Unlike counter-narratives, the Indirect Approach proposes to use local community members in the form of benevolently radicalized humanitarians. Their credibility is upheld by the consistency of their heroic behavior abroad (see "Heroism" and "Heroic Imagination" in glossary). Their status is confirmed because their enterprise is community funded and at the time of writing, they have initiated long-term projects (read: more expensive) next to their immediate relief efforts.

2.6.2 The Affect Heuristic

A second shortcoming of counter-narratives is that of affect, specifically the affect heuristic which posits that our brains are programmed to respond more strongly to emotional appeals and vivid explanations than to dry facts (Gorman and Gorman, 2017, p.47). Amanullah (in Mitchell, 2017) provides a specific example, "nobody wakes up in the morning and says, 'I can't wait to go out there and fight extremism'…You can't generate that kind of passion on the other side." A similar point was made by Cottee (2015); IS has a narrative and fanboys while counter-messages have neither, perhaps because the worldview or ideologies presented by Jihadists are "emotion-laden concepts" (Braddock and Morrison, 2018, p.14; Venhaus, 2011b). Simpson (2018, p.179) notes that for narratives to be persuasive, they must have emotional as well as rational purchase on an audience.

The problem in countering Jihadist narratives is, viewers need to understand the purpose of the emotionally-laded message and this requires critical thinking. This can be difficult to achieve because "when something provokes an emotional reaction most of the brain may be mobilized to deal with it, leaving fewer resources free for second thoughts" (Taylor, 2004, p. 160). Nonetheless, understanding the emotional pull-power of an ideology or call-to-action is essential in crafting an alternative narrative because it must generate the same enthusiasm and fan base if it is going to resonate and be competitive. In short, counter-messages largely target the neocortex (the analytical and rational areas of the brain) and appeal to reason (or, for the purposes of this thesis, theological doctrine or moderation) whereas Daesh-inspired-Jihadism targets the limbic system (the parts of the brain engaged in processing emotion) and appeals to more visceral instincts (see "Limbic System" and "Prefrontal Cortex" in glossary). Effective

alternative narratives must also target the limbic system and, as argued in section 7.3.2, by encouraging involvement in counter-engagements, these alternative narratives may settle in the neocortex as the frame aligns with the induced behavior ("Dissonance Theory" [1.3.2.3.3]) (see section 2.6.6).

Rational arguments can not effectively compete with affect-centric messaging; "our minds gravitate naturally to clear and simple explanations of things, especially when they are laced with emotional rhetoric" (Gorman and Gorman, 2017, p.13). Furthermore, emotional messages activate more primitive regions of the human brain and these regions, when activated, *inhibit* the more rational, contemplative regions (Gorman and Gorman, 2017, p.48 and pp. 73-74).[25] In such instances, people have a tendency to ignore powerful contrary evidence and, as the following section illustrates, some groups even prosper from it; adherents dismiss it as propaganda resulting in a strengthening of antecedent convictions (Darden, 2018; Gorman and Gorman, 2017, pp.43-44 and p.95; Marsden 2017b; Marsden, 2017c; Sageman, 2017b, p.22; Sunstein, 2009, pp.50-53).

2.6.3 The Backfire Effect

"Merely giving people facts that contradict their beliefs is not sufficient to disconfirm those beliefs" (Gorman and Gorman, 2017, p.136) because once "locked in", new information is assimilated into existing structures (Heuer, 1999 in Moore, 2007, p.25 [see "Status Quo Bias" in glossary]). Paradoxically, such an approach may result in the strengthening of (false) beliefs (Sunstein, 2009, p.51). This bias is known as the "Backfire Effect" (Cook and Lewandowsky, 2011); approaches which aim to correct misperceptions result, paradoxically, in strengthening

[25] It should be noted that the opposite is also true: a powerful PFC (prefrontal cortex) can inhibit the amygdala, so that reason overcomes emotion (Gorman and Gorman, 2017, p.183).

those very convictions. Berger (2017) furthermore argues that attacking the contents of an ideology allows the group propagating it "to craft new and more pernicious justifications". In other words, counter-messages may backfire making people recalcitrant to them. As such, the Indirect Approach does not counter Jihadism. Instead, it recognizes how and why pre-Jihadists mobilize and seeks to channel these constructively (see section 4.7). That is to say, rather than attacking the perceived aggressor, it aims for a perceptive shift in order to engender a victim-centric prognosis (see sections 1.3.1.3 and 4.5.2 and Figures 7.2 and 7.3).

2.6.4 Biased Assimilation

There is a growing body of evidence to suggest that people would rather seek evidence which confirms what they already think rather than seeking new information which would provide a more robust view of reality (Levitt and Dubner, 2014, p.10). This is because sensory stimuli (such as counter-messages) are pre-processed by the thalamus (a part of the limbic system: heuristically framed as the neurological seat of emotion [see glossary]) before being sent to other cortical areas such as the prefrontal cortex (heuristically framed as the seat of rational thinking [see glossary]) (Oakley, 2007, p.185).

This is a product of the evolutionary sequence of cortical development where the limbic system preceded the development of the neocortex (Weston, 2008, p.57). As such, every sensory input is overlaid with an emotional overtone. This is why, for example, words are not perceived as a raw sound; they always evoke an emotion (Pinker, 2008; Sageman, 2017a, p.92; Sunstein, 2009, p.52). Critically, this emotional overlay extends to human reasoning more generally, as discussed in section 2.4.1.1. Subsequently, thinking in a strictly rational manner is particularly difficult. Therefore, and as discussed in section 2.4.1.2, "emote control" (emotional reasoning) is

the human default mode of reasoning (Oakley, 2007, p.187). This means that there is a natural tendency to assimilate information in a biased manner, one which fits with preconceived notions and associated (positive or negative) feelings; a frame (see section 2.5).

A consequence of this is "a crippled epistemology"; strongly held views may be supported by a limited amount of self-selected confirmatory knowledge (Hardin, 2002, p.3). Furthermore, these beliefs can become firmly entrenched in an echo chamber (Sageman, 2008, p. 87; Sunstein, 2009, p80) which are a natural consequence when groups isolate, as Jihadists are documented to do (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p.810; Huband, 2010, p.118; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014a, p.602 [see also "Flocking and Feathering" in glossary]).

2.6.5 Isolation

Isolation poses three important problems for counter-narratives:

1. Group interaction in isolation tends to intensify in-group loyalty, opinions and behaviors in individuals who identify with their group due to no (or limited) outside moderating influences (Githens-Mazer, 2010b; Gómez, *et al*., 2011; Waller, 2007, p.39). As such, isolated groups can become progressively more extreme than any single individual member (see "Risky Shift" in glossary).
2. The human tendency to associate two stimuli perceived at the same time (Cialdini, 2007, p. 12; Kolenda, 2013; Gorman and Gorman, 2017, p.50; Taylor, 2017) as similarly discussed in section 6.6.1. This can be taken advantage of by associating a perceived or real injustice with an "ethereal idea" (Taylor, 2004, p.27) such as a Jihadist frame (see section 5.4.6.3). These linkages are recorded in our associative memory and are updated automatically. That is, without conscious effort and in light of new experiences (Brader, 2005, p.390). Therefore,

within an isolated environment (on or offline), learning and association can be maliciously sculpted and disaggregating that connection is unlikely to be achieved through rational arguments (see section 2.6.6).

3. How are counter-messages meant to make their way into the circles they were designed for rather than "languishing on YouTube or Facebook unable to find an audience?" (Briggs and Silverman, 2014, p.29). Or, as Sunstein (2009, pp.151-152) states, counter-messages should not live "in an echo chamber of its own design." As stated in the previous section, breaching these groups is particularly difficult given that many Jihadist (inspired) groups have a tendency to self-isolate (see "Opportunity Factors" [1.3.2.2.6] and section 7.4).

2.6.6 Role of Knowledge

Limited Islamic knowledge is a frequent finding within contemporary radicalization research (Holt *et al.,* 2015, p.115; Khan, 2016, pp. 47-48; Khoshrokavar, 2009, p.187; Ranstorp, 2010, p.7; Rosenblatt, 2016, p.8) as is religious naivety (Byrne, 2016, p.98; Silke and Brown, 2016, p.136; Venhaus, 2011a). Similarly, as Arendt (1969, pp.19-20) noted on the student movement (1960s), "while the rhetoric of the new militants is clearly inspired by Fanon, their theoretical arguments contain usually nothing but a hodgepodge of all kinds of Marxist leftovers. This is indeed quite baffling for anybody who has ever read Marx or Engels". Indeed, the wording used by contemporary researchers is similar; "Hodgepodge" can be replaced with "Lego Islam" (Kiefer, Hütterman, Dziri, Ceylan, Roth, Srowig and Zick, 2017 in Chase 2017) to denote the cobbling together of primary source material in support of a cause or movement (see also: Ibn Khaldûn, 2015, p.11). This lack of theological rigor is why Hegghammner (in Anthony, 2017) distinguishes between depth of knowledge and intensity of belief and, similarity, why

Dawson and Amrasingham (2016, p.203) characterize their research participants' knowledge as "theologically flawed and incomplete … but probably sincere."

As Mercier and Sperber (2017, p.7) note, "we produce reasons in order to justify our thoughts and actions to others". Indeed, "reasoning was not designed to pursue truth. Reasoning was designed by evolution to help us win arguments" (Haidt, 2013b, p.303)[26]. In short, this is how human brains are constructed and the cognitive dynamic is affective; "it feels good to 'stick to our guns', even if we are wrong" (Gorman and Gorman, 2017, p.135) because people experience pleasure in the form of dopamine when their beliefs are confirmed (Hertz, 2013, p.38 in Gorman and Gorman, 2017, p.135). Subsequently, Gorman and Gorman (2017, p.251) note that people will seek to replicate this feeling and over time the brain learns to solidify the idea into a fixed one (see section 2.6.2 and Taylor's [2004, p150] concept of "cog web").

Therefore, Sunstein (2009, p.110) states that "people are motivated to accept accounts that fit with their preexisting convictions; acceptance of those accounts makes them feel better and acceptance of competing accounts makes them feel worse". Or, to summarize Spinoza (1996 in Wright-Neville and Smith, 2009, p.94), "those things that we perceive as self-empowering bring us joy, while those things that we perceive as disempowering bring us sadness". Biased assimilation (trusting ones own confirming sources over a weighty ensemble of disconfirming others [section 2.6.4]) is therefore easily achieved (Sunstein, 2009, pp.50-53) and this is compounded by the fact that "we are wired to resist changing our minds too easily" (Gorman and Gorman, 2017, p.6).

[26] This is called the Argumentative Theory of Reasoning and was developed by Mercier and Sperber (2011)

2.6.7 Formal Responses

In 2011 the USA responded to Jihadist online propaganda with the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications - replaced in 2016 with the Global Engagement Center. Its purpose was to undermine Jihadist narratives and dissuade pre-Jihadists through counter-messaging. The problem, as noted by its former coordinator Alberto Fernandez, is that "we don't have a counter-narrative. We have a half message: 'Don't do this', but we lack the 'Do this instead'" (Cottee, 2015). Indeed, terrorist propaganda functions optimally when left largely unchallenged by competing narratives (Sitter, 2013, p.12). But as the CSCC did not provide an alternative, the execution of its campaign was largely a failure (Braddock and Morrison, 2018, p. 1).

This failure may have commenced when the then CSCC was defining its purpose, as Fernandez (Cottee, 2015) seems to have conflated counter-narratives with alternative narratives; the purpose of counter-narratives are to debunk extremist propaganda (Ritzmann, 2017, p.2) whereas alternative narratives (the "do this instead" message) promote alternative courses which would include alternative perspectives and role models by fostering critical thinking (Ritzmann, 2017, p.2). Briggs and Silverman (2014, p.27) add that alternative narratives present themselves as "what we stands for, rather than what we are against". As such, alternative narratives fall squarely within a strengths-based paradigm (sections 1.3.2.1.6 and 6.2.4). Fernandez's conflation aside, discrediting a course of action without offering an attractive alternative is indeed a shortcoming of counter-narratives (Barzegar *et al*., 2016, p.28). However, that is not their purpose; counter-narratives do not seek to address the factors which make (violent) extremist narratives appealing (Fergusson, 2016, p.3).

2.6.8 Concluding Remarks

Discovering "truth" requires a conscious effort to override the natural human tendency to be "right" and feel good about it, which can be uncomfortable and inconvenient if it conflicts with (deeply) held convictions (Atir, Rosenzweig and Dunning, 2015; Barrett, 2017; Ritzmann, 2017; Sloman and Fernbach, 2017). Therefore, if communicative strategies are to be used to counter Jihadism, they will need to be framed in a way which will ensure that they are not flagged as counter-narratives and if they are to be effective, they will need to use and channel the same emotionally (and values) which propels Jihadism.

2.7 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter covered a wide variety of topics. These form the foundation for the conceptualization of radicalization as a vector which functions as a conceptual framework for the findings presented in chapters five to seven. Radicalization is an important topic in this thesis. As such, the history, assumptions, limitations and approaches to researching it were presented. These were followed by a critical appraisal of the thought-leading-to-behavior paradigm because learning-by-doing forms a central element of the Indirect Approach.

The role of chance encounters and the implications thereof also featured prominently and this alludes to the role of affordance in influencing behavior (section 4.5). Furthermore, the influencing force of emotions, protocols and frames were also introduced and discussions centered on how these relate to the creation of resonating narratives. Together, these form critical elements oft the Indirect Approach; offering an effective and constructive alternative to Jihadism. However, and as stated, radicalization as a vector is the premise under which chapters five, six

and seven are undergirded. Given that this conceptualization is only briefly alluded to in the literature (section 4.3.2), it is critical to illustrate that it is a credible construct and this is the purpose of the following chapter.

Chapter 3

Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This study juxtaposed British Muslim humanitarians who mobilized to "Sham" between 2015 and early 2018 with European Muslim Jihadists who mobilized to the same geographic locale during the same time period (Daesh's rule [2013-2018]). The purpose of this grounded theory study was to ascertain how the research participants mobilized as humanitarians rather than Jihadists. As such, the primary research question of this thesis is: "How do British Muslims mobilize to Jihadist conflict zones in a benevolent rather than a malevolent manner?" In order to answer this, the author selected research participants using normative group equivalence. That is, research participants were selected who shared stipulated characteristics with European Jihadists (see Table 3.2 [the theoretical sampling criteria] and Tables 3.4 and 3.5 [the matching criteria related to the scholarly literature on European Jihadists]). The credibility of this sample was confirmed by all research participants having been interviewed by the authorities under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act before and/or after at least one of their deployments. In other words, the authorities conflated the research participants with Jihadists and in so doing, confirmed the credibility of the match. Nonetheless, as detailed in section 3.4.5.1, the research participants are neither terrorists nor extremists nor supporters of either (see Table 3.3).

As discussed in section 3.5.1, the sample ($n=6$) was identified using theoretical sampling; the process of simultaneously collecting and analyzing data so as to be informed of what one should ask and who one should ask it to (see section 3.4). In order to select the matching criteria, the author engaged in "Initial Sampling" and "Purposive Sampling" (Figure 3.9) and canvassed

the literature on the characteristics, contributing factors, pathways and socialization of Jihadists. This information was used to identify the requirements for matched research participants (the theoretical sample). Once these criteria were defined and the final sample were identified, formal data collection commenced ("GT Data Collection" in Figure 3.9).

Through constructivist grounded theory methodology (section 3.5), it was ascertained that the research participants proceeded through a socialization process which resulted in them mobilizing to "Sham" (sections 4.4 to 4.6). Indeed, the central finding which emerged was the counterintuitive assertion that the research participants radicalized, but that they did so in a benevolent manner (see sections 4.2 and 4.3 and "Multifinality" in glossary). The coding and abstraction process which resulted in this is depicted in Figures 3.7 and Table 4.1. Five activities were engaged in to ensure the credibility of this finding (see section 1.2.4). These included two interviews with two consultants who function in CVE roles (SHB435 and HQD556), procedures to confirm credibility of coding and analysis, a focussed literature review (utilizing the literature matrix [Figure 3.8]), juxtaposing radicalization pathway models (section 4.6) and a peer-reviewed publication in the Journal for Deradicalization Studies (Reidy, 2018). Together, these corroborated the trustworthiness of conceptualizing radicalization as a vector.

To a significant extent however, this conceptualization is at odds with the radicalization literature where the focus is largely on explaining "what occurred before the bomb went off" (Neumann in Schmid, 2013a, p.6 and Sedgwick, 2010, p.479) (sections 2.2 and 2.3). Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is explain the methodological approach, procedures and tools employed in coming to this conclusion.

3.2 Organization

Section 3.3 presents the rationale for selecting the qualitative research approach. This provides a general overview of qualitative enquiry and concludes on the appropriateness of the qualitative tradition selected. Section 3.4 introduces grounded theory and why it was deemed the most appropriate methodology for the primary research question. It also outlines the fundamental components of grounded theory (section 3.4.4) as well as presenting its limitations (section 3.4.5).

This is followed by section 3.5 which addresses the sampling strategy. While all aspects of this chapter are important, section 3.5 is particularly crucial because the methodology employed and the conclusions drawn hinge on the "thin line" (WQB121 in sections 1.1 and 3.5.2) between the two morally opposed outcomes (humanitarianism and Jihadism) which stem from the same premise (radicalization). Therefore, section 3.5 details the sampling strategy (section 3.5.1), how the theoretical sample was identified (section 3.5.2) and the inclusion criteria (sections 3.5.3 and 3.5.4). With the characteristics of the theoretical sample identified (Table 3.2) and the matching criteria confirmed (Table 3.4), section 3.5.5 juxtaposes the research participants to the scholarly literature on European Jihadists (Table 3.5). Section 3.6 discusses the development of the interview questions and the protocols employed during data collection. This is followed by section 3.7 which addresses the coding process. It illustrates how raw data was abstracted (Figure 3.6 [see also Figure 4.1]) and how the final coding schedule aligned with the literature review (Figure 3.7).

Given the open-ended nature of grounded theory and its laborious analytical procedures, grounded theory produces large amounts of data. Without establishing a means with which to

locate, categorize and synthesize, one risks being overwhelmed. This may result in missed opportunities for synthesis, abstraction and saturation. Therefore, illustrating how data was organized is essential and is discussed in section 3.7.1. As stated, the analytical procedures employed in grounded theory analysis are notoriously time-consuming. Therefore, during data analysis and under looming deadlines, researchers make decisions on which codes to pursue based on their applicability to the research question as well as their potentiality to assist in reaching theoretical saturation. This is critical because without theoretical saturation, a theoretical code is not credible. How and when codes were deemed saturated is the subject of section 3.7.2. This is followed by section 3.8 which provides an overview of the grounded theory process and the results which transpired. Section 3.9 discusses ethical considerations. The importance of ethical research design is stressed and involves a description of the numerous safeguards put in place in compliance with institutional ethical regulations. Chapter three concludes with section 3.10 which address how trustworthiness was established using Lincoln and Guba's (1985) evaluative criteria for rigorous qualitative research; credibility, dependability, transferability and confirmability.

3.3 Rationale for Using a Qualitative Research Approach

Qualitative and quantitative approaches are distinct research paradigms and present themselves as two forms of data. Data is referred to as quantitative when it is numerical and qualitative when it is not (such as words or images), with mixed methods combining both. Qualitative research questions focus on process and assume a flexible nature to research design (Silverman, 2013, p.3). The answers they seek stress how social experience is created and how

meaning is established (Denzin and Lincoln, 2013, p.17). In contrast, quantitative studies emphasize the measurement and analysis of causal relationships between variables.

Qualitative inquiry is primarily exploratory in nature and strives to achieve in-depth, detailed and rich data from a relatively small sample. Analytically, it retains the complexity of each case/research participant, remains open to emerging categories/themes, extracts and interprets meaning and culminates with a hypothesis - generated from analysis of data rather than stated at the outset (Denzin and Lincoln, 2013). Quantitative inquiry aims to quantify a problem through the generation of numerical and/or measurable data so results can be generalized. This is a key feature of quantitative research, achieved through random or representative sampling procedures based on statistical probability. This controls for selection bias where the intent is hypothesis testing. On the other hand, qualitative research assumes that each research setting is unique. Therefore, the primary intent is to achieve a holistic understanding through purposive sampling. To accomplish this, adaptable methods of data gathering, sensitive to the context of the study, are employed.

Qualitative research offers numerous values and benefits for particular strands of research, particularly those which require an in-depth, rich, descriptive and a contextually attuned understanding of a phenomena. The strengths of qualitative research can be divided into four categories. First is the dynamic human instrument as the primary tool for data collection. The researcher can identify contextual variables as they relate to the phenomenon and process information to clarify, check for accuracy of interpretation and explore unanticipated responses. This adaptive ability is possible due to the second category; flexible research design. As data becomes available, the focus can be modified to respond to emergent themes. The complexity of

the phenomena and how they are analyzed constitute the third category; dynamic and complex processes. These are analyzed through an interpretive stance which *may* be transferable to other contexts and population samples (see section 3.10.3). Nonetheless, interpretation of the data remains within the confines of the context it was collected in (see section 1.5). This is due to the fourth category; the emic perspective. Data is based on the participants own categories of meaning, their determination of constructs and their experiences of the phenomena.

Qualitative inquiry was deemed the most appropriate approach because the goal of this thesis was to understand the subjective construction of the research participants social reality (ontologically constructivist) while utilizing an interpretivist epistemology to convey the nature of their socialization. This suggests a qualitative rather than a quantitative approach.

3.4 Selecting a Research Methodology

Methodological preference was based upon methodological congruence (Morse and Richards, 2002 in Creswell, 2013) which pertains to the alignment between the researchers philosophical position, the research purpose and the methodology employed (Birks and Mills, 2015, p.36). Numerous conceptual frameworks were considered. The problem was, at the initial phases of research, the author only had a rudimentary understanding of who the research participants would be, what chain of events led them to Daesh controlled territory and what would potentially differentiate them from matched Jihadists (the trajectory determining factors [Figure 7.1]).

Initial thoughts on these distinguishing factors centered on the difference between non-violent extremism and violent extremism which was covered in the preliminary literature review.

The logic was, as both cohorts are mobilized in Jihadist conflict zones, both also function under the aegis of armed non-state groups. Therefore, how does one become and remain a non-violent actor under conditions of escalating violence? Rather than selecting a methodology and entering the field, the author opted instead to confirm if his initial assumption was correct; are those factors which distinguish benevolent from malevolent mobilization the same as those which distinguish violent from non-violent extremism?

To do so, the author visited numerous Islamic aid organizations in London and made introductory inquiries. As discussed in section 3.1 and illustrated in Figure 3.9, "Initial Sampling" and "Purposive Sampling" were not considered as formal data collection. Rather, the purpose was to ensure that his fledgling concepts had a firm enough grounding for further investigation. These initial inquiries intended to shed light on the decision-making processes and justifications for non-violent (but nonetheless extremist) behaviors while mobilized in areas where violence is condoned and normalized. In other words, why not engage in violence when you nonetheless support it and are surrounded by it? However, the initial sampling process and the conversations which followed laid bare that these aid workers were not extremists (see section 3.5.5.1) and that one does not necessarily require permission from the armed non-state groups to provide humanitarian assistance in the areas they control. In other words, the authors initial assumptions were wrong.

These initial conversations ("Initial Sampling" in Figure 3.9) also raised numerous other forms of information on British Islamic humanitarian aid in Jihadist conflict zones. These were collated and, after a period of sampling, memoing (see section 3.5.4) and a literature review, the author decided to use normative group equivalence and match research participants to European

Jihadists in order to isolate those distinguishing factors (see Figure 7.1). An initial focussed literature review resulted in identifying the characteristics of the theoretical sample (Table 3.2). It must also be stated that at this early stage in the research, multifinality was not considered. That is to say, radicalization was not conceptualized as a vector.

However, given ethical requirements and the rise of Daesh, the requirements listed in Table 3.2 were restrictive and, more than likely, unrepresentative of British Muslims humanitarian workers. The author faced a choice: interview a larger and more representable sample of British Muslim humanitarians, who are an overall less than adequate match to British Jihadists, or pursue those fulfilling all the requirements in Table 3.2 with the knowledge that doing so is riskier and will more than likely result in a smaller and non-representative sample (depicted in Figure 1.1).

This was the first critical decision made in research design and in deciding which avenue to pursue, the author returned to the purpose of the research; in order to ascertain how one mobilizes in a consistently benevolent manner, one must identify the factors which distinguish Jihadist trajectories from humanitarian ones under matched conditions. It was therefore reasoned that the humanitarian sample should fulfill all the requirements in Table 3.2. Therefore, the researcher chose to pursue the latter strategy; interviewing British Muslim humanitarians who are as closely matched as possible to British Jihadists rather than being representative of British Muslim humanitarians as a whole.

With a matched design selected, the following task was to select the most appropriate methodology. In so doing, the author consulted the literature and sought to ascertain which methodologies were employed by similar research designs. Unfortunately, no research design

was found which juxtaposed European (or Western) Jihadists with matched humanitarians. Therefore, the author investigated which methodologies were most utilized and applicable when attempting to establish or develop an empirical foundation for an under-researched phenomenon.

3.4.1 Grounded Theory Methodology

Grounded theory is an appropriate methodology to understand social processes associated with a phenomenon (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Urquhart, 2013, p.10) and is particularly appropriate when little is known about it (Birks and Mills, 2015, p.17), when a theory is not available to explain or understand a process (Creswell, 2013, p.88) and for research which requires transcending disciplinary boundaries (Goulding, 2017, p.63) - all of which were well-suited to the proposed topic of study.

The purpose of a grounded theory is to build theory, or elaborate on existing theory (Nyilasy and Reid, 2009). Furthermore, its philosophical underpinnings are well-aligned with the explorative nature of the proposed research design, the "how" and "process" centric nature of the research question and the data-informed analysis. Therefore, grounded theory was selected because it resonated with the research question and the philosophical views of the author. That is to say, it was methodologically congruent. This choice was augmented by the fact that a small number of studies on Jihadism had been completed using grounded theory (Bartlett and Miller, 2012; de Bee and Poot, 2016; Pisoiu, 2014a) as well as others who advocated for more grounded theory usage within terrorism and/or radicalization research (Bartlett *et al.*, 2010 p.48; De Bie and De Poot, 2016; Lindauer, 2012, p.9).[27]

[27] It must be restated that at this early stage, the potential research participants were not considered radicalized because the author assumed the same perspective as most terrorism scholars; radicalization is only applicable when investigating terrorism and/or extremism and the research participants were neither.

3.4.2 Grounded Theory Approaches

Grounded theory was founded by Glaser and Strauss (1967) with the intention of introducing a methodology which was not deductive and did not test hypotheses. By developing grounded theory they established a methodology which was inductive in nature and designed to build theory through data (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). As the methodology gained in popularity as an investigative and theory building tool, two other permutations of grounded theory developed reflecting different ontological and epistemological perspectives (Charmaz, 2014). Despite these philosophical differences, what all three share are the fundamental strategies of grounded theory (discussed in section 3.4.4).

Glaser (1978) further developed the original approach into what is now referred to as "classical grounded theory". This is characterized by an objectivist ontology and is generally understood to fall within the (post-) positivist paradigm (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). Strauss collaborated with Corbin (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) to develop what is referred to as "straussian grounded theory". This differs from classic grounded theory in that it is informed by Chicago School pragmatism and Blumer's (1969) symbolic interactionism (Charmaz, 2014; Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Strauss and Corbin (1990) also introduced a stringent coding process which emphasized context and (social) interactions.

Charmaz's (2000) grounded theory adopts a constructivist ontology and an interpretivist epistemology. This philosophical position departs from classic and straussian grounded theory where both require the researcher to be an objective observer and, in the process of conducting grounded theory, "discover" theories. Instead, Charmaz asserts that theories are "constructed" and the researcher and research participants collaborate during the interview to develop a mutual

construction (co-construction). Through the iterative processes of constructivist grounded theory, the author constructs the grounded theory and is therefore a co-producer in it rather than one who relays abstracted data as a "distant expert" (Charmaz, 2000, p.513). This approach is reliant on, or at least encouraging of, the researcher being reflexive and innovative in their analysis because the data collection and analysis phase is open to external influences (such as the researcher him or herself). As such, Charmaz's version of grounded theory is referred to as "constructivist grounded theory".

In selecting which form of grounded theory to utilize, the author identified his paradigmatic inclinations with reference to social reality. In so doing, the author agreed with Guba and Lincoln's (2005, p.208) assertion that "objectivity is a chimera"; perceptions of phenomena vary between social actors and social reality is not external to them. As such, an objective social reality cannot be observed and investigated. This deductive reasoning illustrated that classical grounded theory would not be methodologically congruent. This conclusively ruled out classic grounded theory. In investigating the tenets and methods of straussian grounded theory, symbolic interactionism (attributed meanings are influenced by social interactions) was deemed important and valuable. However, while stressed by straussian grounded theory, it is not necessarily unique to it either (Charmaz, 2014; Corbin and Strauss, 2008).

Another advantageous factor of straussian grounded theory is its relativist position (which has increased over successive iterations) where the researcher creates theory based on his or her interpretation of the data. However, the author took an unfavorable view to the (overly) structured approach Corbin and Strauss (2008) advocated for coding and analysis. While some, particularly those using grounded theory for the first time, may view this as a safe form of

conducting coding and analysis, the author's natural inclination was towards a more amendable and less prescriptive approach. Furthermore, with no previous experience of grounded theory, the author did not want to ascribe to a strict analytical process which *may* hinder conceptual development and where deviation *may* render analysis untrustworthy (see section 3.10).

Finally, research participants arouse suspicion of extremism and/or terrorism (the scholarly interests of the author) as evidenced by their Schedule 7 interviews (see "suspicion" in Figure 3.7). Therefore, the co-construction of a theory or narrative account which combined the authors scholarly interests with the research participants experiences and identities as (radical) humanitarians (thereby functioning as a means of isolating those factors which differentiated them from Jihadists) was both appealing and applicable. Given this, Charmaz's (2014) constructivist grounded theory was selected; a flexible approach which endorses "an imaginative engagement with data" (Charmaz, 2008, p.168).

3.4.3 Preliminary Literature Review

One of the defining characteristics of grounded theory is the delay of the literature review until data is in the process of collection (Charmaz, 2014, p.245). The implication is that researchers should not research specific literature so as not to "contaminate or stifle … the researchers efforts to generate categories" (Glaser, 1992, p.31). However, this does not mean entering the data collection phase as a "blank slate" (Urquhart and Fernandez, 2006, p.460). Suddaby (2006), in his review of common methodological mistakes in grounded theory, noted avoiding the literature review as his first of six misconceptions of grounded theory, as have others (Goulding, 2009; Nyilasy and Reid, 2009). Rather, a researcher should be informed by the literature so that the study conducted is focussed in a particular area of interest (Goulding, 2017,

p.68; McCallin, 2006, p.14). As such, Martin (2006, p.47) labelled the relationship between the existing literature and grounded theory a "red herring".

Instead, what distinguishes grounded theory from other methodologies is that grounded theory does not commence with a hypothesis. A fine line must be drawn between becoming immersed in the literature and being guided by it.[28] Nonetheless, without a foundation in extant knowledge, the researcher would be less sensitive to theoretical emergence. In other words, without a foundation in the literature, analysis would not only be uninformed, but superficial. Therefore, a preliminary literature review was carried out which examined and gathered existent theory without imposing a framework on future data collection (see "Initial Memos and Preliminary Literature Review" in Figure 3.9).

However, the authors previous occupations and academic interests revolved to a signifiant extent around the topics of Islamist extremism, terrorism, (de-)radicalization and disengagement. Therefore, the preliminary literature review involved a re-acquaintance with the literature, primarily achieved by reviewing the numerous literature reviews (Dzhekova *et al*., 2016; Nasser-Eddine *et al*., 2011; Schmid, 2013a) and seminal texts (Horgan, 2014a; Schmid, 2013b; Silke, 2011) rather than committing to a particular approach or theory. Martin (2006 in Urquhart and Fernandez, 2006, p.x) labels this "phasing" where the first stage is preliminary and the second stage integrative; the researcher integrates the emergent theory with extant theory to contextualize the emergent theory.

[28] While the author was immersed in the literature, he was not guided by it. This is evidenced by the construct which emerged from analysis; had he been guided by the literature, radicalization would not have been conceptualized as a potentially benevolent phenomena.

The author was able to remain non-committal because his research focus (juxtaposing British Muslim humanitarians with European Jihadists through normative group equivalence in order to decipher which factors influenced their morally opposed trajectory to the same conflict zones during the same time period and under similar radicalizing conditions) was not one pursued by other scholars. This was objectively confirmed by peer review when the author submitted an article for publication with the Journal for Deradicalization (Reidy, 2018).

3.4.4 Fundamental Components of Grounded Theory

Grounded theory has eight general components, irrespective of which approach one follows. Grounded theory is best described as a "total package and not a pick-and-mix approach to theory building" (Goulding, 2017, p.66). The first component is induction and this involves developing new theories or hypotheses from numerous observations. However, the form the grounded theory research takes or the direction it pursues is dependent on what is said during interviews, how this is coded and how one organizes, synthesizes and abstracts those codes. Therefore, doing so requires being open to interpretation rather than bound by a hypothesis; hence the inductive nature of grounded theory.

Second is theoretical sampling which is an emergent process because it is driven by emergent analysis. In other words, how the researcher selects their sample is not known at the outset.[29] Instead, it is informed by coding, comparison and memo-writing (explained below) which clarify who the following research participant should be and/or what should be asked. Together, these illustrate relationships and knowledge gaps and this informs the selection of the

[29] Initial sampling is distinguished from purposive and theoretical sampling. For this thesis, data collection did not commence until a theoretical sample was delineated (see Figure 3.9). While some researchers do code and utilize initial and purposive samples in their data analysis, this approach was not utilized in this thesis because, given the novelty of the research design and the contemporary nature of the macro factors involved, doing so would not have served the function of matching (see section 3.5).

next research participant and/or refinement of the interview questions. Given the interwoven and concurrent nature of sampling, data collection, analysis and literature review it is necessary for data to be immediately analyzed so theoretical sampling can occur. As such, the third component is immediate analysis of data.

Data analysis relies on coding, the fourth component, which is the process of disassembling the data into smaller, more manageable components. These are subsequently labelled and compared to understand data variation. Charmaz's (2014) coding process begins with "Open Coding" which is guided by two key questions: "what is the chief concern of participants?" and "how do they resolve this concern?" (Charmaz, 2008, p.163). She proposes to code with gerunds; noun forms of verbs such "revealing, defining, feeling or wanting" (Charmaz, 2008, p.163). These forms are visible under "Select Open Codes" in Table 4.1. Open coding is followed by Focussed Coding, the process of identifying those codes which are either recurring or are particularly significant in illustrating the studied process (Charmaz, 2008, p.164). As the researcher becomes more familiar with the data, focused codes are elevated or combined resulting in more abstract formations referred to as "Theoretical Codes" (see Tables 3.6 and 4.1). Achieving these is assisted by the fifth component; memo writing. This is where initial and subsequent codes are scrutinized and potential concepts are developed. Memos can also illustrate relationships between codes while simultaneously functioning as a means of analytical stimulation. Memos are subsequently compared to codes, theories in the process of construction, subsequent literature reviews and theoretical sampling in a process called "Constant Comparison" (see Figure 3.9). This is the sixth component and it assists in relating more abstract concepts to each other so as to explain a (social) process. This continues until no new insights are

received from research participants. This is the seventh component; theoretical saturation. The final component, theory production, cannot be reached without saturation. A theory derived from grounded theory can be presented in numerous formats (depending on which tradition one follows), but it is always presented as a set of concepts that are related to one another as a cohesive whole; hence its process-centric nature.

3.4.5 Limitation of Grounded Theory

Given the fact that coding is a dynamic process (in other words, codes may be re-coded based on the most recent round of data collection [see section 3.7]) relying on the constant comparison of codes (at various levels of development), memos, sampling strategies, potential theories and the co-construction of meaning during interview (and subsequent contact), inter-rater reliability was not utilized in this thesis. Doing so would only be feasible if all data collection and analysis was conducted with other researchers where collective agreement could be reached on what was "meant" in interview, particularly during abstraction and the avenues pursued in co-construction.

The author considered inter-rater reliability for the initial coding phase once theoretical saturation was achieved, but given constant comparison and the resultant re-coding process (undergirded by a pursuant literature review and memoing), an inter-rater who is not familiar with how and why each raw fragment was coded the way it was (and why other fragments were discarded or re-coded) would not be engaging in informed coding and given analytical bias, may do so in a manner which is reflective of their own analytical tradition rather than that which informs the research question and the literature review. As such, the resultant theory is inherently subjective and dependability rests on illustrating how the author engaged in sampling, coding

and abstraction (section 3.5 and Figure 4.2) as well as the steps taken to ensure its trustworthiness (section 1.2.4). Overall, grounded theory involves a time-intensive and laborious coding process involving memo writing and the constant comparison method. As more data is analyzed, coding often must be redone to cater for new analytical insights (see section 3.7 for an example).

3.5 Research Sample and Sampling Strategy

3.5.1 Sampling Strategy: Theoretical Sampling

The research participants of this thesis were located by following the tenets of theoretical sampling, defined as "the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them in order to develop the theory as it emerges" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p.45). Preliminary findings from initial data collection illustrated potential codes and concepts which then directed the collection of new independent data. This was used to validate or falsify the initial concepts which emerged from the original (or previous) dataset. This sampling procedure provided the vector for the following interview or next stage of data collection which continued until theoretical saturated was achieved.

Initial data sampling, in the form of introductory meetings rather than data collection, began with British Muslims who were engaged in humanitarian activities. This took place in London and involved meeting British Muslims who worked for or volunteered with aid organizations (both formal and informal). This was done partly by the author introducing himself at their offices (or having contacted them on social media), partly by asking mosque officials for

assistance and partly by introducing himself where they raise money and/or awareness (usually in the form of a booth). Both the offices and awareness locations were almost always within walking distance from a mosque and respondents occupy space within all three. Therefore, mosques, offices and awareness forums were not mutually exclusive locations. In the process of these introductory meetings, respondents clarified the context of humanitarian aid with respect to the Arab Spring; what was happening, who were involved and problems encountered. This assisted in providing the information required to define the characteristics of the theoretical sample (see section 3.1 and Tables 3.2 and 3.4).

Purposive sampling (assisted by snowball and opportunistic sampling during the previous sampling phase [see Figure 3.9]) focussed on those humanitarian groups which function specifically in Jihadist conflict zones.[30] The researcher visited these offices and forums to introduce himself and more information was provided on which organizations engage in which activities and how these are performed. However, like the initial sampling stage, this also did not constitute a formal data collection phase; this only commenced once the criteria of the theoretical sample were identified (see Table 3.2). Finally, theoretical sampling honed in on those who mobilized in-person as opposed to the majority who raise funds and freight supplies to location (the conflict zone or a refugee camp) or those who raise funds and drive aid to bordering countries which is then picked up by previously established contacts and brought by land or sea to those in need. With the theoretical sample defined and located, data collection commenced.

[30] These people did not specialize in Jihadist conflict zones because they were Jihadist. Rather, these were the theaters with (often) the most suffering and they were selected out of urgency (see “Social Responsibility Norm” in glossary).

Given the specific requirements of the match, initial and purposive samples were not considered formal data collection. Instead, as stated in section 3.1, these served the function of defining the characteristics of the final (theoretical) sample. However, some grounded theory studies commence with a well-delineated sample and in those cases (unlike this research), the evolution from initial to theoretical sample is small. Grounded theory studies in those formats subsequently utilize initial samples in their data analysis given their representativeness (and therefore utility) to the theoretical sample. Therefore, while the theoretical sample in this study is indeed small, a far larger number was utilized in order to obtain it (Table 3.1). Furthermore, the specificity of the match (3.5.3) and the risks to the credibility of the study if research participants were admitted with Jihadist sympathies (3.5.5.1) rendered the admittance requirements necessarily restrictive rather than inclusive, further contributing to the sample size (sections 1.4 and 3.5.3). Finally, given the intuitive equation of

British Muslim + Jihadist Conflict Zone = Terrorist

only a small number of potential research participants were prepared to be interviewed. Therefore, the sample (*n=6*), while not unique in terms of British Muslim (historical) responses to global humanitarian catastrophes (to include those in Jihadist conflict zones), cannot be confirmed as representative. But neither is it intended to be. The value of this thesis lays in resultant conceptualizations and a new avenue for preventing Jihadism based on a small number of successful outliers who, by definition, are never representative; positive deviants (section 6.4). As stated in section 1.3.2.1, the intention of the proposed Indirect Approach is to transport the radical yet pro-social prognosis of the research participants from the fringes to the mainstream. Therefore, what may be deemed radical (and therefore deviant and unrepresentative) at the time

of writing is not intended to retain that status. Nonetheless, at the time of writing, the behaviors the research participants engage in represent a small and unrepresentative sample and this contributed to the theoretical sample size.

3.5.2 Identifying the Theoretical Sample

Approximately forty respondents were engaged in data collection. Many of these (approximately 30) occurred during the preliminary sampling stage which, as stated in the previous section, involved the researcher introducing himself in various forums (mosques, offices and awareness/fundraising sites). It is difficult to state accurately how many were spoken to because this was often done by approaching groups of people who would introduce the author to other groups and these groups inter-mixed, splitting off into other groups. In the process, the author would change location from a mosque - to an office - to a stand - to a coffeeshop, all within a short walk from one another. As such, the author can not accurately state where each meeting took place (during initial sampling) and precisely how many he met, as the process was consistently fluid. Nonetheless, initial sampling was critical to identifying the required criteria of the theoretical sample (see section 3.5.3).

Other potential respondents were contacted via social media. The precise amount was also difficult to quantify; Facebook pages were formed by (informal) aid groups to raise awareness and funding, but were often taken down once funding was complete or post mobilization. This is because (informal) groups or organizations (from various parts of the UK) often join forces for particular deployments and rather than having separate funding (and subsequently separate accounting) and awareness pages (with potentially different mission statements), all their promotional media is centered on one website - often a Facebook group

(with a corresponding www.justgiving.com account [see section 4.4]). Therefore, the researcher responded to new groups being formed and checking Facebook for these groups was an activity engaged in approximately once a week or if the opportunity arose. However, the low level of responses which resulted from this may be because there was either no official group moderator or, if there was, the group moderator did not know who specifically to direct requests to (see Figure 3.1).

During purposive sampling, the author learned that numerous groups were being investigated by the Charity Commission for potential links to armed groups in Syria. A regulatory alert was issued by the Charity Commission in 2014 regarding potential non-charitable functions of aid convoys after a British citizen used an aid convoy to travel to Syria and subsequently became a suicide bomber. Such episodes aside, the authorities suspicion of charity groups may also be a product of:

1. The documented overlap between NGOs/charities and militant groups (Anonymous, 2003, pp.39-40; Casciani, 2014; Fergusson, 2017, pp.46-51; Kaplan, 2001; Kilcullen, 2009, p.247; Korteweg *et al*., 2010, pp.35-36; Nesser, 2015, p.261; Neumann, 2016, p.115; Pisoiu, 2014b, pp.772-773; Richardson, 2006, p.42; Schmid, 2013b, p.258; Staub, 2013, pp.191-192; Wiktorowicz, 2002, p.197), specifically in the U.K. (Maher, 2013; Rudd, 2017).[31] For example, the killer of Daniel Pearl was strongly influenced by the plight of Bosnian Muslims and joined a charity (Convoy of Mercy) to bring supplies to plighted Bosnian civilians - but

[31] Jihadists and aid workers are frequently conflated because Jihadists have used charities as a cover to enter Jihadist conflict zones (Shanahan, 2018). For example, Callimachi's (2018) interviewee used humanitarianism as a cover to bypass Turkish security and join Daesh. British foreign fighters who engaged in Jihadism in Bosnia in the 1990's (among other theaters) were also introduced to armed conflict through humanitarian aid (as were French foreign fighters [Khosrokhavar, 2017, p.139]). See, for example Babar Ahmad (Verkaik, 2016), Aimen Dean (Dean, Cruickshank and Lister, 2018) and Shahid Butt (2017). See also "Defenders" in section 6.7.

this was not deemed sufficient and he subsequently joined Al Qaeda (Staub, 2013, pp. 191-192) (see also Dean, Cruickshank and Lister, [2018] and the discussion of "disillusionment" in Horgan [2017c]). If accurate, this constitutes an example of "Pathological Altruism", what McCauley (2018) termed as "the dark side of empathy", initially introduced in section 1.3.2.1.9 and expanded upon in section 5.4.6 (see also section 2.4.1.3).

2. The similarity in the static and dynamic factors (Silke and Brown, 2016, p.136) of potential research participants and Jihadists (the match [section 3.5.5.2]), thus leading to verified conflation (Schedule 7 interviews).
3. The conflation which may occur between those who adhere to an extremist cause and/or are members of an extremist group, compared to those who take extreme measures for a non-extremist cause under the aegis of a non-extremist group (see "In Extremis", "Devoted Actors" and "Sacred Values" in glossary). This conflation captures the essence of the primary research question of this thesis and its resultant conceptualization; radicalization as a vector. As one research participant noted, "their lives (Jihadists) went this way and my life went that way, and it's a thin line between the two" (WQB121). The paradox is, while this "thin line" is morally opposed, it is nonetheless premised on the same or similar sacred values (see "Group Priorities" in Table 4.5).

The research participants selected were not accused at any point of any potential wrong doing by the Charity Commission and therefore have and retain their charity number. To confirm that the research participants were neither violent nor extremist, various data sources were triangulated as discussed in sections 3.5.4 and 3.5.5.1. Most potential theoretical samples were

informal. That is, they did not have a charity number; they simply raised money or supplies locally and drove them to Syria. Others were medical professionals who traveled to the conflict zones to function in hospitals or (makeshift) medical centers; their charity was often their skillset rather than medicinal products.

However, without a charity number, the Charity Commission is unable to account for these actors[32] and without being able to do so it remains unknown how many informal groups have mobilized in this manner. Therefore, all respondents without a charity number during their deployments to "Sham" did not proceed to the final theoretical sample and those who remained were located through opportunistic and snowball sampling.

Table 3.1 Response Rate

Source	Number Contacted	Number of Participants
Sampling (mosques, humanitarian organizations and Speakers Corner [Hyde Park])	30-50	6
Gatekeepers	5	0
Official Emails	30	0
Youtube	±30	6
Social Media	±40	6
Formal Media	1	0
Posted Letter	1	0

[32] This was established by visiting the Muslim Charities Forum who informed the author that data was only collected on formal charities, not informal aid convoys. Therefore, they were unable to confirm precisely how many British Muslims mobilized in an informal manner.

The “Number of Participants” listed in Figure 3.1 depicts the theoretical sample (the six research participants), not the initial or purposive sampling stage. This is because it was not entirely clear for the researcher when he was in which sampling stage as it was an ongoing process. For example, the final theoretical sample were contacted relatively early in the sampling process but it was through the sampling process that it became apparent that this particular group fulfilled all the stipulated criteria (see section 3.5.4). However, these requirements were not fully developed when the researcher initially contacted them and as such, he was not aware that he had in fact already contacted the theoretical sample.

3.5.3 Theoretical Sample Inclusion Criteria

Through the process of theoretical sampling, the researcher learned what was required of the sample in order to, as accurately as possible, ascertain which factors influenced the vector pursued (malevolence or benevolence). In order to establish the research participants as credible and the research design as dependable (see section 3.10), research participants were required to fulfill six criteria (depicted in Table 3.2):

Criterion One: One in-person mobilization (of a month or more) or a minimum of two (shorter duration [minimum 24 hours]) in-person mobilizations to “Sham” post 2014 done solely in a humanitarian capacity without functioning under Daesh and/or (receiving protection from) any armed group.

This criterion was established in interview as well as triangulating data (see section 3.5.4). It can be divided into four parts:

A. “One deployment (of a month or more) or two (or more)”: This was deemed important because on one's first mobilization, the research participant may not be fully aware of the dangers they are subjecting themselves to. Returning a second time fulfilled a necessary requirement for the definition of radicalization (“consciously perilous” [see glossary]) as would one mobilization of a longer duration because the danger would be apparent. However, no research participants engaged in mobilizations of a duration longer than ten days.

B. “In-Person”: Most respondents during the initial and purposive sampling phases did not mobilize to “Sham” post 2014, opting instead to freight aid, primarily because doing so is more cost effective. However, doing so in-person (“mobilization” [section 4.2]) was an important criteria for categorizing an individual as benevolently radicalized (see section 3.5.4).

C. “To ‘Sham’ post 2014”: Of those who did mobilize in-person, most did so either to bordering countries where aid was delivered to Syrian or Iraqi nationals to distribute, or they mobilized before the rise of Daesh in 2014 (but not afterwards if they had a charity number). In order for the research participants to match Jihadists, it was necessary that they mobilized during the same time periods as many Jihadists thereby reflecting the rise of Daesh which stopped an untold number of humanitarian mobilizations, but raised the number of aspiring Jihadists (see section 1.2.1).

D. “Humanitarian capacity without functioning under Daesh and/or (receiving protection from) any armed group”: Not every pre-Jihadist who (intends to) joins Daesh aspires to function in a violent capacity. On the contrary, some are motivated to be state functionaries or work in a

medical capacity. This requirement is important because functioning under the aegis of an armed extremist group conveys (at least) some level of support and this would not be considered objectively benevolent. This requirement is related to criterion four: "Research participants could not be extremists or supportive of extremist groups". Finally, receiving protection from an armed group while delivering humanitarian aid was not congruent to how radicalization is defined in this thesis because armed protection makes the deployment less "perilous" (see glossary for definition of radicalization).

Criterion Two: Research participants were selected with similar static and dynamic factors to European Jihadists (see Tables 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5). These were established using equivalent normative matching as introduced in section 1.3.2.1.18 and outlined in the following section.

Criterion Three: Prospective research participants were ideally non-practicing Muslims until they became involved in humanitarianism and/or commenced the socialization process which led to them deploying to "Sham". This was deemed important because research suggests that most European Jihadists who mobilized to "Sham" were not strict observers until they became involved and/or began the socialization process (see the literature presented under "Religiosity" and "Political Awareness Prior to Involvement" in Table 3.5). Therefore, the same religion-post-involvement/socialization pattern was requested of the research participants.

Criterion Four: Research participants could not be extremists nor supportive of extremist groups. This was discussed in reference to criterion one above and to determine this, six strategies were

employed. As discussed in section 3.5.5.1, these included triangulating data with other research participants and two CVE consultants, reading the research participants' social media accounts as well as consulting various literary sources on extremism, risk factors and resilience factors (see Table 3.3).

Criterion Five: The humanitarian organizations the research participants mobilized with were required to have a charity number. This meant that the Charity Commission recognized these providers as humanitarians (rather than a front organization [section 3.5.2]) and this added a further layer of credibility to their non-terrorist (supporting) status (see criterion four).

Criterion Six: Research participants could only be involved in the supply of goods, not professional services. This distinguished British medical professionals from the research participant sample and was a necessary requirement given that purposive sampling illustrated that medical professionals did not match Jihadists; most were first generation British, had no criminal background and presented a wide spectrum of socio-demographics.[33]

3.5.4 The Theoretical Sample

A gatekeeper (Mubin Sheikh) provided initial contact with one individual within a group which fulfilled these requirements. This person was contacted by Facebook and telephone and it was agreed that he would introduce the author to the rest of the group for data collection. However, while pursuing another potential research avenue (British medical professionals volunteering in [make-shift] Syrian hospitals), this contact deleted his social media profiles and

[33] This was established during purposive sampling when the author interviewed a board member of Syria Relief.

changed his phone number. To establish contact with the group, the author left a comment on one of the (future) research participants (WQB121) Facebook posts. WQB121 sent a voice message to the author and data collection commenced soon after (June 2017).

All data collection took the form of semi-structured interviews (three were recorded and three were not recorded) in the office of the humanitarian organization the research participants work or volunteer for in Birmingham (Sparkbrook) and these occurred over three research trips in 2017. The author took copious notes during the three interviews which were not recorded. Research participants were messaged on social media for follow-up questions when needed, although the author always received the same response: "just pop by when you're in town". Therefore, follow-up responses occurred during the following interview. All research participants knew each other from their youth and all mobilized under the same organization during the same time period. However, one was in the process of leaving this organization to work in the National Zakat Organization (NAV321) and two others (ABM818 and ABS633) were volunteers. Therefore, only half the sample (at the time of writing) were full-time humanitarians.

As depicted in Table 3.2, the research participants fulfilled the six criteria thereby ensuring that they matched British Jihadists on critical factors identified in the preliminary literature review and sampling process while also being differentiated from Jihadists by their consistent benevolence.

Table 3.2 Theoretical Sampling Criteria

Participant Code	Criterion 1a: 1 long/minimum of 2 short mobilizations	Criterion 1b: in-person mobilizations	Criterion 1c: mobilized to "Sham" post 2014	Criterion 1d: consistent humanitarian without support from extremist or armed groups
ABM818 ABS633 NAV321 OO161 WQB121 ZHS908	Yes: established in interview and confirmed through triangulation	Yes: established in interview and confirmed through triangulation	Yes: established in interview and confirmed through triangulation	Yes: established in interview and confirmed through triangulation

Participant Code	Criterion 2: similar static and dynamic factors	Criterion 3: non-practicing before involvement and/or socialization	Criterion 4: non-extremist identities	Criterion 5: possess a charity number	Criterion 6: supply of goods, not professional services
ABM818 ABS633 NAV321 OO161 WQB121 ZHS908	Yes: see Table 3.5	Yes: established in interview and confirmed through triangulation	Yes: see Table 3.3	Yes: confirmed through charity register search and www.justgiving.com	Yes: established in interview and confirmed through triangulation

While role modeling is posited as a significant factor in the conclusions of this study, the prototypical group members who shepherded the research participants were not interviewed for three reasons:

1. They departed significantly from the matching criteria described in section 3.5.3 by being over 40 years old, first generation British, financially and/or socially successful and throughly grounded in and informed of their humanitarian role.
2. The research participants became (or are becoming) prototypical group members themselves; the author observed a large and younger (often teenage) following during interviews in the

Birmingham office. Therefore, the research participants are the next generation of "Constructive Leaders" (see glossary) and this has important implications for the role they can play in providing an attractive alternative to Jihadism (see section 7.3).

3. The goal of the prototypical group members was neither to shield the research participants from Jihadism nor provide them with an alternative and socially acceptable means of impacting upon areas of (humanitarian) devastation. Instead, the research participants wanted to become humanitarians like the prototypical group members and they assisted the research participants in becoming so (section 4.4). In other words, that becoming a humanitarian protected them from Jihadism was not the intended purpose. Instead, as stated in section 1.5, it was an accidental second-order effect.

3.5.5 The Theoretical Sample Juxtaposed to European Jihadists (Static and Dynamic Factor Juxtapositions)

The credibility of this study hinged significantly on selecting research participants with attributes specific enough to the sphere of violent extremism (a potentially large group of people depending on which characteristics one selects on [i.e. specificity]) yet sensitive enough to warrant the authorities suspicion (i.e. sensitivity [ascertained through Schedule 7 interviews]); a quasi-experimental research design[34] which utilizes matching (section 1.3.2.1.18) to achieve a theoretical sample with analogous characteristics to terrorists and/or extremists.

Contrasting in this way is called matching; the control or comparison group cohort is selected based on how well they "match" the selected equivalent characteristics of terrorists and/or extremists. Matching in this manner is called normative group equivalence. This functions by

[34] Quasi-experimental designs select members of their control group rather than randomly assigning them.

selecting participants with equivalent characteristics in order to obtain a control (or comparison) group that is representative of those specified characteristics. As Williams (2018) notes, “the key here is finding good counterparts” i.e. the better the “match”, the higher the credibility of the study. As discussed in section 1.1, the research participants embody a match with a relevant behavior (mobilization to Jihadist conflict zones) which was posited to yield insights other research participants may not. That is to say, they are “doers” not “talkers” (Sageman, 2016, p. 108, Sageman, 2017a, pp.12-13; Sageman, 2017b, p.32); only what the research participants “do” is morally opposed to what the Jihadists “do”.

3.5.5.1 Selecting the Research Participants and Establishing Methodological Congruency

Fergusson (2017, p.1) begins his book on "Muslim Britain” by referencing the hundreds of British foreign fighters who left the U.K. to join Daesh where “many … add the suffix ‘al-Britani’ to the jihadist's traditional nom-de-guerre.”[35] What goes largely unnoticed is that the Jihadists (and those who function in mobilized support roles) are not the only “al-Britanis” departing the U.K. to (function under) areas controlled by the likes of Daesh - referred to in this thesis as global Jihadist conflict zones.[36] Other British Muslims responded to civil strife in a humanitarian capacity (often informally)[37] by raising funds domestically and traveling into the

[35] A suffix which denotes where one is from is called a *nisbah* in Arabic. However, a *nisbah* can also signify that one is veteran of a particular battle, or where ones father is from, or which school of jurisprudence they follow. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that there are more British Jihadists than those with the suffix of “al-Britani”. For example, two Australian Jihadists call themselves “Abu Yahya *al-Shami*” (of Syria or Damascus [interchangeable in Arabic]) and “Abu Nour *al-Iraqi*” (Kohlmann and AlKhouri, 2014, p.4).

[36] For example, Kaplan (2001 in Nesser, 2015, p.25) notes that thousands of Muslims worldwide volunteered in a humanitarian manner to support the Afghans during the Russian invasion, yet only a minority joined to function in combat roles.

[37] As stated in section 3.5.2, given the informal nature of these responses, the Muslim Charity Forum are unable to provide metrics as to how many acted in this capacity i.e. these informal responders did not apply for a charity number. Therefore, the scope of these informal responses is unknown.

conflict zone to distribute much needed food and medical aid, partly because professional aid agencies were (and are, at the time of writing) unable to do so for legal and/or security reasons.[38] This contributes to perceptions of international paralysis (Hegghammer, 2013). These (amateur) aid workers are the research participants (*n=6*) of this study and they have been overlooked by scholars of political violence because they are neither malevolent, extremist, violent nor anti-social despite the violent extremist contexts within which they function abroad.

Upon departing (and returning to) the UK, the research participants are consistently interviewed by airport security personnel under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000. This, more than likely, is because they are visibly Muslim and traveling to (or from) known entry (and departure) points to Jihadist conflict zones. Socio-demographic information, if elicited from the interview, would raise further suspicion as it parallels that of British Jihadists;[39] British nationals of Pakistani heritage (second generation) in their twenties to mid-thirties, educated to secondary school level and traveling in locally networked kin groups where many, or most (depending on group composition) have had previous law-enforcement encounters (mainly drugs, petty crime and gang related activities). Their travel was self-funded and their stated motivation to mobilize, while faith-aligned, is best described as stemming from the desire to "do the right thing" (see Tables 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 4.1).

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[38] Furthermore, research participants revealed that donors do not want their donations to cover overhead costs which can equate to a sizable sum for formal aid agencies.

[39] While there is no Jihadist profile (Byrne, 2016, p.111; HM Government, 2018, p.32; Maskaliūnaitė, 2015, pp. 17-18; Qadir, 2016, p.101; Weggemans *et al.,* 2014, p.102), recurring factors have been identified (see section 2.3) and numerous categorizations (referred to as "typologies") have been constructed (section 6.7). Therefore, there are a number of attributes Jihadists have in common beyond mere coincidence (Schmid, 2016a). The empirical literature on case studies, profiles, pathways and typologies was consulted and research participants were selected based on them fulfilling numerous static and dynamic criteria outlined in section 3.5.5.2.

Given these parallels, claims of humanitarianism during the Schedule 7 interviews further undergird the insidious undertone that all is not as it seems, particularly given the documented overlap between Islamic charities and Jihadist groups (section 3.5.2). Indeed, this may explain why the Security Service intends to declassify "key" biographical data and share it with the Charity Commission (BBC, 04 June 2018).[40] Were network analysis to be employed, it would also become apparent that others in the research participants' domestic social milieu (Sparkbrook, Birmingham) were accused of being Jihadists - two acquaintances even spent time in Guantanamo Bay and others (abroad) have had their citizenship stripped. Given a lack of evidence for malicious activities, the research participants are nonetheless allowed to egress and ingress the U.K (see section 1.1).

The matching characteristics of their behavior, intent and socio-demographics aside, a final requirement for establishing congruency is a definition of radicalization which can cater for other outcomes by having mobilization as its outcome rather than terrorism and/or extremism (see sections 1.3.1.6 and 4.2). There are three reasons for selecting mobilization over extremism and/or terrorism, as is the norm. First, mobilization captures the research participants' initial false positive construal by (airport) security personnel because the impetus for the Schedule 7 interviews was, above all else, their destinations (a combination of *them* [the static and dynamic factor match depicted in Table 3.4] going *somewhere* [known Jihadist transit routes also depicted in Table 3.4]) and this necessarily implies mobilization.

Second, mobilization eschews specificity of action i.e. mobilizing to a specific theatre does not elucidate the behaviors engaged in and this is key to conceptualizing radicalization as a

[40] However, as Knott (2018, p.46) notes, apparent "links" between Islamic charities and Jihadist groups have not been substantiated.

vector rather than a unilinear process which only results in terrorism and/or extremism when successful (Reidy, 2018, pp.260-262). Third, having mobilization as the central defining construct benefits by focussing on the immediate problem of behavioral radicalization ("actions") rather than the related but not necessarily causative issue of extremism ("cognitions" and "narrative justification") (see section 2.4 and Dawson, 2018a, p.11).[41] Furthermore, as Rekawek *et al.* (2018, p.9) clarify, "European Jihad is about traveling to and returning from a foreign conflict" which necessarily implies mobilization rather than extremism or terrorism (see section 5.3.1).

The authorities (those conducting the Schedule 7 interviews) suspicion of Jihadism combined with a definition of radicalization which can incorporate other outcomes establishes congruency and this sanctions the use of radicalization as a conceptual framework, albeit post data analysis as per the tenets of grounded theory (see section 3.4.1). In order to establish empirical falsification (their non-violent and non-extremist stance), data was triangulated with other research participants, two further research participants working in CVE (SHB435 and HQD556) and reading social media accounts (particularly Facebook and Twitter) which revealed contacts with known peaceful community figures. Furthermore, the literature on extremism was consulted (Shiraz, 2016) as were risk factor instruments (see "Risk Factor Instruments" in glossary). Consulted instruments included the Structured Risk Guidance 21 Factors i.e. SRG 21 (Webster, Kerr and Tompkins, 2017, pp.7-8), Identifying Vulnerable People i.e. IVP (Cole, Alison, Cole and Alison) and Extremism Risk Guidance 22+ i.e. ERG22+ (Lloyd and Dean,

[41] Indeed, behavioral radicalization is now the focus of CVE programs in Australia, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, the U.K. (Hardy, 2018, p.95).

2015)[42] as well as Schmid's (2016a) list of resilience factors so as to confirm their non-violent and non-extremist stance.

With specific reference to the extremism literature and checklists, Table 3.3 divides the various "checks" into psychological, social, religious, political, legal and risk factors. In so doing, it outlines how the research participants were verified as non-extremist. No single factor in Table 3.3 is especially telling of a non-extremist stance. However, as a whole it does not display indicators of extremism. An exception to this is the final section "Risk Factors" which raises four concerns; previous criminality, experience with racism/discrimination, becoming religious post involvement and travel to Jihadist conflict zones. These are circumvented based on context; their criminality is not indicative of Jihadism because, as stated in sections 3.5.5.2 and 6.1, extremists and humanitarians recruit from the same sentiment pool. Their prior experience with racism is also not categorized as being indicative of Jihadism because, as explained in section 4.5.2, unlike the malevolently radicalized, the research participants do not brood over their discriminatory experiences because doing so is not a "Group Priority" (see sections 1.3.1.3, 2.4.1.1 and 4.7.2). Finally, as stated above, the research participants mobilizations to Jihadist conflict zones were confirmed as solely and consistently humanitarian. As their adoption of Islam occurred near simultaneously with them becoming genuine humanitarians, the hue their religious identity took was pro-social.

[42] The actual ERG checklist itself remains classified.

Table 3.3 Vulnerability to Extremism Checklist

Variables	Indicators
Political	• Research Participants vote (Labour) • Publicly endorse others to vote • Critical of Foreign Policy, but do not view it as a war against Islam • Do not support violent extremism. Rather, in Iraq they were targeted by violent extremists • Displayed a nuanced understanding of politics rather than a simplistic one
Social	• Publicly endorse International Women's Day • Do not support the segregation of males and females • Do not view women as subservient • Are not hostile to non-Islamic practices • Enjoy a wide circle of non-Muslims acquaintances
Religious	• View veiling as a personal preference • Adhere to a human-centric stance to their religion • Two research participants make rap videos • No inflammatory or hateful remarks
Psychological	• No display of cognitive rigidity • Non-confrontational • Did not display unmet aspirations or personal injustices • Not socially isolated • No display of mental illness • No display of low self-esteem • No display of identity confusion or conflict • Healthy relationship with family
Legal	• Possess a charity number
Risk Factors	• **Previous (non-violent) criminal involvement** • **Previous experience with racism/discrimination** • **Becoming religious post involvement and/or socialization** • **Travel to Jihadist conflict zones (therefore, Schedule 7 interviews)**

Nonetheless, given the chronicled association (material support and general links) between Islamic charities and Jihadist groups (section 3.5.2), an extra precautionary layer was deemed necessary. As discussed in section 3.5.1, purely informal groups (i.e. unaccountable

groups operating without a charity number) did not form part of the final theoretical sample; one potentially Jihadist (or sympathetic to a Jihadist cause) research participant would taint the entire sample and bring the credibility of the entire research into question. Other mobilizers (despite being non-violent and non-extremist) were also rejected from the final sample because they mobilized to Jihadist conflict zones with a trade to ply (particularly medicine) and did not conform to the static and dynamic criteria displayed in Table 3.2 (criterion two and three specifically). Therefore, and as stated in section 3.5.3 (criterion six), the match and pathway of these medically trained mobilizers did not correspond with scholarly knowledge of Jihadist "profiles" and pathways and rejecting these medically qualified mobilizers was done to ensure as high a degree of credibility as possible.[43]

As such, this research agenda is not focussed on addressing and accounting for all non-Jihadist mobilizers to Jihadist conflict zones from the UK. Instead, it is only concerned with exploring how a specifically defined group mobilized in a benevolent rather than malevolent manner as this typology shares a significant number of characteristics with a significant number of malevolent mobilizers (at the time of writing [see Table 3.5]) and is therefore an appropriate sample to use in order to isolate those factors which influence a malevolent from a benevolent trajectory (displayed in Figure 7.1). Given these methodologically relevant restrictions, the theoretical sample, while small ($n=6$), is nonetheless credible. This small sample size is further buoyed by the fact that most British Muslim did not respond to the rise of Daesh (or other Jihadist groups) in a behaviorally radicalized manner - whether that behaviorally radicalized

[43] Nonetheless, medical doctors have joined Daesh (for example, the Australian Dr. Tarek Kamleh) or engaged in Jihadist activities (for example, Bilal Abdullah of the 2007 Glasgow airport attack). Indeed, Al-Qaeda's current chief, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is a surgeon by trade.

outcome took a pro-social form such as humanitarianism or an anti-social form such as Jihadism (see section 6.1). In sum, the research participants are behaviorally radicalized on a benevolent vector (as a consequence, they are not extremist) while simultaneously presenting a comprehensive match with British Jihadists.

3.5.5.2 Specifying the Match

Recent research indicates that criminals and terrorists recruit may from a similar pool of people (Basra, Neumann and Brunner, 2016, p.26; Neumann, 2016, p.93; Pyrooz *et al.,* 2018, p. 5), often described as an amorphous social scene (Hemmingsen, 2010 in Nilson, 2015, p.344; Neumann, 2016, p.112; Sageman, 2017a, p.12). However, as noted by Sitter (2013, p.10), "civil society groups are often in direct competition with extremist elements for the hearts and minds of marginalized and disadvantaged elements of society". This, along with their criminal/gang related backgrounds combined with known Jihadist figures in their domestic social milieu (Tables 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5) suggests that the research participants stem from the same amorphous sentiment pool as Jihadists.

What seems to have been overlooked in terrorism research is that morally opposed groups recruit from the same countercultural pool and this "thin line" (WQB121 in section 3.5.2) between morally opposed outcomes is characteristic of the vectorized nature of radicalization. This has also been observed in Colombia where insurgent groups (such as the FARC) and counter-insurgent groups which operate outside the state's formal institutional boundaries (referred to in the literature as paramilitary groups) "often recruit from the exact same

pool" (Arjona and Kalyvas, 2008, p.2 [see also Hoffman in section 6.5.1 and "Opportunity Factors" in glossary]).[44]

Indeed, numerous parallels can be drawn between the humanitarian research participants and the current cohort of Jihadists. Both were, largely, non-practicing Muslims with a latent Islamic identity and no prior experience of their future occupation yet introduced to it in stages - either by kin members, close friends or a respected other (Bakker, 2006). Like Jihadists, the research participants would, more often than not, also be considered "youth" (Atran, Axelrod, Davis and Fischoff, 2017, p.354; Slootman and Tille, 2006) and "self-starters" (Kirby, 2007, pp. 415-416) because they sought out a means to "do the right thing" (see the third theoretical code in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2) rather than being formally recruited. Furthermore, all possessed previous law enforcement encounters (mainly petty crime and gang related activities) - a characteristic typical of the current cohort of Jihadists (Lyall, 2017; Neumann, 2016, p.113; Basra, Neumann and Brunner, 2016).

They function in locally networked kin groups which arise from an an amorphous social scene (Hemmingsen, 2010 in Nilson, 2015, p.344; Lindauer, 2012; Neumann, 2016, p.112; Sageman, 2017a, p.12; Schmid, 2013a, p.10; Wali, 2011, p.245). Both were also affected by watching videos of Syrian and Iraqi conflict zones (see sections 1.3.2.1.4, 2.5.2.1 and Table 3.4). These took the form of "triggering events" (Sageman, 2017b, p.33) rather than "key events" (Sageman, 2017b, p.39) and both groups upload their own videos onto social media from

[44] It should be noted that scholars have identified important differences in the motivations for joining the paramilitaries and the guerrilla groups; paramilitary groups motivate recruits through the provision of a stable salary whereas guerrilla groups, unable to provide regular salaries, rely on ideology (Nussio, 2017, p.6). See sections 4.5.1 and 6.5.1 for the role of chance (encounters) in spurring (politically opposed) pathways.

theatre.[45] As discussed in section 4.4, the research participants intention was to "do the right thing" and this finding has also been documented within the terrorism literature[46] (Bakker and Grol, 2015; Bartlett *et al.,* 2010, pp.30-31; Bloom, 2016; Fernandez in Cottee, 2015; Gurski, 2016, p.45; Gurski, 2017, pp.69-70; Marsden, 2017b; UNOCT, 2017, p.33), partly prompted and justified by social media footage. Finally, both groups are also largely self-funded and committed to a consciously perilous cause, often located within Jihadist conflict zones. This qualified as the match within normative group equivalence and is outlined in Table 3.4. This is followed by Table 3.5 which juxtaposes specific scholarly data (as opposed to the risk factor literature discussed in the previous section) on European Jihadists with this match so as to confirm it as credible.[47]

[45] The research participants do so because funders demand to see how their donations are being spent.

[46] Interestingly, this motivation is also mentioned by British Muslim medical doctors who function as volunteers in the same conflict zones, albeit not necessarily directly in the conflict zone itself. One British surgeon (of Syrian descent who has functioned in medical roles in Syria and Syrian environs) was interviewed, but he did not proceed to the final theoretical sample because his pathways and "profile" (as well as all of his medical colleagues of the same ethnicity and religion) did not resemble (i.e. "match") that of British Jihadists. Furthermore, medical doctors have a formal trade they ply whereas pre-Jihadists and aspiring humanitarians generally do not - at least not directly relevant trades. As such, medical doctors operate with widely recognized medical organizations and are not (or rarely) interviewed under Schedule 7 (although further research is required to adequately determine how and why this is the case). See, for example, the motivations of one such medical volunteer and his pathway into medical aid: Iqbal, N.

[47] It is worth noting that there is considerable overlap between the European risk factors presented in Table 3.5 and those of U.S. based terrorists: delinquency, social network, sporadic work history/unemployment, lower levels of education, lower social economic class and a perception of failure (Smith, 2018, p.ii).

Table 3.4 Matching Research Participants with the Scholarly Literature on European Jihadists

Factors	Variables		
General Intent	Desire to "do" something about the suffering (as opposed to the specific intention to fight against Assad, desire to live under Sharia law or a sense of estrangement from the West). This will to act is partly borne from international failure to act but unrelated to any specific foreign policy	"Do the right thing"	"Cognitive Opening" i.e. looking for something beyond their immediate environment (Dawson and Amarasingham, 2016; Cottee and Hayward, 2011; Venhaus in Borum and Fein, 2017). Often triggered by a series of events that unmoor them from their immediate social surroundings (Pretus *et al.,* 2018)
Pre-Mobilization Behaviors	Delinquency and gang related activity.Therefore: part of the amorphous social scene and un(der) employed	Self-funded and self-starter	"Vicarious Deprivation"
Socio-Demographics	British males of Pakistani heritage (second generation)	Youth	Locally networked kin groups in amorphous social scene where some become Jihadists
Risk Indicators	**Previous experience of racism and disillusionment**	**1 long or a minimum of 2 short mobilizations to Jihadist conflict zones**	**Non-practicing before involvement but maintained a latent Islamic identity**

Table 3.5 Jihadist and Research Participant Juxtaposition

Static and Dynamic Factors	European Jihadist	Research Participants
Age	- Approximately 30 (Rekawek *et al.*, 2018). - 23.5 (Bakker and de Bont, 2016). - 27.3 (Bakker, 2006). - Vast majority of studies indicate that the age range of I.S. foreign recruits is the mid twenties (Benmelech and Klor, 2018). - Mainly mid-twenties (Dawson and Amrasingham, 2016). - 18-30 for British foreign fighters (van Ginkel and Entenmann, 2016). - British foreign fighter average age was 24 (Lyall, 2017). - 26 (Hecker, 2018). - 26.5 (Knight, Woodward and Lancaster, 2017)	25-35
Class	- Mainly lower and middle class (Bakker and de Bont, 2016). - Studies suggest that the average foreign I.S. recruit is above the median socioeconomic background (Benmelech and Klor, 2018). - Positive perception of their socio-economic background (Dawson and Amrasingham, 2016).	Lower and/or lower middle class.
Crime	- Gang and more serious crime (Rekawek *et al.*, 2018). - 20% suspected of criminal activity (Bakker and de Bont, 2016). - Second wave of mobilizers did not have a criminal background (Coolsaet, 2016a). - Approximately half had a criminal conviction or were known to police - conversely, half did not and were not known (Hecker, 2018). - Minority were involved in non-Jihadist crime (Bryson, 2016). - Crime and Jihadist correlation (see: Basra, Neumann and Brunner, 2016; Lyall, 2017).	Yes (gang and petty crime)

Education	- Largely below secondary school, but significantly higher in U.K. (Rekawek *et al.*, 2018). - Only a minority were educated to university level (Coolsaet, 2016a). - A significant amount were vocationally trained (Bakker and de Bont, 2016). - Studies suggest that the average foreign I.S. recruit is above the median educational level (Benmelech and Klor, 2018). - A significant number of British Jihadists are well educated (Bryson, 2016). - Most of sample had either no highschool diploma or a high school diploma (Hecker, 2018).	Secondary school
Employment	- Most were unemployed or in low level jobs (Hecker, 2018; Rekawek *et al.*, 2018). - 75% unemployed or students (Bakker and de Bont, 2016).	Unemployed or low level jobs
Exposure: Sought Out or (In)formal Recruitment	Largely sought out (Mercycorps in van Ginkel and Entenmann, 2016; Rekawek *et al.*, 2018).	Largely sought out
Finance	- Largely self-financed (Rekawek *et al.*, 2018). - Half of sample were self-funded and half were supported (Hecker, 2018).	Self-financed through fund raising
Generation	Largely second and third generation from Muslim majority countries (Benmelech and Klor, 2018; Komen, 2014).	Second generation from Pakistan
Incarceration	Yes (but in the U.K. radicalization does not mainly occur in prison) (Rekawek *et al.*, 2018).	No
Marital Status	- Most are married (Bakker and de Bont, 2016). - Most are single (Dawson and Amarasingham, 2016).	Single (but at least two married during the write-up phase of this thesis).

Nationhood Status	- Largely born in EU (Rekawek *et al.*, 2018). - Majority born in EU and/or EU citizenship (Bakker and de Bont, 2016; Hecker, 2018). - Majority were British citizens rather than British residents for the British sample (Knight, Woodward and Lancaster, 2017; van Ginkel and Entenmann, 2016).	Born in UK
Perception of Future	Absence of future (Coolsaet, 2015; Roy, 2017a).	Negative perception of future prior to involvement.
Political Awareness Prior to Involvement	Apathetic prior to Hijra (Bakker and de Bont, 2016).	Not politically aware prior to involvement
Religiosity	- Not strict observers but intensification of belief over time (Bakker and de Bont, 2016). - Intensification of belief over time (Weggemans *et al.*, 2014). - A youthful turn to religion (Dawson and Amrasingham, 2016). - Their fate is now viewed as being in the hands of Allah (Dawson and Amarasingham, 2016).	Not strict observers initially, but intensification of observance post involvement. They now view their fate as being in the hands of Allah.
Role of Religion in Influencing Behavior Post Involvement	Significant (Dawson and Amarasingham, 2016; Munroe and Moghaddam, 2018) but not a principal cause (Goodwin, 2018).	Significant
Role of Networks	- Friends and/or family (in the UK, this largely revolves around mentors who become friends) (Rekawek *et al.*, 2018). - Pre-existing social affiliation (Bakker and de Bont, 2016). - Join in groups (Borum and Fein, 2017). - Other locals who went to Syria were an inspiration (Dawson and Amarasingham, 2016). - Foreign Fighters originate from the same neighborhood (van Ginkel and Entenmann, 2016). - Friendships with radicalized individuals (Campelo *et al.,* 2018).	Friends joined (became involved) together. They subsequently became involved in aid in groups.
Team Effort or Solo Radicalization	Team effort (Rekawek *et al.*, 2018).	Team effort
Verification of Match	**Schedule 7 Interview (where applicable) and often mobilized in Jihadist conflict zones**	**Schedule 7 Interviews and mobilized in Jihadist conflict zones**

Match Distinguishers	- Extremist and/or terrorist - Anti-social (Khosrokhavar, 2017)	- Non-extremist, non-terrorist and supporter of neither - Pro-social

3.6 Interview Protocol

The interview process consisted of six stages (Ritchie *et al*., 2014) where each interview commenced with the interviewees being brought "from the surface everyday level of interaction to a level where they can together focus on a specific topic" and then, towards the end, signaling "the return back to the more conventional everyday level of interaction" (Ritchie *et al*., 2014, p. 186).

Stage one commenced as soon as the researcher met the research participant and was essential for establishing rapport, particularly given the "intuitive equation" discussion in section 3.5.1. For example, just before commencing the first interview, the author was asked gauging questions such as "So, what's your favorite city in the Middle East?" and "How's your Arabic?" NAV321, the first interviewee, approved of the authors answers ("Sana'a" and "so bad that children make me talk for their entertainment") and this set a positive foundation for the five interviews which followed. Stage two began with the introduction of the topic. It also covered the aims and objectives of the research, informed consent and research participants were informed that they were not obliged to answer any questions. Stage three marked the beginning of the interview and began with an open introductory question to gauge how the research participant would take to the role of interviewee and if need be, the researcher could adapt. This always took the form of the author asking a contextual question involving immediate events in the office.

Stage four was the longest section where the central interview questions were asked. A balance was drawn in each interview between guiding the research participant, following emergent themes as well as seeking breadth and depth. However, this proved particularly difficult as research participants often answered questions they preferred they were asked. For example, in deciphering how research participants became involved in humanitarianism, they consistently answered why they are humanitarians. This was overcome by discussing their lives before they became humanitarians as this led naturally to the various events (behavioral waypoints) before contemplating humanitarianism. Stage five commenced approximately ten minutes before the end of the interview where the author signaled the approach of the end, thereby encouraging the research participant to raise anything that was not discussed. Stage six was post interview and this involved explaining what would happen with the data and the author answered any additional questions.

Raw data was stored on an encrypted and password protected hard drive which was kept in a locked locker in Northumbria University. Transcription occurred directly after the interview and the names of research participants were changed to pseudonyms. Raw data will be destroyed after the viva. Confidentiality was covered in the informed consent form as well as contact details for support services. Each research participant signed the ethical consent forms before the interviews and none required any assistance from the author post interview. Data collection was conducted by face-to-face interview. Each lasted between one and one and a half hours and took place throughout 2017 in Birmingham where the research participants are based.

3.7 Data Organization, Synthesis and Analysis

Initial coding was used to assign labels and all levels of analysis were constantly compared. This was reinforced through the use of memos and literature reviews which influenced interview questions and analysis. Select labels were subsequently abstracted to focused codes based on frequency or impact. Focussed codes were used to generate theoretical codes which relate to each other and these, if saturated, led to the construction of (and explanation for) the research participants pathway into humanitarianism and the socialization process which occurred (see section 3.4.4). Table 3.6 is a composite sample of the initial coding and analysis process. That is to say, the coding process went through numerous iterations resulting in continual refinement of codes.

Table 3.6 Sample Coding Process

Raw Data (Summary)	Initial Open Coding	Initial Focussed Coding	Sample Theoretical Coding
Q: How did you get involved? A: A friend asked me to join him on a trip.	Mobilizing as a favor	The factors which commence one's mobilization may not be the same as those which sustain mobilizations	(1) Process of involvement (2) Construction of identity through positive impact (3) Construction of perception though positive impact
Q: Why did you agree to do it? A: It sounded good. Better than what I was doing then. I slept really well after it.	Mobilizing as a better alternative (short and long term)		
Q: Did you know it was going to feel good? A: No. Never crossed my mind. I thought I was doing him a favor (by helping him out). But he was doing me one (but didn't know it).	Mobilizing felt good	Mobilization leads to positive impact and perception	
Q: Is that why you went out again? A: Yeah sort of. But, when you see all that bad stuff on TV… I saw that for real. Different places, same suffering. And we made an instant difference. Like, "boom"	Mobilizing as part of a wider narrative of suffering and means of positive contribution		

As an example of how codes are frequently re-coded, the theoretical codes depicted in Table 3.6 were subsequently re-coded to (1) “Involvement” leading to (2) “Identity” formation and (3) changes in “Perception" based on (4) mobilized “Outcome”. The full coding schedule (presented in chronological order and depicting the initial, focused and theoretical codes) is illustrated in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2. Table 4.1 is presented in the results chapter because presenting the coding process functions as a means of demonstrating the genesis of the resultant model (Figure 4.2). Nonetheless, Figure 3.7 distills numerous key codes (open codes [colored grey], focussed codes [colored blue] and theoretical codes [colored red]), displays them chronologically and illustrates their relationship with the wider literature (colored yellow). As discussed in section 4.4, the theoretical codes which resulted from the coding process formed the building blocks for conceptualizing radicalization as a vector.

Figure 3.7 Basic Chronological Coding Schedule



3.7.1 Management of Data

Given their drive for for saturation, grounded theory studies often generate a wealth of data from which concepts are derived. The author did not utilize any software to identify patterns. These were largely identified in memos through writing and the re-reading of older memos. However, the author did make use of a literature matrix which combined the coded interviews, the literature and condensed memos as illustrated in Table 3.8 below.

Table 3.8 Sample Literature Matrix

Citation/ Interview/Memo	Database Code	Quote	Page Number	Notes
Singhal, A., Buscell, P. and Lindberg, C. (2014) *Inspiring Change and Saving Lives The Positive Deviance Way.* New Jersey: PlexusPress.	Positive Deviance	Simple yet uncommon behaviors	8	Is uncommon always deviant?
Interview SHB435	Typology	"Yeah it would work for some"	N/A	Specify "some" through typologies of Jihadists
Memo 62	Victim	Are they helping victims or are they helping themselves?	N/A	Make this an interview question: What does this give you that you didn't get from previous "work"?

This resulted in just over five thousand entries at the time of writing. Given the amount of data, the author made separate databases for each database code, but this proved cumbersome and all data was returned to one single database. Database codes were constantly in flux as they

developed along with the coding process. Many entries had numerous codes, particularly during the focussed coding phase. In theoretical coding, the number of databased codes was reduced from approximately fifty to approximately fifteen. However, as the database expanded, the author opted to only update the codes for the interviews and the memos and not the literature as constantly re-coding the database to reflect the coding process was too time consuming. The database, while time consuming to input the data, was immensely helpful in the synthesis of data; a (potential) code or key word could easily be found with the search function and all quotes, notes or memos with that particular keyword could easily be found, collated and synthesized. In other words, once coding was complete, synthesis with the data occurred quickly. Post viva, the interview and memo inputs will be extracted from the database. The literature inputs will remain as this database can be used for further research.

3.7.2 Theoretical Saturation

An inherent difficulty in using grounded theory's inductive and theory evolving methodology is determining sample size which is only known, or complete, once theoretical saturation has been reached. Sample sizes in qualitative studies are relatively small (Silverman, 2013, p.117) and unlike quantitative enquiry, the reliability of qualitative findings are not linked to the amount of interviews (Rubin and Rubin, 2006, p.68). Concerning grounded theory specifically, theoretical saturation refers to conceptual saturation rather than representativeness (Charmaz, 2014, p.198). However, as Goulding (2017, p.66) notes, "GT techniques are messy and require a tacit understanding of when saturation is reached." Similarly, Flick (2018, p.90) states that theoretical saturation is "something researchers become confident about and not something defined in a systematic way".

Saturation is the main source of validity checking; the researcher remains in the field searching for new data which will flesh out the theory. Theoretical sampling ceases only when no new insights are seen in freshly gathered data. The risk of doing otherwise is premature closure. Therefore, while the sample is indeed small, given the theoretical codes developed throughout the grounded theory process, the author determined saturation when no new data provided the properties of category development (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007, p.611). In order to confirm the credibility of the concept, five steps were taken as discussed in section 1.2.4. Finally, saturation does not merely refer to exhaustion of the data (no more new concepts), it also relates to how ideas and concepts are abstracted and theorized (Goulding, 2017, p.69). If a concept has merit and is fully supported by data from the theoretical sample, one may consider the concept saturated.

3.8 The Grounded Theory Process

For many studies, the literature review forms the foundation of the final product, but this is not the case when grounded theory is the utilized methodology because the constant comparison method dictates which literature is pursued and how theory develops. Figure 3.9 illustrates the centrality of this methodology to the overall research design and, given this, pertinent aspects of methodology and research design are interspersed through this thesis. Much of what is depicted in Figure 3.9 has been explained in the previous sections and preceding chapters (see section 3.4.4 specifically).

Figure 3.9 Grounded Theory Process and Results



3.9 Ethical Considerations

Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2011, p.59) note that the term *ethics* derives from the Greek *ethos*, meaning character, thereby linking the researcher's values with the research process to ensure trustworthiness of findings (section 3.10). As such, it is incumbent on the researcher to both inform and protect research participants (Bloomberg and Volpe, 2016, p.175). Doing so requires voluntary participation, the right to withdraw, protection of research participants, assessment of potential benefits and risks to participants, obtaining informed consent and not doing harm (Silverman, 2013, p.161), with Ritchie *et al.* (2014, p. 87) adding that undue intrusion should be avoided.

Furthermore, protecting research participants also assists in establishing trust and (maintaining) rapport which are important facets in obtaining credible data (section 3.10.1). Therefore, a balance was struck between the research questions and avoiding an undue burden on the research participants. Overall, numerous safeguards were put in place to protect the participants: the author asked only what was deemed necessary and this amounted to a robust ethical structure. Doing so meant that the author followed all of Northumbria University's ethical guidelines as stated in the Ethics and Governance Handbook.

Informed consent was a priority throughout the research and maintaining informed consent ensured that the research participants were able to retain autonomy. The author provided research participants with an informed consent form which summarized the purpose and aims of the research, the funder of the study, voluntary participation, what participation involves and how data would be kept confidential and anonymous (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2011, p.64; Ritchie *et al*, 2014, p.87-88). Following informed consent, research participants were given 14 days to

decide if they wanted to participate and were informed that all requests to withdraw data made within two weeks of the interview taking place would be respected. Immediately prior to the interview and after the signing of the informed consent form, the researcher provided the research participants with an information sheet and gave them the opportunity to raise any concerns. Furthermore, the researcher reiterated to the research participants that participation was voluntary, that they could refuse to answer any question throughout the interview and that they were free to withdraw from the research at any point for whatever reason they deemed necessary.

Another safeguard included protecting research participants from harm. If the researcher felt that the research participant was in any form of distress during the interview, this would have led to immediate cessation of the interview. Whether anguish occurred post-interview or not, they were anyhow provided with the contact details of local support services. Confidentiality was achieved by not disclosing who had taken part in the study and not reporting what was said in terms that could identify the research participants (Ritchie *et al.* 2014, p.96). Indeed, Wiles *et al.* (2006, p.3) note that the principle of privacy is integral to our societal beliefs that individuals matter and that individuals have the right for their affairs to be private.

Furthermore, as stated, the codes linking the data to individuals were kept on an encrypted hard drive in a locked drawer and all data will be destroyed after the viva. This is in accordance with Ritchie *et al.* (2014, p.96) who states that researchers should do everything possible to maintain the confidentiality and anonymity of research participants. Therefore, and in accordance with the Data Protection Act, all data provided to the researcher by respondents (to include the signed consent forms) were kept in a locked locker solely accessible by the

researcher and any digital data was stored on a password encrypted hard drive in the same locked locker. There are a large number of legal and regulatory standards concerning the collection and storage of research data, but the researcher had become familiar with them and was compliant. Therefore these requirements were given due and careful consideration.

3.10 How Trustworthiness was Established

Within the quantitative paradigm, the standards used to portray convincing research are validity and reliability. The key principles of quantitative research are related to the natural sciences and possess limitations when researching the social world with smaller samples in an in-depth manner. Given the epistemological differences between quantitative and qualitative research (section 3.3), other means of establishing the quality of qualitative research are utilized instead of validity and reliability; trustworthiness (Lincoln and Guba, 2000). This is compromised of four factors: credibility, dependability, transferability and confirmability.

3.10.1 Credibility

Credibility in qualitative research parallels internal validity in quantitative research (Gray, 2014, p.186), thereby ascertaining whether the findings are accurate and valid. Or put another way, whether the qualitative research was conducted with integrity (Maxwell, 2005, p. 108). A correlate of this is whether the results are convincing. A key means of ensuring this is if the researcher him or herself is convinced of the results (Mason, 2013, p.187). The researcher is convinced of his results based on the five techniques outlined in section 1.2.4. Specifically, the researcher engaged in critical self-reflection in memos and also did so by clarifying his biases when deciding upon a philosophical position during methodology selection. Second is the

process of co-construction within constructivist grounded theory where the researcher and the research participant engage in meaning construction during interviews.

3.10.2 Dependability

Dependability is relatable to reliability in the quantitative paradigm which illustrates data collection and analysis procedures. However, the statistical procedures utilized in quantitative research are not amendable to small-*n* qualitative studies. To confirm dependability, the author detailed how data was collected and analyzed (Tables 3.6 and 4.1 and Figure 3.7 and 3.9). Nonetheless, inter-rater reliability was not utilized to determine dependability given the subjective nature of the analysis (section 3.4.5). Therefore, dependability in this thesis relies on documenting how the author proceeded through each coding stage (see Table 4.1 specifically).

3.10.3 Transferability

Generalizability (external validity) was not the aim of this thesis given the context dependency of radicalization (Rabasa and Benard, 2015; Ranstorp, 2010; Wali, 2011) and the smaller samples sizes used in qualitative research (Gray, 2014, p.622-623). Instead, the study aimed for transferability where the applicability of the findings could be applied to another context (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p.124). For example, Patton (2002, p.584) citing Cronbach and Associates (1980) discusses the importance of extrapolating findings to other contexts as this signals that the researcher has "gone beyond the narrow confines of the data to think about other applications of the findings" (Patton, 2002, p.584). To confirm transferability, the author has illustrated how the inducted theory is relatable to other phenomena (chapter five) and how it can be transferred to other contexts to prevent Jihadism (chapters six and seven).

3.10.4 Confirmability

Parallels can be drawn here with the notion of objectivity where, within the qualitative paradigm, confirmability rests with the findings being results-driven rather than researcher bias-influenced. The topic of confirmability necessitates a discussion about objectivity. The researcher complied with the requirements of confirmability by providing an audit trail in the form of memos, triangulation of data, being openly reflexive through memos and using a transparent coding process as advised by Patton (2002, p.576).

In sum, trustworthiness (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) was used to distinguish quality in qualitative research with credibility being "an analog to internal validity, transferability as an analog to external validity, dependability as an analog to reliability, and confirmability as an analog to objectivity" (Patton, 2002, p.546). He further states that the sum thereof addressed the trustworthiness of research, itself an analog to the term *rigor*. Post analysis, the researcher provided evidence which supported his interpretations and explored rival explanations in memos which contradicted said analysis. Patton (2002, p.575) states that "qualitative rigor has to do with the quality of the observations made by the evaluator" and the researcher has attempted to depict his research as not only rigorous, but methodologically congruent.

The following chapter presents radicalization as a vector. This forms the foundation for potential future radicalization research designs (chapter five), effective alternatives (chapter six) and the counter-engagement of the Indirect Approach specifically (chapter seven).

Chapter 4

The Conceptualization of Radicalization as a Vector

4.1 Introduction and Organization

The radicalization process posits four outcomes: "terrorism", "extremism", "both" or "neither" terrorism nor extremism. Whether the process takes a religious, ethnic or nationalist form and results in anti-social attitudes or political violence, successful radicalization is always considered malevolent. Any non-extremist or non-terrorist outcome(s) emanating from the radicalization process would be subsumed into the "neither" category because, per the prescribed outcomes, it would definitionally constitute "neither" terrorism nor extremism. Given this outcome specificity, this "neither" category is implied to mean "no result" because the only actionable outcomes successful radicalization concedes to are "terrorism" and/or "extremism".

The problem is, data analysis revealed an outcome of radicalization which was "neither" terrorism nor extremism, but which was also not "no result"; the research participants radicalized to a hazardous form of humanitarianism, referred to in this thesis as *aid-in-extremis* (see sections 4.2 and 4.3). Therefore, the main thrust of this chapter is to argue that while terrorism and extremism are indeed successful outcomes of the radicalization process, they are not the only ones. In so doing, the function of this chapter is to provide the foundation for answering the primary research question of this thesis: "How do British Muslims mobilize to Jihadist conflict zones in a benevolent rather than a malevolent manner?". That is, the process of radicalization may result in malevolent *or* benevolent outcomes (see section 4.3.2 and "Multifinality" in glossary).

Radicalization (as opposed to "radical" [section 2.2]) is not ordinarily associated with positive outcomes, yet this is precisely what is suggested here. Two steps were taken to account for this:

1. Section 4.2 illustrates the definitional shortcomings of radicalization and redresses these by presenting a definition of radicalization which substitutes the postulated successful outcomes of radicalization ("terrorism" and/or "extremism") for mobilization within specific parameters.[48] As mobilization does not address intent, one may theoretically mobilize with positive or negative intentions and engage in anti-social or pro-social behaviors (see sections 3.5.5.1 and 4.2).
2. The purpose of presenting radicalization as mobilization-centric rather than one which is definitionally hinged on terrorism and/or extremism is to present the concept of radicalization as a vector; one may radicalize malevolently or benevolently. Framing radicalization as a vector is a necessary precondition for answering the primary research question of this thesis (see section 4.3).

Section 4.4 presents the results of data analysis. Figure 4.1 expands upon Table 3.6 and Figure 3.7 by presenting the coding schedule. The purpose of this is to illustrates how raw data was abstracted using constructivist grounded theory (see "Coding and Analysis", "Memoing" and "Saturation" in Figure 3.9). The resultant theoretical codes are then aligned in Figure 4.2

[48] These parameters are defined as consciously, voluntarily and repeatedly (or of a long duration) engaging in potentially perilous mobilizations to global Jihadist conflict zones without any supplementary means with which to defend oneself (see glossary). As such, radicalization in this thesis only refers to *ad extra* radicalization (directed outward), not *ad intra* radicalization (directed inward) (Khosrokhavar, 2017, p.114). Therefore, the radicalized outcome is directed outwards to conflict zones, not inwards within the West. Furthermore, as stated in section 1.4, radicalization in this thesis only refers to movements/organizations below the level of the nation state. This, however, is not to suggest that the nation state cannot, by definition, engage in terrorism (Jackson, 2009, p.70) or become more extreme (Schmid, 2016a). Rather, for purposes of clarity and scope, this thesis sets the boundary with which individuals or groups engage in radicalized behavior below that of the nation state.

which depicts how the research participants evolved into humanitarians functioning in Jihadist conflict zones. This takes the form of a composite model and consists of three segments: (1) a decisional way-point pathway (characterized by behavioral contingency and chance encounters [section 6.5.1]). (2) A contingency based threshold ("involvement") and (3) a socialization process where the research participants adopted the "Group Priorities" (section 1.3.2.3.1) and learned to diagnose and prognose in accordance (section 4.5.2). That is to say, the group priorities provided an operational frame and the internalization of that frame impacted upon their identity, perception and behaviors, as discussed in sections 2.5 and 4.5.2. Socialization paved the way for mobilization ("Operational Outcome" in Figure 4.2) and their collective experience on each deployment reinforced the group priorities, diagnosis and prognosis; "Learning-By-Doing" (see sections 2.4.1.1 and 6.5) which assisted in perceiving conflicts in a victim-centric manner; the humanitarian prognostic (see sections 1.3.1.3, 4.5.2 and 4.7). Given the matching criteria (section 3.5), the factors involved in their socialization (section 4.6 and Figure 7.1) and how they both relate to the concept of radicalization (particularly the definition of radicalization used in this thesis which stresses mobilizing in a consciously perilous manner [in extremis] for sacred values as a devoted actor [see section 4.2]), the socialization process was categorized as a benevolent form of radicalization (see sections 4.3 and 4.7).

Section 4.4 pays particular attention to the establishment of "Group Priorities" (see glossary); investigating a group through its priorities rather than a snapshot view of identity offers an effective means of differentiating religious conservatism and/or political activism from malevolent variants - a common conflation which has resulted in suspect communities (section 6.6). Furthermore, focussing on group priorities rather than overt behaviors avoids the trap of

assuming that particular people are *not* Jihadists because they engage in particular behaviors (such as alcohol consumption or drug dealing [addressed in section 5.4.5]). Consequently, section 4.5 stresses the importance of establishing an analytical separation between the radicalization pathway and the radicalization process; while both are similar in benevolent and malevolent radicalization, it is the particulars of both which determine the vector pursued (see Table 4.5 and Figure 7.1).

In order to establish credibility for this vectorized conceptualization, section 4.6 juxtaposes Figure 4.2 to nine models and frameworks initially introduced in section 2.3.2.2. While these are only designed to cater for malevolent radicalization, Figures 4.6 and 4.7 demonstrate that the pathway and process of the research participants towards humanitarianism in Jihadist conflict zones can be incorporated into many existing radicalization models, albeit to varying degrees given context specificity and the starting points (the pathway) of these models and frameworks. The conclusions drawn from these juxtapositions illustrate that conceptualizing radicalization as a vector is credible. Nonetheless, despite the pathway and process similarities, the outcomes of malevolent and benevolent radicalization are morally opposed. To illustrate how such morally opposed outcomes can originate from the same premise (radicalization), Borum's (2003) heuristic is utilized (section 4.7) to illustrate the perceptive and prognostic differentiators of both and is premised on framing (see sections 1.3.2.3.2 and 2.5).

Two themes emerge from understanding radicalization as a vector: (1) benevolent radicalization can function as an attractive alternative for specific typologies of pre-Jihadist (chapters six and seven). (2) This vectorized view of radicalization also has implications for research design; the benevolently radicalized may also function as a credible control or

comparison group for radicalization research (chapter five). As chapters five and six are constructed from the conceptualization of radicalization as a vector, this chapter functions as the foundation for both.

4.2 Definitions of Radicalization

Radicalization is a contested and conceptually fraught term (Neumann, 2013; Sedgewick, 2010, p.479). Given this, it has been described as "fuzzy" (Bötticher, 2017, p.76; Schmid, 2013a, p.19), particularly because it is used interchangeably with a variety of other terms such as extremism (Bötticher, 2017, p.73; Schmid, 2013a, p.11), terrorism (Gurski, 2016, p.5) and fundamentalism (Dzhekova *et al*., 2016, p.9). Different definitions stress different factors. For example, some definitions stress deviation from wider societal norms (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p.798; Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). The problem with these definitions is that if applied, they may criminalize (legitimate) political differences (see section 2.2). Other definitions view radicalization as a form of political socialization towards extremism (Neumann and Rogers, 2007, pp.5-6) or, with a slightly different focus, a process of conversion (Farrall, 2015). Others stress the centrality of Jihadist doctrines (Silber and Bhatt, 2007).

Mainstream usage contends that radicalization is a process involving the internalization of extremist ideologies which are understood to function as a precursor to terrorism (section 2.4.1). The problem is, the sequential movement from extremism to terrorism has been brought into question given the empirical disconnect of cognitive radicalization leading to behavioral radicalization (section 2.4.1.1). Githens-Mazer (2010a, p.18) instead defines radicalization as "a collectively defined, individually felt moral obligation to participate in direct action". This

definition of radicalization is well-positioned to cater for other outcomes by having "direct action" as its outcome rather than the specific outcomes of terrorism and/or extremism (see section 3.5.5.1). Therefore, this definition was selected because it does not stipulate an outcome beyond a generalized form of mobilization. But this is also one of its limitations; a shortcoming of this definition is that radicalization could be applied quite broadly, even beyond the politically violent scope of terrorism research and the politically violent context with which the concept was introduced (section 2.2).[49]

In order to retain relevance and elevate the threshold with which Githens-Mazer's definition would categorize an individual as radicalized, this thesis adds a caveat by clarifying that "direct action" is specified as voluntarily, repeatedly (or of a longer duration) and consciously mobilizing "in extremis" (James, 1906, p.3) to Jihadist conflict zones i.e. categorizing an individual as radicalized would require them to voluntarily and repeatedly (or of a longer duration) engage in mobilizations which knowingly carry a significantly heightened risk of death (see "In Extremis" in glossary). As these hazardous mobilizations are undertaken for a cause, the research participants (much like Jihadists [Atran, 2006]) are conceptualized as "Devoted Actors" whose moral logic is best described as "Sacred Values". What distinguishes the two are their constructive or destructive expressions (see Table 4.5 and sections 1.3.1.3, 1.3.2.1.5, 2.3 and 4.7). Therefore, the research participants would be considered radicalized because they voluntarily functioned in (very) high risk areas in order to fulfill their duties and repeatedly exposed themselves to life threatening situations without any supplementary means

[49] Nonetheless, this may be an accurate construal of radicalization.

with which to defend themselves.[50] In other words, their mobilizations were consciously perilous; an *in extremis* form of direct action.[51]

A further consequence of defining radicalization through specific behavioral outcomes rather than cognitions is that extremism (sans mobilization) would also disqualify as radicalization. As stated above and critiqued in section 2.4, this attitude-behavior axis is central to most definitions of radicalization. The problem is, research illustrates that people do not necessarily become terrorists based on well-developed convictions alone (Horgan and Altier, 2012; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011; Sageman, 2008).[52] Instead, "most experts agree that radicalization is a highly complex and individualized process" (Vidino and Hughes, 2015, p.27; Vidino, Marone and Entenmann, 2017, p.77). As such, numerous researchers advocate for differentiating radicalization of opinion from radicalization of action (Borum, 2011c, p.2; della Porta and LaFree, 2012, p.7; Hafez and Mullins, 2015, pp.960-961; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, p.5; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014a, p.603; Schmid, 2013a, p.8).

In sum, radicalization is defined in this thesis as a collectively defined, individually felt moral obligation to participate in direct action, where direct action involves a voluntary, repeated

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[50] This "supplementary means" is what distinguishes an armed soldier from an aid worker; not merely their weapon systems, but the entire nation state apparatus available to functionaries of the nation state.

[51] Wolf (1982, p.420) would describe these people as "moral saints" (which she disaggregates between "rational saints" and "loving saints") whereas Macfarquhar (2015) would label them as "radical do-gooders"; "one step over the brink and their commitment might look like craziness" (Macfarquhar, 2015, p.299). As an example, one recent social media video (an answer to a posted question on Facebook) by a British Muslim humanitarian in Iraq (2018) captures this: "Am I ready to risk my life? Yes. All of us are. We agreed to it. We have all written letters to our families in case we die out here, subhanallah." This is said to the backdrop of destroyed houses and Iraqi soldiers because the conflict was ongoing at the time of posting. In other words, these are mobilized individuals, not merely "talkers" (Sageman, 2016, p.108; Sageman, 2017b, p.32) and their moral premise would accurately be described as "Sacred Values" (a duty-bound form of reasoning rather than a one premised on a cost-benefit [see glossary]) which makes them "Devoted Actors" (see glossary).

[52] The same is also true of the pro-life movement (Munson, 2008) and, albeit to a lesser extent, the Reverend Moon's Unification Church (Staub, 2013, p.267) (see section 6.5.1).

(or of longer duration) and consciously perilous mobilization to a Jihadist conflict zone without any supplementary means with which to defend oneself.

4.3 Establishing Radicalization as a Vector

Conceptualizing radicalization as a vector means that benevolent outcomes are equally as plausible and assists in differentiating benevolent from malevolent radicalization. Doing so directly impacts upon "the central question" (Sagit, 2010, p.3) of radicalization research: "Why do only a diminutive amount of people radicalize to terrorism while a majority, subjected to the same forces, do not?" (see section 5.2). Understanding radicalization as a vectorized construct implies that other people (non-terrorists and non-extremists) also radicalized, but that their radicalization resulted in an outcome that most definitions of radicalization have not accounted for. Therefore, these other outcomes are imperceptible to those researching the radicalization process. This is a significant conceptual omission which, if factual, portrays a fragmented understanding of the concept with important implications for researching radicalization more generally (section 5.3) and challenging its malevolent variants specifically (section 6.3).

4.3.1 Conceptualizing Radicalization as a Vector

Velocity (a vector) is distinguished from speed (a scalar quantity) by the additional variable of directionality; 4km/h as opposed to 4km/h on a south-easterly bearing. Therefore, while both speed and velocity provide a magnitude quantity (speed), a vector has the additional quality of providing a heading. In terms of radicalization, this vector would indicate whether one radicalizes on a malevolent or a benevolent bearing (see "Multifinality" in glossary). This distinction is important because the scalar-centric assumption is that successful radicalization is

solely a question of magnitude; above a hazily defined and continuously shifting threshold and one is categorized as a (potential) terrorist and/or extremist, as the research participants are when they are when interviewed under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (see section 3.5.5.1).

For radicalization to be conceptualized as a vector, the central defining construct requires sufficient vagueness so as to be both consistent as well as accommodating to other potential outcomes. Mobilization achieves this by eschewing specific actions taken when mobilized in global Jihadist conflict zones i.e. mobilizing to a specific theatre does not specify which actions were engaged in. Githens-Mazer's (2010a, p.18) definition is able to incorporate mobilization as the central defining construct of radicalization because it avoids specificity of action in theatre while also being mobilization-centric through its outcome of "direct action" which, as stated in Section 4.2, is clarified as mobilizing repeatedly (or of longer duration), voluntarily and consciously "in extremis" (James, 1906, p.3) to Jihadist conflict zones without any supplementary means to defend oneself.

A further requirement for conceptualizing radicalization as a vector are the bearings themselves. These require consistent specificity in order to elucidate the subtleties of the defining construct (mobilization). That is, whether one engages in positive or negative behaviors when mobilized in theatre. Benevolence achieves this as it stipulates the specific and consistent actions taken when mobilized. In this case, humanitarianism without engaging in any malevolent behaviors or functioning under the aegis of malevolent groups.[53]

[53] Malevolence as a bearing is less clear-cut as it may not be consistent: one may engage in violence while also engaging in positive behaviors (albeit solely for ones in-group). Furthermore, in terms of radicalization to "homegrown" terrorism, mobilizing in extremis ("direct action") would also not elucidate any relevant information as the potential assailant would not be crossing international boundaries to a Jihadist conflict zone. Therefore, with the malevolent bearing either known or suspected, defining mobilization in extremis in this "homegrown" instance would use indicative factors such as the purchase of a weapon system or specific chemical components for explosive ordnance construction.

It is this contrast between definitional construct (mobilization to global Jihadist conflict zones) and bearing (consistently benevolent in global Jihadist conflict zones) which brings clarity and a practical nuance to understandings of radicalization unobtainable with most definitions because their defining constructs (terrorism and/or extremism) are overly specified. Defining radicalization in such a reflexive manner challenges normative assessments of radicalization (radicalization is always a net-negative) and this duality is at the heart of terrorism studies given the context and perceiver dependent "terrorist or freedom fighter" cliché.

4.3.2 Presenting Radicalization as a Vector

To the seasoned radicalization researcher, conceptualizing radicalization as a vector may seem particularly alien. Yet numerous publications have articulated that the same radicalization process which creates malevolent outcomes may also lead to benevolent ones (Bartlett *et.al.,* 2010, p.38; Dearey, 2010, p.29; Githens-Mazer, 2009, p.19; Jackson, 2011; Kundnani, 2015a, p. 15; Lakhani, 2013, p.2; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, p.215; Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2009, p.1; Sunstein, 2009, p.149; Thompson, 2011, p.195 in Ramakrisha, 2016a, p.152; Tiflati, 2018; Venhaus, 2011a and 2011b; Wiktorowicz, 2005, p.210).[54]

For example, Lakhani (2013, p.2) notes that radicalization is perceived as negative but "it can in essence be thought of as either pro-social … or anti-social" (see section 5.4.6.2). In consensus with this, Schwerin (in McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, p.216) notes that "mobilization of individuals, groups, and mass publics for beneficent purposes may depend on many of the same mechanisms as mobilization for political conflict and intergroup violence".

[54] Of note, this does *not* refer to positively perceived aspects of radicalization such as fulfilling a sense of belonging, obtaining peer approval or partaking in a significant ordeal (thereby contributing to a positive sense of self) (Dugas and Kruglanski, 2014; Taylor and Horgan, 2006, p.588). Rather, "positive aspects" refer to objective benevolent outcomes of the radicalization process such as functioning consistently in a pro-social role within social norms and the democratic consensus (such as a humanitarian).

Therefore, McCauley and Moskalenko (2011, p.215) conclude that their radicalization mechanisms may be of use in understanding pathways to pro-social groups such as the NGO *Doctors Without Borders* because "the process is amoral in the sense that radicalization can occur for causes both good and bad" (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, p.4). Similar "vectorized" analyses have been proffered by others:

1. Wiktorowicz (2005, in Kundnani 2015b, p.21) states that "the social psychological process by which individuals become active in radical Islamist groups is not all that different from moderate, non-violent Muslim groups or from non-Islamic social movements, even if the content of the ideology differs."
2. Sunstein (2009, p.149), in his exploration of the social psychological mechanisms which lead to groups going to extremes, notes that "the American Revolution, the civil rights movement, and the fall of both communism and apartheid had everything to do with mechanisms of the sort sketched here". This is why he further notes that when "people shift from indifference to intense concern with local problems, such as poverty and crime", then "extreme movements are good, even great".[55]
3. In such instances, Sarma (2017, p.279) notes that non-violent radicalization "is often the fulcrum of societal growth" and for this reason Jackson (2011) states that "in some cases…it might actually be socially desirable to radicalize people, and more of them." Given this, Tiflati (2018) recommends differentiating "problematic radicalization" from "positive radicalization".

[55] It must be noted that "extreme" and "radical" are often used interchangeably in the literature (see section 2.2).

Nonetheless, combining contemporary understandings of radicalization with benevolent outcomes begs the question of how two morally opposed behaviors (terrorism [taking life] and humanitarianism [saving life]) can derive from the same premise (radicalization)? Data analysis (displayed in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2) indicates that this is a product of chance encounters with benevolent prototypical group members during transitional periods in the research participants' lives (section 4.4). These constructive leaders assisted the research participants in defining priorities (operationalizing their intent to "do the right thing" [Table 3.4]), thereby inculcating in them the frames, identity and behaviors which defined the next period of their lives (see "Group Priorities" [section 1.3.2.3.1]). However, incorporating these frames and engaging in congruent behaviors are dependent on who one meets and bonds with. Therefore, factors which influence who one meets are posited as critical in determining the vector one pursues (section 6.5.1), particularly given the role which role models are posited to play in establishing "Group Priorities" which subsequently set the vector for the prognostic response (see Table 4.5).[56]

As such, radicalization as a vector is significantly impacted by affordance (Taylor and Currie, 2012), which is understood as the range of actions one can perform with something. For example, a hammer's affordance is as a tool to a handyman and as a weapon to a sadist (see: Barrett, 2017, p.135; Elshimi, 2017, p.10). Therefore, much like radicalization, the function of a hammer is situationally inferred and/or role dependent.[57] It is along similar reasoning that

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[56] That is not to say that there is no role for individual dispositions (see section 5.4) or agency (section 6.7). As Waller (2007, pp.38-40) notes, chance encounters which resonate have mutual dispositional qualities to that resonance.

[57] "Affordance emphasizes the significance of the environment as a determinant of behavior, as the 'agent' that facilitates some behaviors over others, rather than seeking explanation of that behavior 'inside' the organism, in terms of cognitive process, or even pathology" (Taylor and Currie, 2012, p.3). Therefore, radicalization as a vector places an emphasis on situational and contextual factors. These factors are central to the Indirect Approach given the impact they can have in activating values and goals (Staub, 2013, p.110).

Zimbardo (2007, pp.444-490) notes that the very situations which inflame the hostile imagination in some may also inspire the heroic imagination in others; the particulars of the situation (the affordance thereof) can conspire to produce a malevolent weapon or a benevolent tool. Similarly, while "severe prior victimization can have strong negative effects, it can also give rise to altruism in many people" (Staub, 2015, p.11); altruism born of suffering (see "Multifinality" and "Altruism Born of Suffering" in glossary). Or, more abstractly put, "such distress always permits a variety of interpretations" (Nietzsche 2015, p.7).

Indeed, the social psychological processes inherent in collectives can produce actions either heroic or barbaric (Staub, 2015, p.86; Waller, 2007, pp.38-40; Zimbardo, 2007, p.485) and the affordances of the environment - what it offers those who inhabitant it, can be applied for "good or ill" (Taylor and Currie, 2012, p.4). Accordingly, context is an integral factor in radicalization (Coolsaet, 2016b, p.5; Hafez and Mullins, 2015, p.959; Wali, 2011, p.248). Yet the sole focus of contemporary radicalization research is concerned with malevolence and this necessarily blinds researchers to other outcomes (see "Multifinality" in glossary) as well as simultaneously reinforcing the assumption that radicalization is always a net-negative. Consequently, radicalization is more accurately conceptualized as a vector and investigating pro-social outcomes becomes an imperative when one's research focus is process rather than outcome-centric which, as stated in section 1.3.1.6, is the academic consensus on radicalization knowledge.

4.4 Findings

Table 4.1 depicts the grounded theory coding process (see section 3.4.4 for an explanation of Charmaz's [2014] coding process). That is to say, it illustrates how the data collected in interviews was abstracted to the theoretical codes which resulted in Figure 4.2: a model depicting the pathway and socialization process the research participants proceeded through to result in the operational outcome studied (humanitarianism in Jihadist conflict zones, referred to as *aid-in-extremis* in section 1.3.2.1.13). Together, Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2 provide the data-led analytical foundation (the "grounded" theory) for the conceptualization of radicalization as a vector presented in section 4.3. While the literature indicates that there are many pathways (Figure 4.3 [see also "Equifinality" in glossary]), a key component for the proposed counter-engagement (the Indirect Approach [section 7.3]) incorporates the role of happenstance, (behavioral) contingency and mere involvement rather than descriptive risk factors (see sections 2.3.2.1, 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 and "Risk Factor Instruments" in glossary).

Table 4.1 Final Composite Coding Schedule

Composite Interview Question	What were you doing before being a humanitarian?	So what happened?		How did that lead to you becoming a humanitarian?
Composite Answer	*"Nothing constructive; I was a bit of a lad and going nowhere really"*	An event	*"I got talking to X"* (one of the research participants)	*"It didn't, not directly anyway. To be good, I took my faith seriously"*
Select Open Codes	Hanging out ↓ Being bored Being broke Being off-kilter Being stuck Lacking routine Struggling "Using"	Processing event ↓ Realizing affect ↓ Being uncomfortable Questioning identity and future prospects on current course	Articulating ↓ Sharing thoughts (not alone) ↓ Bridging experience ↓ Concluding	Accepting need for change ↓ Brainstorming change ↓ Change defined as opposite of current ↓ Pursuing religion
Select Focussed Codes	Pre-Joining ↓ Apathy Uncertainty Unsatisfied	Purposeful questioning ↓ Experiencing dissonance	Bonding ↓ Agreeing	Defining *via negativa* ↓↑ Searching for objective "good" ↓ Islam
Theoretical Code	**(Reluctant) Delinquency**	**Acute Question: what am I doing?**	**Chronic Question: what are we doing?**	**Do the right thing**

Composite Interview Question	What did you do after deciding to pursue religion?		What happened after you proved yourself?
Composite Answer	*"We went to the mosque. We met aid workers there. They were good guys who did good work and that was appealing. But we had to prove ourselves to be taken seriously"*		*"They took us seriously and took us under their wing. That's how we learned"*
Select Open Codes	Becoming a known quantity at the mosque ↑↓ Reaching out ↓ Chance encounters ↓ Meeting and Liking ↓ Conversing ↓ Planning and prioritizing →	Initial expansion of self-identity – – – – – – – – – Proving commitment ↓ Raising awareness ↓ Fundraising ↓ Mobilization to Calais and/or Greek islands ↓ Being welcomed →	Hanging out ↓ listening - learning - questioning - practicing - planning - rehearsing - engaging - predicting ↓ Learning-by-doing and following – – – – – – – – – – Focussing time and energy (opportunity cost on previous lifestyle) – – – – – – – – – – Becoming trustworthy – – – – – – – – – – Becoming responsible
Select Focussed Codes	Serendipity ↓ Aspirational identity ↓ Lowering of uncertainty	Just-do-it ↓ Gaining acceptance	Behavioral contingency ↓ Community of practice ↓ Group Priorities (learning diagnostics and prognostics)
Theoretical Code	**Aid Contact**	→	**Involvement**

Composite Interview Question	What changed as you became a humanitarian?		
Composite Answer	*"It's not a job so much as a lifestyle, so everything changed really"*		
Disaggregated Composite Answer	*"On and offline, who I am now and how everyone knows me is as a humanitarian…*	*…so like the guys I work with, I see everything from a humanitarian perspective and they're my priorities now. It's hard, there's a lot of suffering. But we lessen that; very rewarding"*	*"And being a humanitarian means constantly doing humanitarianism; constantly looking for ways to make peoples lives better and then doing it"*
Select Open Codes	Delineating self – – – – – – – – – – – Others (internal and external of group) expectations of self – – – – – – – – – – – Further expansion of self-identity ↓ Representing – – – – – – – – – Maintaining identity ↓ Amalgamating self-identity with social identity	Adopting "other-as-victim" perspective ↓ Assisted by leader ↓ Empowering of self – – – – – – – – – – – Generating emotions ↑↓ Channeling emotions ↓ Assisted by leader	Walking-the-walk – – – – – – – – – – – Framing problems as a humanitarian ↓↑ Impacting as a humanitarian ↑↓ Confirming the humanitarian response ↓ Reinforcing humanitarian identity and perception through mobilization
Select Focussed Codes	Bridging self and social identity ↓↑ Practicing humanitarian diagnostics and prognostics in accordance with group priorities ↓↑ Social reality →	Framing (victim-centric) ↓ Affective channeling and coping ↓ Cognitive consistency →	Internalization (group priorities and prognostics) ↓ Behavioral consistency ↓ Mobilized consistency
Theoretical Code	**Identity** ⟷	**Perception** ⟷	**Operational Outcome**

Figure 4.2 The Radicalization Model



4.4.1 Benevolent Radicalization: Pathway and Process

As stated in sections 1.3.2 and 4.1, Figure 4.2 is divided into three segments: (1) a pathway comprised of four stages ("Delinquency", "Question", "Right Thing" and "Aid Contact"), a threshold ("Involvement") and a three factor socialization dynamic ("Identity", "Perception" and "Operational Outcome") - each of which were theoretical codes (see Figure 3.7 and Table 4.1). Stages one to four are sequential and depict the radicalization pathway. This is characterized by happenstance and contingency (see the blackbox parallel to pathway in Figure 4.2). The three (non-sequential) factors represent the socialization process (radicalization), the function of which is to establish priorities ("Group Priorities" [section 1.3.2.3.1]), define problems and proscribe courses of action ("Diagnostics and Prognostics" [section 1.3.2.1.17]) as illustrated in the parallel black and red boxes in Figure 4.2. Involvement characterizes the transition (the threshold) which bridges the pathway to the process.

Pathway Stage 1: Delinquency

All research participants were involved, to varying degrees, in a delinquent gang lifestyle involving drugs and crime (see Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 and Figure 3.7). This was not a topic they were happy exploring and as such, specifics were not broached (see section 3.9). Nonetheless and as illustrated in Table 3.3, this lifestyle did not involve violence. As depicted in Figure 4.2, three focussed codes characterized this period of their lives: (1) apathy borne from a generalized disconnectedness and lack of existential meaning. This left them feeling (2) unsatisfied and (3) uncertain with regards to their future prospects. The latter in particular is posited to have contributed to the "Cognitive Opening" (sections 1.3.2.1.3 and 4.5.1 and Table 3.4) discussed in

Pathway Stage 2 below and the "Need" (section 1.3.2.1) for acceptance as discussed in the threshold section "Involvement" (a theoretical code in Table 4.1). Furthermore, and given their pursued trajectory, this phase of their life was also characterized by what was *not* mentioned in interviews; a relationship with their faith. Despite their lack of Islamic behavior, they (and others) nonetheless identified (them) as Muslim; a latent identity more aligned with ethnicity than religiously aligned behavior. As research participant OO161 noted, "Like, his name is Mohammed. His parents are from Mirpur. So he's Muslim."

Pathway Stage 2: "What am I doing?"

All research participants experienced compounding social problems. However, specific discriminatory experiences were only mentioned anecdotally and were not expanded upon. Therefore, these codes did not achieve saturation and are not displayed in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2. As such, Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2 do not depict macro level factors which conjured personal grievances. However, during "Construction" (illustrated in Figure 3.9), non-saturated open codes did provide "Subsequent Literature Review" trajectories (Figure 3.9) and as such, they are displayed in Figure 3.7. Nonetheless, not achieving saturation on these macro level factors proved crucial in analysis: their omission was indicative of their worldview ("Frame" [sections 1.3.2.1.8, 1.3.2.3.1 and 1.3.2.3.2]) where the "other" (rather than themselves) is viewed as the victim (see section 4.5.2).

Some research participants also experienced an acute event which brought the previously mentioned uncertainty to the fore. As depicted in Table 4.1, for these "acutes" the question raised was, "What am I doing?" This either took the form of a drug induced epiphany or a pertinent

point/realization brought up in conversation. For example, for one research participant, it was a text message where his friends informed him that he "should stay low" because the police were looking for him: "Ugh," OO161 said upon receiving the message, "what am I doing?" For those categorized as "chronics" it was a steady barrage of negative macro factors and shame (see the grey colored open codes Figure 3.7). The "acutes" approached the "chronics" (who were part of the same wider social network) and in conversation asked them the same question. This resonated with "chronic" research participants because either the "acutes" were able to articulate what the "chronics" were thinking and/or feeling, or because following the "acutes" was better than where they were doing at that particular point in time (for an example of the latter, see Table 3.6). As discussed in Pathway Stage 1, this may be characterized as a "Cognitive Opening" (see glossary).

Pathway Stages 3 and 4: Doing the Right Thing and Making Contact

"What am I doing?" was followed by "What should I be doing?" Research participants turned to Islam because they understood it as unquestionably good. That is to say, (re-)establishing an Islamic identity was perceived as a guaranteed net-positive, particularly when defined in opposition to their previous life course (see the three select focussed codes under the theoretical code "Do the right thing" in Table 4.1). To do so, they forayed back into their community and began attending their local mosque on a regular basis (see the first two select open codes under the theoretical code "Aid Contact" in Table 4.1). New social contacts were developed while visiting the mosque during this time period and these contacts matured into friendships through reciprocal bonding (see Bandura [1982] and Cialdini [2007] in section

6.5.1). As discussed in section 1.1, some of these new contacts were professional aid workers and these people became role-models for the research participants (see the focussed code "Aspirational Identity" under the theoretical code "Aid Contact" in Table 4.1 and section 6.5.1 for a discussion on the significance of chance encounters in influencing life course trajectories). However, old contacts formed during their delinquent period were not cut because the research participants did not socially isolate; this is argued to constitute one of the factors which contributed to them radicalizing in a benevolent manner (see sections 2.6.5 and 4.7.1, Table 3.3 and Figure 7.1). For example, after taking part in a fundraiser or an awareness raising event, "chronics" became "acutes" themselves and attempted to bring others into the fold. While some (or many) of those approached remained in their previous delinquent lifestyle, (some of) these people nonetheless contribute a portion of their illicit gains to the humanitarian causes espoused by the research participants based largely on their previously established friendship and/or network ties.[58]

This was a transitional period in the research participants' lives and it occurred during a transitional phase in numerous Islamic majority countries; the Arab Spring and its anti-climatic aftermath. The conversations they were exposed to in and around the mosque reflected a prevalent uncertainty; is the Arab Spring good or bad? How will it pan out? Pathway stages 3 and 4 (deciding to do the right thing by becoming more religious and operationalizing their religiosity [and intent] through charity) is best understood as a period of lowering levels of collective uncertainty: by aspiring to become humanitarians, the research participants were able

[58] Understanding why these people did not choose to leave their delinquent lifestyle and become humanitarians (so-called "attritors") constitutes an important research question with particular relevance for the effectiveness of the Indirect Approach (section 7.3).

to lower their own uncertainty as well as (potentially) contributing to a lowering of the prevalent uncertainty characteristic of the post Arab Spring period (see the focussed code "Lowering of Uncertainty" under the theoretical code "Aid Contact" in Table 4.1 and "Uncertainty Reduction Theory" in section 1.3.2.3.5). How this was achieved was labelled under the select open code "Planning and Prioritizing" and is described in the following section as a reasoning process.

Threshold Factor: Involvement

As noted above, it was through serendipitous encounters with professional aid workers in their communities (a product of "Contingency" [1.3.2.2.2] and the "Affordance" of their environment [1.3.2.2.1]) that z*akat* ("Alms Giving" [1.3.2.3.1]) was interpreted by the research participants as a means for them to progress from being practicing Muslims to becoming operational ones; their new identity (see Process Factor 1 ["Identity Enactment"] below, the theoretical code "Identity" in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2 and "Interests" in Table 4.5).[59] Their reasoning process can be described as follows: Islam is practiced in accordance with the five pillars; *shahada* and prayer are practiced daily, fasting is only practiced during Ramadan and the *Hajj* is usually a once in a lifetime experience. Therefore, to expand quickly upon their rekindled identity (see the select open code "Initial Expansion of Self-Identity" between the theoretical codes "Aid Contact" and "Involvement" in Table 4.1) and prove their commitment (see the select open code "Proving Commitment" between the theoretical codes "Aid Contact" and "Involvement" in Table 4.1 and the focussed code "Proving and Acceptance" in Figure 3.7),

[59] *Zakat* is presented as the only pillar of the five pillars with which the research participants could quickly expand upon their newly kindled Islamic identity. However, in more nefarious circles, Jihad is presented as the sixth pillar of Islam (Ahmed, 2015, pp.318-319 in Schmid, 2017, p.21). In these groups, Jihad is the recommended route with which to commit oneself to Islam. However, mainstream Islam only consists of five pillars, not six.

zakat was taken up with gusto. However, as displayed in Table 4.1 (the composite answer under the theoretical code of "Aid Contact"), they (felt they) had to prove their commitment in order to be taken seriously by the professional humanitarians they chanced upon in their local mosque.[60]

To gain the acceptance discussed in Pathway Stage 1 (the "Need" discussed in sections 1.3.2.1 and 5.4.6), some research participants raised funds and made an informal mobilization to Calais to help migrants. Others went to Greek islands to assist refugees arriving on boats - two research participants participated in both. These humanitarian actions were applauded by the professional humanitarians in their mosque and the research participants gained their sought after acceptance. This was followed by "going under the wing" of the professional humanitarians (see the composite answer under the theoretical code of "Involvement" in Table 4.1). However, rather than a period of formal instruction, they learned (and came to believe in humanitarianism) by doing humanitarianism ("Learning-By-Doing" in section 1.3.2.2.6) and this necessitated following the lead of the professional aid workers (see sections 1.3.2.2.3, 2.4 and 6.5), but was also facilitated by the tenets of a "Community of Practice" (1.3.2.2.5) .

This "Learning-By-Doing" approach (section 1.3.2.2.6) involved spending time in the humanitarian offices (see the select open code "Hanging Out" under the theoretical code of "Involvement" in Table 4.1) where two behaviors were engaged in simultaneously: (1) partaking in discussions and (2) fulfilling necessary protocols such as administrative tasks (see "Protocols" in glossary). In the process, the research participants became accustomed and acclimatized to the reasoning process of the group (see "Diagnostics and Prognostics" [1.3.2.1.17], "Group

[60] As noted in section 3.5.4, these professional humanitarians were not interviewed. Therefore, it was not established if they intended for the research participants to demonstrate their commitment before becoming formally involved. Therefore, that the research participants reasoned that they had to prove themselves first was a matter of their perception rather than an instruction.

Priorities" [1.3.2.3.1] and "Socialized Norms" in glossary) as further elaborated on in the process factor stages of "Identity" and "Perception" below.

However, engaging in these concurrent discussions and protocols also occurred during humanitarian mobilizations to various parts of the word (Iraq, Ghana, Somalia, Yemen and/or Cox's Bazar [referred to formally as Kutupalong refugee camp which caters for Rohingya refugees]). As an example, during mobilizations the research participants would frequently come upon an individual or family who required specialized assistance (such as an operation, a tool such as a wheelchair or funds for specific medication not provided by aid agencies), a community which required specific equipment to continue to provide for its members (such as [spare parts for] a water pump or generator), an organization that was doing important work that would soon cease without further funding (such as an orphanage, school or medical facility) or spur-of-the-moment gestures which facilitate a level of lightheartedness such as having a face painting day for children in refugee camps, taking orphans clothes shopping before Eid and being an overall "smile supplier" (WQB121) to traumatized children.

As these opportune requirements were encountered during deployments rather than planned in advance, they would be raised in discussions with other team members whenever possible. Time would then be allocated to ascertain if the equipment, tools, medication or expertise could be acquired locally. If affirmative, an account would be set up on www.justgiving.com (a crowdfunding website for charities) and each team member would either livestream an appeal over Facebook or, given intermittent internet access and/or a weak signal, record an appeal on their phones and upload it to Facebook at a later period when internet access was available. These videos would appear on the research participants Facebook timeline and

would have the “justgiving” link embedded in the comments section. Pre-recorded videos are usually ten minutes in length (live appeals tend to be longer because the research participants would answer questions from those tuning in) and they provide context to the appeal; viewers would be introduced to the location, the work being done, the locals in the vicinity and the problem(s) encountered.

Given this interconnectedness, the theoretical code “Involvement” is necessarily linked to the process factors of “Identity”, “Perception” and “Operational Outcome” as indicated by the red “socialization” box in Figure 4.2. However, this did not occur sequentially. Instead, every mobilization (“Operational Outcome”) reinforced the frame and prognostic response inherent in the “Group Priorities” (section 1.3.2.3.1). That is to say, the more they engaged in aligned behaviors (such as fundraising, fulfilling protocols, discussing the specifics of a conflict with each other or mobilizing [see Table 4.5]), the more they self-identified as humanitarian (Process Factor Identity) and viewed conflicts through that lens (Process Factor Perception). As NAV321 said, “…when you’re there and you’re actually doing it [humanitarianism], it makes complete sense. You can see it [the difference it makes]. We need to do more”.

Two conclusions can be drawn. First, rather than viewing this cynically through the sunk cost fallacy, the author (and the research participants through co-construction [section 3.3.2]) understands it as a means of learning how to engage in humanitarian prognostics (see the select focussed code “Group Priorities (Learning Diagnostics and Prognostics)” under the theoretical code “Involvement”). This is a precursor to its “Internalization” (see the select focussed code under the theoretical code “Operational Outcome”). Second, given the iterative “Learning-By-Doing” (sections 1.3.2.3.6 and 6.5) method employed, this thesis characterizes the aid group as a

"Community of Practice" (see the select focussed code "Community of Practice" under the theoretical code "Involvement") as introduced in section 1.3.2.2.5 and operationalized in Figure 7.2. Finally, despite the interwoven nature of the theoretical codes "Involvement", "Identity", "Perception" and "Operational Outcome", they are separated here for purposes of analytical clarity.

Process Factor 1: Identity

The longer the research participants "hung out" (a select open code under the theoretical code "Involvement") in the office, engaging in discussions and fulfilling protocols and the more these activities were operationalized through mobilizations, the more they came to identify as humanitarians. In other words, under conditions of increasing commitment and practice, their self-identity aligned with that of the group and away from their previous lifestyles (see the focussed code "Bridging Self and Social Identity" under the theoretical code "Identity"). However, the form their humanitarianism assumed exists on the fringes of social norms; aid-in-extremis (section 1.3.2.1.13).

Indeed, most British Muslim humanitarians do not risk their lives to save others. Performing aid-in-extremis is a product of the prognostic frame (see "Group Priorities" [section 1.3.2.3.1]) and group identity (which is significantly influenced by the prototypical group leaders). These cultivate a sense of "Active Bystandership" (section 1.3.2.1.10). This distinguishes the research participants from other humanitarians (see "Social Identity Theory" in section 1.3.2.3.4) and in the process, forges a fearless identity (see "Moral Courage" [section 1.3.2.1.11] and "Heroic Imagination" [section 1.3.2.1.12] and footnote 51). As stated in section

4.2, this "radical" form of humanitarianism is partly why they are categorized as radicalized. That is to say, given its "consciously perilous" nature (see definition of radicalization in glossary), over time the humanitarian prognostic became the expression of the "Sacred Value" it was premised on (see "Group Priority" in Table 4.5) and the research participants themselves became "Devoted Actors" (see glossary).

Process-Factor 2: Perception

Engaging in *zakat* was the research participants' formal introduction to the suffering of the *Ummah*. These first-hand experiences assisted in viewed footage over social media becoming part of a wider "victim suffering" narrative which resulted in "Vicarious Deprivation" (see sections 1.3.2.1.4 and 2.5.2.1, Table 3.4 and Figure 7.1). However, as discussed in sections 2.5 and 4.5.2, unlike the prognostic frame of Jihadists, that of the research participants assured that the "other" is perceived as the victim who should be supported and equips them to assume responsibility and respond constructively. Indeed, their projects in conflict zones are filmed and uploaded onto (or live streamed through) social media platforms as a means of showing funders how their donations are impacting the lives of others. This also functions as a form of awareness raising for wider audiences. As Sontag (2003, p.85) notes, "sentiment is more likely to crystalize around a photograph than around a verbal slogan". But this also served another function, as described next.

As the research participants describe the situation and project to viewers, they also discuss difficulties encountered or the emotional toll the work is having on them. This generates much supportive feedback from viewers in the comments section and has two effects: (1) This

social support functions as a protective factor which offsets the impact of stressors (Lopes Cardozo *et al*., 2012). (2) It also assisted the research participants in maintaining their humanitarian perspective (see the select focussed code "Cognitive Consistency" under the theoretical code "Perception"). The (more experienced) prototypical group leaders also assist in positively channeling the generated affect through discussion (see the select focussed code "Affective Channeling and Coping" under the theoretical code "Perception"). In other words, and despite being in a radicalizing context, the research participants are not isolated (see sections 2.6.5 and 4.7.1, Table 3.3 and Figure 7.1) and their emotions are moderated (or channeled) by others in their immediate and digital surroundings.

Process Factor 3: Operational Muslim

As argued above, engaging in humanitarianism played a significant role in adopting the humanitarian prognostic frame and identity. Given the internalizing effect of numerous mobilizations, the research participants pro-social identity is now thoroughly adopted and their prognosis of dire situations revolves around protecting civilians as opposed to punishing aggressors (see section 4.7.2 and "Socialized Norms" in glossary). As will be returned to in section 4.5, what initially spurred the research participants to become involved in aid was not what sustained their involvement; doing the right thing was an aspiration which could be widely interpreted, but once defined and operationalized, being and remaining a constructive contributor became the valued identity, frame and social role.

4.4.2 Addressing Criticisms

The radicalization pathway is presented in a linear and sequential format, but the radicalization process is not. There are two reasons for this:

1. The radicalization pathway is a composite map of context specific decisional way-points. This is not to suggest that the radicalization pathway itself is linear and sequential. Rather, the radicalization pathway is presented as linear and sequential *because* it is a composite. Furthermore, there are many radicalization pathways (Jensen *et al.,* 2018). As such, what is presented in Figure 4.2 is merely one pathway. Figure 4.3 illustrates equifinality; many different pathways towards the same outcome. This is also termed as the principle of degeneracy, which means "many to one" i.e. many combinations of factors and/or mechanisms can produce the same outcome (Barrett, 2017, p.19). In other words, radicalization is "protean" (Khosrokhavar, 2017, p.145); there are many pathways (Bond, 2014; Klausen, 2016, p.i; Koomen and Van Der Pligt, 2016, p.234; McGilloway *et al.*, 2015, p.49; UNOTC, 2017, p.40). These different pathways reflect a wide array of motivations (see Weiss and Hassan [2016, p.167-168], section 6.7 and Table 2.1), "Needs" (see sections 1.3.2.1.1 and 6.2.4) as well as contextual instigators such as the (combined) role of networks, family, prisons and friends (section 2.3). Therefore, variation in how one radicalizes is the norm.

Figure 4.3 Principle of Degeneracy



2. A frequent misgiving about the non-process models discussed in section 2.3.2.3 is that they fail to provide mechanism information of any kind (Bouhana, 2018; Tyson, 2012, p.806 in Horgan, 2014a, p.162). This is overcome with so-called box-and-arrow models such as Figure 4.2. However, a shortcoming of these models is that they do not convey *how* an individual or group progresses from one stage to the next. Furthermore, they have also been described as rigid given the specific stages they address and, finally, they only account for "successful" radicalization i.e. radicalization resulting in an output consistent with most definitions of radicalization (section 4.2). In other words, these models neglect all the

individuals in similar situations who either (a) did not proceed through all of these stages despite similar starting positions or (b) did proceed through these stages, yet became something other than a terrorist or extremist. As stated in section 2.3.2.2, Figure 4.2 addresses these shortcomings:

- It ensures that each stage of the pathway has an opt-out mechanism. This accounts for non-successful radicalization as well as disengagement (see "other" and "Exit" in Figure 4.2).
- The sequential ("successful") pathway stages in Figure 4.2 are but one potential pathway towards involvement (see Figure 4.3)
- By displaying the radicalization process as dynamic rather than linear and sequential, Figure 4.2 is not accurately characterized as a stage model. As it recognizes that there are many pathways to radicalization while simultaneously presenting the radicalization process as a dynamic rather than one which is mechanistic, Figure 4.2 as a whole is not characterized as a rigid model and this is reinforced by its ability to simultaneously cater for malevolent as well as benevolent radicalization (see section 4.6).

4.5 Separating the Radicalization Pathway From the Radicalization Process

4.5.1 The Radicalization Pathway

The research participants pathway into humanitarianism in Jihadist conflict zones revealed two disagreeable findings with the radicalization literature. First was the centrality of (behavioral) contingency (section 1.3.2.2.2) during the nascent stages of the pathway as opposed to descriptive risk factors such as group dynamics, ideology, moral outrage or grievances (which

may include relative deprivation, social alienation or assaults against the *Ummah* [through foreign policy affronts]); push and pull factors as outlined in section 2.3.2.1. However, these did play a prominent role post involvement (the process stage [section 4.5.2]); close-knit groups and personal loyalties were formed. Discussions were had and topics revolved around injustices, geopolitics, British foreign policy, Muslims in the UK, the far-right and what Muslims are to do about it all. Emotions ran high, but they were also positively channeled; a product of the prototypical group leaders (who Staub [2015, p.133] refers to as "altruistic models and guides" [see "Constructive Leadership" in glossary]) and the "Group Priorities" (section 1.3.2.3.1).

For example, as stated in Section 2.5.2.2, anger can be channeled to violence (Holt *et al.,* 2015, p.109; Ranstorp, 2010, p.6; Sageman, 2008 and 2017c), particularly because it is the emotion underlying revenge and justice (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, p.16) and is "the most, and most long lasting, force to our actions" (McMullen in Staub, 2013, p.175). However, in keeping with multifinality, it can also be a "source of social progress" (Byrne, 2016, p.118) when positively channeled (Bartlett, *et al.,* 2010, p.25; Githens-Mazer, 2010a, p.19; Peucker and Akbarzadeh, 2014, p.136) (see sections 2.5.2.2 and 4.3.2). In this sense, radicalization can "make the world a positive better place" (Githens-Mazer, 2017) (see Sunstein [2009] and Jackson [2011] in section 4.3.2).

When asked in interview why the research participants engage in high risk humanitarianism for plighted Muslims, answers paralleled that of the radicalization literature: moral outrage at assaults on civilians (Vidino and Hughes, 2015, p.27), feeling obliged to "do" something about injustices (particularly because world powers seemed unable or unwilling to do

anything) (Sageman, 2017a, p.95), being a good Muslim and so forth. Yet upon detailing their pathway into this community of practice, a "how" rather than "why" approach (Horgan, 2014a, pp.87-90; Waller, 2007, p.137), the tertiary role of these factors in the initial stages of the pathway was revealed. However, this is unlikely to be true for all pathways (see sections 4.4.2 and 4.6).

The second finding was the significance of mere involvement; participating in the generative activities which define this humanitarian community of practice allowed for constructive socialization, particularly by prototypical group members (Khosrokhavar, 2017, p. 147; Nesser, 2015, p.1; Sageman, 2017a, pp.124-125) as emphasized by "Social Learning Theory" (section 1.3.2.2.3). This impacted upon the research participants perception and paved the way for an aligned positive (social) identity based on a pro-social cause (see "Constructive Ideology" in glossary) which played a significant role in inoculating the research participants from engaging in and/or justifying political violence.[61] In other words, research participants were neither initially nor primarily motivated to act by the oft ascribed risk factors. If anything, they drifted into humanitarianism (see also: della Porta, 2006; della Porta, 2009). Together, contingency and involvement raises two points:

1. Are the oft ascribed risk factors actually the initial impetus, or are more arbitrary (even "mundane" [Taylor and Horgan, 2006, p.586; Universiteit Leiden, 2017]) factors at play before the risk factors resonated? This is not a new suggestion; despite the breadth of risk factors occurring at all three levels of analysis (section 2.3), examples of indefinite (or

[61] Therefore, chapter seven recommends that governments buttress alternative cause(s) which people can benevolently radicalize for and build a (partial) identity around (primary prevention) rather than countering extremism through at-risk individuals (secondary prevention).

contextual) factors influencing a budding pathway have been discussed in the literature. These include "accidental relationships" (Staub, 2013, p.190-191), "accidental events" (Staub, 2013, p.259 and p.262), "chance" (Barrett and Martin, 2014, p.199), "chance encounters" (Bandura, 1982; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008b, pp.16; Malthaner, 2017, p.645; Pantucci, 2015, p.15; Pisoiu, 2012; Sageman, 2004, p.121; Schuurman, 2017; Vidino, Marone and Entennmann, 2017, p.96), "coincidence" (Nesser, 2015, p.295), "contingency" (Dawson, 2018b; Jakoski *et al.*, 2017, p.2; Marsden, 2017c, p.103), "cognitive opening" (Leiken, 2012; Wiktorowicz, 2005, p.20) (which is also understood as "openness to engagement" [Horgan, 2014a, p.101] and "unfreezing" [McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, p.80][62]) and "opportunity (factors)" (Barrett and Martin, 2014, pp. 192-193; Gill, 2008; Knight, Woodward and Lancaster, 2017, pp.27-28; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014b, p.70; Mullins, 2016, p.48; Precht, 2007, p.56; Sageman, 2008; Sinai, 2012). Regarding the latter specifically, Gill (2008, p.416) further notes that "social movement theorists posit that structural availability is more important than attitudinal affinity to a cause". Furthermore, even if explicitly stated in interview (as was the case with the research participants of this study), such risk factor ascriptions may in fact be post-involvement rationalizations, as similarly remarked upon by others (Byrne, 2016, p.107; Coolsaet, 2016a, p.21; Roy, 2017b).

[62] A cognitive opening may be achieved when one experiences "doubt and uncertainty" in their behaviors and/or cognitions as some scholars have documented with terrorists (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013; Khosrokhavar, 2017, p.109; Sageman, 2017b, p.5). This "opens" up a space in the "stimulus response capability" (Thaler, Sunstein and Balz, 2010, p.3) depicted in Figure 7.3 i.e. the signal to be received (the stimulus - or, for the purposes of this thesis, the extremist narrative and violent prognosis) must be consistent with one's desires or needs. The doubt and uncertainty between the extremist stimulus and the violent response "opens" up a space (a cognitive opening) which could be targeted by the pro-social narrative and the humanitarian prognosis of the Indirect Approach.

2. Had the research participants happenstance encounters been malign, the socialization process which followed involvement may have fueled rather than tempered these risk factors, thereby negatively channelling them for potentially hostile purposes (Staub, 2013, p.24). While this will be critiqued as a counterfactual argument, the same situational argument has been applied vice versa i.e. under different circumstances (or different "Contingencies" [section 1.3.2.2.2]), those engaged in malevolent behaviors may have engaged in different behaviors (Staub, 2013, p.241; Sunstein, 2009, p.121), even positive behaviors (Byrne, 2016, p.118; Dutton, 2013, pp.9-10; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, p. 68; Reich, 2009, p.40; Richardson, 2006, p.45; Schmid, 2013a, p.28; Staub, 2013, p.262; Zimbardo, 2007, p.301). In other words, particular typologies of pre-Jihadists may radicalize malevolently or benevolently and ensuring that one stays on the pro-social side of "the line" (WQB121) (see "Prognostics" [1.3.2.1.17]) is the central preventative thrust of sections 4.7, 5.4.5 and 7.2.

Both points undergird the necessity for distinguishing the radicalization pathway from the radicalization process, particularly when viewing radicalization as a vector.[63] Specifically, the initial motivations inherent in the pathway may be wholly different from the motivations which resulted from the process as was the case for the research participants (see section 4.4). Furthermore, it is the factors inherent in the radicalization process (particularly "Group Priorities" [section 1.3.2.3.1] which are influenced by the prototypical group members) which

[63] Interdicting pre-Jihadists (section 1.3.2.1.8) at the pathway stage (section 4.5.1) by maximizing "Opportunity Factors" (section 1.3.2.2.6) and nudging them (section 1.3.2.1.14) to become involved (section 1.3.2.2.4) in generative activities which fulfill their intent to "do" something (section 1.3.2.1.2) and fulfill needs (section 1.3.2.1.1) is postulated to be an effective means of preventing particular typologies (section 6.7) from embracing Jihadism (section 7.3).

seems to impact most significantly on the vector pursued (see Table 4.5 and Figure 7.1). Therefore, separating the radicalization pathway from the process is an analytical imperative.

4.5.2 The Radicalization Process

As conceptualized in this thesis and displayed in Figure 4.2, the process of radicalization is postulated to occur by means of three factors:

1. Defining priorities. As stated in section 1.3.2.3.1, "Group Priorities" was a product of the coding process and refers to the combination of the group frame, the group interests and aligned behaviors. However, groups with different frames may nonetheless possess the same interest. For example, members of a gym in one village and a mutually exclusive team of hairdressers in another may both be overt supporters of football team X. As illustrated in Table 4.4, group identity (overt supporters of football team X) may be identified by group interests (evidenced by, for example, being season ticket holders). However, group identity may be probed further (and more accurately identified) when analysis combines the group frame *and* aligned behaviors. Drawing on the previous example, while the hairdressers and gym attenders may both be supporters of football team X ("Identity" in Table 4.4), the latter may possess a hostile frame and are therefore more likely to engage in violence or vandalism ("Aligned Behaviors" in Table 4.4) when attending matches. The difference between the hairdressers and the gym attenders is that the group priorities of the latter revolve around football *for the sake* of hooliganism ("Group Priority" in Table 4.4 [see also "Criminogenic Needs" in glossary and Table 5.6]).

Table 4.4 Forging Group Priorities

Group	Identity	Group Interests	Frame	Aligned Behavior	Group Priority
Gym Attenders	Football Supporter	Football Support (evidenced by season ticket and source of social identity)	Hostile	Vandalism and Violence	Hooliganism
Hairdressers	Football Supporter	Football Support (evidenced by season ticket and source of social identity)	Non-Hostile	Football Support Within Social Norms	Opportunity to Spend Time With Significant Others and Constructively Contribute to Social Identity

Without understanding group priorities, a gang which specializes in selling narcotics may not be assumed to also be one which aspires towards Jihadist actions because drug dealing and Jihadism are (rationally, albeit superficially) incompatible. A more thorough analysis may indicate that the group frame presents drug dealing as, for example, a means of warfare or a form of punishment for the designated enemy as well as being a source of funding for future operations (see sections 5.4.6 and 5.4.6.1 for similar superficial analyses). This will be further expanded upon in Table 4.5.

2. Delineating a problem ("Diagnosis" [section 1.3.2.1.17]). This need not necessarily be connected to the priorities of the group and may include any problem encountered, but for the purposes of this thesis and Table 4.5 it encompasses the violent conflicts and humanitarian catastrophes which followed the Arab Spring in Syria. With the group priorities

identified and the problem defined, the third factor combines both to conjure a congruent prognosis.

3. Prescribing a course of action ("Prognosis" [section 1.3.2.1.17]). This is the means with which the group remedies the delineated problem ("Diagnosis" in Table 4.5). As illustrated in Table 4.5, the resulting appraisal ("Prognosis" in Table 4.5) is influenced by the group priorities. What follows draws on the example of the drug-dealing Jihadist aspirants above and contrasts them to the research participants. While the former and latter both identify as Muslims within groups which prioritize victimhood (premised upon similar or identical sacred values) within the context of the same problem ("Diagnosis" in Table 4.5), their resultant prognosis is nonetheless morally opposed. This is because the components of the group priorities ("Interests", "Frame" and "Aligned Behaviors") are fundamentally different. For the research participants, their group interests (*zakat*), frame (pro-social) and aligned behaviors (such as fundraising) paved the way for a congruent prognostic based on Islam (or "British values" as research participants have quipped).[64]

[64] The verb "quip" is used purposely; the research participants do not see any fault lines between who they are, what they do and how the U.K. represents itself. As stated in section 1.5, this is partly why they are labelled as "Accidental Ambassadors".

Table 4.5 Forging the Prognostic Response

Group	Identity	Interests	Frame	Aligned Behaviors	Group Priorities	Diagnosis	Prognosis
Jihadist Aspirants	Muslim	• Profit (drug dealing) • (aspiring towards) Political Violence	Hostile	• Viewing Jihadist Footage • Planning for Jihadist Actions	Victimhood (premised on sacred values with vector provided by frame)	(sectarian) Violence in Syria and Iraq	Jihad (eliminate enemy)
Research Participants	Muslim	*Zakat*	Pro-Social	• Fulfilling Protocols • Raising Funds • Mobilizing	Victimhood (premised on sacred values with vector provided by frame)	(sectarian) Violence in Syria and Iraq	Humanitarian Actions (assist victims)

The group priorities defined during the radicalization process impact upon the proscribed action ("Prognosis" in Table 4.5) because they influence the perception ("Frame" in Table 4.5) of the delineated problem ("Diagnosis" in Table 4.5); as Milgram (1974, p.162) noted, "if you control the manner in which a man interprets his world, you have gone a long way toward controlling his behavior". For example, with malevolent radicalization in the West (which functions differently than radicalization within conflict zones [Schmid, 2016a]), where the priority of the group is, say, the perceived persecution of European Muslims and the specified problem (the diagnosis) is that of the Syrian civil war, the proscribed course of action may bridge both through some form of retribution (the prognosis). As stated in section 1.3.1.3, the function of a destructive ideology is to solidify this reasoning and provide it with a foundation grounded in cultural capital; religion. That is why the intersection of biographical exposure (which includes personal grievances such as discrimination) and the enabling environment (particularly the group, its priorities and the embedding function of ideology) is posited to play a central role

in radicalization (van Ginkel *et al.,* 2016, p.55; Briggs and Silverman, 2014, p.23; Coolsaet, 2016a, p.47; Schmid, 2013b, p.221; Silke and Brown, 2016, pp.135-136).

The priorities and prognoses inherent in malevolent radicalization are perpetrator focussed.[65] These defined priorities encompass a hostile frame which pits Islam against the West and/or democracy.[66] Where these frames are negative or anti-social and the behaviors they inspire violent (or supportive thereof), particularly under a religious and/or political premise, scholars speak of ideology. But for the research participants, the priorities of the group they stumbled upon centered around fulfilling Islamic duties ("*zakat*" in Table 4.5), particularly those which quell suffering (a constructive ideology [Staub, 2013, p.343] as discussed in section 1.3.1.3). Much like the malevolently radicalized, the benevolently radicalized similarly diagnosed the problem of the Syrian civil war. But unlike the malevolently radicalized, the priorities of the group shaped their prognosis resulting not in a perpetrator-centric solution, but a victim-based one (with the "other" as victim rather than oneself [see sections 1.3.1.3 and 4.4]).

Therefore, Jihadists engage in retributive activities against (what they perceive as) the source of the injustice whereas the research participants focussed their energy on the injured but nonetheless innocent civilians ("Active Bystandership" [1.3.2.1.10]) at potentially great cost and therefore consciously perilous (see "Moral Courage", the "Heroic Imagination" and "Devoted Actors" in glossary); aid-in-extremis (see "Process Factor 1: Identity" in section 4.4). Given their

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[65] In the case of Daesh, their prognosis included the establishment of an expansive and well-protected Sunni safe haven (the Caliphate) which appealed to a larger audience including those more prone toward being functionaries of the State in combination with the religious ideals it is purportedly based on.

[66] As stated in section 2.5, Goffman (1974, p.21) utilized the concept of frames to conjure "schemata of interpretation" which permit individuals to "locate, perceive, identify and label" events in order to clarify their meaning. As (Daalgard-Nielsen, 2008a, p.6) notes, these schemata of interpretation also function in an organizing capacity as well as guiding (future) actions. However, as argued in this thesis, these future actions may be malevolent or benevolent depending on the factors which determine the vector (role-models which impact upon "Group Priorities" which guide prognostics [see Table 4.5 and Figure 7.1).

pro-social perceptive frame, the research participants were not receptive to functioning under Daesh's Caliphate nor following its ideology. In other words, the same problem (the Syrian civil war [diagnosis]) framed through different group priorities resulted in a different and morally opposed (but nonetheless radicalized) behavior (prognosis).

A further example aims to illustrate this. Schuurman (2017) notes that a frequently posed question within the Hofstad Group was what to do about those who insult the Prophet. This is the problem (the diagnosis) that the Hofstad Group were contending with.[67] However, both the diagnosis and the prognosis were influenced by the priorities of the group which provided and reinforced the West-vs-Islam perceptive frame. This frame is hostile and perpetrator-centric with the adherents as the victims (the opposite of the research participants), but displaced onto Muslims as a whole by means of the destructive ideology (further elaborated on section 4.7). This resonated with these individuals through their personal experiences of discrimination which provided a degree of anecdotal confirmation. As such, the delineated problem resulted in the following question: "What will we do to these people?" On 02 November 2004, Theo Van Gogh (who directed a polemical film about Islam) was murdered by Mohammed Bouyeri (a member of the Hofstad Group).

The social group the research participants joined did not have these group priorities. As stated earlier in this section, their group priorities ("Victimhood" in Table 4.5) had the other as victim rather than the group members themselves. As such, not only did this question ("What will we do to these people?") never arise within their group, but the research participants were also reluctant to talk about their personal grievances. This is because the group priority of the

[67] In their (perhaps narcissistic) drive to consider themselves as true Muslims, they distinguished themselves from the other (Dawson and Amarasingham, 2016, p.202; Schuurman and Horgan, 2016).

"other" as victim (rather than oneself) was well-entrenched by the time of the interview (see "Pathway Stage 1" in section 4.4.1). Nonetheless, the research participants had all experienced racism, discrimination and alienation (see "Risk Factors" in Table 3.3, "Indicators" in Table 3.4 and the initial codes in Figure 3.7) but with their newly acquired group priorities, their experiences paled in comparison to those of the victims of war (see the "Perceptive Shift" discussed in sections 1.3.2.1, 1.3.2.2 and 2.6.3 and illustrated in Figures 7.2 and 7.3). Furthermore, focussing on the perceived perpetrators (whether that be the West, democracy, the far right, Shi'a Islam or the Assad coalition) is inconsistent with humanitarianism. In other words, brooding over personal injustices and linking them to religion and geo-politics was not within their affective niche and social/occupational circle.

The priorities of the group, if hostile or anti-social, may align with descriptive risk factors which may pave the way for particular courses of action. As such, after becoming involved, adherents may opt out if, for example, they disagree with the fundamental tenets or lines of reasoning (depicted as "Exit" in Figure 4.2). The problem is, as is clear during the pathway phase of Figure 4.2, adherents may not have developed their own opinions yet or may only have a superficial grounding for the opinions they already hold.[68]

This was the case for the research participants who wanted to "do the right thing" but were unable to articulate much more than that at that point in time. This lack of clarity and, perhaps, inability to critically appraise ideas, rendered them vulnerable to those with malevolent intent. Kruglanski (2018) termed this as "being vulnerable to cognitive closure providing

[68] This is why Goffman (1974, p.21) discussed the organizing function of frames - the alignment (and organization) of personal experiences with the priorities of the group (the intersection of biographical exposure and enabling environments discussed above).

ideologies". This is why critical thinking has been cited as an important preventative variable (Barzegar, Powers and El Karhili, 2016, p.8 and p.26; Byrne, 2016, p.191; Kundnani, 2015a, p. 289; Meerlo, 1956, p.270; Qadir, 2016, p.84) as has an established (read: knowledgable) religious identity (Byrne, 2016, p.108; Githens-Mazer, 2009, p.15; International Peace Support Training Center, 2015, p.52; Patel, 2011, pp.8-10; Roy, 2017b; Travis, 2008). The problem is, merely teaching critical thinking skills is insufficient; for critical thinking skills to be employed, one must be motivated to use them (Moore, 2007, p.85) and this can be difficult when it "feels" right (see section 2.4.1.2).

4.6 Juxtaposing Models

This section juxtaposes nine radicalization models/frameworks, initially introduced in section 2.3.2.2. Not all radicalization models could be effectively juxtaposed; as discussed in section 2.3.2.3, some models/frameworks are designed to be non-process (COT Institute, 2008; Gartenstein and Grossman, 2009; Hafez and Mullins, 2015; Horgan, 2005; Horgan and Taylor, 2006; Innes *et al.,* 2007; Khosrokhavar, 2017; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011; Mullins, 2016; NCTC, 2012). Others are context specific. For example, Sageman's (2017b) latest model is only applicable in conflict zones or areas of escalating conflict and Taarnby's (2005, p.22) eight stage recruitment process only concerns the Hamburg cell. Similarly, Ramakrisha's (2009) "Radical Pathway" only concerns radicalization in Indonesia. Finally, Sinai's (2012) and Klausen *et al's* (2016) models, while similar in some respects to Figure 4.2, progress at a different sequence. Therefore, none of the above could not be accurately juxtaposed.

However, not all of the juxtaposed models are directly applicable; both Moghaddam's (2005-2006) and Sageman's (2008) frameworks commence with grievances which are not accurately conveyed in Figure 4.6 and Wiktorowicz's (2004-2005) as well as the PET (2009) models do not result in behavioral outcomes. Nonetheless, the selected models/frameworks serve the purpose of illustrating the credibility of understanding radicalization as a vector because the factors or mechanisms inherent in malevolent radicalization transfer to a significant extent to benevolent radicalization. Section 4.7 discusses what differentiates benevolent from malevolent radicalization. To do so, Borum's (2003) heuristic is utilized (Figure 4.8).

Figure 4.6 Model Juxtaposition I



4.6.1 Model Juxtaposition

4.6.1.1 Silber and Bhatt (2007)

Siber and Bhatt's (2007) first stage (pre-radicalization) characterizes the time period prior to exposure to the extremist ideology and includes descriptions of their lifestyle, socioeconomic status and religion. On the whole, this stage depicts an "ordinary" (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, p.23) life course with little if any criminal history. Self-Identification, the second stage, marks the process of extremist exploration, adopting ideological tenets, moving away from one's previous identity and affiliating with those who espouse extremist tenets. Catalysts and/or triggers commence this movement. These can take the form of a personal crisis or grievances at the micro or macro level. This is followed by indoctrination where the individual adopts the ideology and concludes that militant action is required. The final stage, Jihadization, involves self-identifying as a holy warrior and commencing the planning stages of an attack.

Given the specificity of pre-radicalization, it was not included in Figure 4.6. Therefore, juxtaposition commenced with the catalytic and trigger requirements of the second stage. As such, the will to do something else (a combination of "Question" and "Do The Right Thing") adequately captures these triggers. While contact with extremist recruiters is not mentioned specifically in Silber and Bhatt's (2007) model, they do discuss the exploration of a new identity and affiliating with people who espouse these views. Therefore, one may assume that there is person-to-person contact at this stage (online or offline). Given this, the self-identification stage progresses from the triggers to "Involvement". Their third stage is the socialization process ranging from "Involvement" to changes in "Identity" and "Perception". As stated in section 4.4, this results in an internalization of the group norms, beliefs and proscribed actions. For

successful malevolent radicalization, this involves the necessity for militant action (Jihadization) and for successful benevolent radicalization it may encompass aid-in-extremis.

4.6.1.2 Precht (2007)

Precht (2007) similarly identifies four stages, the first of which is pre-radicalization. This stage focuses on the general background factors which may make an individual receptive to extremism and includes macro and/or micro trigger factors. This can include personal crises or coming into contact with a charismatic recruiter. The second stage is conversion and identification and this involves changes in identity and behavior. While this transformation process is unique to each individual, it is propelled by the initiating trigger from the previous phase. This is emboldened by identity seeking behavior and the will to join and feel part of the group. The third phase, conviction and indoctrination, builds on the previous and usually involves a level of isolation from ones former lives while simultaneously delving deeper into radical Islam and incorporating it into ones worldview. This stage sees an intensification of group bonding as people associate more with the likeminded and trust is fostered. This is followed by the final phase, action, which Precht asserts can occur quickly.

Unlike Silber and Bhatt's (2007) model, Precht's (2007) first stage does include trigger or instigating factors which include personal crises and contact with a recruiter. As such, Pre-Radicalization encompasses the four stages between "Delinquency" and "Aid Contact". Conversion and identification begin at the tail end of the radicalization pathway and follow through to "Involvement" with the group and stops halfway through the radicalization process. For the research participants, this involved the nascent stages of (social) identity development but does not progress far enough to include changes in perception (frame) which is reserved for

Precht's (2007) third phase; conviction and indoctrination. At the end of Precht's (2007) final phase, those involved are fully committed to their newly acquired cause, be that radical Islam or, as argued in this thesis, aid-in-extremis. The final phase is the behavioral manifestation of these internalized beliefs and identities.

4.6.1.3 Wiktorowicz (2004-2005)

Wiktorowicz's (2004-2005) model has four key stages; cognitive opening, religious seeking, frame alignment and socialization. A cognitive opening may take the form of a personal crisis and this makes a person receptive to ideas that, under other circumstances, they would not have been. This is why the intersection of personal experience and the enabling environment is posited to play a central role in radicalization (see sections 2.3 and 4.5.2). Religious seeking is an extension of this; the individual is guided toward religion or seeks it out of their own volition. Through discussion, the individual's frame aligns with the message and they "realize" that the Islamist worldview is congruent to their own (section 2.5). During socialization the individual adopts the ideology and group identity which is maintained through constant interaction with the Islamist group and this interaction occurs at the expense of other social interactions. Therefore, (progressive) social isolation is key (Campelo *et al.,* 2018; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p.890; Slootman and Tille, 2006, p.90) (see sections 2.6.4 and 2.6.5).

The process of benevolent radicalization, sans isolation, is similar (see sections 4.4 and 4.7.1). Wiktorowicz's cognitive opening is well-aligned with the transitional phases the research participants experienced in stages 1 to 3. His second stage (religious seeking) may be interpreted as "Do The Right Thing" and "Aid Contact" as all research participants dutifully sought out religion within their wider social network. Wiktoroiwcz's final two stages (frame alignment and

socialization) link stages 4, 5 and 6 in so far as the actions of the research participants and how they were guided impacted upon what they came to believe about themselves, the world and their role in it. For Wiktorowicz's participants, this resulted in a weaponized identity but for the research participants, it assumed that of a protector.

4.6.1.4 Moghaddam (2005-2006)

Mohgaddam's (2005-2006) "Staircase to Terrorism" is a metaphor for violent radicalization which draws on a variety of psychological constructs. It is argued that perceived deprivation, a common factor in radicalization models, forms the foundation which instigates the path toward terrorism (see section 2.3.2.1). The ground level commences with perceptions of discontent and a desire to improve ones situation (first floor) which, if unsuccessful, leads to the displacement of frustration and anger (second floor). This is followed by the third floor (moral disengagement from standard social norms) which occurs as the individual increasingly adopts the moral framework of the cause the extremist group espouses. At this stage, the individual is (or close to) supporting and justifying terrorism (the start of the process of cognitive radicalization). As this becomes entrenched over time, the third floor leads to the fourth (solidification of categorical thinking and the perceived legitimacy of the terrorist group) and the individual joins the group. The final floor involves the members planning for the attacks and psychologically preparing to do so (side-stepping inhibitory mechanisms [Bandura, 1998; Staub, 2013, p.257]). According to Moghaddam (2005, p.161), political violence is the result of individuals' perceptions of "material conditions and the options seen to be available to overcome perceived injustices".

Mohgaddam's (2005-2006) ground floor, first floor and second floor present pathways which are too specific to be accurately juxtaposed to the specific pathway the research participants began on. As illustrated in Figure 4.3 and stated in section 2.2.3, there are many pathways toward radicalization. However, his third floor (moral engagement) is the commencement of the identity formation process and this starts with involvement while simultaneously providing a gateway into the socialization process. As such, moral engagement connects to categorical thinking through "identity" (see section 4.4). Therefore, Moghaddam's (2005-2006) third and fourth floors encompass the radicalization process. It is at this stage that the tenets of the group and their worldview are shared and adopted by the new members. However, given the vectorized conceptualization of radicalization used in this thesis (sections 4.2 and 4.3), this worldview may be benevolent or malevolent. The final stage sees an operationalization of these tenets and the (psychological) preparation required in order to carry them through. For the research participants, this involved conversations with more experienced members on what to expect and how to utilize the pitfalls to generate more awareness (and consequently, funding [section 4.4]). For the malevolently radicalized, this involves the dehumanization of future victims.

4.6.1.5 Sageman (2008)

Sageman's (2008) bottom-up four prongs framework commences with (1) personal experience of discrimination while living in the West. (2) Moral outrage in response to stories, particularly footage of Muslims suffering from Western violence. The former and the latter combine to (3) create the perception that Islam is under siege; the GWOT is viewed as a war against Islam. This results in (4) making contacts who connect an individual with the means and

opportunity to attack. The radicalization pathway he presents is not separated from the radicalization process. Indeed, they are one and the same. However, later work (2017b) used a within case analysis approach thereby expanding upon the pathway as a separate entity (although this focussed almost exclusively on environmental factors [see section 5.3.2]).

His 2008 framework contextualizes the rise of self-starters; the leaderless Jihad. Although depicted as linear and sequential in Figure 4.6, it must be noted that Sageman (2008) does not place clear boundaries around any of his prongs while further noting that the order of events may also shift. He also does not dismiss the role of ideology nor that of charismatic recruiters. No parallels can be drawn with the radicalization pathway of the research participants and Sageman's (2008) framework because he does not outline a pathway. Instead, the final stage of the research participants radicalization pathway forms the penultimate prong of Sageman's (2008) framework; "contact". As such, radicalization in Sageman's (2008) framework occurs, to a large extent, prior to contact and this is reflected by his bottom-up approach and analysis indicating that cognitive radicalization occurred before behavioral radicalization; the opposite of what this thesis concludes. Personal discrimination, which could be juxtaposed to "delinquency" (and a pre-delinquency factor if Figure 4.2 depicted it) is not presented as a stand alone factor as in other models. Neither are macro level factors such as the GWOT. Instead, discrimination and the GWOT are combined under the rubric of a perception which frames both as stemming from the same source; the West as anti-Islamic and this propels moral outrage. As argued in Section 4.5.2, this is a perpetrator based perception.

Figure 4.7 Model Juxtaposition II



4.6.1.6 Lakhani (2013)

Lakhani's (2013) radicalization flowchart depicts how people can become (violent) extremists as well as how they can exit or, uniquely to radicalization models (and highly pertinent for the research question), how they can become involved in non-extremist charity work. The "radicalisee" commences with susceptibility (strains and grievances at the micro, meso and macro level [see Table 2.1]) and contingencies which stress the social bonds inherent within a group as well as (sub)cultural trends which make extremism appealing. It also stresses the generational gap between youth and their elders which partly explains why the youth neglected their religion. This is followed by conversion which centers on the "radicalisee" internalizing extremism through contact with a "radicaliser" (social networks). When successful, this results in a reconstruction of the self and social identity.

Susceptibility is adequately captured by the delinquent status of the research participants, while contingencies account for their quest to change their lifestyle and engage in other activities. Contingencies also collapsed the "generational gap" between themselves and their elders as they sought out religion themselves. After meeting with charity figures in their community (social networks) their self and social identity "converted" with the priorities of the group (section 4.4). Lakahni (2013) posits four outcomes from this; two groups of people become radicalized and engage in either violent or non-violent extremism. The third and fourth outcomes do not radicalize and either return to their previous lives or engage in non-extremist activism such as charity work.[69] This thesis posits that some adherents of the latter did radicalize

[69] Similarly, one of Khan's (2016b) documentary participants, Zakarius Negussue, states that the social conditions which lead to an individual engaging in Jihad may also "be converted into something positive which would be activism … or it could be converted into something negative … and that's where you get extremism and violence."

and engaged in particular forms of non-extremist charity work (aid-in-extremis). However, Lakhani's (2013) definition of radicalization centers on extremism, not mobilization. As such, even an *in extremis* form of aid would not qualify as radicalization under his conceptualization.

4.6.1.7 PET (2009)

The PET (2009) model consist of four phases. Much like Lakhani's (2013) diagram, phase one commences by being susceptible to radical ideas and meeting a "radicaliser". This was split into two "phase ones" in Figure 4.7 because it combined susceptibility with contact which, an an opportunity factor, is a separate factor in Figure 4.2. The PET model subsequently advances onto new religious practices and changes in behavior to include new communication habits. This is followed by a narrowing of the person's circle of friends to include only the like-minded while simultaneously segregating oneself from family and former friends (see section 2.5). The final stage is one of moral hardening which includes viewing violent videos of Jihadist actions. As such, the PET model does not stipulate an operational or behavioral outcome as it is largely concerned with the adoption of extremism.

As in other models, "susceptibility" may include a large number of people with a variety of grievances who come into contact with malevolent (or benevolent) influencers (section 2.3). While the research participants did not experience social isolation during their radicalization process (sections 4.4 and 4.7.1), they did engage in changes of behavior in terms of religious practices which included spending increasing amounts of time with the members of the aid group. As stated, conversation at this stage was central in introducing to the research participants what to expect from aid work, how difficult it is and how to become successful at it. In some ways, this could be described as moral hardening because research participants were introduced

to the negative side of their future occupation; the realization that one cannot help everyone and the devastation they will experience.[70] And this must be accepted, but also used to generate awareness and funds so as to assist as many people as possible.

4.6.1.8 Gill (2008)

Gill (2008) outlines four stages that people experience on their paths towards suicide bombing: (1) Broad socialization processes and exposure to propaganda, where socialization into such a group predisposes one to support and participate in violence. (2) Experience of catalysts function as motivators to join militant organizations. (3) Pre-existing familial or friendship ties facilitate the recruitment process. (4) In-group radicalization. He notes that the order of these can change and that they are mutually reinforcing. He presents one such pathway as follows:

(1) Socialization Processes, Community Support and Other Environmental Factors. Propaganda and proclamations from legitimately perceived leaders assist in the creation of a willing pool of recruits. Included in this is the facilitative role of relative deprivation and a collective sense of frustration.

(2) Catalysts (religious, political or personal) make joining militant organizations salient and this can include vicarious suffering.

(3) Pre-existing social ties explain why the motivation to join is often times not enough, one must also have the structural opportunity to do so and this occurs through kin networks.

(4) In-group radicalization draws largely from Social Identity Theory (section 1.3.2.3.4) which places emphasis on social contexts, the acquisition of group norms and group processes. Joining the group impacts upon ones identity resulting in a positive self-perception and

[70] As Macfarquhar (2015, p.299) states, “do-gooders who last have strong stomachs”.

congruent behaviors aligned with a corresponding worldview. This sharing of identity and norms subsequently makes the group more cohesive and intra-trusting. The result is that adherents obtain a positive self-perception while simultaneously reducing the complexity of the world. Conversation is posited to play an important role in group norm acquisition and may also lead to groups isolating themselves.

(5) Suicide Bombing (the desired group goal for the individual)

While Gill's (2008) model focusses exclusively on suicide bombing, numerous parallels can be drawn. While top-down pull factors such as propaganda played no role whatsoever in compelling the research participants to engage in their subsequent activities, they were pushed by the hopeless circumstances of their situation. This was aided by the catalysts of either the question some asked themselves, or the same question that was asked to others ("chronics and acutes" in section 4.4). At this point, the only motivation the research participants had was to do something else, ideally "the right thing". Therefore, unlike in Gill's (2008) model, there was no motivation to join a specific group or engage in specific activities. However, that changed when "social ties" of their community resulted in them meeting charity workers and becoming involved in their social circles. As involvement continued, it was also strengthened; the research participants adopted new norms as they became convinced of the groups priorities and this resulted in a positive self-perception by giving them a means with which to minimize their own uncertainty and that of the *Ummah*. In other words, by engaging in aid research participants had a defined role which resulted in a (positive) impact. While the outcomes of aid through benevolent radicalization and suicide bombing through malevolent radicalization are morally opposed, similar dynamics are observable in both.

4.6.1.9 Pisoiu (2012)

The final model discussed is Pisoiu's (2012) occupational change process. Her focus is on the adoption of extremism as an occupational choice. The radicalization to extremism process is categorized as involving three types of incentives (reward, standing and recognition) which result in materialization and this is conceptualized in three stages: (1) "Probing" involves being in the wrong place at the wrong time and requires that the individual (more often than not, an immigrant) lacks an understanding of their new surroundings and how to prosper in it. This vulnerability is used by the recruiter in order to set the individual on a life course of extremism. (2) "Centrifuging" involves an increasing focus on Islamism and encompasses indoctrination, which includes isolation from non-group members. (3) The final stage is "Professionalizing" and involves the acquisition of an occupational speciality within a terrorist cell.

Pisoiu's (2012) first stage involves a specific form of susceptibility which could not be accurately displayed in Figure 4.7. Therefore, the juxtaposition commences with "Probing" being juxtaposed to the "Aid Contact" and "Involvement" stage. For her research participants, this was described as being in the wrong place at the wrong time. For the research participants of this study it was the opposite; the right place at the right time and from these "Chance Encounters" (Section 4.5.1)/"Opportunity Factors" (section 1.3.2.2.6), relationships developed. This is followed by her "centrifuging" stage. This, essentially, is the radicalization process as presented in Figure 4.2 - what Pisoiu (2012) describes as indoctrination. As in other models and as discussed in section 4.4, a key difference is that the research participants did not isolate (see Figure 7.1 for other differentiators).

This section aimed to demonstrate that the pathways and processes of the research participants and Jihadists/extremists have significant similarities and this assists in the credibility of the vectorized conceptualization of radicalization (section 1.2.4). What follows pertains to those factors which distinguish malevolent from benevolent radicalization.

4.7 In Conclusion

As stated in section 4.1, the research participants are considered radicalized. How radicalization is defined in this thesis stresses specific behaviors in the form of direct action and "consciously perilous" mobilizations to conflict zones ("in extremis" [see glossary]). While categorizing the research participants as radicalized was assisted by the matching criteria (Tables 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5), the merit of this vectorized conceptualization was confirmed by the numerous parallels in the pathway and socialization process of the research participants and Jihadists (see section 4.6). Nonetheless, as discussed in the following section and depicted in Table 4.5 and Figure 7.1, there are numerous differences between Jihadists and the research participants.

4.7.1 Behavioral Differentiators

Despite the match (section 3.5) and similarities in pathway and process (section 4.6), the research participants and Jihadists differ on numerous fronts (depicted in Figure 7.1). First, at no point during their pathway or radicalization process did the research participants isolate (section 4.4). Indeed, such "total" situations are a key requirement when groups move to extremes (Bandura, 1982, p.751; Meerlo, 1956, p.201; Sunstein, 2009; Taylor, 2017; Waller, 2007) (see section 2.6.5). Second, unlike Jihadists (who stem from the same amorphous social scene as the research participants [see Table 3.4 and sections 3.5.5.2 and 6.1] and may hold the same or

similar “Sacred Values” [see glossary]) there was no skill transfer between their delinquent life courses and their future humanitarian one. Third, the research participants experienced a heightened sense of responsibility by framing the other as victim, unlike the Jihadists who are documented to experience a diminished one (see Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008b, p.10) (see sections 1.3.1.3, 4.5.2 and 4.7.2). Minimizing individual responsibility occurs when self identity is forged with group identity (Taylor, 2004, p.44), under conditions of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1998) and/or when dehumanization techniques are utilized (Atran, 2010, p.322; Khosrokhavar, 2009, p.72; Zimbardo, 2007, p.11). Diminished responsibility may also be a product of self-categorization (see “Flocking and Feathering” in glossary, “Social Identity Theory” in section 1.3.2.3.4 and Sageman, 2017a, pp.114-118 and pp.146-150).

However, relinquishing self identity and self-categorization may also be positive and, given the "Learning-By-Doing Principle” (section 1.3.2.4.6) this may be influenced by the behavioral roles one engages in (see Table 4.5 for the role that “Group Priorities” play in influencing behavioral prognostics). For example, Sunstein (2009, p.79) notes that “the very assumption of a particular social role automatically conveys a great deal of information about appropriate behavior”. More generally, Haslam, Reicher and Platow (2011, p.52) note that the simple act of individuals self-categorizing themselves as group members is enough to create group behavior, an argument also put forward by Sageman (2017b, p.6) and one which is consistent with the arguments made in section 4.5.2. In other words, if positively channeled through pro-social prototypical group members who are able to influence “Group Priorities”, self-categorization may “pull” people towards benevolence (for particular typologies [see section

6.7]) in the same way that, if negatively channeled (through destructive role-models and hostile "Group Priorities"), it can "pull" the same people towards malevolence.

4.7.2 Cognitive Differentiators

Borum's (2003) heuristic is used to explain the process of the development of the terrorist mindset.[71] Borum (2003) outlines four stages, the first of which frames an event as "it's not right" (Borum, 2003, p.8). The second stage is comparative and what was identified in stage one is viewed as unjust; "it's not fair". One may, for example, view the Syrian civil war in these terms or the plight of the Rohingya. Stage three targets an out-group (which could also be a policy) and blames them for the injustice; "it's your fault". This, for example, is relatable to Bin Laden's concept of targeting the far enemy (Anonymous, 2003; Bergen, 2002). In the process of doing this, the out-group is vilified and often dehumanized which facilitates justification for aggression (Bandura, 1998; Borum, 2003, p.7; Blazak, 2001, pp.988-989 and p.994). Stage four sees a normalization of negative stereotyping which provides the ability to assign a moral dispositional quality to all members; "you're evil".

This process results in the justifiable use of violence against the out-group. As Richardson (2006, p.49) states, "a sense of injustice can provide a personal incentive to act. An individual is more likely to do so if he sees empirical evidence of injustice as well as evidence that the enemy is to blame" (see Figure 4.8). Furthermore, people are likely to enjoy inflicting pain on others when they are sufficiently enraged by them (Baron, 1977). Therefore, an important component in quelling violent responses lays in mitigating the rage (and recognizing the role of emotion more generally [see sections 2.4 and 2.5]).

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[71] Numerous parallels can be drawn between Borum's (2003) heuristic and Dalgaard-Nielsen's (2008b, p.10) framework.

Conceptualizing radicalization as a vector requires a perceptual change of Borum's (2003) heuristic and this is achieved by organizing his stages into diagnostics (blue overlay) and prognostics (red overlay), as is illustrated in Figure 4.8. The research participants similarly experienced discrimination in their own lives and moral outrage at events in, for example, Syria, but these coalesced in a manner which focussed on the "other" as victim, rather than oneself and one's religion (section 4.5.2).

Figure 4.8 Borum's (2003) Terrorist Mindset



As the blue and red colored overlays indicate, stages one and two are diagnostic in nature; they delineate the existence of a problem which is always defined through the assigning of victimhood. Stage three and four are prognostic in nature; they attribute blame and may specify what needs to be done to alleviate the suffering (however this is not the case with

Borum's heuristic).[72] In malevolent radicalization, stage one and two are victim based and stage three and four are perpetrator based. The research participants of this study similarly diagnosed what the problem was. But instead of blaming an out-group for the(ir) (personal) injustice(s), their focus remained with the victims.

Progressing from stage 2 to stage 3 is what Byrne (2016, p.118) calls "a fork in the road" where one path is peaceful and the other violent - a sentiment also expressed by Fergusson (2017, pp.54-55). Specifically, Borum's (2003) stage 3 is summarized as "it's your fault" (perpetrator based) whereas the research participants reasoned along the lines of "it's *not* your fault" (victim based). The fourth stage, the mobilization stage - what Borum (2003, p.9) labels as "the reaction" and characterizes it as "you're evil" - also followed a different prognosis, best described as "you're innocent". The research participants, through benevolent radicalization, responded by traveling to the location of the injustice and helping the suffering population rather than attacking the perpetrator; "you are innocent" as opposed to "you are evil". In other words, when progressing from stage 2 to stage 3 (from diagnosis to prognosis), the benevolently radicalized remained loyal to the victims. That is to say, while the prognosis of the Jihadists is perpetrator based ("it's your fault and you must be stopped and punished"), the benevolently radicalized prognosis is victim based ("it's not your fault, you don't deserve to suffer. I will help you").[73]

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[72] Similarly, van Ginkel *et al*. (2016, p.54) state that "the language of jihad then only legitimates the grievance, offering a designated culprit and a direct justification to fight the wrong."

[73] Another response from a benevolent prognosis within violence inducing circumstances is observed by Kelman and Hamilton (1989, p.7) who describe a soldier who was ordered to shoot during the My Lai massacre as saying "I can't. I won't."

Instead of self-categorizing as “soldiers” attacking the perceived perpetrator, the research participants self-categorized as “protectors” helping the victims. While the prognosis of the Jihadists (or, for example, the Hofstad Group [section 4.5.2]) is perpetrator based, the benevolently radicalized prognosis is victim based - with the other as victim (see sections 1.3.1.3 and 4.5.2). This difference in reasoning is postulated to occur for two reasons. First, the prototypical group members (the leaders [Khosrokhavar, 2017, p.147; Nesser, 2015, p.1; Sageman, 2017a, pp.124-125]) convinced adherents that solutions to the intractable problems within Jihadist conflict zones must occur among political elites and power brokers, not by storming their land and eliminating those causing the injustice.[74] This is logical and correct. But this is not to say that Jihadism is the only means to have impact. Second, this reasoning is part of a frame which is not concerned with being the righteous individual who rights wrongs and functions on the supply-side of justice. The research participant's frame centered around assisting the oppressed, not eliminating the oppressor (see also the literature on “rescuers” during the Holocaust [Clarke, 2003, p.3; Oliner and Oliner, 1998, p.1; Snyder, 2016, p.251 and p.270] who similarly functioned as devoted actors and displayed moral courage, heroism, active bystandership and charity [see also Macfarquhar, 2015, p.300]). As such, benevolent radicalization may be perceived as social norms taken to the extreme whereas malevolent radicalization is always outside of these norms (see also section 2.2).

[74] Bandura (1982, p.751) notes how Diana Oughton’s (a prominent member of the Weathermen) pathway towards militancy was equally affected by a prototypical group member who convinced her that only revolutionary force would bring the necessary changes. Similarly, Post (2007) discusses the case of Omar Rezaq who hijacked a plane and killed five passengers. He notes the role of a mentor in influencing Rezaq that “the only way to become a man was to join the revolution” (Post, 2007, p.18). This view aligns with Nesser's (2004, p.20) which stresses the role of the entrepreneurial group leader (see section 6.7).

Chapter 5

The Control Group Function of Vectorized Radicalization

5.1 Introduction and Organization

Horgan (2017c), in discussing dependent variable bias and the selection of adequate control groups (see sections 1.1 and 1.2.8), labelled these "a rate limiting factor in terms of the success and progress in terrorism studies. Whoever cracks that issue will help the field turn a corner which we badly need to get around very quickly." The hope is that the suggestions in this chapter go some way towards navigating that corner.

This thesis has conceptualized radicalization as a vector; the process can result in malevolent or benevolent outcomes (see "Multifinality" in glossary). This was discussed in chapter four. Confirming radicalization as a vector resulted in two further research questions. This chapter addresses question two in section 1.2.5: "To what extent could the benevolently radicalized be utilized to function as a control or comparison group for radicalization research?"

This is an important question because control or comparison groups play a critical role in (dis)confirming extant knowledge. However, they are also important for the primary question of this thesis: "How do British Muslims mobilize to Jihadist conflict zones in a benevolent rather than a malevolent manner?" If benevolently radicalized Muslims are found by others to be of value in a control or comparison group function, then the premise upon which they were selected (mobilized and matched but non-extremist) would also be confirmed; radicalization as a vector (see "Multifinality" in glossary).

Section 5.2 commences by reiterating the central question of radicalization research: "Why do only a diminutive amount of people radicalize to terrorism while a majority, subjected to the same forces, do not?" This serves as the foundation for the presentation of various research designs scholars have used to investigate it (section 5.3). Table 5.1 illustrates three control or comparison group research designs utilized in the majority of radicalization research along with the fourth design proposed by this thesis; using benevolently radicalized research participants as a control or comparison group for future radicalization research. While all control or comparison groups are matched (albeit to varying degrees), what distinguishes the vectorized approach from the others is that it is the only design (outside of Merari's [2010] research) where both the dependent variable (violent extremism) and the control group (the benevolently radicalized) are confirmed as behaviorally radicalized, according to the definition of radicalization utilized in this thesis (see glossary).

While a behaviorally radicalized control or comparison group is advantageous for radicalization research, and while the credibility of the research participants as an adequate match to Jihadists has been verified (section 3.5), there remains the irksome notion that the premise upon which this has been constructed is false. This is why it seems counterintuitive to have humanitarians function as a control or comparison group for Jihadists or extremists. As a Home Office panelist said to the author after he presented the concept of radicalization as a vector, "I see what you're saying, but … humanitarians … *radicalized*? Surely not".

The function of the latter part of this chapter (sections 5.4 and 5.5) is to illustrate that the premise (radicalization is a vector [multifinality]) and the research design (utilizing a matched but morally opposed [and therefore non-extremist] control or comparison group) is also utilized

in other research. In other words, what is suggested in this thesis, while counterintuitive, is not new. To demonstrate this, psychopathy research is introduced because it also functions under a similar vectorized premise; contrary to popular belief, psychopathy can be presented on a pro-social to anti-social spectrum. As such, various research designs within psychopathy research make use of matching. In these research designs, research participants are selected based on their psychopathic etiology, but differentiated by how that etiology is expressed; maladaptive psychopathy (anti-social psychopathy [violent and non-violent]) juxtaposed to adaptive psychopathy (pro-social psychopathy).

Five psychopathic categorizations are presented in Figure 5.2 and are depicted along a pro-social to anti-social spectrum. The purpose of presenting Figure 5.2 is to use it as a framework for Figure 5.3 where the five categorizations are applied to radicalization. While each category is presented as a separate entity, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. "Pathological Altruism" is used to illustrate this (introduced in section 1.3.2.1.9). As discussed in sections 1.3.2.1 and 6.7, the Indirect Approach is only posited to be successful with particular typologies of pre-Jihadist. As outlined in section 1.3.2.1.9, this primarily involves those motivated to defend victims and reduce their suffering, but other typologies (presented in section 6.7) are also subsumed under the umbrella of pathological altruism. These include those experiencing an identity gap filled by membership, those searching for a sense of belonging and potentially those experiencing "doubt and uncertainty" within a malevolent pathway and/or process. While not pathologically altruistic in the strict sense of the term, these other typologies may nonetheless be channeled onto more constructive paths by means of the Indirect Approach. Therefore, the purpose of the Indirect Approach is to prevent the typologies presented in section

6.7 from operationalizing their empathy or "Need" fulfillment (section 1.3.2.1.1) in a destructive manner (see section 5.4.6). Overall, this chapter argues that research designs which utilize matched but morally opposed behavioral outcomes (such as aid-in-extremis for radicalization research) offer a credible mean of elucidating those factors which influence the vector pursued (argued in this thesis to be role-models which influence "Group Priorities" which in turn guide congruent prognostic responses [see Table 4.5 and Figure 7.1]).

5.2 Why Them but Not Others?

The most frequently asked question in radicalization and terrorism research is "Why do only a diminutive amount of people radicalize to terrorism/become terrorists while a majority, subjected to the same forces, do not?" Sagit (2010, p.3) notes that this question is the central question for those interested in radicalization. Her analysis is confirmed by the number of researchers who have asked the same question (Bartlett *et al*., 2010, p.7; Bartlett and Miller, 2012, p.16; Bartlett, 2017, p.136; Bjørgo and Gjelsvik, 2015, p.15; Borum, 2011a, p.2; Burke, 2017; Coolsaet, 2016b, p.4; Cragin, 2014, p.337; Cragin *et al.,* 2015, p.1 and p.6; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008a, p.2; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008b, p.5; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p.797 and p.801; della Porta, 2009, p.308; Githens-Mazer, 2009, pp.26-27; Hafez and Mullins, 2015, p.958; Horgan, 2014a, pp.55-56; Huband, 2010, p.136; Khosrokhavar, 2009, p.11; Knight, 2017, pp. 11-12; Knight, Woodward and Lancaster, 2017, p.9; Kundnani, 2015a, pp.133-135; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, pp.3-5; Merari, 2010, p.243; Nasser-Eddine *et al.,* 2015, p.15; Nesser, 2010, pp.90-91; Neumann, 2016, p.178; Pierson, 2017, p.xiii and p.61; Pisoiu, 2012, p.4; Pisoiu, 2014b, p.779; Reich, 2009, p.34; Schmid, 2013a, p.31; Schmid, 2016a; Schmid and Forest, 2018,

p.70; Sedgwick, 2010, p.484; Silke, 2009, p.97; Taylor and Horgan, 2006, p.588; UNOCT, 2017, p.4; Victeroff, 2005, p.18; Wali, 2011, p.55).

Indeed, this question is an oft posed question in the study of social movements more generally (for example, the Reverend Moon's Unification Church; the Moonies [Barker, 1985, p. 144]) and is beset by the limitation of affirming the consequent; no matter how many traits are correlated with the behavior in question, there will alway be more people who share those traits who do not engage in that behavior (Munson, 2008, p.3). Horgan (2014a, p.80) labelled this specificity quandary as "the low base rate of terrorism" and Sageman (2016, p.111) characterized it as "the iron requirement of specificity of any adequate explanation". Therefore, the litmus test of any credible radicalization-to-terrorism theory would take this conundrum into account and answer "why them and not others?" in a manner which avoids selecting on the dependent variable; doing so is "not great practice" (Gill, 2015, p.2) and is therefore a frequently cited shortcoming of radicalization research (Githens-Mazer, 2010a, p.5; Hafez and Mullins, 2015, p. 971; Nasser-Eddine *et al.,* 2011, p.16) (see section 2.3.2.2). What is proposed in row four of Table 5.1 avoids selecting on the dependent variable because successful radicalization in this thesis is defined by mobilization to Jihadist conflict zones, not terrorism and/or extremism (see sections 4.2 and 4.3). However, a shortcoming of what is proposed is that this research can only account for mobilization to Jihadist conflict zones and not other related categories such as extremism or domestic European terrorism (see section 1.4).

5.3 Scholarly Responses

Researchers responded to the "low base rate of terrorism" conundrum in various ways. The two discussed here are the relevant ones for the argument which follows.

1. Some questioned the logical causality of the radicalization-to-terrorism paradigm, querying if radicalization could lead to something other than terrorism and/or extremism (Bartlett *et al.,* 2010, p.7; Dearey, 2010, p.3; Githens-Mazer, 2009, pp.20-22; Githens-Mazer, 2012; Khan, 2016; Kundnani, 2015a, p.15; Lakhani, 2013, p.2; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, p.4 and pp.215-216; Schmid, 2013a, p.31; Sunstein, 2009, p.149 in Ramakrisha, 2016a, p. 152; Wiktorowicz, 2005, p.210). Were another outcome of the radicalization process to be discovered, this would subsequently account for a higher base rate response. This is why numerous scholars have advocated for the scope of inquiry to extend beyond terrorist subjects (Bartlett *et al*, 2010, p.46; Breen-Smyth, 2009, p.213; Gunning, 2009, p.160; Horgan, 2014a, p. 96; McCauley, 2012; Ranstorp, 2010, p.7).
2. Others called for more advanced research designs, specifically ones which utilize a control group (Bartlett *et al.,* 2010, p.15; Cragin, 2014, p.338; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008b, p.16; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p.811; Hafez and Mullins, 2015, p.971; Helmus, 2009, p.73; Horgan, 2014a, p.157; Kundnani, 2015a, pp.17-21; Monahan, 2012; Neumann and Kleinmann, 2013, p.370; Sagit, 2010, p.3; Schmid, 2013a, p.20 and p.32; Victeroff, 2005, p. 30). In this manner, researchers could delineate the distinguishing factors and come closer to identifying the factors which differentiate the politically violent from the non-violent majority. Indeed, most studies lack control groups or counterfactuals to substantiate their findings (Cragin, 2014, p.338; Knight, Woodward and Lancaster, 2017, p.29).

This thesis combines both by asserting that the benevolently radicalized are "something other than terrorism and/or extremism" (point 1) while also constituting a credible control or comparison group for radicalization-to-terrorism theories, models and metaphors (point 2). Given that the benevolently radicalized fall outside the extremism-terrorism continuum (thereby confirming the first response ["something other than terrorism and/or extremism"]), what follows focuses on the control group response by detailing how and why the benevolently radicalized may function as a credible control or comparison group for elucidating (factors which impact upon) violence and extremism, particularly when contrasted to other control group variants as introduced in section 1.1.

5.3.1 The Control Group Response

The purpose of the control or comparison groups discussed in this section are to ascertain what distinguishes the politically violent minority from the non-violent majority (see section 1.1). To achieve this, the control group cohort (the second group in section 5.3) queried what the ideal characteristics of a control or comparison group would be (Freilich and LaFree, 2016, p. 572; Klausen *et al.*, 2015, p.79). To do so, numerous studies were consulted. For example, some samples were violent but non-political (Lyons and Harbinson, 1986; Mumford *et al.,* 2008; Pyrooz *et al.,* 2018) while others were politically violent, but for different causes (Change Institute, 2008). However, the specific threat discussed in this thesis involved Muslims. Therefore, the most relevant samples were also Muslim. Furthermore, the aegis under which politically violent Muslims were acting was extremist. Therefore, the most relevant Muslim samples addressed extremism.

This section organizes the relevant studies into activist Muslim samples and non-activist Muslim samples as both address the extremist premise. However, as introduced in section 1.1, a shortcoming of presenting Muslim activist research is the placement of non-violent extremism; some non-violent extremists are activists (Kenney, 2018; Wiktorowicz, 2005) while others who express extremist views in interview may not be. For example, Pretus *et al.'s* (2018, p.9) sample was comprised of research participants who were convincingly determined to be vulnerable to recruitment into (violent) extremist groups, but who were not reported to have engaged in any behaviors which were indicative of this (see "availability samples" in section 1.1). Therefore, it is exceedingly difficult to confirm the extremist status of subjects who express views which may be considered as extremist when asked in interview, but who may never act upon them nor express them if not asked (see sections 2.3.2.2, 2.4.1 and 2.4.1.1). This say-do gap will be returned to in the latter part of this section but is discussed here in order to illustrate the importance of previous relevant behaviors (such as mobilizations to Jihadist conflict zones) as a credibility check for expressed opinions.

1. The Non-Activist Control Group: Schmid (2013a, p.31) preferred a control group of "apolitical, non-activist or apathetic young people who do not become radicalized" but did come from similar circumstances - what McCauley and Moskalenko (2014a, p.603) have labelled as "inert". Similarly, Hafez and Mullins (2015, p.971) called for selecting cases where the "presumed causal variables are present, even if radicalization is not". Cragin *et al.* (2015) is an example of a confirmed non-activist research sample which does originate from similar circumstances. This is represented in row two of Table 5.1.

2. The Activist Control Group: Githens-Mazer (2009, pp.26-27) advocates research into Muslims who are non-violently politically active because "non-radical does not equate to non-political or apolitical". Specifically, Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010, p.808) requested a control group of "democratically active" Muslims. In response, various studies contrasted violent with non-violent extremism (Bartlett *et al.* [2010]; Knight, Woodward and Lancaster [2017]; Wali [2011]) as represented in row one in Table 5.1. Their shortcoming is that they are premised on extremism (see section 2.4.1, 5.3 and 5.3.2). This is overcome with Sageman (2017b) who used a within-case analysis to illustrate how non-violent and non-extremist activists "turn" to violence (row three in Table 5.1). The shortcoming of his research is that his cases are largely historical and confined to contexts of escalating conflict between state and non-state actors (see section 5.3.2). Another example of an activist control group is Merari's (2010) research. He juxtaposed incarcerated failed suicide bombers with incarcerated non-suicide terrorists (the control or comparison group) in order to ascertain what differentiated suicide from non-suicide terrorists. While this is a highly fruitful research design, particularly because the control group may be accurately categorized as behaviorally radicalized, it is not a popular one given the difficulties of accessing these samples (see "restrictions placed upon researchers" in section 2.2.3). Therefore, it is not presented in Table 5.1. and not discussed in section 5.3.2.

The non-activist approach requested an indifferent control group ("Muslim Non-Activism") because this represents the antithesis of activism and/or mobilization. In contrast, the activist approach requested a non-violent one because this is diametrically opposed to violent mobilization/extremism within the sphere of activism. The problem with the former is,

deciphering how or why such a specific demographic did not radicalize (behaviorally or cognitively) would be an attempt at pinning a causal factor on a non-event. At best, one could hypothesize due to the events nonoccurrence, the counterfactual (Gorman and Gorman, 2017, p. 149), thereby adding to the ever-increasing list of root causes and contributing factors introduced in section 2.3; over two hundred at last count (SAFIRE, 2013).[75] Such an approach would question why the flick of a switch (input) did *not* turn on the light (output) - a question exceedingly difficult to answer outside of the controlled for conditions of a laboratory. Crucially, embedded within such a cause and non-effect approach within the malevolent-only confines of successful radicalization (as contemporarily understood i.e. non-vectorized) is the thinly veiled and "suspect community" (Hilliard, 1993) insinuation of, "you're a second-generation Muslim from Paris. Why are you *not* a terrorist?" (see section 6.6.1). This is not the tone interviewers intend to set.

As such, radicalization as a vectorized construct is aligned with the second approach (the Activist Control Group) and Michael Leiter (former director of the National Counterterrorism Center) who re-phrased Sageman's (2014, p.565) "turn to political violence" by labeling it as a "shift from radicalization to mobilization" (Horgan, 2014a, p.84). Similarities here are also apparent with Gurr's (1998, p.87) definition of radicalization which hinges on mobilization for social and/or political purposes rather than stressing political violence or ideology and Schmid (2013a) who "re-conceptualized 'radicalization' as a socialization and mobilization process" (Schmid, 2018) (see also Rekawek *et al.* [2018, p.9] in section 3.5.5.1). Radicalization

[75] Gill (2015, p.2) notes that "at times, it seems there are more indicators than actual domestic terrorists" and Knight, Woodward and Lancaster (2017, p.30) state that "the number and potential combination of factors that might characterize extremist individuals are too large to have any meaningful application for practitioners." For further discussion on specificity and sensitivity, see Neumann (2016, pp.178-179), Pisoiu (2012, p.40), Sageman (2017a, p. 60), Sarma (2017, p.282), Schmid (2013a, p.26) and section 5.4.2.

from this thesis's perspective therefore departs quite significantly from most post-9/11 understandings of radicalization by specifying successful outcomes of the radicalization process from "terrorism" and/or "extremism" (both of which are defined in various ways and often used interchangeably [see section 4.2]) to a more broadly observable "mobilization" to a Jihadist conflict zone (see section 4.3).

This understanding has particular practical relevance as governments, in contrast to academia, do not consider non-violent extremists as mobilized unless they progress beyond protest group (membership) (Sageman, 2016, p.117).[76] While Sageman in this instance writes specifically about the progression to violence, a progression resulting in mobilization to a Jihadist conflict zone would fulfill governmental definitional requirements. That is to say, unlike the false alarms (the non-radicalized) and non-violent extremists (the cognitively radicalized), the research participants of this study (the behaviorally radicalized on a benevolent vector) and those who engage in terrorism (the behaviorally radicalized on a malevolent vector) are not apathetic and do not merely "talk talk talk - and do nothing" (Sageman, 2016, p.108; Sageman, 2017b, p.32). They mobilize (see section 4.2).

Nonetheless, the Activist Control Group has a distinct shortfall, most evident in the work of Wiktorowicz (2005):[77] the centrality of cognitive radicalization rather than the immediate problem of behavioral radicalization where the former is assumed to be a proxy for the latter

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[76] Therefore, "mobilization" in this thesis necessarily favors the governmental understanding as this is what separates the minority of "doers" from the majority of "talkers" (Sageman, 2017a, pp.12-13). As Sageman noted in personal correspondence, "mobilization is just joining a movement. In the intelligence community, it is the turn to violence" (Sageman, 2018, personal correspondence). Therefore, the outcome specificity of the definition used in this thesis moves the needle closer to that of the intelligence community.

[77] Wiktorowicz's (2005) research did not feature a control or comparison group. Therefore it is not present in Table 5.1. However, his study of *Al Muhajiroun* concerned non-violent but activist extremism because they engaged in outreach. It is in this non-comparative capacity that it is discussed here.

because it is understood as the logical antecedent. While this Cartesian view (the behavior-before-thought principle [section 2.4.1.1]) may make intuitive sense, the problem is that attitudes are not good predictors of behavior (Mackay and Tatham, 2011, pp.169-171; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, p.105 and pp.219-220; Wicker, 1969, p.65) and this is particularly evident with regards to extreme behaviors (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017, p.211).

Indeed, holding radical beliefs is a poor indicator of violent action (Dawson and Amarasingam, 2017, p.10; Khalil, 2014; Kundnani, 2015a, p.140; Sageman, 2017a, p.80) because of the wide gap between what people believe and what they actually do (Sageman, 2017b, p.xvi and p.31; Nesser in Bokhari *et al.*, 2006, p.13; Venhaus, 2010, p.1). This intuitive (albeit weak sequential) link between attitude and behavior is further eroded by the role of additional variables such as norms, habits and perceptions of control (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017, p.213).

Nonetheless, as Dawson (2018a, p.11) clarifies, studying behavioral radicalization to the exclusion of cognitive radicalization is only favorable in the short-term because the two are inextricably linked; the latter providing the moral justification for the former. However, this moral justification should not be taken to mean that behavioral radicalization was preceded by cognitive radicalization. Given equifinality (Figure 4.3) and the various motivations (Table 2.1 and section 6.7), cognitive radicalization may be a product of accruing levels of involvement (the "Radicalization Process" in Figure 4.2 which includes "Operational Outcome" and is typified by a "Learning-By-Doing" approach [section 1.3.2.3.6]), as suggested by others (section 2.4.1.1). Accounting for this, a control or comparison group posited to yield insights others may not should ideally be matched and behaviorally radicalized, but in a non-violent and non-extremist

manner. In doing so, the role of extremism as a precipitant (local) or permissive (distal) causative or contributive factor may be excluded (see section 2.3.2.1).

The problem is, this is conceptually impossible given the malevolent-only confines of successful radicalization as contemporarily conceived (see section 4.1). Nonetheless, such specification may be achieved by expanding upon the potential outcomes of the radicalization process (see "Multifinality" in glossary). Under this conceptualization, behavioral radicalization is understood as mobilized in Jihadist conflict zones (section 4.3) and this is posited to elicit data which (mere vulnerability to) extremism cannot. Indeed, many more people espouse extremist views than those who act upon them; specificity and sensitivity (see footnote 75 and section 3.5.5). Nonetheless, and as discussed in section 4.2, focussing on behavioral radicalization does not negate the role of a cause (such as "zakat" in section 4.4), a (prognostic) frame (such as humanitarianism [see sections 2.5 and 4.5.2]) or an undergirding philosophy (see "Duty" in footnote 51, "Moral Logic" in Atran [2006] and "Sacred Values" in glossary). Instead, by conceptualizing radicalization as a vector, radical ideologies are provided with a level nuance by being categorized as constructive or destructive/within or outside of social norms and the democratic consensus (see sections 1.3.1.3 and 1.3.2.1.5).

5.3.2 Control Group Research Designs

As illustrated in Table 5.1 (row 1) where the dependent variable is violent Islamic extremism, scholars such as Bartlett *et al.,* (2010) attempt to isolate the usage of the terrorism tactic by distinguishing terrorism from extremism through control or comparison groups of non-violent extremists (see also: START and University of Arkansas in Smith, 2018, p5). The problem is, groups move in and out of violence based on circumstances, particularly those

occurring between state and non-state actors. Given this contextual fluidity, comparative research between violent and non-violent extremists may instead be investigating violent and *pre-violent* extremists (Knight, Woodward and Lancaster, 2017, pp.32-33). Nonetheless, not every role within the group requires violence; the distinction between terrorist involvement and terrorist events (Schuurman, 2017; Taylor, 2010, p.121). Terrorist behavior is not always violent (Horgan, 2017a, p.200) as each organization and operation requires numerous roles. Indeed, most people imprisoned in the U.S.A. for terrorism offenses never engaged in violence themselves (Sageman, 2016, p.66; Sageman, 2017c). As such, given its context dependency, violence is not a consistent dependent variable (Sageman 2017c).

Where the dependent variable is non-violent Islamic extremism (the second row on Table 5.1: the Non-Activist Control Group discussed above), scholars attempt to distinguish extremist involvement through control or comparison groups of Muslim non-activists. The shortcoming is that this merely accounts for political apathy.[78] Accordingly, neither row 1 nor row 2 adequately elucidate the usage of terrorism nor the adoption of extremism. A promising approach is presented in the third row; differentiating violent Islamic extremism from peaceful activism by Muslims (or violent from non-violent resistance more generally [Dornschneider, 2016]). The problem is, legitimate peaceful activism is not the sole purview of peaceful activists because those with malevolent intentions may nonetheless engage in legitimate activism, albeit

[78] Analytical distinctions need to be drawn between those who are politically apathetic and those who are resilient to (violent) extremism (see section 6.1). On the surface, both seem identical because neither engage in (violent) extremism, but the foundation for these identical non-behaviors is fundamentally different; the latter is informed, the former is not. Similarly, analytical distinctions need to be drawn between non-violent extremism and non-extremist mobilization; both may be considered radical, but only the former lays outside (European) social norms and the democratic consensus. Finally, they also need to be drawn between those who mobilized to Daesh to engage in Jihad and those who did so to be state functionaries (see section 3.5.3).

inconsistently.[79] A further shortcoming is, despite these subjects engaging in activism, governments may not consider them mobilized (i.e. behaviorally radicalized) because various forms of activism remain within the confines of a protest group which governments may not define as mobilized (Sageman, 2016, p.117 [see section 5.3.1]). An exception to this are qualitative within-case analyses such as those utilized by Sageman (2017b). As discussed in section 5.3.1, this is an approach in case study research design which involves an in-depth exploration of a single case study as a stand-alone entity using process tracing to depict how an individual or group came to adopt politically violent tactics; an evolutionary approach. However, this methodology requires detailed and reliable data. As such, within case-analyses are scarce and, given these restraints, the ones presented by Sageman (2017b) are historical rather than contemporary (see section 4.6.1.5).

The final row is the only row which juxtaposes two behaviorally radicalized groups (beside Merari's [2010] research) and essentially forms a sub-group of row 3. The difference is that the dependent variable and the control group in row 4 are more specific with regards to who they are referring to. Furthermore, the dependent variable in row 4, which characterizes the malevolently radicalized as "armed" rather than "violent", is a more consistent representation because, as stated above, engaging in violence is inherently contextual. However, as discussed in section 1.4.1 and 4.2, radicalization in this thesis is definitionally tied to mobilization. As such, it can only account for behavioral radicalization when defined as mobilization to Jihadist conflict zones. Nonetheless, benevolently radicalized groups are posited to provide insights that other

[79] For example, Michael Adebolajo (one of the killers of Lee Rigby, London, 2013) is known to have attended at least three protests (Casciani, 2013) and Khalid Ali (apprehended just before his attack in 2017) used a protest march as cover for reconnaissance in central London (Hamilton, 2018).

control or comparison groups may not. Therefore, the recommendation is that future radicalization research consider them as a control or comparison group.

Table 5.1: Control Group Categorizations

Research Goal	Dependent Variable	Control Group	Limitations
Differentiate non-violent extremism from violent extremism (Bartlett *et al.,* 2010) ——————— *Distinguishes "bad" from "worse"*	Violent Islamic Extremism ——————— *The behaviorally radicalized*	Non-Violent Islamic Extremism ——————— *The cognitively radicalized*	• Does not account for extremism • Assumes a linear progression from extremism to consistent employment of Islamist violence
Differentiate extremist involvement from non-involvement (Cragin *et al.,* 2015) ——————— *Distinguishes "bad" from "innocuous"*	Non-Violent Islamic Extremism ——————— *The cognitively radicalized*	Muslim Non-Activism ——————— *The non-radicalized*	• Only accounts for political apathy, including when the dependent variable is behaviorally radicalized
Differentiate (violent) extremism from peaceful activism (Sageman, 2017b) ——————— *Distinguishes "legitimate" from "illegitimate"*	(Violent) Islamic Extremism ——————— *The behaviorally radicalized*	Muslim Activism ——————— *The non-radicalized, the potentially radicalized, the cognitively and/or the behaviorally radicalized (either vector)*	• Inadvertently securitizes faith-inspired activism because sampling selects on Muslims • Is unable to distinguish typologies of radicalization • Depending on definition of activism, governments may not consider the control group activists as radicalized
Differentiate mobilized malevolent Muslims from mobilized benevolent Muslims (Reidy, 2018) ——————— ***Distinguishes "bad" from "good"***	**Malevolent Radicalization** **Armed European Muslim non-state actors operational in global Jihadist conflict zones** ——————— ***The behaviorally radicalized***	**Benevolent Radicalization** **Non-extremist, non-supportive of extremist groups, non-armed and non-violent British Muslim humanitarians operational in global Jihadist conflict zones** ——————— ***The behaviorally radicalized***	• **Only accounts for radicalization resulting in mobilization to global Jihadist conflict zones**

5.4 Socially and/or Morally Opposed Research Designs Constructed Upon Counterintuitive Premises

Utilizing benevolently radicalized research participants as control or comparison group subjects for future radicalization research is premised on the conceptualization of radicalization as a vector (sections 4.2 and 4.3). Trustworthiness (section 3.10) was established through four means:

1. The credibility of the match and how it relates to the scholarly literature on European Jihadists was outlined in section 3.5 (see Tables 3.2 to 3.5).
2. These were bolstered by Figure 7.1 which depicts similarities in static and dynamic factors and sections 4.4 to 4.6 which illustrates the similarities in pathways and socialization. The factors identified as significant in determining the vector (role-models [section 1.3.2.2.3] which influence "Group Priorities" [section 1.3.2.3.1] which guide "Prognostics" [1.3.2.1.17]) are depicted under "Differentiators" in Figure 7.1.
3. The dependability of analysis was illustrated in Table 3.6, Figure 3.7 and Table 4.1.
4. The confirmability of results is illustrated by the research design in Figure 3.9 and the five steps taken to ensure their trustworthiness discussed in section 1.2.4 and 3.1.

Nonetheless, given that these morally opposed behaviors stem from the same premise, conceptualizing radicalization as a vector remains counterintuitive. To address this, the following section will introduce psychopathy and psychopathy research in general. As one may expect, categorization and appraisal of this classification occurs in a comparative manner with the rest of the population by cataloging the variables (or traits) which distinguish psychopathic responses from those of the wider population. But disaggregation also occurs within the psychopathic

construct because, much like radicalization, the signature traits or hallmarks can aggregate into a variety of anti-social *or* pro-social behaviors (see "Multifinality" in glossary). Therefore, much like radicalization as constructed in this thesis, psychopathy is also a vector (the psychopathic etiology may result in pro-social or anti-social behaviors) and various research designs within psychopathy research juxtapose or contrast the behavioral outputs of adaptive psychopathy (pro-social psychopathy) with maladaptive psychopathy (anti-social psychopathy) in order to demarcate the factors which determine (or influence) anti-social (and/or violent) behaviors from pro-social ones (section 5.4.4) within the construct. This is precisely what is proposed for future radicalization research in row 4 of Table 5.1.

That the psychopathic etiology can coalesce in maleficent *or* beneficent outcomes makes the psychopathic construct (and the research designs which investigate it) a suitable platform to replicate within radicalization research. Furthermore, psychopathic research designs which contrast adaptive psychopathy to maladaptive psychopathy with the express purpose of elucidating the factors which determine whether the etiology manifests itself anti-socially or pro-socially provide an important by-product; with the etiology identified (a diagnosis) and the factors which determine the vector (adaptive or maladaptive) identified[80] practitioners are better positioned to influence the vector. In so doing, psychopathy research continues to elucidate factors which would not have been forthcoming had such comparative or contrastive research designs *not* been used. In other words, the dependent variable selected on in these contrastive

[80] Below a clinically quantifiable level, these include the role of: child abuse, isolation, specific combinations of hormones/hormone levels, pre-mature exposure to sex and/or violence, socialization, brain damage, parental techniques, epigenetics and psychological trauma among others.

psychopathic research designs span the breadth of the psychopathic construct rather than solely focussing on, say, serial killing.

These research designs are able to do so because investigative research documented the breadth of the construct rather than assuming that the construct is defined by specific behavioral outputs; selecting on the dependent variable (see sections 1.2.8, 1.3.1.6, 2.3.2.2, 3.5.5 and 5.2). This is why this thesis criticizes the radicalization hypothesis (successful radicalization results in terrorism and/or extremism); by focussing on these dependent variables, radicalization research has unwittingly restricted the radicalization construct by focussing on a select number of radicalized outputs (terrorism and/or extremism). As discussed in section 2.2, this is a product of the conditions which gave rise to the term and the (scholarly) focus of those who utilize it, both of which influence how and when the term is applied. Therefore, this thesis recommends that radicalization be expanded to encompass outcomes beyond the specified remit of terrorism and/or extremism, but doing so within predefined boundaries nonetheless.

As stated in section 4.2, these boundaries are defined by how this thesis defines radicalization: a collectively defined, individually felt moral obligation to participate in direct action, where direct action involves a voluntary, repeated (or of longer duration) and consciously perilous mobilization to a Jihadist conflict zone without any supplementary means with which to defend oneself. Finally, broadening the radicalization hypothesis so as to include behavioral outputs beyond terrorism and extremism would, much like in psychopathy, assist practitioners in influencing the vector one pursues (the purpose of the Indirect Approach [see Figures 7.2 and 7.3]).

5.4.1 Similarities in Proposed Research Design

The concept of radicalization and most definitions thereof highlight various forms of anti-sociality (Khosrokhavar, 2017, p.10). Indeed, the same is true for psychopathy (Berry-Dee,2017, pp.15-16). Therefore, understandings of both terms impose scoping limitations which may inhibit these contrastive research designs. Relatedly, both also conjure net-negative appreciations. Therefore, both constructs face the limitation of (popular) perceptions. A final similarity are the small sample sizes inherent in the research of both as neither are widespread among the general population; low base rates (section 5.2).

However, replicating how (elements of) psychopathy research is conducted is not to suggest any sort of relationship between psychopathy and radicalization (although recent research is re-examining the role of psychopathology more generally and personality disorders specifically [Corner and Gill, 2018] as other research suggests that mental illness is a contributive factor [Khosrokhavar, 2017, pp.101-102; Weenink, 2015]). Therefore, psychopathy research in this thesis is used as a heuristic device and how it is conducted is used as a platform for how one may engage in future radicalization research. As such, the research designs utilized in some psychopathic research present a fruitful means of replication within radicalization research.

5.4.2 Introduction to Psychopathy

This section presents five categories of psychopath (or those with psychopathic tendencies). Maladaptive psychopathy is comprised of violent and non-violent psychopaths and is situated within the anti-social spectrum of Figure 5.2. Adaptive psychopathy is comprised of one group labelled “Dispositionally Frontline” and these include adaptive psychopaths who

function in various frontline professions (see section 5.4.4). Figure 5.2 also illustrates that pro-social orientated psychopaths (adaptive psychopathy) can, within particular behavioral contexts and dynamics, engage in anti-social behaviors - what this thesis labels as “Manufacturism” in Figure 5.2 and (see section 5.4.6). Likewise anti-social psychopaths (maladaptive psychopathy) can, below a specified diagnostic level and within particular behavioral contexts and dynamics, become pro-social. Those in this category are labelled as “socialized primary psychopaths” in Figure 5.2. Finally, the further each category is placed from the center, the more extreme the behavioral expression. Immediately following Figure 5.2 is Figure 5.3 where the psychopathic framework of Figure 5.2 is applied as an overlay to radicalization. Section 5.4.3 discusses how psychopathy is measured and in so doing, provides the foundation for introducing those factors which distinguish adaptive from maladaptive psychopathy.

Figure 5.2 Framework of Psychopathic Typologies



Figure 5.3 Framework of Radicalized Typologies



5.4.3 Maladaptive Psychopathy and Malevolent Radicalization

"Trolleyology" is shorthand for a set of philosophical dilemmas which have been asked for over half a century (Cathcart, 2013; Edmonds, 2014). A more recent version of the thought experiment is as follows: you are standing on a footbridge overlooking a train track. You notice that a train is speeding down the track and is out of control. Five people, slightly further down the line, are chained to the track and unable to escape. Unless something is done, they face

imminent death. Next to you on the bridge is an obese man. The only way to save the five people chained to the track is to push the obese man over the bridge and onto the track before the train passes; his bulk would stop the train and save the five, but he would die in the process.

***What-do-you-do*?**

90% of people refuse to push the obese man over the bridge (Dutton, 2013, p.19). This leaves the remaining 10%; a minority who apply their morals less rigorously.[81] These people are typically labelled as psychopaths. This leads to the counterintuitive conclusion that "those individuals who are least prone to moral errors also posses a set of psychological characteristics that many would consider immoral" (Bartels and Pizarro, 2011, p.154).

Popular culture left a lasting impression on the psychopathic personality - a uniquely violent, criminal and anti-social one. This is reinforced by the availability heuristic; violent psychopaths readily spring to mind when thinking about psychopathy. Less known is that the majority of psychopaths are neither incarcerated nor institutionalized (Thompson and Mather, 2013, p.121) and the minority of offenders who are, populate the dysfunctional section of the condition because psychopathy is measured on a spectrum (Edens, Marcus, Lilienfeld and Poythress, 2006). Much like extremism in terrorism studies, one may logically assume that this continuum ranges from non-violent to violent with the former being, nonetheless, decidedly anti-social; people who inflict emotional rather than physical pain. But this is not the case because psychopathy is not defined by the outcome of torment (see "hypothetical intent" in sections 1.3.1.6 and 1.3.1.6.1).

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[81] Much like the replication crisis of foundational studies in social psychology (Resnick, 2016), recent research has also brought these results into question (Bostyn *et al.* 2018).

Instead, it is defined by a constellation of core clinical features assessed along a two factor model (Benning, Patrick, Hicks, Bloningen and Krueger, 2003).[82] Factor 1 consists of core interpersonal characteristics and affective deficiencies such as egocentricity, a lack of empathy (shallow affect), fearlessness, callousness, grandiosity and superficial charm, among others. Factor 2 accounts for unstable and emotionally dysregulated traits resulting in poor behavioral controls, anti-sociality and disciplinary issues i.e. boredom proneness, cruelty, impulsivity, irresponsibility and delinquency, among others (Hare, Harpur, Hakstian, Forth and Hart, 1990, p. 339).[83] The four types of psychopath, distinguished by their Factor 1 and Factor 2 ratings, are displayed in Table 5.4.

Table 5.4 Typologies of Psychopaths

Typology of Psychopath	Factor 1	Factor 2	Social Orientation
Violent Primary Psychopathy	High	High	Anti-Social
Non-Violent Primary Psychopathy	High	High	Anti-Social
Secondary Psychopathy	Low	High	Anti-Social
Adaptive Psychopathy	**High**	**Low**	**Pro-Social**

[82] Precisely how many factors psychopathy should consist of (and the content of those factors) is subject to much debate (Andershed *et al.,* 2008, pp.189-190).

[83] This is based upon the two most utilized instruments to measure psychopathy (the PPI-R and PCL-R). Both utilize a two factor model which can be conceptually overlaid because Factor 1 and Factor 2 on both tests are correlated.

Scoring high on both factors, displayed in rows one and two, is the familiar psychopathic construct - those who engage in parasitic lifestyles (as well as other exploitative and manipulative [although not necessarily violent] behaviors [McGregor and McGregor, 2013, pp. 16-26]) and, specifically for row 1, those who commit approximately half of all serious crimes in the United States (Taylor, 2004, p.89). These are typically labelled as "primary psychopaths" or "classic psychopaths"; those who commit anti-social acts due to an idiopathic lack of empathy, conscience and fear (Factor 1). This category corresponds to Jihadists in Figure 5.3. While violent psychopaths (row 1) conflict with social norms more directly than non-violent psychopaths (row 2), the latter are nonetheless anti-social (Babiak and Hare, 2006). This categorization is comparable to extremists in Figure 5.3. As stated in section 5.4.1, this is not to suggest that Jihadists are violent psychopaths or that extremists are non-violent psychopaths. This juxtaposition is solely for purposes of research design and the credibility of radicalization as a vectorized construct.

Row three presents the "secondary" psychopaths. Much like those in rows one and two, those in row three also engage in anti-social behaviors, but unlike primary psychopaths, secondary psychopaths are remorseful, shameful and/or fearful after the act (Dean *et al.,* 2013, p. 242). This distinction is important: "secondary psychopaths" score low on Factor 1 variables (for example, unlike primary psychopaths they do feel empathy [Coyne and Thomas, 2008] and therefore have a functioning [if not delayed] conscience) and high on Factor 2 variables as they engage in anti-social acts. As such, "secondary psychopaths" are not fundamentally psychopathic because what characteristically defines a psychopath is that they are "without conscience" (Hare, 1999) - a Factor 1 variable, not their anti-social behaviors (Factor 2 variables) as these are not

unique to psychopathy.[84] Therefore, secondary psychopaths are not displayed in Figure 5.2 and subsequently have no correlate in Figure 5.3.

5.4.4 Adaptive Psychopathy and Benevolent Radicalization

Scoring high on the interpersonal-affective dimension (Factor 1), particularly fearless-dominance (read: boldness), and *low* on the anti-social component (Factor 2) are the "adaptive psychopaths". These are the cases where "bad" traits are used for "good" purposes (Oakley, 2007, p.322) or, put another way, this is when a negative etiology (Factor 1) results in a pro-social behavioral output (Factor 2). Definitional parameters aside, both the DSM (Diagnostics and Statistics Manual [representing the behavioral and clinical approach to diagnosis]) and PCL-R (representing the personality approach to diagnosis) are unable to account for adaptive psychopathy. In order to incorporate this, Lilienfield and Andrews (1996) devised the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI) (subsequently "Revised" to PPI-R) which focuses largely on Fearless-Dominance (Factor 1/PPI-I) and Impulsive Anti-Sociality (Factor 2/PPI-II). With this more sensitive instrument, adaptive psychopathy became observable and measurable.

Similarly, contemporary conceptualizations of radicalization are unable to account for benevolent radicalization. In order to do so, radicalization was conceptualized as a vector. This corresponds conceptually, albeit simplistically, to Lillienfeld and Andrews' (1996) PPI-R. As

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[84] The DSM (Diagnostics and Statistics Manual) does not diagnose psychopathy specifically. Instead psychopathy is subsumed under ASPD (Anti-Social Personality Disorder). In diagnosing ASPD, the DSM emphasizes Factor 2 variables in diagnosis because psychopathy is a taxonomic term which, given the wide range of traits, is too cumbersome to disaggregate from other conditions or disorders in the DSM. Labeling and framing psychopathy in this manner favors the diagnostic means utilized by psychiatrists over the dimensional one, the gradation approach, favored by psychologists. Nonetheless, some psychologists only refer to the ASPD classification. In contrast to the behavioral and clinical approach of the DSM, the personality approach (grounded on Hare *et al.'s* [1990] Psychopathy Checklist Revised [PCL-R]) gives prominence to affective impairment (Factor 1). In other words, this approach primarily defines psychopathy by the Factor 1 variable of being "without conscience" (Hare, 1999). As secondary psychopaths receive low scores on Factor 1 variables, Hare (1999) does not consider them psychopaths and this is the approach this thesis adopts. Therefore, secondary psychopaths are not considered psychopathic in this thesis.

such, and utilizing this thesis' mobilization-centric definition of radicalization (see glossary), Factor 1 variables in psychopathy correspond to the matching characteristics between the research participants and Jihadists (Tables 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5). Furthermore, as stated in section 4.3.1, mobilization eschews specificity of action in theatre. Therefore, Factor 2 variables for radicalization would include the behaviors one engaged in while in theatre; anti-social or pro-social behaviors (see Table 5.8).

Indeed, psychopathy may also be expressed as a vector; the particulars of the psychopathic etiology can aggregate for pro-social or anti-social behavioral outcomes. Subsequent corroboratory research indicated that the (genetic and/or neuroanatomical) predispositions of those classified as adaptive psychopaths coalesced with environmental factors (or more immediate situational variables) to engender the adaptive, but nonetheless risky, pro-social behaviors of frontline occupations such as firefighters and police officers (Lykken 1982; Lykken, 1995) or combat soldiers (Berry-Dee, 2017, p.43; Lilienfeld, Waldman, Landfield, Watts, Rubenzer and Faschingbauer, 2012). These are the "hero populations" (Dutton, 2013, p. 221) and are represented in Figure 5.2 by being labelled as "Dispositionally Frontline".[85] For the purposes of radicalization, these are the benevolently radicalized and are represented in Figure 5.3 by being labelled as "Mobilized Do-Gooders"; "frontline" as a product of their mobilization (see Table 5.8).

Given the etiological similarities between primary psychopaths and adaptive psychoapths, "Lykken (1996, p. 29) speculated 'that the hero and the psychopath may be twigs

[85] Staub (2015, p.11) notes that "personal characteristics are important in giving rise to the motivation for heroic helping". Other research (Steiner, 1980) has also alluded to dispositional traits which, under particular circumstances can become violent. Steiner (1980, p.431) labels these people as "sleepers". Similarly, and regarding Milgram's obedience experiments, Kohlberg and Candee (1984) note that research participants with more authoritarian personalities were more likely to administer the strongest shocks.

on the same genetic branch' in that they share a predisposition toward fearlessness that can be channeled into either socially adaptive or maladaptive outlets" (Smith, Lilienfield, Cofey and Dabbs, 2013, p.635). Dutton (2013, p.221) clarifies that adaptive psychopaths show a greater preponderance of specific psychopathic traits (fearless/dominance and cold-heartedness [Factor 1 PPI-R variables]) but what distinguishes them from primary (maladaptive) psychopaths is the absence of traits related to self-centered impulsivity (Factor 2 PPI-R variables) and "such a profile is consistent with the anatomy of the hero as portrayed by Zimbardo" (Dutton, 2013, p. 221). Thus far, two conclusions can be drawn:

1. It is the anti-social wing of the disorder (Factor 2) and the channeling/socialization process which determines how these Factor 1 dispositions are expressed (Board and Fritzon, 2005 in Dutton, 2013, p.25). In other words, how the psychopathic etiology (Factor 1) manifests itself (Factor 2) is dependent on how it is channeled.[86]
2. Therefore, those who score negatively on Factor 2 (the pro-socially inclined and/or influenced) engage in socially and/or morally opposed behavior *precisely because* they are psychological cousins of primary psychopaths, not in spite of it. Therefore, psychopathy (below a particular threshold)[87] is not the problem per se - the means with which it is expressed, is. Likewise for radicalization (and other constructs such as, for example, the "daimonic" [see May, 1969, pp.123-129 and Figure 5.5] or its Jungian correlate "the shadow" [Abrams and Zweig, 1991, pp.3-4; Diamond, 1996, p.96]).

[86] This is only applicable below a clinically quantifiable level (see next footnote).

[87] Experts are in dispute as to where precisely to draw the line. However, this is of little relevance to the arguments presented here because psychopathic frameworks and research designs are the focus, not the intricacies of diagnosis.

5.4.5 The Janusian Quality

Rather than a spectrum, Dutton (2013, p.31) depicts psychopathy as an *almost* fully-circular crescent where “the psychopaths and anti-psychopaths [those on the morally and/or socially opposed ends: maladaptive psychopaths and adaptive psychopaths] sit within touching distance of each other. So near, and yet so far” (Dutton, 2013, p.31).

(1) Psychopathy: "so near” etiologically (Factor 1), “and yet so far” interpersonally (Factor 2).

(2) Radicalization: “so near” by match (section 3.5 [Factor 1 equivalent]), “and yet so far” by behavioral output (sections 4.3 to 4.7 [Factor 2 equivalent]).

This paradox is best illustrated in Figure 5.5 where angels and demons interconnect to provide their mutual contours despite their morally opposed identities and behaviors. Conceptualized in this “so near, and yet so far” manner, psychopathy, like radicalization, is awkwardly Janusian; socially and/or morally opposed (Factor 2), yet “matched” on numerous characteristics or traits (Factor 1 [to include “Sacred Values”]). For similar Janusian outcomes, see “the daimonic” in section 5.4.4 and Solzhenitsyn (2003, p.75) in section 5.4.6.3.

The following section addresses how one can cross the pro-social to the anti-social chasm; from intending to be “Dispositionally Frontline” to actually engaging in “Manufacturism” - from intending to be a “Mobilized Do-Gooder” to actually engaging in “Pathological Altruism” as illustrated in Figures 5.2 and 5.3.

Figure 5.5: M.C. Escher's Angels and Demons



5.4.6 "Manufacturism" and Needs

Iatrogenesis is a term evoked to denote unintentional harm by healer, such as inadvertent side effects from pharmaceuticals or surgical procedures. But what of those curious cases where the healer *intentionally* causes harm *in order* to heal? This is perhaps best encapsulated by the latin phrase *cura te ipsum*; the solution for a particular problem is provided by the very person who created the problem in the first place. Yet the purpose of these actions is neither to create nor resolve the problem per se, rather the motivation centers on achieving the resulting "net

proceeds" ("regardless of the consequences" [Berry-Dee, 2017, p.29]) presented in Table 5.6 and further desegregated in Table 5.7. These are the sought after "Needs" (section 1.3.2.1.1).

As depicted in Table 5.6, these are the nurses[88] who induce cardiac arrest in order to perform chest compressions and save the patient - the firemen who commit property arson in order to extinguish the burning building and rescue the occupants - the police officers who plant evidence in order to arrest a factually (but not legally) dangerous person and through incarceration, take them off the streets. Unlike iatrogenesis (an inadvertent side effect), the true intention of these behaviors is the side effect itself: the "Net-Proceeds" in Table 5.6. This is important because recognizing the true intent assists in understanding the "Need" (section 1.3.2.1.1) which the behavior is fulfilling. As illustrated in Table 5.8 and in reference to preventing Jihadism, recognizing the need which pathological altruism is fulfilling opens avenues for providing counter-engagements (section 1.3.2.1.16) which may constructively fulfill those identified needs.

[88] One study in particular shows that 86% of serial murder by healthcare professionals was conducted by nurses (Yorker *et al.* 2006, p.1362).

Table 5.6 Outcome Versus Net-Proceeds

Profession	Instigation	Process	Outcome	Net-Proceeds
Medical Professions	Induce Cardiac Arrest	Perform CPR	Save Patient	• Practice Skills • Proof of Competence • Boredom - Excitement • Collegial Adulation • Follow Impulse
Fire Service	Property Arson	Extinguish Fire	Save Occupants	• Extra Money • Distort Crime Scene • Gain Experience • Practice Drills/Proof of Competence • Boredom - Excitement • Removing Social Blights • Collegial Adulation
Police	Plant Evidence	Solve Case	Arrest "Offender"	• Clear Case Load • "Stats" i.e. Bragging Rights • Collegial Adulation

While these nurses certainly take lives, labeling them as serial killers conflates the raw behavioral output (a description of their behavior, one hinged on psychological, phenotypical and/or neuroanatomical abnormality [in probable combination with environmental factors]) with an explanation or it. The fact that they engage in behaviors which are consistent with that label is regarded as evidence that they are as the label describes. Likewise, while a minority of firemen light many fires, they are not accurately described as pyromaniacs or arsonists (Huff, Gary and

Icove, 2001; National Volunteer Fire Council, 2011, p.24).[89] Similarly, while a minority police officers frame (legally) innocent people, they are not accurately described as "dirty cops" because the motivation for doing so was spurred by a warped sense of doing right by their community and colleagues, not personal profit.

To understand why these behaviors occurred (and introduce effective means of circumventing them), the primary intent, albeit a side effect, needs to be sufficiently identified because what people do may not necessarily be why they do it. In other words, the "Net Proceeds" in Table 5.6 need to be sufficiently disaggregated so as to identify the primary intent (and develop constructive means of fulfilling that "need"). Table 5.7 presents the *actual* purpose of the manufactured outcome in the motivational column labelled "Social Benefits".[90] As such, the "Instigation", "Process" and "Outcome" presented in Table 5.6 are manufactured in order to achieve particular net-proceeds, specifically those labelled "Social Benefits" in Table 5.7 and these are directly related to various "Needs" (section 1.3.2.1.1).[91] Given the second-order means

[89] All three frontline professions required pre-employment screening, indicating that these maladaptive behaviors began *after* taking up their various occupational roles. Still, a significant number of healthcare professionals in Yorker *et al's* (2006, p.1370) study "had histories of falsifying their credentials or other aspects of their background." While this is not a criminal offense per se, "the propensity to engage in fraud or fabrication of significant information is consistent with sociopathic traits." While this almost certainly would have raised concerns with other professions, Yorker *et al.* (2006) provide context by noting the overall shortage of available nurses and, as a result, the laxer criteria employed when assessing employment suitability.

[90] The "Net-Proceeds" presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 were gathered from various media accounts, grey literature and academic accounts because there are no (national or international) standardized and publicly accessible databases which record cases for analysis (see: FEMA, 2003, pp.4-5; National Volunteer Fire Council, 2011, p.10).

[91] For example, within "Basic Needs" (see glossary) these are relatable to "positive identity" and "positive connection". Within "Emotional Needs" (see glossary) these would be categorized as a quest for belonging and significance (Dugas and Kruglanski, 2014) resulting in a sense of "oneness and wholeness" (Staub, 2013, p.188). Within "Primary Goods" (see glossary) these would be categorized as the need for "community", "relatedness" and "pleasure". Finally, within "Primary Human Goods" (see glossary) these would be categorized as the need for "community", "excellence in work" and "pleasure".

with which these goals are achieved, this method of obtaining these goals is labelled in this thesis as “Manufacturism”.[92]

Of course, there are people who purposefully cause harm and this is done for their own amusement, gratification or profit (see sections 5.4.6.3 and 6.7). However, the cases presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 are premised on each case commencing their harm-to-heal behaviors *after* they began functioning in those occupational capacities. This is confirmed by the fact that each of these professions require pre-employment screening in the form of background checks and psychological screening in order to identify criminals (or previous instances of criminality) and psychological instability or abnormalities (see section 5.4.6). Therefore, at the time of their hiring, none of these individuals were deemed threatening. Assuming these pre-employment checks were valid, the behaviors described manifested the way they did *during* employment, not prior to it (Hinds-Aldrich, 2011, p.37; Huff, 1994 in National Volunteer Fire Council, 2011; National Volunteer Fire Council, 2011, pp.4-5 and p.23) and this hints at the preference for a situational rather than a dispositional analysis.

[92] On the origin of this term, Klockars (1980, p.38) describes police who push procedural, legal and ethical boundaries in this manner as “manufactured arrest”. Similarly, Pierson (2017, pp.30-31) describes the motivation behind firefighters who light fires as “manufactured heroics” - also termed “vanity firesetters” (Lewis and Yarnell, 1951, p.228 in Hinds-Aldrich, 2011, pp.36-37).

Table 5.7 Disaggregating Net Proceeds

Frontline Profession	Features		Net-Proceeds		
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 2 Proceeds	Instrumental Benefits	Social Benefits
Medical Professions	• Fearless-Dominance • Egocentricity • Shallow Affect • Means to an end	• Boredom - Excitement • Impulsivity • Irresponsible • Lack of Risk Aversion	• Thrills • Act on Impulse	• Practice Resuscitation (among others skills)	• Collegial Adulation (to include proof of competence, heroics and acceptance into occupational social group)
Fire Service	• Fearless-Dominance • Means to an End • (weak) Egocentricity	• Boredom-Excitement • Irresponsible • Lack of Risk Aversion	• Thrills • Act on Impulse	• Earn Extra Money • Gain Experience • Practice Drills • Remove Social Blights (ex. dilapidated properties)	• Collegial Adulation (proof of competence, heroics and acceptance into occupational social group) • Warped motivation to do "right"
Police	• Fearless-Dominance • Means to an End	• Irresponsible • Lack of Risk Aversion	• Thrills • Act on Impulse	• Clear Case Load • Less Offenders Free to Offend (temporary solution until void is filled by others)	• Collegial Adulation (proof of competence and acceptance into occupational social group) • Warped motivation to do "right"

Table 5.7 amasses the concepts introduced thus far; by listing the Factor 1 and Factor 2 traits associated with a psychopathy diagnosis (based on the PCL-R and PPI-R), Table 5.7 disaggregates the net-proceeds ("Factor 2 Proceeds", "Instrumental Benefits" and "Social Benefits") and in the process, catalogs the "Social Benefits" (the true intent) received from their actions by means of the instrumental reasoning utilized to achieve them. As in table 5.6, the first

column in Table 5.7 lists the professions. Unlike Table 5.6 however, these professions are labelled as "Frontline" in keeping with the "Hero Professions" designation (section 5.4.4). This is not to suggest that all cases presented in Table 5.6 and 5.7 are quintessentially psychopathic. Rather, their reasoning, means and true intentions (the "Social Benefits" in Table 5.7) are indicative of psychopathic tendencies.

Therefore, given their behaviors (Factor 1), reasoning (instrumental)[93] and choice of profession (frontline), a reasonable assumption is that the cases presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 were individuals who, on various levels (given variation), possessed Factor 1 tendencies before employment but did not cross the "so near, and yet so far" threshold of Factor 2 (see section 5.4.5). Indeed, had they done so they would not have passed the pre-employment screening. As such, before crossing the threshold and engaging in Factor 2 behaviors, they conformed to the conceptualization of adaptive psychopathy (high on Factor 1 but low on Factor 2). The question therefore is, what caused the adaptive psychopaths (or those with psychopathic tendencies) to cross the threshold and engage in Factor 2 behaviors? Given when these behaviors began occurring (post employment), the analysis employed is more likely to be effective if it assumes a situational (the meso-level of analysis involving socialization) focus rather than solely a dispositional one (the micro level). A tentative suggestion is presented in the following section.

[93] As "Trolleyology" indicated in section 5.4.3, psychopaths engage in utilitarian forms of reasoning rather than moral reasoning (Glenn, Raine and Schug, 2009) (see "Instrumental Aggression" in glossary). This is why Cleckley (2015) conceptualizes psychopaths as fully rational actors; their reasoning is typified by the executive function of the prefrontal cortex rather than the affective-centric limbic system.

5.4.6.1 The Paradox of Frontline Professions

How and why these adaptive psychopaths cross the threshold to "Manufacturism" is the paradox of frontline professions; this may be a product of the social context where one's commitment to their occupation and their colleagues went awry. In order to be accepted into the occupational social group (the "Social Benefits" in Table 5.7: the true intent), one needs to be at least proficient (but ideally good) at their job and this requires experience ("Instrumental Benefits" in Table 5.7). But if one is bored ("Factor 2" in Table 5.7) because there are no fires or cardiac arrests - no opportunity to practice in order to gain the experience and fulfill the tasks one joined for ("Thrills" on "Factor 2 Proceeds" and "Practice Resuscitation" and "Gain Experience" on "Instrumental Benefits" in Table 5.7) or one is overworked and cannot conclude their work thereby losing pace with their colleagues ("Clear Case Load" on "Instrumental Benefits" in Table 5.7), one will not be viewed with respect by one's peers ("Social Benefits" in Table 5.7: the true intent).

Without collegial esteem, one's natural dispositions (Factor 1 in Table 5.7 ["Means to an End" - a strictly utilitarian logic void of moral squeamishness] and Factor 2 in Table 5.7 ["Lack of Risk Aversion"]) coalesce to bridge the divide between their good intentions (Hinds-Aldrich, 2011, p.37; National Volunteer Fire Council, 2011, p.5) such as "Removing Social Blights" and ensuring that there are "Less Offenders Free to Offend" (in "Instrumental Benefits" in Table 5.7) and their desired outcome ("Social Benefits" in Table 5.7). As an example, Huff (1994 in National Volunteer Fire Council, 2011) notes that some firefighters opt to "put their training and expectations into action by setting the fires themselves … They are excited, eager and motivated. And the alarm doesn't sound nearly enough".

As such, labels which serve as explanations (“pyromania” or “arson" for firemen, “serial killing” for nurses and “dirty cops” for police officers [section 5.4.6]) are motivationally and dispositionally superficial and may lead policy decisions astray when attempting to remedy or prevent such behaviors. A similar proposition is offered in the following section concerning radicalization where labels such as “Jihadist” and “extremist” also serve as explanations for behavior and, while correct for some, are false for others. In this manner, “Manufacturism” corresponds to “Pathological Altruism” in Figures 5.2 and 5.3.

5.4.6.2 “Pathological Altruism”

Although there exists an intuitive disconnect between terrorists and altruists, what O’Gorman (2011, p.70) has called “incongruous”, numerous scholars have postulated on the altruistic characteristics of terrorists and/or the pro-social reasons for engaging in terrorism (Atran, 2010, p.xiii; Awan, 2008, p.16; Azam, 2005; Bélanger *et al.,* 2014; Bloom, 2016; Byrne, 2017; Cragin *et al.*, 2015, p.11; Gupta, 2008, pp. 32-63; LaFree and Dugan, 2004, pp.54-56; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, pp.28-33; Mullins, 2016, p.48; Munroe and Moghaddam, 2018, p.171; Murshed and Pavan, 2009, p.14; O’Gorman, 2011, pp.67-68; O’Gorman and Silke, 2016, pp. 149; Pinker, 2011, p.416; Rahimullah *et al.*, 2013, p.23; Schmid, 2013b, p.222; Staub, 2013, p.269; Tobeña, 2012, pp.207-224 in Oakley *et al.,* 2012; Victeroff, 2005, p.14; Whittaker, 2007, p.9). For example, Hoffman (1998, p.43) states that the terrorist is fundamentally an altruist: he believes in serving a “good” cause designed to achieve a greater good for a wider society. Similarly, Hueseman and Hueseman (2018, p.159) note that individuals who feel a stronger sense of pro-social responsibility for their in-group are more at risk for participating in violence (see also Knight, Woodward and Lancaster [2017, p.32]). However, other research

indicates that higher in-group identification is associated with less intergroup anxiety; a likely product of the tempering effect of the resultant higher levels of self-esteem which also stem from in-group identification (Doosje, Loseman and van den Bos, 2013, p.598).

Others questioned whether radicalization is inherently pro-social or anti-social (Lakhani, 2013, p.2; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, pp. 215-216; Reeve, 2015 in Silke and Brown, 2016, p.139; Victeroff, 2009, p.63). For example, della Porta (1998 in Schmid, 2013b, p.215) illustrates the pro-social qualities of female Italian terrorists and Victeroff (2005, p.14) notes the theoretical plausibility of pro-social behavior among terrorists. Furthermore, Cohen (2016, p. 763) notes the importance and relevance of pro-social and interpersonal themes in the wills (farewell letters) of Palestinian suicide bombers over anti-social ones such as revenge. Therefore, people may radicalize and engage in terrorism for (misconstrued) pro-social reasons; altruism gone awry.

As such, while altruism is generally perceived of as a net-positive, it can also be pathological (Macfarquhar, 2015, p.300; McCauley, 2018; Oakley, Knafo, Madhavan and Wilson, 2012, pp.3-10). People who engage in terrorism for pro-social reasons are labelled as "Pathological Altruists" in Figure 5.3 - what McCauley (2018) characterized as "the dark side of empathy" (section 3.5.2) and what Lindner (in Staub, 2013, p.135) described as the instrumentalization of empathy for destructive purposes. How this is postulated to occur is the subject of the following section.

5.4.6.3 Pathological Altruists: Crossing the Threshold to Factor 2

There are a myriad of reasons and motivations people join Jihadist groups, but at least some may simply want to be Jihadists and engage in violence (Roy, 2017b; Staub, 2013, p.170

and p.262) as discussed in sections 6.7 and 6.8. This should not be ignored and this is why offering counter-engagements as alternatives (sections 6.3 and 7.3) will only resonate with particular typologies (section 6.7).

This section presents five factors which may result in what has been termed in this thesis as pathological altruism; the correlate to manufacturism in adaptive psychopathy (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3). However, unlike how psychopathy is conceptualized (and how adaptive psychopathy can go awry ["Manufacturism" in Figure 5.2]), radicalization is generally not conceptualized as a vector. Therefore, there is no research on how (potentially) benevolent radicalization can go awry (categorized as "Pathological Altruism" in Figure 5.3). To present this possibility, this section discusses the factors which prevented the research participants from becoming pathological altruists. These are displayed in Figure 7.1 which combines the theories presented in sections 1.3.2 and 2.3, the matching criteria presented in section 3.5 (displayed in factorized form in Table 5.8 below) as well as the results and data analysis presented in sections 4.4 to 4.7. Five factors are presented over two time periods:

1. Before mobilization: (a) Non-operationalized intent followed by negative chance encounter which (b) results in one joining a malevolent group, adopting the frame of the group and, under particular circumstances, this can result in an aligned behavior.
2. During mobilization: (c) No specified role in theatre combined with (d) no coping method leading to isolation, particularly when (e) one spends longer periods of time in conflict zones; without a specified role and no delineated means of staying in role, one can succumb to the brutality over time and change roles.

(1) Before Mobilization

Some radicalized pathways commence with an individual or group electing to simply "do" something about perceived wrongs or injustices (Amarasingham, 2018; Barrett, 2013; Horgan, 2017b; Pantucci, 2015, p.13; Schuurman, 2017). As Briggs and Silverman (2014, p.24) note, "we cannot ignore the very real desire among many to do something to help the people of Syria." Or, as the British Daesh member Abu Adam al-Britani (2017) asked after describing the situation in Raqqa (25 September 2017), "what are you going to do? … Are you actually going to step up and do something?" (this argument is further expanded upon in section 6.6.2).

This unspecified motivation bridges powerful sentiment with morality. Horgan (2014a, p. 79) characterized this as "an emotional pull to act in the face of injustice" (sections 2.4 and 2.5). Or, as the definition utilized in this thesis describes radicalization, "an individually felt moral obligation". Much like the research participants, others describe it specifically as the desire to "do the right thing" (Bartlett *et al.,* 2010, pp.30-31; Bloom, 2016; Fernandez in Cottee, 2015; Gurski, 2016, p.45; Gurski, 2017, pp.69-70; Marsden, 2017b; UNOCT, 2017, p.33).[94]

The problem is, this value-laden and intensely felt motivation (loosely conceived of in this instance as a "Sacred Value" [see glossary]) is not defined; the core idea behind "doing the right thing" is so highly abstract and ill-defined that it is best referred to as ethereal. It is the ambiguous nature of ethereal ideas which allow them to be interpreted differently by different people (Taylor, 2004, p.27) and this is how they attract so many supporters (Taylor, 2017, p.xi). But the unspecified nature of this sentiment is also what makes them vulnerable to influence which may occur by chance encounter (as discussed in sections 1.3.2.2, 2.3.2.1, 2.6.5 and 4.4).

[94] Indeed, "doing the right thing" was also cited as a motivation by firemen-turned-arsonists with examples including "eliminating dilapidated or crime-ridden properties" (Hinds-Aldrich, 2011, p.37).

For example, in specifying what actions are to be taken, one may progress from wanting to "do something" - to "doing the right thing" - to deciding to defend or protect Syrian Sunnis from Assad's (and his supporters) onslaught as introduced in section 1.3.2.1 (see footnote 31). Indeed, "defense" is a common motivational claim among some of those mobilizing to Syria (Mercy Corps, 2015, pp.5-6; Neumann, 2016, p.90; Sageman, 2017a, p.94; UNOCT, 2017, p.35).

The problem, as discussed in section 4.6.2 (the factors which influence a prognosis [role-models and group priorities]) is that defending or protecting civilians may be interpreted to mean engaging in violence (in the Middle East or anywhere else) against the perceived aggressor as a form of protection; a notion which stems from "the best defense is a good offense" adage. For example, the instrument ERG22+ identifies "a need to defend against a threat" as a risk factor (Lloyd and Dean, 2015). Yet it could equally be interpreted to mean providing medical and humanitarian assistance to the suffering civilians or documenting what is happening in order to inform others and propel some sort of action (for example, Omar Mohammed of the Mosul Eye).

The suggestion put forward here (and section 4.3.2) is that those who are motivated to act (section 6.7), particularly in an unspecified manner (such as "doing the right thing" [section 4.4]), may fall prey to malevolent interpretations of those sacred values and malevolent operationalizations of those emotions and "General Intent" (see Table 3.4) (see also Solzhenitsyn [2003] in point 2 below). To ensure that prognosis occurs with social norms and the democratic consensus, sections 1.3.2, 6.5 and 7.3.2 recommend inducing involvement with benevolently radicalized groups through "Choice Architecture" (section 1.3.2.1.14) as their "Group Priorities" (section 1.3.2.3.1) and social reality specify which behaviors are acceptable (section 4.5.2), particularly in combination with role-models (section 6.5.1).

Section 1.3.2 introduced “Group Priorities”, defined in this thesis as the congruency between frame, group interest and aligned behaviors. Being a member of a group with anti-social and/or malevolent group priorities significantly increases the chances of an individual adopting the negative frame and pursuing an aligned behavior (section 4.3.2). As such, sections 6.3 and 6.5 recommend the provision of alternatives and alternative role models in particular, as have others (Allan *et al.,* 2015, p.24; Byrne, 2016, p.165; Sageman, 2008; Schmid, 2013a, p.49), particularly altruistic ones (Staub, 2015, pp.115-140; Zimbardo, 2007, p.450) as this increases the likelihood that those around them will engage in similar or identical pro-social behaviors and provides an opportunity to channel the intent to “do” something into less damaging outlets (Roy 2017b; Taylor, 2004, p.255). Having the opportunity to chance upon positive role models and alternative (narratives and behavioral options) are posited as particularly effective just before an attack as scholars have noted that during these periods, some experience doubt and uncertainty (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013; Khosrokhavar, 2017, p.109; Sageman, 2017b, p.5 [see “Opportunity Factors” in glossary]).

However, as radicalization is a vector, the converse is also true. For example, recent research into both Milgram's (Perry, 2012) and Zimbardo’s (Blum, 2018) experiments show that Milgram’s researchers veered off the study script and pressured participants into delivering the desired results. These new revelations about the SPE (Stanford Prison Experiment) also illustrate the power an authority figure — in this case Zimbardo himself and his “warden” — can have in manipulating others to be cruel. As such, there is an imperative to providing alternative role-models (to include narratives and behavioral options) and defining the operational contours of a

response for these potential mobilizers, thereby denying Jihadist recruiters their malevolent opportunities ("stymying Jihadist recruitment" in sections 2.5, 6.1 and 7.1).

(2) During Mobilization

The risk of becoming a pathological altruist is made higher the longer one spends in a conflict zone, particularly without a (constructive) guidance figure. For example, in defining one of his typologies (the "Defenders" - the first generation of European Foreign Fighter to respond to the current civil conflict in Syria [see section 6.7]), Neumann (2016) notes that these people mobilized to protect the Sunni population and they did so by mobilizing with aid convoys, but "they were so shocked by the conditions they encountered that they stayed and joined the uprising" (Neumann, 2016, p.90). Neumann's (2016) depiction of the "Defenders" shares much with Khosrokhavar's (2017, pp.73-136) model for European radicalization. Khosrokhavar (2017, p.110) notes, "most of the Europeans who go there (via Turkey especially) are not radicalized in the strict sense of the term when they set off." He later notes that their main motivation is a humanitarian desire, rather than violent extremism (Khosrokhavar, 2017, p.113) but this changes once involved in the conflict.[95] As Solzhenitsyn (2003, p.75) notes, moving "from good to evil is one quaver" (see section 5.4.5).

Therefore, both Neumann's (2016) "Defenders" and Khosrokhavar's (2017) European Jihadists were (to varying degrees) radicalized by the conflict itself (see also Sageman, 2017b). This is made all the more possible without a specified role because one is not hinged to that identity and therefore does not require consistency between behavior and identity. As stated in

[95] Similar analysis was offered by Pisoiu (2014b, pp.772-773) who states that "conflicts such as the ones in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Iraq or Syria have functioned as radicalization triggers of individuals originally traveling there on charity missions and have played an important role in the construction of a jihadi narrative of oppression exercised by Western powers on Muslims around the world".

section 4.6.1, one's role conveys "a great deal of information about appropriate behavior" (Sunstein, 2009, p.79). But this is easily influenced, particularly under the strains of conflict scenarios. Without a means of coping, one may not see any other option but to join in combat. As such, the research participants of this study only spend a short period of time in these conflict zones (see section 3.5.3). Furthermore, they do so with people who have been long-time humanitarians and who are constructive guidance figures (see "Constructive Leadership" in glossary [see also "Altruistic Role-Models" in sections 2.5.2.2, 4.5.1 and 6.5.1). In addition, the research participants are in constant contact with their home community (the people who fund their initiatives) via social media. In so doing, they never loose sight over what they are there to do and why they are doing it. This means of coping maintains their benevolence and prevents it from becoming pathological (see Table 4.1 and section 4.4).

Therefore, (1) a non-operationalized intent followed by a negative chance encounter may (2) result in one joining a malevolent group, adopting that worldview and, under particular circumstances, may result in an aligned behavior. During mobilization, the risk of becoming a pathological altruist is significantly higher if (3) one has no specified role, (4) no coping methods (potentially leading to isolation [see section 2.6.5]) and if (5) one spends longer time periods in conflict zones.

5.5 In Conclusion: Future Research Design

Radicalization as a vector corresponds to the psychopathic spectrum where Factor 1 variables in psychopathy (affective deficiencies) correspond to the match between Jihadists and the research participants (particularly mobilization to Jihadist conflict zones). This is presented in

Table 5.8 and is intended to function as an initial step towards operationalizing radicalization as a vector. Much like psychopathy, Factor 2 variables for vectorized radicalization are the behavioral outputs: anti-social or pro-social. As neither correspond to the construct in which they are placed, amendments were made to account for both. For psychopathy, this was the construction of the PPI-R and for radicalization, the conceptualization of the construct as a vector. This chapter also discussed how the positive manifestation of both (adaptive psychopathy and benevolent radicalization) can warp and result in outcomes which, on the surface, may seem like accurate portrayals of the original construct, but which may also be distinct from it because they are not as extreme and/or are fulfilling different needs ("Manufacturism" and "Pathological Altruism"). Therefore, this thesis recommends that the "Radicalization Hypothesis" (see glossary) be expanded to include benevolent radicalization as an outcome. Nonetheless, a limitation to doing so is that radicalization as a vector can only account for radicalization to Jihadist conflict zones (see section 1.4.1). However, this does provide a starting point for further conceptualization and means of overcoming this rate-limiting factor in radicalization research (sections 1.2.8 and 5.1).

To answer the second research question (see section 1.2.5), the benevolently radicalized are well-placed to function as a control or comparison group; their behaviorally radicalized status differentiates them from other control (or comparison) group cohorts. Furthermore, they provide an excellent opportunity to disaggregate needs and, with reference to Tables 5.6 and 5.7, provide an opportunity to determine which needs are *actually* sought after. With this knowledge in hand, evidence-based policies can be developed. Therefore, benevolently radicalized research participants may, to a significant extent, be utilized as a control or comparison group in future radicalization research. The above is summarized in Table 5.8 below.

Table 5.8 Adaptive Psychopathy and Benevolent Radicalization Juxtaposition

Variables	Adaptive Psychopathy	Benevolent Radicalization
Factor 1	Interpersonal-Affective Dimension	The "match": socio-demographics, pre-mobilization behaviors, geographic mobilization locales and general intent (Tables 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5)
Factor 1 Score	High: Psychopathic Etiology	High: Factor 1 variables "match" with Jihadists (but unlike other matches, does not include extremism)
Factor 2	Behavioral Controls	Behavior in Jihadist Conflict Zone
Factor 2 Score	Low: Behavioral Output is Pro-Social	Low: Behavioral Output is Pro-Social
Factors Conclusion	Not representative of research focus on psychopathy. Requires new instruments to account for adaptive psychopathy	Not representative of contemporary understanding of radicalization. The concept of radicalization requires amendments to account for benevolent radicalization
New Instrument/Concept Development	PPI-R (Psychopathic Personality Inventory - Revised)	Radicalization as a Vector
Warping Mechanism	"Manufacturism"	"Pathological Altruism"
Means of Preventing Warping	Provide social benefits (needs) and means to perform occupational function	Provide social benefits (needs) and means to have personal and/or social impact
Limitations	Only functions below a clinically quantifiable threshold of psychopathy	Only posited to function on particular typologies of pre-Jihadist and is premised on mobilization

Chapter 6

Benevolent Radicalization as Counter-Engagement

6.1 Introduction and Organization

The primary question of this thesis is "How do British Muslims mobilize to Jihadist conflict zones in a benevolent rather than a malevolent manner?" This question was addressed by means of grounded theory methodology. Data analysis illustrated that the research participants radicalized, but that they did so benevolently. As such, radicalization was conceptualized as a vector; one can radicalize malevolently or benevolently (see chapter four and "Multifinality" in glossary). As illustrated in Figure 1.1, this resulted in two further research questions: "To what extent could the benevolently radicalized be utilized to function as a control or comparison group for radicalization research?" This was addressed in the previous chapter. This chapter lays the foundation for the second research question: "How could humanitarianism be presented in order to function as an effective alternative to Jihadism?" It argues that alternative narratives and attractive alternatives could function in unison to provide an effective counter-engagement to Jihadism. In researching this, a further question was raised: "Who (which typologies [of pre-Jihadist]) would view this as an attractive alternative?" This is addressed in section 6.7.

The argument put forward in this chapter is that benevolently radicalized Muslims present a potential means of preventing particular typologies of pre-Jihadist (sections 5.4.6.3 and 6.7) from commencing the malevolent radicalization process by offering an attractive and pro-social alternative to Jihadism. This is presented as an effective means of prevention because involvement with benevolently radicalized groups is posited to garner resilience to violent

extremism through the justification process which follows the pro-social behavior ("Cognitive Dissonance Theory" [1.3.2.3.3]). Furthermore, Jihadists and humanitarians seem to recruit from the same or a similar counter-cultural sentiment pool (section 3.5.5.2). As further outlined in sections 6.3 and 6.8, the benevolently radicalized are construed as competitors to Jihadist groups; they offer an alternative means of impacting upon victims in Jihadist conflict zones and one's own sense of victimhood in the process (see "Emphatic-Joy Hypothesis" and "Negative State Relief Model" in glossary). Indeed, impacting upon others' victimhood and one's own are significant motivators for becoming a Jihadist (Burke, 2016; Holt *et al.,* 2015).

Supporting the benevolently radicalized would provide a competing worldview and an alternative behavior to Jihadism, while bolstering their numbers would stack the odds in favor of more people having benevolent fortuitous encounters (see "Chance Encounters" [section 4.5.1] and "Opportunity Factors" [1.3.2.2.6 and 6.5.1]). Given the significance of chance in this thesis ("Contingency" [1.3.2.2.2] leading to "Learning-By-Doing" [6.5 and 1.3.2.3.6]) and in the literature (section 4.5.1), the latter in particular is posited as a significant factor in determining the trajectory one pursues. Nonetheless, Jihadism has a significant advantage over policies designed to quell it: it is action orientated, appeals to more visceral instincts and is simple to understand. What is proposed in this chapter and the next is equally as simple, emotional and behavioral. As Venhaus (2010, p.16) states, "why do young men join Al-Qaeda? Because they see no other viable choice". In other words, what is proffered here is an attractive alternative to

Jihadism; a counter-engagement which fuses an alternative narrative with an aligned and appealing off-line behavior.[96]

Section 6.2 introduces the literature on the various policy approaches to countering radicalization. This is a general overview rather than one which covers British policies specifically because what is proffered in this chapter is intended to function as an auxiliary rather than a substitute or an amendment (section 1.3.1.8). This overview includes problem-based approaches (push-factor approaches, pull-factor approaches, and personality approaches) and strengths-based approaches (such as the Good Lives Model and Positive Deviance) as introduced in section 1.3.2.1.6. While each have their respective strengths, they also have their limitations and these are discussed in Section 6.2.3 and 6.3.1. Particular attention is paid to Positive Deviance in Section 6.4 because this theory addresses the specific shortcomings of problem-based approaches and forms the theoretical grounding for the Indirect Approach.

The argument is, buttressing benevolent radicalization would (to a certain extent and for particular typologies) stymy the recruitment efforts of malevolently radicalized groups by promoting an alternative response. Doing so would also have longer-term positive consequences to include the instillment of a pro-social frame (an alternative narrative) which, unlike counter-narratives, is able to effectively compete with Jihadist prognoses through alternative action scripts (see section 7.4.1). Therefore, unlike counter-narratives, the Indirect Approach does not function by criticizing Jihadism. As stated in section 2.6.3, doing so may "backfire". Instead, it promotes the benefits of benevolent involvement; a "do this" narrative rather than a "don't do

[96] A further (public health orientated) argument in support of this approach is put forward by Bhui *et al.* (2012, p.7) who state that "it is important to find ways of preventing political moderates or the politically uncommitted in a community from developing sympathies for violent extremist ideologies based on perceived attacks on their religion or identity group". See the "Grey Zone" in glossary.

that" one (see section 7.5.1 for further elaboration). As such, it is non-confrontational (a key safety concern) but competitive nonetheless, particularly because it targets recruits from the same amorphous pool as malevolently radicalized groups (section 3.5.5.2). As it does not tackle the tenets of Jihadism directly, the means with which it proposes to prevent Jihadism is accurately termed as "indirect" which is reflective of the unintended (i.e. "accidental" [see section 1.5) second-order consequences experienced by the research participants; being diverted away from Jihadism by default rather than design (see sections 1.5 and 3.5.4).

The problem with asserting the Indirect Approach as a policy is that, by and large, current radicalization prevention policies do not function in this manner. Instead, their aim, largely, is to counter radicalization rather than influence what can result from it. As detailed in section 6.2, the reason for this is because radicalization, as contemporarily conceived, is viewed solely through a national security lens and this is a threat focussed (problem-based) rather than an opportunity focussed (strengths-based) approach (see section 1.3.2.1.6). As such, positive outcomes of radicalization are imperceptible (see sections 1.3.1.6 and 4.3) and this net-negative appreciation of radicalization unintentionally spills over to British Muslims generally where Islam became a potential threat indicator (section 6.6) - a product of the conditions which brought the term into mainstream usage (section 2.2).

Sections 6.2 and 6.3 advocate for the use of a strengths-based approach to prevent Jihadism. This is followed in section 6.4 by the introduction of Positive Deviance; the strengths-based approach utilized in the Indirect Approach. Section 6.5 builds on section 4.5.1 by discussing the role of chance encounters (see "Affordance" [1.3.2.2.1] and "Behavioral Contingency" [1.3.2.2.2]) in spurring future life courses and reiterates the significance of

"Learning-By-Doing" (section 1.3.2.3.6); two key factors experienced by the research participants (section 4.4). Together they illustrate the significance of creating as many opportunities as possible for as many people as possible to become benevolently involved - what the Indirect Approach refers to as "Dominating the Generative Prognostic Narrative Online and Pro-Social Behaviors offline" (see Figure 7.3). Section 6.6 discusses the implications of *not* providing counter-engagements and *not* conceptualizing radicalization as a vector.

6.2 Approaches to Preventing Jihadism

Efforts to prevent terrorism are viewed as critical (Bokhari, Hegghammer, Lia, Nesser and Tønnessen, 2006, p.7; Clutterbuck, 2010, p.145; Ranstorp, 2010, p.1; Vidino and Hughes, 2015, p.33). There are two broad approaches to doing so; problem-based approaches and strength-based approaches (section 1.3.2.1.6). The former are the most utilized globally (van Ginkel *et al.,* 2016, p.6); they identify causal factors and address them in one of three ways, often times in combination. These include pull-factor approaches, push-factor approaches and personalty based approaches.

6.2.1 Pull Factor Approach (Problem-Based)

The pull factor approach is a secondary form of prevention. That is to say, it functions after radicalization has been identified and works to reduce the impact of the factors which "pull" an individual towards Jihadism. Pull factors vary widely and include cognitive factors (such as propaganda consumption), grievance or (emotional) needs, group processes and material incentives. Addressing these include programs which prevent malevolent promotional material reaching potentially receptive audiences, organizations which refute (ideological) arguments or

operations which disrupt (online) networks. This approach may also attempt to remedy by means of direct personal interventions such as de-radicalization.

6.2.2 Push Factor Approach (Problem-Based)

But pull factors need not necessarily be directly linked to the identity and priorities of the group; a sense of belonging and/or being of significance are also positively perceived factors which may incentivize one to join a Jihadist organization. What precipitated this may have its roots in structural factors such as unemployment, resulting in a low self-esteem which is remedied through a perceived elevated social status; "Jihadi-cool" (Sageman, 2008, pp.159-160; Sageman 2017c). Therefore, push-factor approaches address structural issues such as relative deprivation or poverty. The logic is, by assisting people out of poverty and providing better occupational prospects, one is less incentivized to join extremist groups. For example, the Action Change Foundation offers youth the opportunity of a protected space (push factor) away from gang violence and extremist recruiters (pull factor). Safe from predatory influences, youth can play pool and be together (pull factor). In the process, those managing the foundation also provide seminars on extremism in an attempt to inoculate or protect the youth (pull factors) as well as addressing personal goals through the attainment of education (push factors). They also go on outings together and engage in group activities in order to build positive and reciprocal bonds (pull factors) (HQD556).

The push factor approach is largely a primary means of prevention and as such, it is situated in the pre-recruitment space (see "Primary Prevention" in glossary). Much like the pull-factor approach, it also targets what is "wrong" by addressing "Needs" (1.3.2.1.1) but it does so

by providing in a structural manner as these factors are sometimes, albeit simplistically, perceived as "root causes" (Reich, 2009, p.37) (see section 2.3.2.1).[97]

6.2.3 Personality Based Approach

A third approach is comprised of personality factors and, for particular individuals, these are presumed to be the source of their support for extremist groups. As such, personalized forms of intervention (outside of the push and pull-actor approaches) address psychological vulnerabilities such as (variants of) schizophrenia among other mental health conditions (in the UK, the appropriate intervention would be discussed in a Channel Panel [section 1.3.1.8]) but may also include addressing particular personality traits such as impulsivity and how this may inhibit critical thinking (see sections 2.6.2 and 4.5.2).

Whereas the pull-factor approach is largely reactive, the push-factor approach is primarily proactive and functions similarly to programs designed to prevent youths joining gangs (Bartlett *et al.,* 2010, pp.41-42; Cragin *et al.,* 2015, p.15). The personality approach functions as an auxiliary to both push and pull approaches and, depending on the point of interdiction, may do so in a proactive or reactive manner. While all approaches counter (violent) extremism from different angels, none offer an effectively competitive narrative or alternative to Jihadism.

6.2.4 Limitations of Each Approach

The pull factor approach offers short-term gains but presents a limitation. Banning groups gives the impression that progress is being made, but this merely causes a retreat underground.

[97] The problem with attributing push (or pull and/or personality) factors as root causes of terrorism is the fundamental issue of specificity; many more people are effected by these factors than are engaged in terrorism i.e. the fallacy of affirming the consequent (section 5.2). This is why the central question of terrorism research is "Why them and not others". Furthermore, distinguishing contributing factors from causal factors is problematic (sections 2.2 to 2.4). Therefore, the evidence linking push factors to terrorism is not clear-cut (Krueger and Maleckova, 2009, p.201) and the academic consensus is that this simple cause-and-effect relationship is false (Horgan, 2014a, p.86).

Whether by geographic isolation or constant mobility, this change in operational procedure results in isolation (sections 2.6.5 and 4.7.1) which limits external feedback resulting in a higher chance of extreme actions (Lewis, 2011, p.17) (see "Risky Shift" in glossary). Therefore, pull factor-centric policies may have iatrogenic consequences (Byrne, 2016, pp.27-28; Ghosh, Warfa, McGilloway, Ali, Jones and Bhui, 2013, p.293; Crenshaw and LaFree, 2017). A general limitation of the pull factor approach is that Jihadism is perceived as an organization when it is perhaps better conceived of as a movement (Neumann, 2016) and one which gains from (domestic) Western repressive measures resulting in polarization and reactance - both of which fuel their narrative (see sections 2.6.3 and 6.6.1). Therefore, solely targeting malevolent organizations "functions" as a policy but does not "work" in preventing terrorism.[98]

While the push-factor approach is laudable, it is long-term orientated and unlikely to attain immediate results. Therefore achieving the necessary political will, sustained over the long-haul, presents a proof of concept problem: metrics are based on non-events (no terror attacks) and attribution thereof is difficult to ascribe and gauge (Bartlett, 2017, p.139; Barzegar, Powers and El-Karhili, 2016, p.33; Coolsaet, 2016a, p.49; Staub, 2013, p.292). A further problem is that prioritizing structural assistance to those deemed susceptible to malevolent radicalization may be viewed as rewarding such beliefs and/or behaviors. For example, some may feign an (limited) interest in Jihadism for the express purpose of receiving these benefits and opportunities and this would skew analysis of the magnitude of those receptive to Jihadist narratives.

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[98] Nonetheless, these policies do ensure (to a certain extent) that such groups have less opportunity to recruit others (see "Opportunity Factors" in section 1.3.2.2.6 and 6.5.1).

6.2.5 Strengths-Based Approach

The fourth approach is a primary means of prevention, but unlike those which focus on the pull, push and personality factors, this is a strengths-based approach. That is to say, instead of focusing on problems or deficits and correcting them, it centers instead on abilities or talents and supports them. The foundation for this approach is the assertion that people are motivated to pursue goods ("Needs" [section 1.3.2.1.1]), but that they do so in an anti-social manner (see "Criminogenic Needs" in glossary). In other words, these goods are obtained in ways that are outside of wider social norms.

As noted in section 4.6.1, appropriate social behavior is significantly informed by the frame of ones group and one's role within it. Therefore, Marsden (2018) notes that the most suitable means of achieving these goods is informed by the ideological setting in which the individual is embedded. As such, strengths-based approaches identify which good(s) (or "Needs" [section 1.3.2.1.1]) one is pursuing and facilitates socially acceptable means of attaining them. Unlike de-radicalization, which has a deconstructive focus, this approach would involve re-directing or channeling the means with which one is pursuing the desired good after it has been identified (see section 5.4.6).

Taking the research participants as an example, while they were not clear as to which good they were pursuing (particularly in the early stages of their pathway), it may be best understood as (wider) social approval because this is what they lacked as delinquents (see "Shame" in Figure 3.7 and section 4.4.1). This evolved from wanting to "do the right thing" (which could be interpreted within as well as outside of social norms depending on "the ideological setting in which the individual is embedded" [Marsden, 2018] [see section 5.4.6.3])

to assisting civilian victims of conflict in a humanitarian manner; a product of their new social group's priorities (see section 1.3.2.3.2) which assisted them in defining how they would receive social approval. In other words, the research participants were serendipitously re-directed away from malevolent or violent means of assisting/protecting civilian victims (such as setting up a Sunni enclave to protect those within it from the Shi'a dominated onslaught [Daesh's Caliphate], loosely referred to as a "Shi'a revival" [Kilcullen, 2009, p.293; Nasr, 2006]). Therefore, "the ideological setting" (Marsden, 2018) of the social group they joined (loosely conceived of as the "Group Priorities" in Table 4.5) ensured that their means of pursuing "the right thing" was within the wider social norms of society (albeit taken to the extreme; aid-in-extremis [see glossary]).

Strength-based approaches are mainly used in offender desistance programs, but have much in common with Denmark's radicalization prevention program known colloquially as "the Aarhus model". Rather than instilling a pro-social worldview by encouraging congruent behaviors, as argued in this thesis ("Learning-By-Doing" [section 1.3.2.3.6]), the Aarhus model focuses on reintegrating those who traveled to Jihadist conflict zones (and preventing others who intend to do so) by assisting them in obtaining basic goods such as housing, occupation and education (Nesser, 2015, p.295) so as to foster inclusion and stymy marginalization. In other words, the Aarhus model assumes that these, rather than impacting upon victims in a conflict zones (and one's own sense of victimhood in the process), are the primary goods one is actually pursuing through Jihadism.

While this may read like a classic push-factor approach, it is not because another factor is also at play; that of the mentor. These people, quasi role-models, play an important role in providing a frame (see section 2.5). For example, in addressing alienation or discrimination with

(particularly second generation [Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008b, p.11; Roy, 2006]) Muslim immigrants, mentors assist mentees in viewing themselves as ambassadors for their religion rather than victims of discrimination; a strengths-based approach rather than a problem based one. Viewing oneself as an ambassador not only involves responsibility (see sections 1.3.1.3, 4.4.1 and 4.7.1 and Figure 7.1), but requires behaviors which are consistently representative of the values and tenets of one's faith.[99]

However, what works in Denmark may not work in other countries because radicalization does not emerge ex vacuo*;* the conducive conditions in various contexts are an integral factor (Coolsaet, 2016b, p.5; European Commission's Expert Group, 2008, p.7; Hafez and Mullins, 2015, p.959; Richardson, 2006, p.45). Therefore, the conditions in Denmark and the goals adherents aim to achieve are different across geographic locations. Rather than push and/or pull factor approaches dominating nation state responses, what this thesis proposes is a supplementary one designed to appeal to those pursuing goods which neither approach caters for. While the Aarhus approach seeks to provide inclusion, the Indirect Approach seeks to provide a resonating sense of purpose resulting in social approval - premised on the pathway of the research participants (see section 4.4).

6.3 The Indirect Approach (Strengths-Based)

Schomerus, El-Taraboulsi-McCarthy and Sandhar (2017, p.3) distinguish programs which "directly and explicitly seek to counter violent extremism" and others which address development gaps (considered as "drivers" [section 2.3.2.1]), thereby implicitly addressing

[99] As noted in section 1.5, this is one of the reasons this thesis labelled the research participants as ambassadors.

violent extremism (Schomerus *et al.,* 2017, p.18). They categorize the latter as indirect CVE approaches. The Indirect Approach introduced in this thesis proposes to fulfill needs sought after by those (particular typologies of pre-Jihadist [section 6.7]) joining Jihadist groups by buttressing benevolently radicalized groups so as to provide a competitor to the Jihadist narrative and prognostic in a way which favors the benevolent prognosis (see section 4.7). Sunstein and Thaler (2009, pp.83-104) describe this as the provision of "Choice Architecture" (introduced in section 1.3.2.1.14).[100] This refers to the design of different ways in which choices can be presented to "Pre-Jihadists" (see section 1.3.2.1.8) and the impact of that presentation on their decision-making. How this would function relies on dominating the prognostic narrative; filling the void left by online takedown efforts and creating opportunities for pre-Jihadists to engage with the benevolently radicalized (see Figure 7.3). This presents an alternative means of having impact and fulfilling needs, specifically a sense of purpose (Taylor and Louis, 2004) as well as belonging and significance (Dugas and Kruglanski, 2014) which is aligned to one's faith (see "Emotional Needs" in glossary) while also being within social norms and the democratic consensus. In this way, pre-Jihadists are made aware that they have a choice and, by buttressing the benevolently radicalized, this choice is designed to be the favored one (see section 7.4).

The philosophy behind this functioning as an attractive alternative to Jihadism is accurately summarized by Shahar (2015): "organizations that counter radicalization do not try to dampen the attraction of 'noble causes'; they know the effort would be futile. Instead they attempt to substitute a different – less violent – version of the same cause". In other words, what

[100] To be effective, choice architecture must be delivered in an Easy, Attractive, Social and Timely manner (EAST in The Behavioral Insights Team). Furthermore, and as noted by Kilcullen (2006, p.33), in order to effectively undercut the influence wielded by Jihadists, one should "tap into" an already existing alternative narrative which necessarily excludes the insurgents. As such, the Indirect Approach is a formalized framework based on an organically existent counter-enagagement (see sections 1.1 and 1.5 and "Biomimicry" in glossary).

is proposed is the offering of something just as enticing, but not as toxic as Jihadism. These have been termed as "attractive alternatives" (Travis, 2008; Upal, 2015), "practical alternatives" (Briggs and Silverman, 2014, p.24) or "alternative solutions/narratives/ opportunities/approaches" (Venhaus, 2011b). Although countering Jihadism is not their goal, benevolently radicalized groups nonetheless achieve this, albeit inadvertently (section 3.5.4). Sheikh (2016) would label these groups as "an alternative brotherhood with an output" i.e. an identity to enact through impactful mobilization. Their mere existence challenges Jihadist responses and quells Jihadist recruitment because, as stated in sections 3.5.5.2 and 6.1, humanitarians and Jihadists (much like FARC and paramilitary groups in Colombia [section 3.5.5.2]) recruit from the same pool of people.

Unlike the push and pull approaches, this indirect approach is identity-centric and requires support from the community (as it is community funded) in order to serve the *Ummah*. In accordance with strengths-based approaches, it targets what is "right" (humanitarianism) and does so by providing a means to attain personal (and/or social) fulfillment through an operationally defined social role managed by informal, yet community approved, leaders (who Khosrokhavar [2017, p.147] labels as "white beards", although the research participants of this study are, on the whole, significantly younger). These prototypical members function similarly to the mentors on the Aarhus program, but the worldview they provide is operationally concerned with *zakat* ("Group Priorities" [sections 1.3.2.3.2 and 4.5.2 and Table 4.5]). By providing *zakat* in Jihadist conflict zones such as Iraq (where there is no consular assistance at the time of writing), the research participants became informal British ambassadors; they accidentally represent their country by simple virtue of their presence and in so doing, compete against the

other “al-Britanis” (the Arabic kunya for “British” [section 3.5.5.1]) functioning under the aegis of Jihadist organizations (see also Sageman [2017b, p.18] in section 1.5).

Simpson (2018, p.188), discussing Kilcullen (2009), notes that the West tends to think about information operations as means of describing actions during war; they are crafted after physical operations in order to explain or justify them. This is the opposite of how Al-Qaeda and the Taliban operate; they act *in order to* convey a message. Therefore, “the physical is merely a tool to achieve a propaganda result” (Kilcullen, 2009, p.299). The Indirect Approach functions similarly; it is an alternative narrative which is behavior-led (“Learning-By-Doing” [sections 1.3.2.3.6 and 6.5]). Given its purpose as well as its messaging and behavioral components, it is accurately described as a “Counter-Engagement” (section 1.3.2.1.16).

6.3.1 Limitations of the Indirect Approach

The Indirect Approach suffers specifically from the problem of little top-down governmental control given its grass “roots” (see section 1.4.1), rendering it a particularly difficult approach to convince policymakers of - more so because governments instinctively favor the top-down approach (Neumann, 2017, p.64). However, the RESOLVE Forum (2017 [see Horgan, 2017c]) featured a unanimous view that communities should play a crucial role in preventing radicalization, as have others (Briggs and Silverman, 2014, p.41 [see sections 3.5.5.2 and 6.1). The problem is, the Indirect Approach to prevention requires the participation of civil society and this “may make governments uncomfortable because it may bring up problems and issues which governments have failed to address” (Neumann, 2017, p.43). Furthermore, this approach acknowledges the proverbial kernel of truth (particularly, [failures in] foreign policy [Qadir, 2016]) and “this may be difficult for governments to consent” (Barzegar, Powers and El-

Karhilli, 2016, p.28). Nonetheless, Barzegar *et al*. (2016, p.28 and p.35) argue that doing so is an important component of alternative narratives. A final limitation is that the Indirect Approach is a framework which is modeled on the organic pathway and socialization of the research participants; a biomimicry model. As discussed in section 1.4.1, given the contextualized nature of the Indirect Approach ("Biomimicry" and "Positive Deviance" [see section 6.4 and glossary]), second-order consequences of this recommendation are not known at the outset and neither is its transferability to other contexts. These drawbacks acknowledged, it is in this competitive narrative and behavioral space that the Indirect Approach offers a means of navigation and it proposes to do so through Positive Deviance (henceforth, PD [section 6.4]) and "Choice Architecture" (section 6.3), among a combination of various other theories initially presented in sections 1.3.2 and 2.4 and assembled in section 7.3.

6.4 Positive Deviance

Adopting an emic perspective on British Muslim communities, one notices that a bottom-up and potent rival to mobilized Daesh-inspired-Jihadism is hard at work providing its members with a wholesome yet arduous (what James [1906, p.3] would call "in extremis") pro-social identity to enact. This indirectly and inadvertently counters Daesh-inspired-Jihadism by offering a competing and alternative narrative to "Pre-Jihadists" (see sections 1.3.2.1.8 and 6.7) and, consistent with the premise of positive deviance, members are not aware that they have "licked the problem which confounds others" (Pascale *et al.,* 2010, p.3). Accordingly, research participants neither function nor frame themselves as counter-Jihadists and as such, terrorism scholars do not investigate them (see section 2.2). Furthermore, their potential for stymying

Jihadist recruitment is an inadvertent by-product of their primary activities (a component of their "Group Priorities" [see glossary]) which function outside of both the radicalization hypothesis (see glossary) and the countering violent extremism paradigm (see section 4.3.2).

The argument presented here is as follows: a policy of bolstering the benevolently radicalized with the express purpose of countering Jihadism (by means of humanitarianism) could be operationalized through Positive Deviance. This is a strengths-based approach (section 6.2.4) which is applied to problems requiring behavioral and/or social change. Its basic premise is three-fold: (1) solutions to seemingly intractable problems already exist, (2) they have been discovered by the community and (3) these innovators have succeeded even though they share the same constraints and barriers as others (Pascale *et al.,* 2010, p.23). Yet, as noted in the previous paragraph, they are not necessarily aware of it.

PD was first applied by Jerry and Monique Sternin (Pascale *et al.*, 2010) in a pilot study in the early 1990's in Vietnam. Initial investigation indicated that 64% of the children in the studied villages were malnourished. Following the tenets of PD outlined above, the Sternins located well-nourished children within the community. They ascertained that their health was attributable to the uncommon yet successful strategies of their parents. This involved feeding their children shrimp and crab in particular (both of which lived in the rice paddies, but were not considered as a form of sustenance by the villagers), washing their hands before eating, feeding the children three times a day instead of the usual two and feeding them first rather than last (as was the practiced Vietnamese custom). In other words, these parents were incorporating naturally abundant (albeit uncommon) food sources into their children's diet (along with complementary behaviors) resulting in a significantly higher uptake of calcium, iron and various proteins. A

follow-on needs assessment ascertained that the rice paddies had a large and sustainable amount of crabs and shrimp (among other [leafy] foods) to feed the various villages.

What followed was a nutrition based program which incorporated the behaviors observed. However, rather than merely instructing the inhabitants on what to do, it was designed to assist the inhabitants to act their way into this knew way of thinking.[101] As such, parents were invited to participate in community cooking sessions provided they brought one of the newly identified foods with them. During the process, they learned how to cook these new foods along with the other complimentary behaviors (hand washing, three meals a day and feeding children first). By the end of the pilot study, malnutrition had dropped by 85% (Pascale *et al.,* 2010).

The PD approach succeeded in this instance not merely because the Sternins discovered a sustainable and easy to implement food source, but because the overall solution (the behaviors which accompany the food source) stemmed from the community itself, not the expert outsiders. In other words, the nutritional program not only provided social proof (see section 6.5.1), but avoided reactance because the solution was already being implemented by community members and functioned inside its cultural context thereby relaying appropriate behavior (see sections 1.3.2.1, 6.2.3, 6.5.1, 6.6.1. and 7.3.2). PD has since been applied to a variety of problems including reducing hospital acquired infections (Awad, Palacio, Subramanian*,* Byers, Abraham, Lewis and Young, 2009), enhancing psychological resiliency (Bouman *et al.,* 2014) and reducing female genital mutilation (Masterson and Swanson, 2000). Furthermore, and much like the Indirect Approach, community-centric program designs were central to the success of these

[101] The reason for doing it this way concerned perception: the villagers were more likely to engage in the behavior and save their children if the recommended means of doing so came from within the village rather than being provided by unknown outsiders who may be perceived as having nefarious intentions (see "Learning-By-Doing" in sections 1.3.2.3.6 and 6.5 and Figure 7.3).

subsequent applications. Over time, the application of PD was organized into seven steps (Pascale, Sternin and Sternin, 2010), five of which are of relevance for this thesis:

1. Applying PD begins by being invited by the community to address a problem which concerns them. This sets the grounding for the process of community ownership.

2. The community defines the problem rather than the "outsider". It is at this early stage that the community also establishes a baseline so that progress can be measured.

3. The community identifies who the positive deviants are amongst them.

4. With these individuals or groups identified, the community learns the strategies these people are using.

5. With the successful strategies identified, the community selects which strategies to adopt. Furthermore, they design activities to assist others in the community in incorporating these successful strategies. A key point in this process is that it is behavior led rather than based on spreading best practices ("Learning-By-Doing" [sections 1.3.2.3.6 and 6.5]). This is a central tenant of PD: one acts their way into a new way of thinking through hands-on activities. In this sense, there is some overlap with "Communities of Practice" (section 1.3.2.2.5), "Dissonance Theory" (section 1.3.2.3.3) and "Biomimicry" (see glossary) as will be illustrated in section 7.3 with the illustration of the Indirect Approach framework.

Overall, PD provides a fresh alternative when problems are viewed as intractable and excels over most alternatives when addressing problems that (1) are enmeshed in a complex social system, (2) require social and behavioral change and (3) entail solutions that are rife with unforeseeable or unintended consequences. As a behavior-centric approach, it holds that "knowledge does not change behavior" (Singhall *et al.,* 2014, pp.23-24). As stated, central to this

is that the positive deviants themselves do not necessarily know that they have succeeded in solving an issue which confounds their community. Therefore, given the "accidental" second-order consequences of their behaviors and narrative (see section 1.5), the research participants are accurately described as positive deviants.

PD is generally described as inside-out (it uses insiders, not outsiders), backward (it assumes that the solution to a given problem already exists, but must be ferreted out and implemented) and counter-cultural because (outside) leaders do not bring solutions. Instead, they locate them within the community and expand their usage among members; precisely the purpose of the Indirect Approach. PD is posited as a successful approach for preventing Jihadism because it has the lowest perturbation to impact ratio as it turns to solutions already proven within the community rather than importing foreign solutions that may arouse skepticism at best and outright sabotage at worst (Pascale, *et al.,* 2010. p.13); the reactance described above. As discussed in sections 3.5.5.2 and 6.3.1, this carries extra weight given the consensus on the importance of local community (i.e. "internal actors" [Staub, 2013, p.290]) in countering violent extremism (Ellis and Abdi, 2017, p.289; Barzegar, Powers and El-Kharhilli, 2016, p.29; Marsden, 2017c, p.3; Schmid, 2013a, p.27) and the importance of credible and trustworthy people (Barzegar *et al.,* 2016, p.29; Braddock and Horgan, 2016; Braddock and Morrison, 2018, p.9) or information providers (Fergusson, 2016, p.3 and p.25) who resonate with said community; "epistemic authority" (Kruglanski, *et al.,* 2017, p.220). Consistent with strengths-based approaches, PD redirects attention from "what's wrong" to "what's right" (Marsden 2017c); what is "wrong" is how malevolent radicalization addresses needs and what is "right" is how benevolent radicalization addresses them.

Utilizing PD to enable people to engage in positive behaviors which are consistent with a pro-social frame resonates with the behavior-led theories introduced in section 1.3; role-modeling ("Social Learning Theory" [1.3.2.2.3]), cognitions as products of behavior ("Cognitive Dissonance Theory" [1.3.2.3.3]) and how merely becoming involved resulted in the research participants identifying with the group ("Social Identity Theory" [1.3.2.3.4]) and adopting its worldview ("Social Movement Theory" [1.3.2.3.2]). However, these theories do not provide the vector. This is influenced by the "Group Priorities" (1.3.2.3.1) of this "Community of Practice" (1.3.2.2.5) and their altruistic role models (see sections 2.5.2.2, 4.5.1 and 6.5.1). Together, these were used to explain how the research participants radicalized benevolently (see "Active Bystandership", "The Heroic Imagination" and "Moral Courage" in sections 4.4 and 4.5 as well as Table 4.5 and Figure 7.1).

The following section addresses this behavior-led sequence and concludes that an effective means of preventing Jihadism (for particular typologies) may occur by assisting an individual or group to engage in behaviors which are consistent with the frame of the benevolently radicalized and in so doing, a pro-social vector is presented thereby favoring the chances of one pursuing "Needs" (section 1.3.2.1.1) and "General Intent" (Table 3.4) in a manner that is within social norms and the democratic consensus.

6.5 Cognitions Resulting From Behaviors; Learning-By-Doing

This thesis proposes to militate malevolent radicalization by buttressing benevolent radicalization; by bolstering the number of humanitarians, it is hypothesized that one can reduce the number of Jihadists by providing attractive alternatives to those on the pathway towards

becoming “Pathological Altruists” (loosely conceived of as the typologies of pre-Jihadists the Indirect Approach targets specifically [see sections 1.3.2.1.9 and 6.7]) to include, potentially, those experiencing “doubt and uncertainty” in their malevolently radicalized pathway (see sections 4.5.1 and 5.4.6.3). Instead of deconstructing Jihadism and illustrating its illegitimacies in order to prevent terrorism (such as de-radicalization and counter-narratives), this thesis recommends promoting another behavior (humanitarianism) and getting people involved in doing it by engaging in humanitarianism (a strengths-based approach [1.3.2.1.6]). As argued in section 6.5.2, “Cognitive Dissonance Theory” (section 1.3.2.3.3) posits that adherents may come to believe the fundamental tenets of this pro-social worldview (see “Group Priorities” [1.3.2.3.1]) by engaging in it (see NAV321 in section 4.4.1) and this is posited to inoculate them to both extremism and Jihadism while simultaneously offering adherents a means of fulfilling needs and impacting upon geo-political events in a manner which not only resonates, but is also within social norms and the democratic consensus.

However, this proposition to preventing terrorism runs counter to the view that extremism leads to terrorism i.e. that the process of radicalizing to terrorism starts with cognitive radicalization (Klausen *at al.,* 2015, p.70; Neumann, 2013, p.873 and p.880; Vidino, 2010, pp. 4-5). Subsequently, to prevent terrorism one must prevent extremism. The problem with this approach, as discussed in section 2.4.1 and further expanded upon in the following section, is that the logical causality of cognitive to behavioral radicalization has been brought into question, partly because people have engaged in Jihadism without the use of a supporting ideology and vice versa (Dzhekova *et al*., 2016, p.63; Horgan, 2014a, p.84; Kundnani, 2015b, p.23; Vergani, *et al.,* 2018, p.3). As noted in section 2.4.1, most people who support a Jihadist ideology do not

engage in Jihadism (Khosrokhavar, 2017, p.4; Sageman, 2017b, p.9) and as such, there is a low conversion rate of behavioral from cognitive radicalization. Indeed, the thought-leading-to-action paradigm, of which cognitive to behavioral radicalization is a sub-set, has equally been brought into question (Barrett, 2017; Gorman and Gorman, 2017; Mercier and Spurber, 2017) because behaviors can induce attitude formation, particularly through direct experience (Dillard, 1993).

Of the various routes one can take to functioning under the aegis of a Jihadist organization, what they all have in common are some form of social interaction (Schuurman, Lindekilde, Malthaner, O'Connor, Gill and Bouhana, 2018) and this is posited as a weightier factor than extremism as a stand alone causal factor. Therefore, social networks and social ties are of critical importance in the commissioning of Jihadist terrorism. As such, the following section argues that influencing who one meets and socializes with impacts heavily upon the behaviors one subsequently engages in; preventative approaches which interject at these social encounter points ("Chance Encounters" [section 4.5.1] and "Opportunity Factors" [1.3.2.2.6 and 6.5.1]) may constitute a credible means of preventing particular typologies (section 6.7) from engaging in Jihadism.

6.5.1 The Company We Keep and the Role of Chance

While starting points and causal variables continue to inspire debate, what does seem to antecede behavioral radicalization in this study and others (section 4.5.1) are serendipitous meetings (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008b, pp.10-11; Dawson, 2018b; Malthaner, 2017, p.645; Pantucci, 2015, p.15; Sageman, 2004, p.121; Schuurman, 2017; Vidino, Marone and Entennmann, 2017, p.96), often with influential group archetypes (Sageman, 2017a, pp.

124-125).[102] These people become role models (Schuurman and Horgan, 2016) and/or heroes (Coolsaet, 2016a, p.24) and invest heavily in structuring the group (Bryson, 2016, p.23; Dawson and Amarasingham, 2017, p.206; Sageman, 2017b, p.19) and/or providing an example for others to follow (Schuurman and Horgan, 2016, pp.58-59).

Poignantly, their prominence is aided by a lack of other (positive) Muslim role models (Byrne, 2016, p.162) and, in many instances, a lack of positive role models when growing up (Ramakrisha, 2016b). Yet contrary to mainstream understandings of radicalization, this can result in malevolent *or* benevolent outcomes (Bierhoff, 2002, p.3; Rahimullah *et al*., 2013, p.23; Richardson, 2006, p.45; Zimbardo, 2007, p.301 and p.405); "Multifinality" (see glossary). How this distinction occurs is consistent with Cialdini's (2007, pp.114-166) third rule of social influence: social proof, which posits that contextually correct behavior is determined by modeling one's own behavior on others (Pinker, 2011, p.674), particularly high-status members of the community (Bandura, 1977 in Venhaus, 2010, pp.9-10).[103]

Expanding this observation to another field of contentious political activism, such opportune encounters also hold true for involvement in the pro-life movement (Munson, 2008) where the same rational Cartesian sequence is also falsely applied: the assumption that people become pro-life activists based on their well-developed conviction that abortion is wrong; cognition guiding behavior (see sections 2.4.1 and 5.3.1). As Munson's (2008) primary research indicates, much like the research participants of this thesis, many of his research participants

[102] These relationships become cemented through interpersonal attraction (see Bandura [1982, p.750] and Cialdini's [2007, pp.114-160] fourth rule of social influence "Liking"). Indeed, the groups people join are highly significant in determining future life experiences (Hogg and Abrams, 1988, p.2). Therefore, encouraging involvement with alternative benevolent groups which fulfill the same needs as Jihadist ones is central to the Indirect Approach.

[103] Ironically, Morrison (in Braddock, 2017) noted that many of his "Talking Terror" podcast panelists have themselves stumbled into terrorism research after such coincidental contact with an influential researcher - a point specifically mentioned by Bandura (1982, p.748).

became pro-life activists after an accidental encounter at a transitional phase of their life (when they were searching for meaning or connection ["Needs" in section 1.3.2.1.1]) and, most importantly, subsequent involvement shaped their beliefs, emotions and behaviors which impacted upon their identity and worldview.[104] Some twenty years earlier, Hoffman (1985 in McCauley and Segal, 2009, p.333) equally noted that "an individual's decision to join a left-wing, as opposed to a right-wing, organization is often a matter of little more than chance", a notion similarly alluded to by the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalization (2008, p.12) and Kundnani (2015b, p.23) and discussed in section 4.5.1 (see also Nussio [2017] in section 3.5.5.2). Indeed, "some of the most important determinants of life paths often arise out of the most trivial of circumstances" (Bandura, 1982, p.749).

Radicalization has similarly been posited as being a product of who you know (Byrne, 2016, p.106; Sageman, 2004, p.158; Wiktorowicz, 2004, p.16), particularly because individuals often turn to their peers when making judgements on how information should be processed and acted upon (Braddock and Morrison, 2018, p.22). Yet the fortuitousness and unpredictability inherent in this dynamic is difficult to accept because humans are primed by the innate need to establish causality (Gorman and Gorman, 2017, p.152; Kida, 2006, p.86; Moskowitz, 2005),

[104] Furthermore, Berger (2018) notes that extremist ideologies are successful in ensnaring followers because they provide entitativity; the provision of clear group boundaries, a common goal as well as internal homogeneity and structures. In so doing, followers obtain a sense of certainty (Bartlett and Miller, 2012, p.16; Raets, 2017; Rahimullah *et al.,* 2013, p.29) - "Uncertainty Reduction Theory" in section 1.3.2.3.5. This indicates that the provision of entitativity and certainty, rather than the specifics of any one particular ideology or belief, are the critical variables assisting involvement and ideological uptake. Therefore, rather than focussing on which group one joins under the assumption that that particular group or ideology was purposefully and rationally selected, a more fruitful and interdisciplinary research avenue may explore the qualities of extremist groups across political or social boundaries and in so doing, provide a grander theory of extremist involvement. A consequence of this conclusion is that directly tackling or attempting to dismantle extremist beliefs is unlikely to be successful, as argued throughout this chapter. Instead, offering entitativity and certainty (among other potential variables) through other means (such as the Indirect Approach) may prove to be a more successful preventative strategy.

particularly because humans experience discomfort with coincidence (Gorman and Gorman, 2017, p.157).

6.5.2 The Role of "Chance" and "Doing" in the Development of a Frame

Given the role of chance and the critical importance of "doing" (as discussed in sections 4.5.1 and 6.5), buttressing benevolent radicalization and creating opportunities to become involved in benevolently radicalized groups may function as an impactful alternative to terrorism for particular typologies (section 6.7) and an effective means of instilling a pro-social worldview (the frame which defines the "Group Priorities" [see section 1.3.2.3.1 and Table 4.5]). Doing so would also function as a means of competing with Jihadist responses by offering an alternative narrative (to geo-political events). Together, these are labelled as "Counter-Engagements" (Hamid, 2018a [1.3.2.1.16]). In other words, attitude change (or, for the purposes of this thesis, instilling a pro-social cognitive schema [a constructive frame]) need not be consciously willed in order for it to occur. Instead, it can be induced by behavior (Cialdini, 2007, pp.57-113; Myers, 2010, p.132) because "it is the nature of the demands made on the brain, on the new behaviors that are performed, that lead to change" (Mahzarin, Heiphetz and Heiphetz in Fiske, Gilbert, and Lindzey, 2010, p.379).

Therefore, structuring the environment (promoting benevolently radicalized groups through "Choice Architecture" [1.3.2.1.14]) so as to influence behavior (section 2.5.2.2) impacts upon what people come to believe because "doing influences thinking" (Myers, 2010, p.148) and people learn by doing (Staub, 2004, pp.71-72; Staub, 2013, p.167). As articulated in section 2.4.1.1, self-justification post behavior is more readily achieved than acting in accord with ones beliefs (Abelson, 1972; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, p.220; Myers, 2010, p.145) and this

explains why “attempts to change behavior by changing attitudes often fail” (Myers, 2010, p. 125).

6.6 Consequences of Linear Conceptualizations of Radicalization

The primary research question of this thesis is: “How do British Muslims mobilize to Jihadist conflict zones in a benevolent rather than a malevolent manner?” To answer this, radicalization was presented as a vector. As such, people may radicalize in a malevolent or benevolent manner. This insight led to the construction of the Indirect Approach. Unlike other approaches to countering and/or preventing Jihadism, the Indirect Approach (a counter-engagement [Hamid, 2018a]) seeks to prevent Jihadism by influencing how one radicalizes under the premise that radicalization fulfills “Needs” (see “General Intent” in section 1.3.2.1.2) in a maladaptive manner such as the “Warping Mechanism” presented in Table 5.8. Therefore, the Indirect Approach offers to fulfill these needs in a constructive and directly relevant manner. Given the constructive, potentially perilous but nonetheless relevant means with which this is achieved coupled with who it intends to address, the Indirect Approach (premised on radicalization as a vector) aims to compete with Jihadist prognoses and dominate the prognostic narrative by filling the online takedown void and maximizing constructive offline encounters by having more people promoting the counter-engagement. This addressed the third research question of this thesis presented in section 1.2.5: “How could humanitarianism be presented in order to function as an attractive alternative to Jihadism?” Another insight gained from this conceptualization was the impact it could have on research designs (Table 5.1). This answered

the second research question of this thesis: "To what extent could the benevolently radicalization be utilized to function as a control or comparison group for radicalization research?"

This following section addresses the consequences of *not* recognizing the vectorized qualities of radicalization. It does so through two arguments. The first addresses the perceptive implications of linear conceptions of radicalization and the second discusses how this impacts upon prevention.

6.6.1 British Muslims as Innocuous at Best, Evil at Worst

Radicalization as a concept mainly considers malevolent outcomes when successful and is largely utilized within the sphere of Jihadism as the term came into mainstream usage to explain the Islamist attacks in New York (2001), particularly those in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) (section 2.2). Indeed, the inspiring ideology moulded perceptions of who the radicalization process concerned and this had the unfortunate effect of heuristically linking mainstream forms of Islam and visible and/or behavioral indicators thereof with Jihadism resulting in a securitization of Islamic identity (see Mackay and Tatham, 2011, p.123).

Before 9/11, radicalization was not a commonly used term (Pisoiu, 2012, p.10) and Islam did not feature prominently, if at all, in national debate. But after 9/11, Islam became heuristically linked with radicalization (and associated terms [section 4.2]).[105] This is a product of the human tendency to associate two stimuli occurring at the same time (section 2.6.5); Islam and Muslims becoming "visible" on the one hand, with the radicalization of a violent few on the other and no adequate means with which to distinguish one from the other. As radicalization is perceived (and by most definitions, defined) as a net-negative, this tacitly impacted upon

[105] This was further reinforced by the derogatory and apocalyptic terms with which some Western leaders described Islam after 9/11 (Staub, 2013, p.346).

perceptions of Islam (see section 1.3.2.1). Given entrenchment, breaking this perceptive link will not be easily achieved.

This perception is inadvertently confirmed by radicalization research designs (Table 5.1) which seek to distinguish various forms of Islamic political engagement; the authors suggestion aside, no control or comparison group would be perceived as "positive" or "pro-social" or behaviorally radicalized (Merari's [2010] research aside). For example, constructively engaged Muslims (such as those exercising their democratic right to, for example, protest) in the row 3 control group "Muslim Activism" would not be labelled as "constructively engaged". Instead, given their non-threat status, under the conceptual framework of radicalization they would be categorized (and/or perceived) as "non-radicalized". In other words, given the net-negative confines of radicalization and how it spills over into the collective frame, (British) Muslims are perceived and researched as neutral at best, negative at worst.

Of course, British Muslims do engage in pro-social actions but most of these do not fall under the rubric of national security and as such, they remain invisible (see sections 1.3.1.6 and 4.3). However, this is also partly a product of how they operate. Indeed, the Overseas Development Institute recognized this and stated that "British Muslim INGOs should be more proactive in raising public awareness of the important work they do in some of the world's most dangerous places, as well as the values and standards that they adhere to and their part in the wider British aid effort" (Metcalfe-Hough *et al.,* 2015, p.26). Nonetheless, a small cohort have managed to bridge this divide between national security and benevolent actions (albeit unintentionally) and they can become perceptible when radicalization is perceived as having vector qualities.

Therefore, reconceptualizing radicalization as a vector challenges this "neutral at best" categorization by opening up a perceptive space for Muslims to be afforded the opportunity to also be viewed positively. This means of doing so is posited as effective because it does so within the conceptual framework which securitized them in the first place. That is to say, the term would therefore attract less reactance over time and may break the "perceptive link" discussed above (see abstract). This is not only realistic, but wholly necessary and salient given the rise of far right extremists who fortify Muslims "other" status. Furthermore, they present an important case for further research by virtue of their match (Factor 1 [section 3.5]), yet distinguished by their behavior in theatre (Factor 2 [section 5.4.4]) as illustrated in Table 5.8.

6.6.2 Applying Strengths-Based Approaches

As most British Muslims are not involved in terrorism, extremism nor mobilized in Jihadist conflict zones, most British Muslims represent the non-engaged norm. In terms of a normal distribution of behavior relative to statistical norms, both the benevolently and malevolently radicalized are outliers. As such, both are deviants and given vectorization, the research participants are positive deviants (Pascale, Sternin and Sternin, 2010; Singhal, Buscell and Lindberg, 2014) (and successful outliers as conceptualized by Gladwell ([2008]). In other words, they deviate with social approval in a manner where they "exert themselves and sacrifice themselves to a much greater degree" than others (Heckert, 1998, p.26). That is, they mobilize "in extremis" (James, 1906, p.3)/they mobilize in a "consciously perilous" manner (see definition of radicalization in glossary) as opposed to behaviors which entail limited degrees of self-sacrifice (Kruglanski, Jasko, Cherniko, Dugas and Weber, 2017, p.219) such as (merely)

donating money or raising awareness. Staub (2003, p.6) refers to this as "goodness" where its extent is measured by exerted effort and/or sacrifice incurred.

However, most definitions of radicalization do not account for these people because the normative view of radicalization does not incorporate positivity as an outcome (see sections 4.2 and 4.3). With no upside (or "strength"), the nation state favors problem-based approaches, if only by default (see section 6.2). The problem is, some Muslims want to "do" something about perceived injustices (Barrett, 2013; Horgan, 2017b; Pantucci, 2015, p.13; Schuurman, 2017) or generated emotion (see section 1.3.2.1.4 and sections 2.4.1.1 to 2.4.1.3) and this is at loggerheads with being "neutral" because mobilizing (to Jihadist conflict zones) is categorized as a non-neutral behavior, with Schedule 7 interviews and securitization as a consequence (see "the intuitive equation" in section 3.5.1).

A pragmatic and legitimate question therefore is: what is an affected, Western and "politically awakened" (Brzezinski, 2013, p.26; Richardson, 2006, p.42) Muslim (particularly a British Sunni Muslim) to "do" about grievances arising from the sectarian cleansing of Sunni Muslims and the ensuing humanitarian crisis occurring in Syria and Iraq (see Abu Adam al-Britani in section 5.4.6.3)? Staub (2013, p.506) notes that "a significant challenge is to address the pain and anger of young Muslims who respond to the suffering of other Muslims in wars fought against them." Similarly, Briggs and Silverman (2014, p.24) note that "we cannot ignore the very real desire among many to do something to help the people of Syria." As stated in section 5.4.6.3, defending Syrian and Iraqi people is a common motivational claim among (particular typologies of) those mobilizing to Syria (Mercy Corps, 2015, pp.5-6; Neumann, 2016,

p.90; Sageman, 2017a, p.94; UNOCT, 2017, p.35) and as such, it is incorporated into the definitions of "Pre-Jihadist" and "General Intent" (see glossary).

Further problematizing this question are the countless numbers of theologians and citizens globally, from all Islamic stripes, who have spoken out against Daesh,[106] leaving in their rhetorical wake a Sunni vacuum of inaction. In other words, the only well-publicized option (British) Muslims have to impact directly upon the suffering victims of Iraq and Syria is Jihadism and this is the only option successful radicalization concedes to (see SHB435 in section 1.2.4 and the "Radicalization Hypothesis" in glossary).

Given the research participants "Positive Deviant" status (section 6.4), this thesis posits that an ineffective policy response to malevolently used "hammers" (section 4.3.2) is to ban them altogether because one cannot feasibly construct a bounded area to keep social complexity out. Yet this, in large, is precisely the policy: radicalization is always negative and must be stopped, premised on stamping out extremism. Conversely, an effective policy response is to augment and capitalize on a "hammer's" constructive use (as this impacts upon narrative and, by means of actions taken, perception and identity [see Figure 4.2]) rather than shoehorning those crossing the decisional line from non-mobilized to mobilized into terrorists and/or extremists. Radicalization as a vector and the Indirect Approach specifically would provide a space which would give potential mobilizers a legal and effective means to have impact; an attractive alternative. Therefore, benevolent radicalization presents itself as one such socially acceptable means of overcoming both problems; the innocuous perception which is at loggerheads with the will to "do" something.

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[106] See: lettertobaghdadi.com and https://ing.org/global-condemnations-of-isis-isil/

6.7 Typologies

As discussed, benevolent radicalization as attractive alternative is only posited to function for particular typologies. This raises the question of agency. In particular, do situational factors override innate tendencies (Zimbardo, 2007) or, given the "choice" to engage (Lifton, 1986), albeit it a situationally weighted one, are personality characteristics nonetheless the more powerful variables in determining behavior (Staub, 1989 [see also footnotes 12 and 84])?

Waller (2007, pp.38-40) notes that group interactions can function as amplifiers of dispositional preference, what Sunstein (2009, pp.53-54) terms as "antecedent convictions". Similarly, Bandura (1982, p.750) notes that one can contribute to their own destiny by developing attributes which resonate in particular social milieus (see "Cumulative Continuity" in glossary). In this sense, there does seem to be a level of agency[107] involved in choosing which group to become a member of. As discussed in section 5.4.6.3, adherents may "self-select" (Kirby, 2007, p.423; Staub, 2013, p.253) and actively seek extremist groups (Roy, 2017b; Venhaus, 2010, p.1).

However, pre-Jihadists may not know their options or, as with the research participants, they may not have operationally defined their intent (see "Doing the Right Thing" in section 4.4). Nonetheless, given the role of such factors, the preventative point of interdiction proffered in this thesis will not function for all potential mobilizers as some may self-select in order to engage in violence, particularly those who (intend to) become "vanguards" of destructive movements (Staub, 2013, p.252) (see sections 5.4.6.3 and 6.8). However, particular typologies have other

[107] This may be a function of early life practices which form the rudimentary components for a positive social identity (Staub, 2004, p.68-69). See also, Oliner and Oliner (1998, pp.142-170). This may also be related to the literature on dysfunctional families and terrorism (Campelo *et al*., 2018; Jenkins, 2007, p.5; Khan, 2016b; Khosrokhavar, 2017, p.86; Komen, 2014, pp.48-49; Roy 2017b; UNOCT, 2017, p.27) and its correlate, a chaotic life course (Khosorokhavar, 2017, p.74).

motivations and the indirect approach may appeal to them thereby diverting them away from Jihadism.

Various scholars have categorized Jihadists or foreign fighters into numerous typologies based on their pathway and/or motivation. However, only some of these typologies would qualify as being receptive to the possibility of becoming involved with benevolently radicalized groups. As stated in section 5.4.6.3, others may simply want to be Jihadists (Lakhani, 2013, p.56; Roy, 2017a, p.2; Roy 2017b). Section 5.4.6 labelled the former as "Pathological Altruists". What follows are a list of the receptive typologies:

1. McCauley and Moskalenko's (2014b) "Caring-Compelled": these people are affected by suffering and feel personally responsible in reducing it. To illustrate this typology, McCauley (2018) uses the example of Mohammed Momin Khawaja, a Canadian national who was found guilty of involvement in a terrorist plot. Unlike many of those drawn to the ranks of Daesh, Khawaja held a well-paying and stable job in I.T. His father holds a Ph.D. in political science from Syracuse University, his family and kin dynamics were healthy and loving and he did not display any indication of mental health issues. To explain his process of radicalization, McCauley (2018) utilizes the role of emotion; "some people … feel so strongly the suffering, the victimization of others that they are impelled to do something about it."[108] The argument put forward in this thesis is that the motivation of this typology can be adequately addressed by benevolent groups.

[108] McCauley's explanation sufficiently aligns this thesis's definition of radicalization with the will to "do" something, discussed in Table 3.4 ("General Intent") and sections 4.5.1 and 5.4.5.3. As such, this is utilized in the construction of the Indirect Approach (Section 7.3).

2. Khosrokhavar's (2009) "Existential Man". State buttressed benevolently radicalized groups would be able to bridge the multiple identity gap these people experience and potentially replace it with a sense of pride which constructively combines their religion and their nationality (see section 4.5.2).
3. Nesser's (2015) "Misfits" and "Drifters" - who Staub (2013, p.367) refers to as "Lost Souls". These typologies would find a sense of belonging and develop an aligned social identity through involvement, but this need not necessarily be through benevolently radicalized groups. For this category, Staub (2013) recommends "connection, community and finding ways to fulfill basic needs". It should be noted that, in many ways, the prototypical group members who socialized the research participants (or "Proteges" in Nesser's typology) bear striking similarities to Nesser's "entrepreneurs" albeit on a morally opposed level. Indeed, Nesser's "Entrepreneurs" may also be relatable to "Political Entrepreneurs"; "the Mohandas Ghandis, the V.I. Lenins, the Maos, the Martin Luther King Jrs and the bin Ladens of the world" (Gupta, 2018, p.154). As is clear to the reader, some of these leaders were destructive while others were constructive (see section 4.7.2 and "the daimonic" in sections 5.4.4 and 5.4.5).
4. Neumann's (2016) "Defenders" seem to come closest to describing the research participants as they also (initially at least) deployed for charitable purposes (much like some "Rescuers" during the Holocaust [Snyder, 2016, p.270]). The difference is that the "Defenders" did not leave the conflict zone and became radicalized by it (see section 5.4.6.3) whereas the research participants only remain in theatre for a maximum of ten days before returning to the UK (see section 3.5.3). Neumann's (2016) depiction of the "Defenders" shares much

with Staub's (2013, p.367) categorization of “Idealists” and Khosrokhavar’s (2017, pp. 73-136) model for European radicalization. Khosrokhavar (2017, p.110) notes, “most of the Europeans who go there (via Turkey especially) are not radicalized in the strict sense of the term when they set off. Their motivations are on the whole a poisonous mix of three components: humanitarian concerns (save the Muslim brothers being massacred by the bloody Assad regime), extreme fundamentalism (fight the Shia regime, which resulted from an adulterer Islam and which represses authentic Muslims, especially Sunni) and a certain playfulness, associated with danger and the exoticism of a change of scene.” Staub (2013) recommends providing this category with a constructive ideological view (see section 4.7.2).

5. Venhaus’s (2011a and 2011b) “Identity Seeker” and, perhaps, his “Status Seeker”. Similar to Nesser’s (2015) “Misfits” and “Drifters” and Staub’s (2013, p.367) “Lost Souls”, the “Identity Seeker” is primarily attracted by the need for belonging to a group rather than, initially at least, being ideologically loyal.

6.8 Chapter Summary

The recommendation of this chapter was to influence how one radicalizes rather than solely implementing measures which counter the process, outcomes and support mechanisms of extremism and Jihadism because people will still want to “do” something about the egregious situations of fellow Muslims (section 6.6.2). This is an indirect approach to prevention hinged on the constructive channeling of emotions, motivations (to include “needs”) and religious sentiment. This may be achieved through beneficent socialization which involves partaking in group priorities; engaging in behaviors which are congruent to the group interests and the frame

which defines the group (se Table 4.5). This is postulated to result in the adoption of the group worldview (the congruence between the initial behaviors engaged in and the thoughts which follow ["Cognitive Dissonance Theory" in section 1.3.2.3.3]) which is recalcitrant to the prognoses of Jihadism. To bolster this humanitarian prognosis, section 6.3 recommended buttressing an organic competitor to Jihadism; benevolently radicalized Muslim humanitarians. This chapter frames these groups as an effective pro-social alternative and (inadvertently) part of a wider network of "protective factors" (HM Government, 2018, p.33) which includes a non-violent (constructive) ideology and fosters strong feelings of belonging (Cole and Cole, 2009; Home Office, 2011). How this may be achieved is outlined in the following chapter.

This is a controversial policy recommendation because it does not stop people from radicalizing. Instead, it adopts the strength-based approach of Positive Deviance (among other theories presented in sections 1.3.2 and 7.3) within a biomimicry model to influence how one radicalizes: promoting a benevolent rather than malevolent socialization process through a constructive community of practice led by constructive leaders who reinforce their beneficent prognostic on adherents. One of the major tenets of the strengths-based PD approach is its focus on "the successful exceptions, not the failing norm" (Pascale *et al.*, 2010, p.3 [see also Gladwell, 2008]). Developing a policy which focusses on success rather than failures presents a shift away from the "us-them" narrative (where "our" success is necessarily "their" failure [Berger, 2018]) which contributes to reactance. In other words, this approach would provide a space for people to have a positive impact on others' suffering in a manner which does not render them at risk of adopting anti-social/extremist tenets or engaging in Jihadist behaviors.

Shrinking the pool of Jihadists is posited to be achieved by bolstering the pool of humanitarians. However, rather than engaging those who want to be Jihadists or extremists, the Indirect Approach would focus specifically on preventing "Pathological Altruism" (section 5.4.6) by addressing particular typologies of pre-Jihadist (section 6.7) as well as, potentially, those experiencing doubt and uncertainty in their malevolent prognosis (sections 4.5.1 and 5.4.6.3). This is posited as effective given the match between the benevolently radicalized research participants and the scholarly literature on (European) Jihadists (Table 3.5) where both commence as "pre-Jihadists" (see glossary) but eventually function in morally opposed capacities; the Factor 2 discrepancies discussed in section 5.4.4 and displayed in Table 5.8. This indirect approach to prevention is posited as effective because it recognizes the legitimacy of the grievances and willingness to act on faith-aligned affect, but offers a nudge through "Choice Architecture" (section 1.3.2.1.14 [operationalized in Figure 7.3]) in order to influence how this is expressed and conceptualized i.e. promoting humanitarianism and humanitarian prognoses at the expense of Jihadism and extremism. That is, *indirectly* stymying Jihadist recruitment and avoiding reactance in the process.

Radicalization (benevolent or malevolent) is a social process where subjects actively identify with those who promote particular acts/views as virtuous (be they sub-political [such as violent expressions] and/or supra-political [such as utopianism]). In other words, "to do evil, a human being must first of all believe that what he's doing is good" (Solzhenitsyn, 2003, p.77). For malevolent radicalization (for neurotypical people, but not those excitedly intent on committing violence), positive goals are presented in order to warrant the abusive/tyrannical behavior; for Stanley Milgram, this was "scientific progress" and for Daesh, it is the

Caliphate.[109] Subsequent actions are construed as a "service" in the cause of "goodness" (Haslam and Reicher, 2012, p.3) and this requires agency from enthusiasts, not rote actions or conforming behaviors from brainwashed vessels (see section 6.7). Understanding radicalization as a vector allows one to recognize the beneficial aspects of the process and to not only craft a resonating narrative in response, but one aligned to an attractive alternative. This results in a competitor to Jihadism, not merely a rebuttal.

To be successful, the Indirect Approach must transcend the national security concern (partly because preventative programs are not the realm of criminal justice [Neumann, 2016, p. 182]) and capture the imagination of those contemplating an engagement with geo-political and/ or domestic phenomena. Stephen and Erdberg (2018) note that "any complete strategy against terrorism must beat this extremist offer to youth of belonging and mission". Benevolent radicalization is presented as one such means. Section 7.3 proposes a means with which to operationalize alternative narratives in order to create an effective and attractive alternative; a counter-engagement (section 1.3.2.1.16). It proposes to do so by building a parallel network to the Jihadist networks; an alternative ecosystem which is sustained by a different worldview (but arguably the same "Sacred Values" nonetheless) - one built on pro-social principles which, by default, are opposed to extremism and Jihadist prognoses and are therefore within social norms and the democratic consensus (see also Kenney, 2018, p.235).

The Indirect Approach has much in common with Ferguson, McDaid and McAuley's (2017) conclusions on preventing violence in Northern Ireland; instead of de-radicalization,

[109] Similarly, Solzhenitsyn (2003, pp.77-78) notes how it was "race" for the Nazis, "Christianity" for the Inquisition, "civilization" for the colonizers and "equality, brotherhood and the happiness of future generations" for the Jacobins (early and late). It is in this sense that "Sacred Values" may lead to pro-social *or* anti-social behavior (see section 5.4.5)

which they view as weakening identity and ideology (2017, p.13), they posit that violence can be prevented by, amongst other measures, providing "an activist identity" (Ferguson *et al.,* 2017, pp. 13-14) which is still ideological but acted out in a non-violent manner (see section 6.3). They recommend mobilizing these identities in positive ways "rather than trying to moderate or dismantle them" (Ferguson *et al.,* 2017, p.19), precisely the goal of the Indirect Approach. Consequently, the net effect of supporting the Indirect Approach would be to expand "The Grey Zone" (Burke, 2016, pp.244-245 [see sections 1.3.2.1.20 and 7.5.2]) which malevolent groups aim to collapse in a divide and conquer manner (Byrne, 2016, p.28; Roussinos, 2017; Khan 2016, p.192) because their ultimate goal is separating *dar al-harb* from *dar al-Islam*. Indeed, this was one of the drivers for the creation of Daesh's Caliphate. Furthermore, government support for attractive narratives and alternatives would downplay any jujitsu politics for two reasons; firstly, governments and those functioning within the Indirect Approach would be promoting the same message. Secondly, adherents would be empowered by having the opportunity to act on their faith-aligned affect. It is for this reason that Kundnani (2015a, p.15) states that "radicalization in the true sense of the word is the solution, not the problem." Indeed, that radicalization can have benevolent outcomes (section 4.3) and that terrorism can be militated through attractive alternatives (section 6.3) are not new concepts. What is novel is their combination.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

7.1 Introduction and Organization

Based on the literature and data analysis, section 7.2 presents a brief overview of the factors in the radicalization process which influence (particular typologies of) pre-Jihadists becoming "Mobilized Do-Gooders" or "Pathological Altruists" (see Figure 5.3). It does so by illustrating those factors which both have in common as well as differentiators (see Figure 7.1). The purpose of this is to assist in answering the primary research question of this thesis: "How do British Muslims mobilize to Jihadist conflict zones in a benevolent rather than a malevolent manner?" Figure 7.1 illustrates the role of "Chance Encounters" (sections 4.5.1, 6.5.1 and 6.5.2), pro-social "Group Priorities" ([section 1.3.2.3.1] with particular reference to the frame [section 2.5]), constructive role-models (sections 1.3.2.2.3 and 4.5.1), "Learning-By-Doing" (sections 1.3.2.3.6, 6.4 and 6.5), where every congruent behavior reinforced the humanitarian prognostic (sections 4.4 and 4.5), and working in unison, how these factors facilitated the constructive channeling of emotions (section 2.4). It was under these conditions that the matched research participants radicalized benevolently by engaging in aid-in-extremis rather than radicalizing malevolently by engaging in Jihadism.

The differentiators and similarities illustrated in Figure 7.1 were instrumental in the construction of the Indirect Approach, presented in section 7.3. Section 7.3 presents a framework designed to stymy Jihadist recruitment by formalizing and expanding upon (through nation state support) how the matched research participants organically radicalized in a benevolent manner (see "Biomimicry" in glossary and in sections 1.4.1 and 6.3.1). Its purpose is to prevent

particular typologies of pre-Jihadists from becoming Jihadists (or what this thesis terms as "Pathological Altruists" [section 5.4.6.3]). It proposes to do so by "pull[ing] them out from the sway" of Jihadism and Jihadist recruiters (Simpson, 2018, p.100). This is followed by section 7.4 which presents a means with which to promote online counter-engagements (section 1.3.2.1.16) utilizing the tenets of "Choice Architecture" (section 1.3.2.1.14). This thesis concludes with section 7.5 which aims to assist the authorities when considering policies and their implications.

7.2 Differentiators and Similarities

Figure 7.1 fulfills three requirements simultaneously. First, it provides a one page synopsis of the findings of this thesis - structured to answer the primary research question. Second, these findings are organized along the three components of Figure 4.2 (the pathway, process and outcome) which runs through the center of Figure 7.1 On the right of Figure 7.1 are those theories, findings, factors and matching characteristics which the research participants share with the scholarly literature on extremists and European Jihadists in particular. On the left are those which differentiate the research participants from the same literature. Third, Figure 7.1 depicts the significant factors in influencing the vector in chronological order: the role that chance played in bringing the research participants into the pro-social group led by constructive prototypical group members who, by encouraging involvement in various activities (discussions, mobilizations, fund raising and awareness raising) within a community of practice modus operandi, inculcated a benevolent worldview (see "Frame" in Table 4.5) in the research participants (a component of the "Group Priorities" [section 1.3.2.3.1]). An inadvertent by-product of this was that their newly adopted worldview and aligned behaviors were incongruent

with those of extremists and Jihadists. However, as stated in section 3.5.4, this was an unintended second-order effect. The following section operationalizes these conclusions and presents a means to stymy Jihadist recruitment in an intended and formalized manner based on Positive Deviance (section 6.4), “Choice Architecture” (1.3.2.1.14) and “Biomimicry (see sections 1.4.1, 6.3.1 and glossary).

Figure 7.1 Depiction of Differentiators Along Each Radicalization Stage



7.3 The Indirect Approach

Figure 7.2 The Indirect Approach I (Process)



Figure 7.3 The Indirect Approach II (Pathway)



7.3.1 Recapitulation

Before describing the Indirect Approach to preventing Jihadism, a brief recapitulation is required of the central elements of Figures 7.2 and 7.3 introduced and discussed throughout this thesis. Figure 7.3 is color coded:

1. Pink represents Positive Deviance as discussed in section 6.4. Positive Deviance involves identifying and expanding upon the successfully deviant methods of a minority of a community for the betterment of the community. Section 6.4 listed the steps required in the application of a PD program. This began with being invited by the community and is followed by the community defining the problem and identifying the positive deviants among the population. Once identified, their successful strategies are learned and adopted. Central to this is that as much of this learning occurs in a behavioral manner within the community rather than theoretically and being brought forward by outsiders.
2. Blue represents framing theory as discussed in 2.5. Three components are of note; (a) "Frame Bridging" is what links ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames and is achieved by linking a frame to a (potential) sentiment pool. For the purposes of this thesis, this bridges pre-Jihadists with humanitarianism. (b) "Frame Amplification" is the means with which the frame resonates through (sacred) values and beliefs and (c) "Frame Extension" concerns the process of expanding the frame to account for the values of new adherents.
3. Red represents Borum's (2003) heuristic (Figure 4.8).
4. Grey represents clarification notes

Figure 7.3 is linked to Figure 7.2 though the back boxes in both figures. In this manner, Figure 7.2 is a continuation of Figure 7.3. Figure 7.2 is also color coded, but is organized along five structures which are different colors for purposes of clarity. Grey represents the critical defining characteristics of the Indirect Approach and blue represents critical theories for the Indirect Approach to be successful. Both are centered around the red colored "Group Priorities" (the frame, group interests and aligned behaviors [see Table 4.5]). Finally, yellow represents the desired results (the "Operational Outcome" in Figure 4.2).

7.3.2 Outlining the Indirect Approach

Staub (2013, p.292) notes that for prevention to be effective, it must identify the desirable outcomes and the activities or processes required to bring those outcomes into fruition. The Indirect Approach achieves both. As stated in section 6.4, Positive Deviance is supposed to commence with an invitation from the community. However, this is not the case with the Indirect Approach because utilizing humanitarianism to prevent Jihadism was recognized from outside the community. As Staub (2013, p.290) notes, "external actors are crucial in … generating internal action and supporting internal actors" (see also Schomerus, El-Taraboulsi-McCarthy and Sandhar, 2017, p.3). In this sense, the order with which the Positive Deviance approach proceeds in this thesis bears much similarity to how the approach was conceived in Vietnam rather than how it was subsequently developed for use in other contexts.

Therefore, Figure 7.3 commences with a re-ordering of Positive Deviance by defining the problem before introducing it to the community. The defined problem is: there is no attractive alternative narrative and behavior ("Counter-Engagement" [Hamid, 2018a]) which can effectively compete with the Jihadist narrative and call-to-action. The Indirect Approach is a

means of narrative dominance and behavior inducement and, while specifically concerned with countering terrorism, it proposes to do so indirectly rather than directly. It does so by focussing on how one administers a prognosis; while counter-messages function to prohibit Jihadist narratives, they are not replacing them. The Indirect Approach proposes to replace Jihadism with something just as enticing but not as toxic by offering an alternative means of addressing the "General Intent" (Table 3.4) to "do" something and/or fulfill needs through the provision of a competing narrative and appealing and relevant offline behavior (section 6.3).

With the problem defined, the next step is to identify positive deviants. These are identified as the research participants and as such, the Indirect Approach is a biomimicry model. Again, this is also out of the recommended order of the Positive Deviance approach, but is nonetheless necessary given that the positive deviants were discovered by outsiders rather than identified by insiders. With the problem defined and the positive deviants identified, the third step is to approach the community and obtain support (see sections 3.5.5.3, 6.3.1 and 6.4). This is a critical stage as not achieving community support is unlikely to result in success. Were programs to proceed without support, they risk creating reactance and bolstering the perception that British Muslim communities are suspect communities (section 6.6.1); the "Backfire Effect" (section 2.6.3). In other words, they risk becoming iatrogenic and collapsing the grey zone (see sections 1.3.2.1.20, 5.4.6 and 6.2.3). As Kilcullen (2009, p.259) states, Muslim community leaders play a critical role in building partnerships, taking key decisions and leading offensive action. For the purposes of this thesis, "offensive action" assumes a non-kinetic approach in the form of a competing narrative and congruent behaviors.

Assuming support, the final stage within the Positive Deviance approach is for the local communities to learn how the positive deviants are preventing Jihadism and to adopt (or support) those strategies. In other words, the community must support activists like the research participants in performing their tasks. As stated in section 2.6.1, the community of the research participants are funding more and larger projects and this is indicative of a supportive community. This, along with what is presented in section 7.3, supports the hypothesis that the community would support the Indirect Approach.

The Indirect Approach to preventing Jihadism would require state-funded assistance in terms of marketing, offices, website and storage facilities. With these supplied, means of outreach are devised - an online form of which is presented in section 7.4. This would also include face-to-face outreach as the role of chance encounters was a significant factor in this study and others (see sections 1.4.1, 6.1 and 6.5.1). The purpose of this outreach is to bridge the benevolent and victim-centric frame with the frames of others ("Frame Bridging" in Figure 7.3). The more people who support or adopt this frame, the more this prognostic can dominate the prognostic space which is solely occupied by Jihadists because there are no nation state supported attractive alternatives which fulfill the desire to "do" something (see sections 7.5.1 and 7.5.2.1, Table 3.4 and SHB435 in section 1.2.4). The diagnostics of this frame are similar to those of the Jihadists (see sections 4.6.2 and 4.6.3 and Table 4.5) and as such, the frame is amplified; it resonates. Yet what the frame proposes to do is morally opposed (prognosis); assist the victims rather than punish the aggressors. While some pre-Jihadists (or those experiencing "doubt and uncertainty" [sections 4.5.1 and 5.4.6.3]) may not agree that the proposed prognosis is the best course of action, it is unlikely that they would disagree with this prognosis outright as

an untold number of pre-Jihadists who subsequently became Jihadists were nonetheless motivated to partake by defending victims and engaging in humanitarianism (see sections 2.4.2.3 and “Defenders” in section 6.7).

The purpose of the Indirect Approach is not to radicalize adherents. Instead it aims to offer an alternative to Jihadism and, in the process of engaging in that alternative prognosis, adherents are intended to adopt the benevolent worldview (the “Perceptive Shift” in Figure 7.3) as hypothesized by dissonance theory (depicted in Figure 7.2 and discussed with regards to the constructive channeling of emotion in section 2.6.2). It is in this sense that the Indirect Approach capitalizes on the tenets of communities of practice; “Learning-By-Doing” (see section 2.4.1.1). Following a biomimicry approach in implementing this policy recommendation, this thesis recommends that future pre-Jihadists (functioning as volunteers) engage in fundraising in the U.K. and eventually make a short trip of no more than five days to a refugee camp or an orphanage (located in devastated but non-combat zones) to deliver supplies and engage with the victims. Critically, this is done under the stewardship of prototypical group members (“Role Modeling” in Figure 7.2 [see section 2.3.3]) who can provide guidance, offer advice and provide structure to thoughts and emotions (“Constructive Channeling of Emotions” in Figure 7.2). This would be supported by other members of the community of practice, as depicted in Figure 7.2. The purpose of traveling to a refugee camp or an orphanage in a devastated but non-conflict zone is to influence their perception of war; from the allure of combating a designated enemy to the second-order consequences of combat, as discussed above (“Perceptive Shift”) and in section 1.3.2.1 (see “Responsibility” in sections 1.3.1.3, 4.4.1, 4.7.1 and 6.2.4 and Figures 7.1 and 7.3). Alleviating the suffering of innocent victims is posited to be an emotional experience but, as

stated in section 2.5.2.2, this can be channeled positively under constructive leadership and group priorities.

While functioning within this mobilized community of practice, engaging in behaviors which are wholly consistent with the frame of the group (group priorities) and doing so with role models who constructively channel emotion, this thesis posits that the benevolent frame has higher chances of being accepted (if only to lower dissonance) and this will impact upon ones identity and perception as illustrated in Figure 7.2. While this may not result in one self-categorizing as a humanitarian, what it does aim to do is instill the humanitarian prognosis (which is posited to ward off Jihadism [section 6.2.4]) and simultaneously cater to the general intent to "do" something [Table 3.4]) as one which not only helps victims and provides purpose, but a positive sense of self-worth for having done so (a "Needs" [1.3.2.1.1]).

Figure 7.3 illustrates that the purpose of messaging (a central component of the Indirect Approach) is to "Dominate the Prognostic Narrative Online and Offline". The offline means of achieving this involves ensuring that as many people as possible have as many people have as many opportunities as possible to encounter the benevolently radicalized ("Opportunity Factors" [section 1.3.2.2.6]). This may be achieved through various means of awareness raising. Nonetheless, the online means of doing so is equally as important given the role of vicarious deprivation through social media footage (section 2.5.2.1). Therefore, the following section addresses the digital milieu specifically.

7.4 Online Alternative Narratives

An alternative narrative is more likely to be competitive if it can utilize the affect associated with malevolent radicalization (for example, anger and frustration) and desire for impact ("General Intent" [Table 3.4]) and channel it constructively (see sections 1.3.2.1.16, 2.4.1.2, 2.4.1.3, 2.5.2.2 and 2.6.1). For example, the former Islamist Hasan (2017) states, "stopping the anger and rage of would-be suicidal terrorists, then channelling and transforming it into charitable virtue, is one of the most difficult tasks we face" - a sentiment also expressed by others (Atran, 2006, p.141; Atran, 2010, p.324; Bartlett *et al.,* 2010, p.25 and p.42; Cottee, 2015; Fergussen, 2017, p.55; Jenkins, 2017; Khan, 2016b; Kundnani, 2015a, p.288; Neguese in Khan, 2016a; Peucker and Akbarzadeh, 2014, p.136; Taylor, 2004, p.255).

Therefore, rather than solely attempting to rid society of noxious ideologies through counter-narratives, a useful auxiliary to P/CVE may include the introduction of "better ideas" (Staub, 2013, pp.343-352) which can effectively compete with malevolent ones (see sections 3.5.5.2, 6.1 and 6.3 and Table 3.4). This would function by providing a sense of (social) identity which transcends the parochialism of Jihadism while ensuring that adherents stay within the societal fold. To do so, this thesis recommends getting potential adherents involved with groups who are pro-social (morally opposed to violence), yet constructively engaged in theaters where Jihadists are destructively engaged; attractive alternatives in the form of humanitarianism.

This is slightly at odds with the UK's Prevent and Channel programs which only begin functioning once an individual has been identified as potentially vulnerable to violent extremism; primary vs. secondary prevention (sections 1.3.1.7, 4.5.1 and 6.2). Nonetheless, engaging with benevolent groups fulfills many of the same needs for engaging in terrorism, whether that be the

various risk factors (see “Risk Factor Instruments” in glossary)[110] (bar the desire to engage in violence) or more nebulous variables such as a “Cognitive Opening” (sections 1.3.2.1.3 and 4.5.1 and Table 3.4) followed by a chance encounter (section 6.5), but realized in a positive manner.

During the GLOBSEC 2018 conference, Magnus Ranstorp stated that “we need to be much more innovative [and] think hard about how we can shape alternative messages.” What follows is a form the Indirect Approach could assume online which not only fulfills Ranstorp's request, but overcomes the limitations of counter-narratives listed in Section 5.3.1; utilizing the same affect generated by Jihadism and delivered by credible members of the community in order to divert those off the malevolent path and onto a relevant yet appealing constructive path.

Holt *et al.* (2015, p.114) view victim footage and Jihadist footage on social media platforms such as youtube as complementary parts of a mobilization frame which moves people to extremist action (for example, see Figure 4.8). A frame, as noted in section 2.5, is a view of history and experience and it ensures an individual can make sense of and react to new events. Therefore, frames influence perception (section 4.6.2) and effective ones perform three functions:

1. They identify and injustice or grievance; a diagnostic.
2. They identify what must be done in response; a prognostic.
3. They call on individuals to participate in said solution; a call-to-action (see section 6.2.6).

In other words, they provide an individual with motivation and convey hope because they only depict successes. Furthermore, the men featuring in these prognostic videos are portrayed as role-models (see sections 2.3.3 and 2.5.2.2) and/or heroes. Indeed, heroism is a frequently cited

[110] Whether that be adventure, sense of belonging or purpose, alleviating suffering, doing the right thing, being a good Muslim etc.

driver (Atran, 2010, p.290; Bokhari *et al.,* 2006, p.34; Callimachi, 2018; Coolsaet, 2016a, p.24; Roy 2017b; Sageman, 2008, p.117) and terrorists become heroes in many communities (Post, 2007; Staub, 2013, p.153). In sum, diagnostic videos elicit outrage (among other emotions), prognostic ones offer solutions and motivational ones encourage viewers to join the heroes who counter the (perceived) injustice (see Figures 4.8 and 7.3).

The concept proposed in this section involves adjusting algorithms to favor particular prognostic videos[111] as well as generating particular advertisements and other youtube recommended footage which support the favored prognostic footage. The concept commences with an individual viewing footage on youtube which would be pre-coded as diagnostic. This would encompass victim footage as well as the general devastation of the Syrian and Iraqi civil conflicts (among relevant others). However, the malevolent prognostic and motivational footage which normally follows Jihadist footage would be supplanted by ones featuring the benevolently radicalized. That is to say, pro-social prognostics: delivering aid, partaking in medical procedures, social programs and the like. This may take two forms: (1) Taking down all Jihadist footage and supplanting it with that of the benevolently radicalized. Or, as recommend in this thesis, (2) Blending. Rather than deleting Jihadist footage, it should be coded along diagnostic, prognostic and call-to-action segments. The former is used at the start of the newly blended footage; diagnostics. Therefore, viewers are under the assumption that what follows is also Jihadist. Instead, what follows are pro-social prognostics and call-to-action segments made by the benevolently radicalized. Key to this is that the transition between the diagnostic segment to

[111] Videos which are already in existence rather than ones produced specifically for the purpose of countering or preventing Daesh messaging. The Re-Direct Method labels these as "hidden" counter-argument content - that is, videos that are not necessarily well known and were not designed with the explicit intention of refuting ISIS (redirectmethod.org).

the prognostic and call-to-action segments be of the same quality and texture. There are two reasons for favoring the blended approach rather than solely relying on newly crafted footage from the benevolently radicalized:

1. The malevolently radicalized and the benevolently radicalized diagnose conflicts in a similar manner: both illustrate unwarranted suffering (see section 1.3.2.1.17 and "Victimhood" in Table 4.5). This is an important component in recognizing radicalization as a vector; both groups identify the problem, but propose different courses of action. However, the style the diagnostic footage takes is somewhat different, albeit difficult to quantify (hence the importance of "transition" discussed above). Nonetheless, pre-Jihadist viewers interested in Jihadism are more likely to continue viewing if the initial segments are genuine Jihadist material as this portrays authenticity. However, and (ideally) unbeknownst to the viewers, the Jihadist diagnostic footage is followed by humanitarian prognostic footage. This is crucial for the second reason.
2. As noted in sections 2.6.5 and 6.3.1, breaching the chatrooms and means with which Jihadists share footage and information is particularly difficult and messages designed to counter or prevent Jihadism should therefore not languish "on YouTube or Facebook unable to find an audience" (Briggs and Silverman, 2014, p.29). In personal correspondence (2018), Anne Speckhard (director of the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism) noted that many "ISIS fanboys" were forwarding footage without having vetted its entire content. In other words, if footage seemed Jihadist in the first moments, it was forwarded to others. Therefore, given its initial authenticity, a blended approach is more likely to find its way into the isolated chatrooms utilized by Jihadists.

Doing so is important. Sunstein (2014, p.29) termed any approach which uses masked means such as what is proposed in this section as “the cognitive infiltration of extremist groups”. Similarly to what is proposed in this section is Atran's (2006, p.141) suggestion: “what is needed is subtle infiltration to create chat rooms, as well as physical support groups, which advance causes that can play to … sentiments but that are not destructive … the aim should be to show how deeply held sacred values can be channeled into less-belligerent paths.” As stated in section 2.5.2.2, Schmid (2013a, p.28) may refer to this proposition as a form of “social engineering”.

Finally, there are many such pro-social prognostic videos on youtube. However, they are not algorithmically aligned to the victim and injustice based diagnostic ones. Such benevolent prognostic videos exist because donors demand to see how their donations are being spent and this ensures a steady supply of future donations for the research participants (as discussed in section 3.5.5.2). There are also a plethora of Jihadist diagnostic footage. Therefore, crafting (or editing) a blended narrative from both could be done relatively quickly, easily and cheaply. The following section illustrates how this could be achieved without editing segments into one narrative.

7.4.1 Online, In Practice

In practice, when a consumer watches a particular youtube video, the youtube recommendation system combines various data sources to provide a resonating recommendation. This could potentially be tweaked to ensure that when an individual views diagnostic footage of Syrian victims which has not already been blended (or Jihadist [inspired] material more generally), an algorithm would align the subsequent recommended video footage to be pre-coded benevolent prognostic footage. This is what Braddock and Morrison (2018, p.21) term as “the

machine heuristic". They note that this can be perceived as credible when such videos are selected by a non-human entity such as an algorithm. Jihadist (diagnostic) footage could also be supplemented with various advertisements for groups opposed to violent extremism, specifically ones which offer a counter-engagement.

Therefore, rather than solely deleting malevolent prognostic and motivational footage from youtube, thereby remaining reactive, sufficiently aligned coding would necessarily favor all pro-socially prognostic footage and this benevolent bottleneck may militate malevolent footage being easily recommended by virtue of the fact that it would not be favorably coded ("Choice Architecture" in section 1.3.2.1.14). Dominating the prognostic narrative in this manner ("Messaging" in Figure 7.3) may facilitate a nudge away from malevolence through the provision of a constructive alternative; a counter-engagement. This is posited to resonate with particular typologies of pre-Jihadists (those who may become "Pathological Altruists" [section 1.3.2.1.9] and those described in section 6.7 specifically [and potentially those experiencing doubt and uncertainty on their current malevolent trajectory as discussed in section 5.4.6.3]) for two reasons:

1. The Indirect Approach is not merely an alternative narrative; it is a call-to-action in the form of a behavioral rebuttal (a "Counter-Engagement" [1.3.2.1.16]). Therefore, and unlike counter-narratives (section 2.6), it embraces "Active Bystandership", "Moral Courage" and "The Heroic Imagination" (sections 1.3.2.1.10-12 and sections 4.4 and 4.5) by capitalizing on and channeling "Sacred Vales" (see "Victimhood" in Table 4.5) into constructive pursuits.
2. Much like Jihadist propaganda, the message it delivers is framed in an affective rather than a rational manner (sections 2.4 and 2.5) and aims to reinterpret what one can "do"; a product

of similar diagnostics, delivered by credible people and hinged on the same factors (sans violence) which coalesce to result in violent extremism (section 2.3). However, the malevolent prognostic is interrupted through the provision of a pro-social prognostic.

7.5 In Conclusion

7.5.1 "Do" Something

A shortcoming in preventative efforts is offering alternatives, particularly relevant and resonating alternatives. Indeed, some people want to "do" something and want to become actively involved in protecting and/or assisting victims of civil strife (see "General Intent" in Table 3.4). While numerous theologians and citizens globally have spoken out against the likes of Daesh in an effort to distinguish Islamism from Islam, they also left a vacuum of inaction which further exasperated the suffering because humanitarian assistance was not forthcoming (as discussed in section 6.6.2). This occurred because mobilizing to (and functioning in) conflict zones where Jihadists are also active was framed as solely a Jihadist activity (see "the intuitive equation" in section 3.5.1 and SHB435 in section 1.2.4). As such, the function of campaigns such as #notinmyname was to distinguish (mainstream) Islam from Daesh's interpretation. What it did not do was provide Muslims with a viable means with which they could engage and contribute.

As Fernandez (in Cottee, 2015), the former coordinator for the Centre for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, states: "we don't have a counter-narrative. We have a half message: 'Don't do this', but we lack the 'Do this instead'" (see section 2.6.7). Rather than a counter-narrative, what is proposed in this thesis is the buttressing of a competitive one which already exists (see Kilcullen [2006, p.33] in section 6.3 and "Biomimicry" in glossary). That is to

say, benevolent radicalization within the Indirect Approach is presented as a viable "do this instead" option and a small number promoting this counter-engagement may have a significant effect (see "Contagion" in section 1.3.2.1.19), more so with nation state support. Culling a violent identity, frame, social reality and behavioral prognostic is as much about the resonance and merits of the alternative (the counter-engagement) as it is about the theological pitfalls and immorality of Jihadism (counter-narrative). However, more attention has been paid to the latter.

The argument this thesis makes is, the British government neither recognizes nor supports effective competitors to extremist or Jihadist groups. This renders policy efforts reactive and problem-based; engaged in countering extremism and Jihadism. This is achieved through arrests and counter-narratives, but offers no other options for Muslims to effectively and relevantly engage and this gives Jihadist groups a monopoly on how British Muslims can respond to events which affect them.

7.5.2 The Grey Zone

Unwittingly, top-down reactive measures strengthen the us-vs-them narrative which not only sustains, but bolsters the malevolent prognostic because it provides them with an evidence base (see the "Backfire Effect" in section 2.6.3). This results in a collapse of the grey zone; the space between the "camp of belief" (the Islamists) and the "camp of unbelief" (non-Islamists) characterized by diversity, tolerance and debate (Burke, 2016). While these protective measures have their drawbacks, they are also necessary and curtailing them may result in increased attacks. However, to be wholly effective, there should also be an investment in consciously expanding

the grey zone, that which Islamists goad the nation state into collapsing.[112] Due to Jihadist attacks (or attempts there at), authorities engage in numerous activities to counter terrorism, some of which are iatrogenic and result in perceptions of suspect communities (section 6.6.1). This is a collapse of the grey zone. In short, what has been termed as "the war of ideas" (the clash of opposing ideals [Islamism vs. Western democracy]) which forms part of the GWOT, is perhaps better characterized as "expanding the grey zone" because doing so provides it with an operational quality.

In other words, before implementation, policies or programs could be judged by a (further) question; "would the proposed policy expand, sustain or collapse the grey zone?" rather than "would engaging in this policy effectively promote our values?" - devaluing Daesh's in the process (see "us-versus-them" in section 6.8). The latter is a counter to Jihadism which may have the inadvertent effect of bolstering it (section 2.6.3). An example of this would be Channel 4's "The State"; portraying life under Daesh's rule functions as a promotion of Western democratic and social values by illustrating, graphically, what it does *not* stand for. This is a counter-narrative which collapses the grey zone for some (those who view it as propaganda) and merely sustains it for others (those already supportive of democracy). What it does not do is expand the grey zone because it does not engage in bolstering that which bridges Islam with the West. Viewed in this manner, the grey zone is the competitive space the authorities should be expanding because doing so effectively counters the Jihadist goal of collapsing it (see footnote 112).

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[112] As von Clausewitz (1976, pp.88-89) notes, one must establish "the kind of war" one is engaged in without mistaking it or turning it into something which it is not. Martin (2014, p.242) specifies having a correct conceptual understanding of the conflict (see also: Lamb, Orton, Davies and Pikulsky [2013]; McFate and Laurence [2015]). The argument put forward here is that the Grey Zone is the territory (or human terrain) which is a central focus of Daesh and therefore it should be a central focus of those confronting Daesh.

7.5.2.1 Breaking the Monopoly

This thesis has a preventative focus and it argues that Jihadists hold a monopoly on bottom-up responses to geo-political events, such as the aftermath of Arab Spring. What it proposes is proactive; pre-Jihadists should be offered a choice of responses (with designated choices favored by design as per the tenets of "Choice Architecture" [section 1.3.2.1.14] as illustrated in section 7.4). The purpose of offering a choice of response is to break the Jihadist prognostic monopoly, thereby expanding the grey zone. As such, to prevent pre-Jihadists from radicalizing malevolently, this thesis suggests that benevolently radicalized humanitarian groups receive assistance for online and offline marketing (among other efforts [see Figure 7.3]). Doing so is posited to result in further humanitarian recruitment as well as narrative and prognostic dispersal. If successful, this would inadvertently (but by design nonetheless) expand the grey zone, sap extremist groups of recruits (as humanitarian mobilizers share many characteristics with Jihadist mobilizers [section 3.5.5.2 and "Pre-Jihadist" in glossary]) and proactively compete with the Jihadist prognostic narrative.

The word "inadvertently" is used purposefully; the intention of the research participants (and the prototypical group leaders who shepherded them) was neither to expand the grey zone nor function as an alternative to Jihadism (see sections 1.5, 3.5.4 and 6.1). As such, they do not perceive themselves as counter-Jihadists. This is why "Reformed and Counter-Jihadists" and "Mobilized Do-Gooders" are presented as two separate entities under the umbrella of "Benevolently Radicalized" in Figure 5.3. The proposed counter-engagement is premised on the accidental second-order effects of their efforts; "indirectly" expanding the grey zone. Nonetheless, these groups are community funded and can only exist when the community agrees

with their responses to geo-political crises (prognostics [see section 2.6.1]). Therefore, they are unwittingly in competition with Jihadists for the community and future adherents (see sections 3.5.52, 6.1 and 7.5.2.1). In other words, they operate in the competitive grey zone space; Jihadists consciously aim to collapse it while the research participants are unknowingly expanding it.

Finally, there are many aid drives within British Muslim communities and Muslim charities constitute a significant percentage of British charities (Fergusson, 2017). To expand the grey zone, these efforts would need to not only function more effectively within British Muslim communities, but branch out and engage with (and even recruit from) the wider non-Muslim British public (see section 6.6.1). This serves four purposes:

1. Doing so expands the grey zone by bridging Islam with the rest of the UK.
2. It also provides pre-Jihadists with a choice of response, albeit a weighted one (see "Choice Architecture" and "Nudge Theory" in glossary). As such, the humanitarian groups and prognostics are applauded and promoted at the expense of the Jihadist ones. This is posited to assist in the attenuation of Jihadism because both groups recruit from the same amorphous social pool (see "Countercultural Recruitment Pool" in glossary and sections 3.5.5.2 and 6.1) and satisfy many of the same needs (see "Basic Needs", "Emotional Needs", "General Intent", "Primary Goods" and "Primary Human Goods" in glossary and section 6.7). Therefore, the purpose of the Indirect Approach is to bolster the numbers of informal (but nonetheless constructive) ambassadors because this negatively impacts upon Jihadist recruitment and prognostic dispersal.

3. Expanding the number of humanitarians may also be used as a metric for gauging success in preventing Jihadism.
4. Countering Jihadism in an indirect, but nonetheless impactful and non-confrontational manner such as the Indirect Approach is less likely to result in social reactance because the efforts come from within the community rather than from outside; a critical component of Positive Deviance (section 6.4) where "outsiders" assist "insiders" in leading that change rather than being the driving and guiding force of it.

Glossary

Abduction	Inferring a cause when a rule is known and/or an effect is observed. For the purposes of this thesis, the cause is "radicalization", the effect is "terrorism and/or extremism" and the rule is "successful radicalization results in terrorism and/or extremism" (see "Radicalization Hypothesis" in glossary). Initial data collection and analysis did not include a rule, therefore data collection and analysis commenced with the effect of British Muslim humanitarians mobilized in Jihadist conflict zones. Abduction resulted in the cause being radicalization which resulted in the rule being that radicalization is a vector
Active Bystandership	"In the midst of great violence, some people endanger themselves to help others" (Staub, 2013, pp.4-5) and they do so in a "continuous" manner" (Staub, 2013, p.387). It fosters inclusive caring by expanding the us-them boundary thereby inhibiting the evolution of violence. See also: "Devoted Actors", the "Grey Zone" and "In Extremis" in glossary
Affordance	The quality of an environment that enables, facilitates or makes action possible (Taylor and Currie, 2012, p.3)
Aid-In-Extremis	See "In Extremis" in glossary
Alternative Narratives	Undercut violent extremist narratives by focussing on what we are "for" rather than "against". This is achieved through the provision of positive stories about social values, tolerance, openness, freedom and democracy and is delivered by civil society or the government (Radicalization Awareness Network, 2015, p.4). See "Counter-Engagement" and "Constructive Groups" in glossary

Altruism Born of Suffering	Refers to people who have been victimized or suffered but who nonetheless act to prevent suffering or help those who have suffered (Staub, 2015, p.11). See "Multifinality" in glossary
Altruistic Models or Guides	When people receive help at the time of their victimization, they are exposed to models of helping which can result in identification with helpers, rather than with aggressors, and the imitation of the helpers' actions (Staub, 2015, p.130). See "Constructive Leadership" in glossary
Anti-Social Behavior	Behaviors which are contrary to the benefit of society
Basic Needs	The need for: security, effectiveness and control, positive identity, comprehension of reality, positive connection, independence or autonomy and long-term satisfaction (Staub, 2015, pp.33-76)
Behavioral Contingencies	Behavioral contingencies state the if-then conditions that set the occasion for the potential occurrence of a certain behavior and its consequences
Behavioral Radicalization	1) Enacting the views which stem from cognitive radicalization (normative definition) Or, as utilized in this thesis: 2) Mobilizing *in extremis.*
Benevolent Radicalization	Radicalization resulting in pro-social outcomes. See "Devoted Actors", "Radicalization" and "Multifinality" in glossary
Biomimicry	Biomimicry refers to the design and production of materials and systems that are modeled on biological entities and processes. As the Indirect Approach is formalized model which is based on the organic socialization of the research participants, it is categorized as a biomimicry model

Cognitive Opening	A cognitive opening is an internal or external (set of) event(s) which makes a person receptive to ideas that, under other circumstances, they would not have been
Cognitive Dissonance Theory	This theory suggests that people have an inner drive to hold all attitudes and behavior in harmony and avoid disharmony (or dissonance). This is known as the principle of cognitive consistency. When there is an inconsistency between attitudes or behaviors (dissonance), something must change to eliminate the dissonance
Cognitive Radicalization	The acquisition of ideas which are severely at odds with the mainstream
Communities of Practice	The shared and emergent sociocultural practices when people with common goals interact toward achieving those goals. It is a form of collective learning that frequently has informal as well as formal qualities (Taylor, 2010, p.125). Communities of Practice are informal social learning environments for the individuals involved within which members exchange experience and views, developing each other's tacit knowledge into conversations and knowledge that allow its transmission. See "Learning-By-Doing" and "Social Learning Theory" in glossary
Confirmation Bias	The tendency to interpret new evidence as confirmation of one's existing beliefs or theories
Constructive Groups	Constructive groups encompass those which join rather than divide people in society. In so doing, they constructively fulfill basic psychological needs thereby making it less likely that people will join destructive groups (Staub, 2013, pp.343-361)

Constructive Ideology	Constructive ideologies are constructive visions that are inclusive and embrace all sub-groups within a society in order to address problems and create a better future
Constructive Leadership	Constructive leaders affirm the humanity of all groups (positive collectivism), offer constructive ideologies, help shape institutions and generate concrete actions to fulfill these visions (Staub, 2013, p.406). Constructive leaders consider peaceful alternatives under violence-generating conditions
Countercultural Recruitment Pool	The sentiment pool who have the same grievances and attributional tendency as those who become Jihadists. An unknown quantity in this pool are pre-Jihadists
Counterfactual	Relating to or expressing what has not happened or is not the case
Counter-Engagement	Coupling an alternative narrative with an offline behavior (Hamid, 2018a) to result in the offering of an attractive alternative
Counter-Narratives	Directly deconstruct, discredit and demystify violent extremist messaging. This is achieved by challenging ideologies through emotion, theology, humor, exposure of hypocrisy, lies and untruths and is delivered by civil society (Radicalization Awareness Network, 2014, p. 4)
Criminogenic Needs	Characteristics, traits, problems, or issues of an individual that directly relate to the individual's likelihood to re-offend and commit another crime. They can be static or dynamic and represent the criminological correlate to Primary Goods
Culture Jamming	The practice of criticizing and subverting advertising and consumerism in the mass media, by methods such as producing advertisements parodying those of global brands

Cumulative Continuity	The tendency of an individual to choose environments and friends which assist them in sustaining their aggressiveness
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
Deduction	Deduction is the process of inferring an effect when a rule and cause are known. For the purposes of this thesis, the cause is "radicalization", the effect is "terrorism and/or extremism" and the rule is "successful radicalization results in terrorism and/or extremism" (see "Radicalization Hypothesis" in glossary). Therefore, deductive research designs within radicalization research investigate terrorism and/or extremism (the effects) under the premise that they are caused by radicalization (the rule)
Devoted Actors	Those willing to make costly sacrifices, including risking their lives, for their cause (Pretus *et al*., 2018). See "Constructive Ideology", "In Extremis" and "Radicalization" in glossary. See also Macfarquhar (2015) and Tosini (2010)
Diagnostics and Prognostics	Diagnostics refers to defining a problem and prognostics refers to delineating a solution
Emotional Needs	Quest for/sense of belonging, significance, camaraderie, glory and purpose
Emphatic-Joy Hypothesis	The idea that people are motivated to help both out of empathy for the victim as well as the expectation of experiencing joy as a result of such action
Equifinality	Many alternative causal paths may result in the same outcome (George and Bennett, 2004, p.10)
European Jihadists	Second (third or more) generation Muslims or first generation Muslims raised in Europe with most or all of their formative years spent in Europe. This does not refer to converts (see section 1.4.1)

Extremism	The U.K. Government defines extremism as vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. Extremism also includes calls for death of members of the armed forces
False Dilemma	An informal fallacy where something is falsely claimed to be an "either/or" situation when in fact there is at least one additional option
False Positive	A test result which wrongly indicates that a particular factor or given condition is present
Flocking and Feathering	Flocking occurs when people with similar opinions "flock" to those with similar attitudes. "Feathering" occurs during interactions: values and attitudes are learned and reinforced in the flock (see Akers, 1973)
Frame	Mental structures which shape perception by organizing experience
Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis	The frustration of basic needs or the blockage of goal attainment results in hostility or aggression
General Intent	The will to "do something" and/or looking for something beyond one's immediate environment. Regarding the latter, this bridges general intent with need fulfillment
Grey Zone	The tolerant and diversified space between the camps of belief and unbelief. Collapsing the grey zone is a divide and rule tactic which aims to foster suspicion on the part of mainstream Muslims and make them feel like the enemy within European (or Western) society as this drives them to the "safety" of extremists groups
Group Priorities	The congruency between the group frame, group interest and the aligned behaviors which result from both

Helping	An action to benefit a person, group or humanity (Staub, 2015, p.291)
Heroic Imagination	The process of being aware of how one can help others in need and being willing to take appropriate action regardless of the personal risk involved. When this motivates pro-social behavior it becomes heroic action (Zimbardo, 2007). See "Active Bystandership", "In Extremis" and "Sacred Values" in glossary
Heroism	An action to benefit individuals or communities that involves extreme danger to the actor, primarily physical danger (Staub, 2015, p.291)
Humiliation-Revenge Mechanism	The relation between social humiliation and retaliatory behavior
Ideology	That which codifies a cause and outlines how it is to be achieved. Constructive ideologies convey hope through constructive behaviors while destructive ideologies convey hope by outlining who the culprit is (blame and scapegoating) and how to eliminate them. See "Constructive Ideology" in glossary
In Extremis	In extreme (even perilous) circumstances. Therefore, "aid-in-extremis" refers to engaging in humanitarian actions in extreme circumstances. See "Radicalization" in glossary
Induction	Inferring a rule when a cause and effect are known. For the purposes of this thesis, the cause is "radicalization", the effect is "terrorism and/or extremism" and the rule is "successful radicalization results in terrorism and/or extremism" (see "Radicalization Hypothesis" in glossary). When the research participants were understood to have radicalized (see "Abduction" in glossary), the inducted rule was amended to cater for benevolent outcomes of the radicalization process

Instrumental Aggression	An act of aggression with some other goal that that of inflicting pain. For example, pushing someone out of the way in order to get out of a dangerous situation
Jihad	Non-state actors engaging in an armed struggle under an Islamist cause
Jihadism	The philosophy behind engaging in Jihad
Jihadist	The contemporary version of the *Khawarij* (Sayyid, 2015, p.xix); neo-khajarites
Jujitsu Politics	The method of using a political opponents words, deeds or strengths against them as a means of strengthening ones own political position. See McCauley (2006)
Learning-By-Doing	Learning-by-doing posits that learning to think or perceive in a particular manner may be brought about by inducing people to act in accordance. See "Communities of Practice" and "Social Learning Theory" in glossary
Limbic System	The portion of the brain which deals with emotions, memories and stimulation
Malevolent Radicalization	Radicalization resulting in subjectively anti-social outcomes; "subjective" because they are perceived in anti-social circles to be pro-social or heroic with regards to the in-group
Matching	Using normative group equivalence, research participants were matched to European Jihadists by socio-demographics, pre-mobilization behaviors, general intent and mobilization locales. The match was confirmed by all research participants having been interviewed under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act
Methodological Congruency	The "fit" between research purpose, research question, methodology, data sources/types and data analysis (Creswell, 2013)

Mobilization	Leaving the U.K. to function in a global Jihadist conflict zone. Mobilization is used interchangeably with the term "deployment" as this is how the research participants refer to their mobilizations
Moral Courage	Courage to express important values in words and actions even in the face of opposition, potential disapproval and ostracism or a violent response (Staub, 2015, p.47)
Moral Disengagement	The ability to selectively engage or disengage moral standards
Multifinality	Referring to "many outcomes" (George and Bennett, 2004, p.10). See also: "Vector"
Narrative	The means of communicating an ideology (Horgan and Braddock, 2016, p.383)
Negative State Relief Model	A model illustrating that the motivation for helping is a means of relieving the negative state (physiological arousal) brought about by witnessing an emergency situation (see Cialdini *et al.,* 1987)
Neo-Khajarite	The modern version of the *Khawarij* (Sayyid, 2015, p.xix)
Normative Group Equivalence	A matching procedure which selects comparison or control group research participants based on them having equivalent demographic characteristics to the test subjects
Nudge Theory	Proposes positive reinforcement and indirect suggestion in order to achieve non-coerced compliance so as to impact upon the motives and decision-making of individuals and groups
Opportunity Factors	Venues or locations which provide the setting for radicalization by offering an opportunity to meet likeminded people, by giving inspiration or serving as a recruitment ground for radicalisors (Precht, 2007, p.56)

Pathological Altruism	Any behavior or personal tendency in which either the stated aim or the implied motivation is to promote the welfare of another. But, instead of overall beneficial outcomes, the "altruism" instead has irrational (from the point of view of an outside observer) and substantial negative consequences to the other or even to the self (Oakley *et al,* 2011)
Positive Deviance Approach	An approach to behavioral and social change based on the observation that particular people in any given community employ uncommon but successful strategies which enable them to find better solutions than their peers despite having no extra resources or knowledge and facing the same constraints. See "Biomimicry" in glossary
Protocols	Fundraising, awareness raising (particularly over social media), accounting for funds, distributing funds, logistical planning, allocating resources, scheduling and obtaining necessary documentation such as formal permissions from refugee camps and the charity commission, visas, freighted supply documents and plane tickets
Prefrontal Cortex	The portion of the brain associated with planning complex cognitive behavior, personality expression, decision making, and moderating social behavior
Pre-Jihadist	Those who are motivated to mobilize by both a humanitarian concern and a desire to engage in defense of fellow Muslims (Khosrokhavar, 2017, p.113). They constitute a sentiment pool who have the same or similar grievances and attributional tendency as those who become Jihadists. They may also hold the same or similar values as sacred
Primary Goods	Fulfillment with regards to life, knowledge, play, work, agency, inner peace, relatedness, community, spirituality, pleasure and creativity (Purvis, 2010)

Primary Prevention	Reducing the onset of Jihadism
Primary Human Goods	The need for community, creativity, excellence in agency, excellence in play, excellence in work, inner peace, knowledge, life, pleasure, relatedness and spirituality
Primary Prevention	Reducing the onset of Jihadism
Pro-Social Behavior	Behavior which is beneficial for society
Pull Factors	Factors which draw one to an organization or group, some of which are "emotional needs"
Push Factors	Factors which propel one toward an organization or group
PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism
Radicalization	"A collectively defined, individually felt moral obligation to participate in direct action" (Githens-Mazer, 2010a, p.18) where direct action involves a voluntary, repeated (or of longer duration) and consciously perilous mobilization to a Jihadist conflict zone without any supplementary means with which to defend oneself. See "Active Bystandership", "Behavioral Radicalization", "Benevolent Radicalization", "Constructive Groups", "Constructive Ideology", "Constructive Leadership", "Devoted Actors" "Heroic Imagination", "In Extremis" "Moral Courage" "Pathological Altruism" and "Sacred Values"
Radicalization Hypothesis	The process of radicalization results in terrorism, extremism, both or neither
Reactance	Negative arousal to externalities which (are perceived to) threaten one's free behaviors
Relative Depriavtion	The perception that one is worse off than those in the immediate environment. This can result in frustration

Research Questions	(1) How do British Muslims mobilize to Jihadist conflict zones in a benevolent rather than a malevolent manner? (2) To what extent could the benevolently radicalized by utilized to function as a control group for radicalization research? (3) How could humanitarianism be presented in order to function as an effective alternative? (3a) Which typologies of pre-Jihadist would view this as an attractive alternative?
Risk Factor Instruments	Numerous instruments assessing risk factors exist. These include, ERG22+ (Extremist Risk Guidelines), Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF), Historical Clinical Risk Management-20 Version 3 (HCR-20v3), Identifying Vulnerable People (IVP), Structured Risk Guidance 21 (SRG21), Violent Extremist Risk Assessment Consultative Version 2 (VERA-2), Multi Level Guidelines (MLG) and specifically for lone actors, the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18). Nonetheless, "a robust empirical foundation does not yet exist for understanding the risk of terrorism or involvement in violent extremist activity" (Borum, 2015, p.63). See also Knudsen (2018), Pressman and Flockton (2014) and Silke (2014)
Risky Shift	When people who are inclined to take risks (or are not inclined to take risks) talk with other people who are inclined to take risks (or not) the result is that they become still more inclined to take risks (or less inclined to take risks). In other words: the pre deliberation median is the best predictor of the direction of the shift (Sunstein, 2009, pp.16-17)

Sacred Values	Values which are immune or resistant to material tradeoffs and are associated with deontic (duty-bound) reasoning, than for mundane values that are associated with utilitarian cost-benefit calculations and consequentialist reasoning (Ginges *et al.,* 2011). See "Ideology" in glossary and Macfarquhar (2015) and Tosini (2010)
Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000	The power to stop, search and hold individuals at ports, airports and international rail stations
Secondary Prevention	Reducing the impact of Jihadism
"Sham"	The geographic area in Iraq and Syria which was under Daesh's control between 2014 and early 2018
Social Identity Theory	Developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979 and 1986), it focusses on how people self-categorize as group members and adopt the identity of the group. People emphasize similarities within their own group and differences with other groups whose members are perceived as being similar. The group differences are enhanced in favor of one's own group resulting in an elevated status of one's own group leading to higher self-esteem, the core motivation for group identification
Social Learning Theory	People learn from one another by means of observation, imitation, and modeling (Bandura, 1977)
Social Movement Theory	An interdisciplinary study which seeks to explain why social mobilization occurs, the form it takes and the consequences thereof. An important aspect of this is the concept of a frame, defined as mental structures which shape perception by organizing experience
Social Responsibility Norm	We help those in need precisely because they need us or are dependent on us (Berkowitz and Daniels, 1963)

Social Scripts	The encoding of social behavior through individual differences in biology and individual differences in opinion (Huesemann and Huesemann, 2018, p.157)
Socialized Norms	Accepted ways of behaving and responding to situations which are acquired through socialization and growing up
Static and Dynamic Factors	Static factors refer to socio-demographics and dynamic factors refer to social relationships and their incentives
Status Quo Bias	The tendency for people to stick "with opinions and practices from the past" (Staub, 2013, p.171)
Strengths-Based Approaches	A means of fulfilling needs by focussing on talents and/or abilities rather than problems and/or deficits. Strengths-based approaches identify which good(s) (needs) one is pursuing and facilitates socially acceptable means of attaining them
Terrorism	The U.K. Government defines terrorism as an action that endangers or causes serious violence to a person/people; causes serious damage to property; or seriously interferes with or disrupts an electronic system. The use or threat must be designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public and is made for the purpose of advancing political, religious or ideological cause (Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000)
Vector	The directionality of the radicalized pathway one follows; benevolent or malevolent
Via Negativa	If one cannot express what something is exactly, one can say something about what it is not - an indirect rather than a direct expression (Taleb, 2012, p.301)

Vicarious Deprivation	The psychological state when other people's oppression or injustice is adopted as one's own. This relies on empathy and may result in moral shock

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